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ABSTRACT 
 
This is the first in-depth and comprehensive study of the deployment of the 
Frontier Myth by US presidents.  It explores how and why this quintessential American 
vision has been adapted and transformed to advance radically different political 
agendas.  
The dissertation incorporates key elements from the disciplines of history, 
literature and anthropology. It explores the relationship between presidential politics, 
history, literature, and popular culture in representing the frontier and the textual, 
verbal and visual representations that have been deployed to depict the significance of 
the westering, frontier experience in relation to the four presidents.  The study relies on 
a broad range of primary and secondary resources from several research institutions 
including three presidential libraries.  
My research reveals that major events in American and world history have caused 
the emphases of the myth of the “Old West” frontier to be reshaped, at times abruptly, 
so that presidents of different eras could attempt to harness this Western symbolism in 
promoting their remarkably wide-ranging ideologies and doctrines. The first of the 
“frontier” Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, vigorously pursued an active federal 
government and helped directly establish a forward looking Frontier Myth that today 
would be considered on the left. A series of tragic events during the Lyndon Johnson 
through Jimmy Carter presidencies (1965-1980), however, including the American 
quagmire in Vietnam, race riots, economic stagflation, and other crises both at home 
and abroad, broke up the consensus of a liberal, progressive Frontier Myth that no 
longer appeared to match the historic experience. These events caused the entire 
structure and popular representations of American frontier symbols and images to shift 
political direction from the left to the right, from liberalism to conservatism—a profound 
change that has had dramatic implications for the history of American thought and 
presidential politics.  
The popular idea today that frontier American leaders and politicians are naturally 
Republicans with conservative ideals flows directly from the Reagan era. Looking 
forward, the nature of the resilient Frontier Myth could once again be entering a 
watershed period as it did during the 1960s: its message in the realm of presidential 
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politics depends on the shape and influence of national and world events that will occur 
in the years and decades to come. 
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Introduction 
 
Human beings make myths, tell stories about ancient times 
and great events, and call such times and events to mind over 
many generations, for all sorts of reasons. But many of these 
reasons are political. 
    --Philosopher Robert B. Pippin, 20101 
 
The Frontier Myth 
Few would deny that the Frontier Myth as it relates to American society, character 
and politics has so effectively captured Americans’ imagination that it has deeply woven 
into the nation’s consciousness and psyche. What is less well appreciated is the way the 
Frontier Myth has changed over time in response to historical events and processes, and 
how, in turn, events and procedures have come to be understood through the lens of 
frontierism. The 1890s decade was the era which first codified the “frontier thesis” of 
American history when it was cogently and persuasively argued that Americans had 
evolved a unique and superior civilization due to the impact of the frontier experience.  
Historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s seminal essay “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History” (1893) contended that as American settlers moved 
westwards they did so across five “fall lines” which saw a “perennial rebirth”2 of society 
in each new region. There, on the frontier, occurred a social evolution from the primitive 
savage to the advanced urban society. Turner measured this process by the recurring 
                                                          
1 Robert J. Pippin, Hollywood Western and American Myth: The Importance of Howard Hawks 
and John Ford for Political Philosophy (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2010): 61. 
2 Frederick J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association (1894): 200, on Empire Online database (accessed 25 March 2012). 
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appearance of the same occupational types in a set order: traders, ranchers, pioneer 
farmers, intensive farmers, and finally the urban occupations. At each new “meeting 
point between savagery and civilization,”3 civilized Easterners were supposedly reduced 
to a more primitive state and then forced to reorient themselves. Therefore, the further 
West one went the more exceptionally “American” they would become as they moved 
farther away from the influences of Europe and toward the creation of a unique nation. 
One needed to look primarily to the West (the real America), then, not only to 
understand the development of that region but that of the rest of the nation as a well. 
According to the most frequently singled out passage of Turner’s thesis,4 the 
existence of a rugged frontier and 400 years of Americans being in contact with it had 
created a new breed of person and a new type of culture. Turner asserted: 
 
To the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That 
coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and acquisitiveness; that 
practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of 
material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that 
restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for 
evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom—these 
are traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of 
the frontier. 
 
 
While Turner also detected in the Western communities a growth of excessive 
individualism and weakening of a civic spirit he simultaneously built up the 
frontiersman as epitomizing the egalitarian democrat who rises against the corrupting 
and phony complexity of Eastern (i.e. excessively European) institutions. This 
“abundance of free land” had accounted for the American character and democracy and 
                                                          
3 Ibid. 
4 Reviewers of Turner’s thesis (including historian Carl Becker) and its commercial promoters 
quoted these 86 words of Turner’s thesis much more than any other segment. See Ronald H. Carpenter, 
“Frederick Jackson Turner and the Rhetorical Impact of the Frontier Thesis,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, Vol. 63 (April 1977): 123. 
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now that the frontier was closed off (as made “official” in an announcement by the 
census bureau in 1891), the consequences for the nation’s future remained uncertain.5  
In the twentieth century, many observers pointed out that Turner’s thesis excluded 
women, visible minorities, and non-English speakers. Native Americans were useful for 
marking the current frontier line and helped bring out frontier traits in white Americans 
who encountered them but, otherwise, were obstacles to be pushed out of the way of 
advancing civilization. “Women,” writes historian Brian W. Dippie, “apparently stayed 
in the East until the land was tidied up and made presentable.”6  And African-
Americans, Hispanics and Asians were invisible. Regardless, Turner’s thesis was widely 
accepted and highly influential. 
Similar characteristics had earlier been attributed to Western frontiersmen and 
hunters in Theodore Roosevelt’s The Winning of the West series published from 1885 to 
1894. The future President praised the pioneering Westerner’s rugged individualism 
“tempered by sound common sense.” By contrast, while TR respected American Indians 
for their warrior prowess, they clearly represented the forces of evil and obstruction, 
preying on newly arrived settlers: the anti-progressive principle of the few who stood in 
the way of many. Going against such evil demanded great courage, and those (white 
Protestant) Americans who possessed that courage were well on their way to heroic 
status. Roosevelt like Turner was deeply nostalgic of the frontier past and his works 
express some apprehension about the future; but there was also an optimistic bent to 
Roosevelt’s writings not seen in Turner’s thesis and an apparent determination to see 
the progressive-frontier dynamic carried forward into the twentieth century. In Britain, 
                                                          
5 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier,” 226-227. 
6 Brian W. Dippie, “The Winning of the West Reconsidered,” Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 
(Summer 1990): 81. 
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following the Boer War, Robert Baden-Powell would conceive of the Boy Scout 
movement as a cure for the allegedly vanishing virtues of loyalty, morality, rugged 
individualism and self-sacrifice said to have been undermined in an increasingly 
modern, industrial age.7  Likewise in many respects, Roosevelt became a key figure in 
the “Cult of the Wild,” believing that contact with (and relatedly, protection of) the 
wilderness would help the country rid itself of “flabbiness” and “slothful ease.”  For 
Turner, Roosevelt and like-minded protagonists abroad, the significance of the frontier 
was simply enormous: to understand American history one had to understand Western 
history. 
The frontier and its disappearance is America’s most powerful and persistent myth. 
Definitions of the term “myth” itself are diverse. Mircea Eliade, in her classic work, Myth 
and Reality, tells us that it would be very difficult to come up with a definition of myth 
which would be acceptable to all scholars. She does offer some guideposts, however. In 
her description of the structure and function of myths, Eliade writes that “myth is always 
related to a ‘creation,’ it tells how something came into existence, or how a pattern of 
behavior, an institution, a manner of working were established; this is why myths 
constitute the paradigms for all significant human acts.”8 She adds “that in one way or 
another one ‘lives’ the myth, in the sense that one is seized by the sacred, exalting power 
of the events recollected or re-enacted.”9 In terms of rhetoric, communications scholar 
Janice Hocker Rushing contends that the term refers to “a society’s collectivity of 
persistent values, handed down from generation to generation, that help to make the 
                                                          
7 Timothy Parsons, “Een Gonyama Gonyama!: Zulu Origins of the Boy Scout Movement and the 
Africanisation of Imperial Britain,” Parliamentary History, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 2008): 61-62, 64; Saul 
Scheidlinger, “A Comparative Study of the Boy Scout Movement in Different National and Social Groups,” 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 13, No. 6 (December 1948): 749-750. 
8 Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963): 18. 
9 Ibid 19. 
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world understandable, support the social order, and educate the society’s young. 
Myths…are widely taught and believed. They are expressed in the dominant symbols and 
rituals of culture.”10 Myth and religion scholar Joseph Campbell likewise asserts that 
“myths offer life models.” He also points out that these models change over time, that 
“The models have to be appropriate to the time in which you are living.” As Campbell 
put it in a conversation with journalist (and former LBJ Press Secretary) Bill Moyers 
“You can’t predict what a myth is going to be any more than you can predict what you’re 
going to dream tonight”11: a matter we shall return to at the close of this study. 
With their focus on the frontier experience, Turner, Roosevelt and similar minded 
writers struck a responsive chord with the nation at the outset of the twentieth century 
which, in a sense, facilitated the shift of the American West from a geographic space to a 
place of the mind (a frontier, an idea, a mythic country).12 It became a stridently 
national myth, not a regional one. Speaking of film and novels, G. Edward White was the 
first scholar to observe that: “We do not have ‘Easterns’ or ‘Southerns’—which would be 
sectional. We have Westerns—since America was, at the outset, all frontier.”13 From the 
outset, the frontier idea held great appeal for the American people because it provided a 
usable history for a public becoming increasingly conscious of its role as a world power 
                                                          
10 Janice Hocker Rushing, “The Rhetoric of the Western Myth,” “The Rhetoric of the American 
Western Myth.” Communication Monographs, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March 1983): 15 (FN #6). 
11 Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers, The Power of Myth (New York: Doubleday, 1988): 13; and see 
“Myths-Dreams-Symbols” online quotations from The Power of Myth with Bill Moyers at 
http://mythsdreamssymbols.com/functionsofmyth.html (accessed 27 April 2016). 
12 Walter P. Webb (and others) alternatively saw the West as a distinct geographic region defined by 
aridity and replete with heroes overcoming environmental obstacles.  As vice president, Lyndon Johnson 
appointed Webb as the premier historian of the land beyond the 98th meridian.  
13 Gary Wills, John Wayne’s America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997): 14; see also G. 
Edward White, The Eastern Establishment and the Western Experience (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968): 1. 
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and “equally self-conscious about the [historical] brevity of their national identity.”14 
The frontier past provided for an American past as impressive and magnificent as those 
of any European power, an American landscape as impressive as any, anywhere in the 
world, and heroes and myths that fully matched those in the Old World. Many were, in 
fact, the same old myths transposed. The Frontier Myth gave credence to a fundamental 
tenet in America’s national mythology, American exceptionalism, and its accompanying 
sense of mission. Turner defined American exceptionalism as synonymous with 
democracy and linked it for all time with the West. In the place where “the wilderness 
masters the colonist” the “outcome is not Old Europe…here is a new product that is 
American.”15 And out of this mystical process allegedly grew the American brand of 
egalitarian democracy and the molding of the American character. As Charles A. Beard 
later declared, Turner’s essay on the frontier had “a more profound influence on thought 
about American history than any other essay or volume ever written on the subject.”16 It 
is a frontier image that became too much of the national ethos to go away. 
In terms of historical accuracy, the alleged demise of the frontier resulted in an 
over-stimulated imagination. Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Significance of the Frontier” 
essay contains numerous and substantive historical errors, as have been exposed by 
many scholars from Earl S. Pomeroy to Gerald D. Nash to Richard White. These include, 
among others, Turner’s a) “orderly” movement Westward (the Californian West Coast 
was, in reality, settled before the interior); b)“radical” politics (westerners often could 
not vote and were typically conservative as opposed to being democratic innovators); c) 
                                                          
14 Martin Ridge, “The Life of an Idea: The Significance of Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier 
Thesis,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1991): 12. 
15 Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier,” 201. 
16 Charles A. Beard quoted in Richard Hofstadter, “Turner and the Frontier Myth,” The American 
Scholar, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1949): 433. 
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distinctive culture (many settlers were “desperately imitative” of the East); d) liberal 
economics (cowboys as employees reliant on eastern capital and the role of government-
funded projects rather than rugged individualists); e) the West as a region composed of 
Anglo-Saxon males (Native Americans and women were there too and an estimated one 
third of cowboys were either black or Mexican17); f) and his depiction of American 
civilization as superior and benevolent to those of the conquered (New West historians 
point out that the “advancement” more resembled an “invasion” and brought 
exploitation and abuse of Native Americans and environmental destruction to the 
landscape).18 But Turner’s arguments expressed what so many Americans wanted to 
believe, and what served their self-interest to believe to be true, that regardless of 
whether he got his facts right his overall arguments were widely considered bona fide 
and correct. This enthusiastic acceptance was also due to the fact that where Turner fell 
short as an historian he succeeded powerfully as a mythmaker and because many of the 
ideas found in his thesis had been “out there” for a long while. In fact, as Richard Slotkin 
has pointed out, many elements of the Turner thesis and of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Winning of the West promoted ideas about the frontier that dated back to the colonial 
period (and had, in part, been transplanted from Europe). This includes the beliefs that 
westward pioneering: was a) part of a national mission—or what would become known 
in the nineteenth century as a “Manifest Destiny”; b) created settlements out West as a 
                                                          
17 In late nineteenth-century Texas, the estimated figure of black and Hispanic cowboys is 37%. See 
Sara R. Massey, Black Cowboys of Texas (College Station TX:  Texas A & M University Press, 2000): xiii. 
18 The most compelling (and original) historical critique of the Turner thesis Earl H. Pomeroy, 
“Toward a Reorientation of Western History: Continuity and Environment” Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 (March 1955): 579-600. The best synthesis of the “New West” historians 
interpretation of Western history, which turned much of Turner and Roosevelt’s frontier arguments on 
their heads, is Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American 
West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. And historian Gerald D. Nash argues that the 
impetus for Turner’s thesis in 1893—that the frontier was “closed”—is false in and of itself. See Gerald D. 
Nash, “The Census of 1890 and the Closing of the Frontier,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 3 
(July 1980): 98-100. 
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refuge from the tyranny and corruption of Europe or later Eastern America; c) provided 
a safety valve for the anxieties and problems of the cities; d) opened up a land of great 
wealth and opportunity (a “Golden West” as Earl Pomeroy phrased it) for enterprising 
individualists; and e) allowed the American nation to tap into an inexhaustible source of 
national wealth on which a future of “sky’s the limit” prosperity could be founded.19  
Elliot West identifies another alluring element of the Frontier Myth. Since the 
earliest days of the Republic, West observes, Americans have been conflicted over their 
infatuation with both urban progress and a glorified rural past. They have reached 
forward for new ideas and improvements while at the same time making heroes out of 
those who lived rugged lives in a vanished age. For Alexis de Tocqueville, writing almost 
two centuries ago, the average American suffused over a rapidly changing world with a 
nostalgic drive to restore a vanished past; the American was, in a phrase proposed by 
historian Marvin Meyers, a  “venturous conservative.”20 The frontier/western myth has 
proven the perfect venue for displaying that conflict of interests and loyalties: the pull 
between old and new, nostalgia and progress that deepened in the twentieth century 
with its sweeping technological and social change and the promise (and fear) that new 
innovations would propel Americans forward away from the past; and Americans’ desire 
to harness those glorious, pastoral images and larger than life characters that made up 
their heroic “good old days.” All, Elliot West observes correctly, were an expression of 
America’s complicated and complex national character.21  
                                                          
19 Richard Slotkin. Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America 
(New York: Athenaeum, 1992): 30. 
20 Marvin Meyer, The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1957): 31. 
21 Elliott West, “Selling the Myth: Western Images in Advertising,” Montana, Vol. 46, No. 2 
(Summer 1996): 40. 
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The tensions between the demands for individualism versus needs of the 
community and of tolerance also remain strong throughout the history of Western 
Frontier Myth. Here was Turner’s vital opposition in the old frontier, the meeting place 
between savagery and civilization. Jenni Calder has summed up the “basic paradox” of 
the American West: 
 
On the one hand there is the instinct to preserve a heroic tradition that 
is aggressive, violent, and potentially anarchic. On the other there is the 
deliberate building up of solid community values, the relating of the 
developing territories of the West to the United States as a whole and 
the emphasis of those warm, homely qualities that have for so long 
flourished side by side with the cult of the violent loner. 22 
 
 
Turner argues that the two American qualities of tolerance and individualism are in 
perpetual conflict. The two greatest achievements of the frontier, the construction of a 
libertarian American individual and the creation of centralized Federal power are 
directly contradictory to one another.23  
Ray Allen Billington contends that most Americans found that “the outstanding 
feature of the frontier thesis was optimism,” which “satisfied the need of American for a 
rose-tinted view of the future.”24 After a Herculean struggle against the untamed wilds of 
the West (including, in the popular mind, “uncivilized” Indians and un-American 
domestic outlaws) the American people emerged triumphant and, according to the 
myth, proved themselves capable of dealing with any subsequent problem or challenge—
even those centered in the crowded stresses of an industrialized, urban sprawl, or 
associated with international global politics. 
                                                          
22 Jenni Calder, There Must Be a Lone Ranger (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1974): 
205-206.  
23 This point is developed in Arthur Redding, “Frontier Mythologies: Savagery and Civilization in 
Frederick Jackson Turner and John Ford,” Literature Film Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2007): 315. 
24 Billington quoted in Carpenter, “Frederick Jackson Turner,” 124. 
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What earlier historians have identified as internal contradictions within the 
Frontier Myth that apparently were in need of reconciliation, this dissertation 
repositions as semiotic flexibility that created within the Frontier Myth an elasticity that 
allowed it to shift to accommodate changing political circumstances—even as it worked 
to shape those very circumstances. Keeping in mind these various facets and tensions, 
this dissertation will explore how the four presidents who most closely aligned 
themselves with the Frontier Myth and imagery of the Old West—Theodore Roosevelt, 
Lyndon B. Johnson, Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush—strategically, and at times 
unconsciously deployed frontier imagery to alternatively explain situations and on other 
occasions to make the complex appear simple.  For, as with Turner’s original articulation 
of the frontier thesis, the cowboy presidents did not always need the facts behind their 
use of the frontier myth to be accurate, rather they needed the frontier myth to be 
persuasive. Interestingly, for most other nations the term “frontier” refers to a border 
between nations. But, in America, the twentieth and twenty-first century Cowboy 
Presidents have used the term very broadly to cover all areas of policy from the frontiers 
of space, to conservation, civil rights, education, the Cold War, gun ownership, national 
economy, and the “War on Terror.” Arguably, no other myth has embedded itself so 
deeply in American presidential politics. Importantly the myth’s application and 
emphases have shifted substantially at watershed periods in the nation’s history so that 
the turn of the century liberal TR’s use of frontier imagery and language would be 
different from that of postwar liberal LBJ’s, and each of these, in turn, would carry 
significantly different political messages than either the conservative Reagan or his 
would-be “cowboy” imitator George W. Bush.   
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In the history of presidential politics one finds that the emphasis on either the past 
or the future—that schizophrenic element of the frontier myth described by Elliot West—
has varied significantly in accordance with the political stripe of individual Presidents 
and with events going on both in America and abroad. Roosevelt’s modern methods of 
engaging with fundamental economic and social change at the turn of century and 
Johnson’s proactive approaches to civil rights and social programs in the 1960s, both 
typically looked to a future of change and possibilities. By contrast, Reagan’s right wing 
prescriptions for economic stagflation and for confronting communism in the 1980s and 
Bush 43’s responses to 9/11 and a worsening economy two decades later drew 
deliberately on the imagery of a nostalgic past in the hope of recapturing it to, in the 
words of the Reagan ’80 Campaign sloganeers’, “Make America Great Again.”  
In this dissertation, the first in-depth and comprehensive study of the deployment 
of frontier myth by US presidents, I will explore how and why this quintessential 
American vision has worked to advance radically different political agendas.  The 
evidence reveals that major events in United States and world history have caused the 
emphases of the frontier myth to be reshaped, at times abruptly, so that presidents of 
different eras could attempt to harness this “Western” symbolism in promoting their 
remarkably wide-ranging ideologies and doctrines, while at other times the interpretive 
power of the myth has blinded American presidents and the public to seeing national 
and international developments through anything other than glasses with frontier 
lenses. 
 
Historiographical Rationale 
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The Frontier/Old West Myth is not a “given.” Rather, it is a formalized way of 
thinking, revealed through both language and visual imagery that carries power. Taking 
part in the Frontier Myth in the guise of a Cowboy President sets up certain expectations 
for a President of himself, shapes his view of the United States and its role in the world, 
and influences the media and the public’s expectations of what the President will do and 
how he will act.  
Brian W. Dippie’s insightful cultural history The Vanishing American: White 
Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (1982) has direct methodological applicability to my 
own study of presidents and the frontier myth. Dippie demonstrates how the belief in 
the inevitable disappearance of Native Americans in the face of advancing American 
society and modernity was actually a myth, but so powerful a myth that it actually 
caused American politicians and policy administrators to create and implement policies 
from the late eighteenth through the mid-twentieth century that took the “vanishing 
American” as a fact. According to this myth, American Indians were a vanishing race 
who had been wasting away since the day that Europeans arrived, declining in strength 
and numbers until, one day not too far from now, no Native Americans would be left on 
earth. “The Vanishing American,” writes Dippie, “achieved the status of a cultural 
myth.” The decline of future native populations was broadly considered inevitable, and 
the myth “accounted for Indians future by denying them one, and stained the tissue of 
policy debate with fatalism.”25 As the myth evolved, the government shifted from its 
segregationist philosophy of the 1830s to the assimilation philosophy of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1938, however, the Commissioner of 
                                                          
25 Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1982): xii. 
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Indian Affairs was reporting that if Indians had been a vanishing race, such was no 
longer the case. And by the latter half of the twentieth century, Native American 
population numbers were increasing at a rate three times higher than the national 
average. This realization compelled the government to shift again—only this time to a 
philosophy of cultural relativism and self-determination during the New Deal era. 
Likewise, public attitudes toward the American Indian also had to mature once the old 
myth was, for most, put to rest.  
Brian Dippie’s analysis broke new ground by focusing on the ideological 
development of attitudes toward Indians: how individual actions and concepts made 
each change in federal policy acceptable to a particular generation and how the theory of 
the “Vanishing American” itself—which alternated from its theses of Indian decline and 
Indian revival—has been transformed. Prior to Dippie’s insights many American 
historians tended to regard the myth of the vanishing American as a static perception 
that lacked tangible consequences. More important still, they regarded policy as 
somehow objectively independent of myth as though it was a product of rational 
responses to testable facts. But drawing on the approach of intellectual and cultural 
historians such as Rush Welter and Charles Rosenberg,26 Dippie demonstrates how 
myths which people have held in the past can be extremely influential—depending upon 
who believes them and acts upon them. As Rush Welter succinctly phrased it, “ideas 
have consequences.”27 Studying the myth, then, is both useful as a reflection of popular 
                                                          
26 Rush Welter, “The Idea of Progress in America” (1955) reprinted in C.K. McFarland, Readings in 
Intellectual History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970): 284-294; Charles E. Rosenberg, The 
Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
Rosenberg’s numerous and highly influential publications convincingly demonstrated the 
interdependence of medical and cultural history by situating medical developments within their cultural 
context and exploring connections between ideas and institutions. 
27 Welter, “The Idea of Progress in America,” 288. 
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societal attitudes, and as actual shapers of attitudes and policies as well and, as such, is 
key to our understanding of American history.  
Taking a similar approach to The Vanishing American, this dissertation explores 
the myth of the frontier in American thinking (including that of the four Presidents), the 
shape of which has been transformed by events and individuals and shifted from a thesis 
of liberalism and inclusion to one of conservatism and exclusion. As with Dippie’s study, 
this examination of the frontier myth endeavours to cast well known thoughts from the 
late nineteenth through early twenty-first centuries in a new light: to demonstrate that 
these ideas about the Western frontier experience had major consequences for the 
attitudes, policies and decisions made by four US Presidents who each, arguably, held 
office during watershed periods in American history. In taking this approach, it is hoped 
that my dissertation will spur further research and discussion concerning the origins, 
acceptance and implications of the idea of the frontier for understanding the nature of 
Presidential politics and policymaking. 
Along with the influence of historian Brian Dippie, the ideas of anthropologist 
Marshall Sahlins’ have also had a substantive influence on this study of the changing 
frontier myth and the four presidencies. Americans have long chosen to draw on the 
frontier for their mythic identity. But as was the case with visions of the “Vanishing 
American,” all social structures, including those associated with myths and ideologies 
have eventually faced crises so disruptive that these events cannot be fully explained by 
invoking or relying on the wisdom embodied in within them. If the symbolism of the 
frontier matched the historic experience closely enough, the applicability of the 
symbolism would be confirmed and even strengthened; but if the two do not fit and no 
match is made, the culture will either be forced to deny the importance of the event(s) 
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themselves or to change and revise the myth—or at very least its emphasis. Sahlins 
offers what is perhaps the clearest description of this process in his work, Historical 
Metaphors and Mythical Realities, where he writes: 
 
People act upon circumstances according to their own cultural 
presuppositions, the socially given categories of persons and things….In 
general [however] the worldly circumstances of human action are under 
no inevitable obligation to conform to [these] categories….In the event 
they do not, the received categories are potentially revalued in practice, 
functionally redefined. According to the place of the received category in 
the cultural system as constituted, and the interests that have been 
affected, the system itself is more or less altered. At the extreme, what 
began as reproduction ends as transformation.28 
 
 
Sahlins provides a specific example of this relationship between structure and 
event in the “Structure and History” chapter of his work, Islands of History. Here 
Sahlins discusses the transformation of Hawaiian culture that resulted from encounters 
between the island chain’s Indigenous peoples and Captain James Cook and his crew 
during the late eighteenth century. European contact gave rise to tensions between 
Hawaiian chiefs and people who had not been anticipated in the traditional relations 
between the latter two groups. As a result, the Hawaiian chiefs and common peoples’ 
relationship changed and the structure of their traditional categories was transformed. 
“In a certain anthropology, also notoriously in the study of history,” writes Sahlins, “we 
isolate some changes as strikingly distinctive and call them ‘events,’ in opposition to 
‘structure’.29   
                                                          
28 Marshall Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History 
of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981): 67. 
29 Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985): 153. 
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Examining this event-structure relationship metaphorically, historian Keith 
Carlson explains that Sahlins’ views structure as resembling “a river that flows and 
carries things along in a predictable way.” Carlson adds: 
 
Small events are like small rocks that the river simply sweeps over 
undisturbed. The structure subsumes, explains and is undisturbed by 
these events. Genuinely historical events are like landslides that divert 
the channel of water into new pathways. They disrupt the structure and 
cause it to take new forms, but not entirely new forms. It is still the same 
river. But Sahlins asks us to examine not only how events effect 
structure, but how structure shapes events. The two are mutually 
informing. So the landslide is shaped by the flowing river. The river and 
islands cannot escape their relationship, without the river the islands 
are not islands, without the islands the river flows in other directions.30 
 
 
In a broad sense, our understanding of the functioning of history has changed as a 
result of Sahlins’ insights and arguments. His views have challenged structuralists who 
saw myths and narrative expressions of structure as largely atemporal, and historians—
especially those focusing on events and of biography—who seemed, on the other hand, 
unconcerned with the underlying structures of American society.   
If, as John Mack Faragher points out, Turner’s thesis is the most influential piece 
of writing in the history of American history,31 then Dippie’s study of the power of the 
Vanishing American myth and combined with Sahlins’ insights concerning the interplay 
of structure and event provide a historiographical framework for understanding the role 
of the frontier myth in American presidential politics and history.  Sahlins’ 
anthropologically grounded work on the event-structure relationship shows us that 
social/cultural structures are powerful because they have the ability to explain and 
                                                          
30 Quotation from Carlson in email correspondence from Keith T. Carlson to David A. Smith, 
October 11, 2012. 
31 John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: ‘The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History’ and Other Essays (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1994): 1. 
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accommodate almost everything that occurs within society. Occasionally, however, an 
event or series of events occurs that is so profound that the structure cannot subsume it, 
and so the overall emphases of the structure or the structure itself changes (typically 
these events emerge from outside the society).  Similarly the Frontier Myth creates a 
structure within which American society and history (past and future) is not only 
understood but within which it is lived. Though the 1890 census was an event which 
Frederick Jackson Turner stated had brought an end to the American frontier 
experience, the idea of the frontier as defining American society had become deeply 
entrenched in American thought.  The myth outlasted the experience itself and 
explained how much of American society saw the world. 
American literature shows that the ideas of the frontier myth have become such a 
key underlying structure of American society that it formed a major part of the nation’s 
culture and self-identity. This dissertation contends that from the presidential 
administrations of Theodore Roosevelt through Lyndon Johnson, the frontier myth was 
interpreted and deployed primarily as a forward-looking phenomenon that celebrated 
inclusiveness, federal government programs and intervention. TR lived out and, as 
president, applied aspects of the myth to bring significant reforms to the American 
political system in an effort to bring modernity to the federal government and a balance 
of power to American society in an age of tremendous industrial and corporate growth. 
Six decades later, Lyndon Johnson tapped into the postwar version of the frontier myth 
to explain his “guns and butter” approach of prosecuting a land war against a Soviet 
proxy state in Asia while pursuing his liberal Great Society and War on Poverty reforms 
at home. But a succession of shocking events beginning with the failure to obtain victory 
in the conflict in Vietnam, and the shocking race riots and assassinations of the late 
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1960s, caused Americans to seriously question the version of the frontier myth that had 
provided an adequate narrative for Lyndon Johnson’s programs and policies both at 
home and abroad. These startling setbacks caused the myth itself to be substantively 
undermined without transforming the entire mythic structure itself. Indeed for a time 
the frontier myth appeared to go into a kind of hiatus. But as a succession of historical 
events continued to build upon one another in rapid succession throughout the 1970s—
from the international oil crises, economic stagflation, Watergate, and the fall of Saigon 
in the first half of that decade, to a worsening American economy (in contrast to the 
economic ascendancy of Japan) and the humiliation of the Iranian hostage crisis in the 
latter half—this cumulative landslide of perceived national failures caused the entire 
frontier mythic structure to shift. Even before leaving office, LBJ had lost control of 
public support for his domestic and foreign policy programs. By the time the next 
Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, left the White House in January 1981 the 
longstanding liberal dominance of the frontier myth was in shambles.  
As this dissertation will demonstrate, the entire structure of American frontier 
symbols and images had shifted political direction from the left to the right—a profound 
change not previously identified by scholars or political analysts.  This dramatic change 
in the political nature of presidential associations with the frontier myth is significant 
and an important phenomenon in the history of American thought and presidential 
politics. Instead of a forward looking, progressive vision for America and the world 
which dominated use of Western symbolism for most of the twentieth century, the 
newer right wing frontier myth harmonized with the nostalgic aspirations and values 
espoused by the conservative Republican Ronald Reagan. The self-styled California 
cowboy Reagan tied into a mythic structure that was now nostalgic and backward 
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looking, anti- “big government,” and exclusionary of those could be included into the 
group of real, bona fide Americans. This more recent, narrower, conservative version of 
the frontier myth was new terrain that would have been unrecognizable in many 
respects to reforming liberals of their day like TR and LBJ. Events had transformed the 
structure, just as the structure continued to inform the events—even if it could not fully 
accommodate or explain them.  
A full century after the quintessential cowboy president Theodore Roosevelt sat in 
the presidential saddle, conservative George W. Bush likewise attempted to deploy 
Western symbolism in the aftermath of 9/11 and, in particular, his prosecution of the 
Iraq War. But while going Western may have worked as a boon for Bush’s assertive 
policies in the early stages, by his second term this reliance on the conservative frontier 
myth had fallen as flat as it had for the liberal LBJ. And in the 21st century, the power of 
the perceived frontier experience as an ideology for shaping federal policy and economic 
power appears, like the “Vanishing American” myth, to have once again receded.  
Interestingly, since the 1980s scholars and observers have widely taken for granted 
that, in the realm of presidential politics and policy making, cowboy symbolism and 
frontier imagery have always been the property of conservative presidents and 
politicians.32 The frontier myth has been portrayed as a touchstone of conservatism for 
                                                          
32 Historian Robert A. Goldberg recently acknowledged LBJ’s westerness, but then quickly 
dismissed its political potency for the Democratic president. Goldberg writes that Johnson’s 1964 
Campaign opponent, the arch-conservative Barry Goldwater, “trumped LBJ” in his deployment of the 
frontier myth, “for the president’s liberal rhetoric and position as a Washington insider compromised his 
Western persona.”  This dissertation’s findings would suggest otherwise. See Robert A. Goldberg, “The 
Western Hero in Politics: Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and the Rise of the American Conservative 
Movement.” In Jeff Roche, ed., The Political Culture of the New West (Lawrence KS: University of Kansas 
Press, 2008): 29. Three popular examples of the exclusive attachment of cowboys and the frontier to 
conservatives include: Gerstenzang, James. “That Retro Feel to Bush’s Style: It’s Reaganesque,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 12, 2003, A18, in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley CA, 
Newspaper Reference Files, Bush, George W; Michael Allen and Romesh Ratnesar, “The End of Cowboy 
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rightist nostalgics who want to restore a way of life that had been “lost” by engaging in 
an anti-modern frontier myth-making of history. But Dippie and Sahlins’ insights 
challenge us to re-examine these conventional assumptions and to rethink the impact of 
the frontier myth themes and its role in US presidential history. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, this dissertation’s findings indicate that, in the realm of 
presidential politics, the dominance of the conservative frontier myth has in fact been a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  
Similar to the historiographical approaches of Dippie and Sahlins’, I will contend 
that significant events of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have challenged 
American society and by extension the value of the frontier myth as a way of explaining 
and understanding America and in so doing caused the Frontier Myth to change and 
adapt.  This study explores the dynamic tensions that have emerged as various cowboy 
presidents have sought to deploy the myth to explain and then deal with transformative 
historical events, and the degree to which these events, as Sahlins alerts us to, served to 
modify and transform the structures of the myth and of American society itself. 
    
Thesis Argument  
The Frontier Myth is best understood as a powerful idea that is so deeply 
entrenched in Americans’ way of viewing themselves and rest of the world that it is 
capable of providing answers to the nation’s problems and of explaining America’s 
global role. From the outset, Turner’s thesis was a concept in search of validation; it’s 
ambiguous, amorphous characteristics allowed it to be poured into a wide array of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Diplomacy,” Time [cover story], Vol. 168, Issue 3, July 17, 2006: 12-17; and “Reagan: An American Icon,” 
USA Today Special Centennial Edition, February 2011. 
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molds. As a result, certain US presidents of different eras and political ideologies have 
chosen to deploy the myth in response to a wide variety of problems and crises plaguing 
their respective generations. Since the “closing” of the American frontier, four presidents 
have become most associated with the myth and symbolism of the frontier 
discourse/epistemology: Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and 
George W. Bush. This dissertation explores how these four American presidents 
deployed, benefitted from (at least initially), and ultimately were constrained in the way 
in which they dealt with various events by the pervasive and persuasive power of the 
frontier myth, and ultimately, how the events served to inform and constrain the frontier 
myth.  Each was altered by the other (Sahlins’ “structure of the conjuncture”), in the 
same way a bronc buster rides and adapts to the bull until one comes along that is too 
tough to ride. By extension, this dissertation will also test the argument (associated 
primarily in the non-American foreign press) that certain events, especially foreign wars 
and economic crises, spurred Americans to look for simple cowboy answers to complex 
problems. But as I will argue, while some of these events and crises could be subsumed, 
explained and dealt with according to the myths of the cowboy code and the Old West, 
other developments overwhelmed the Frontier Myth and caused the myth itself to 
change over time. 
Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson both used the frontier myth to move 
American politics to the left on domestic issues while at the same time viewing 
engagement with enemies overseas as the logical and necessary extension of the 
continental westering experience. Roosevelt and Johnson’s policies favoured a proactive 
federal government approach to American problems as opposed to focusing on 
individualism, and emphasized an optimistic “better and brighter” forward look toward 
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an American future of limitless possibilities over any desire to return to a nostalgic past. 
Roosevelt bolstered the role and strength of the federal government with the 
introduction of the regulation of big business, the vast expansion of conservation 
programs, and promotion of greater inclusion of minorities into the nation’s “melting 
pot.” But by the late 1960s, a liberal version of the frontier myth was in trouble as 
Johnson’s “Great Society”—one of the two most ambitious liberal programs in the 
nation’s history—appeared to falter due in large part to the ever growing commitment to 
the failing war in Vietnam. LBJ and American society were struggling to make sense of 
America’s place in a rapidly changing world and wondered if the old rules of the Frontier 
Myth and its assumptions still applied. Popular movies and novels expressed the rise of 
the anti-Western that would see the tension between individualism and community 
stretched until it snapped with individualism carrying the day. In 1980, twelve years 
after Johnson left office, President Ronald Reagan dealt with economic stagflation and 
incidents associated with America’s Cold War rivals, the Soviets, by looking backward in 
time to an America that “should have been.” In terms of presidential politics and popular 
culture the frontier myth shifted and became the property of radical conservatives as 
opposed to progressive liberals. Reagan and his handlers tapped into myths and symbols 
that relied on so-called American tradition, an alternative lifestyle to what was said to be 
ailing the country based on the simple truths of the Old West: individualism, self-
reliance, “know how” and higher values. Reaganites attached themselves to a revised 
frontier myth characterized by a restorative nostalgia that first sought a return to a 
longing for the good old days; encompassed a rebirth in national pride; and, second, in 
its darker manifestations, sought out enemies to be vanquished before the imagined 
homeland of old could be restored.  
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A shift had taken place, what I argue is best regarded as the hinge from Reagan to 
LBJ. Two political practitioners who came down on diametrically opposite polls—one 
calling for more government intervention, the other calling for much less—and both 
count on the frontier myth to deliver them popular support and a genuine answer to the 
crises facing their administrations. A dichotomy developed here and with it the 
discourse was rearticulated; the myth, or at very least its emphasis, adapted and 
changed—becoming a narrower, less flexible, conservative voice. Johnson’s attempts to 
bring the full myth forward collapsed and a reactionary, nostalgic way of understanding 
America replaced the more forward thinking, progressive approach. LBJ, promoter of 
the public good, was replaced by the deregulator and protector of big business, Ronald 
Reagan. Here what Sahlins regards as the events-structure dynamic took hold of 
American society. The series of events from 1965 to 1980 had caused the frontier myth 
structure to shift course and emphasis and accommodated this change. As this 
dissertation will reveal, tumultuous times and LBJ’s own contributions to these events 
caused the myth itself to be exposed as an inadequate vision out of touch with the 
realities of the late twentieth century; a vacuum that Reaganites would go to great 
lengths to exploit. After the crisis event known as 9/11, Republican President George W. 
Bush deployed his own interpretation of the Frontier Myth to allow him to react to Al-
Qaeda and Iraq in certain ways but, as with LBJ, this too largely backfired. For Johnson 
and Bush, and to a lesser degree TR and Reagan as well, the myth had a discursive 
power that constrained and liberated actions by creating expectations among the public 
of what a cowboy nation should do and what a cowboy nation could do.  Events that had 
rendered earlier expressions of the myth less viable for the Democrats in the 1960s and 
early 1970s would do much the same for the Republican George W. Bush in the 2000s. 
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Today, outside of Texas, when Republicans apply the frontier myth it is almost always in 
the context of their only modern presidential icon, Ronald Reagan, rather than the much 
more controversial Bush. The transformed myth’s eventual inapplicability to Johnson 
and Bush (though retaining some of the same language) was in part a product of 
American presidential discourse and policy; more broadly, though, it was a victim of 
changing historical events and circumstances. The Frontier Myth in American 
presidential politics has historically been a pervasive, powerful and shifting image. 
Dippie and Sahlins provide us with the theoretical and interpretive tools for 
understanding how and why this has occurred. And since the days of the Johnson 
Administration, my dissertation will contend, the use to which the frontier myth has 
been put, and the success (or lack thereof) of this deployment by American Presidents 
has contributed to deeper division between liberals and conservatives in American 
politics in general and to the current polarization in the US Congress.  
 
Thesis Organization 
John Cawelti states correctly in Six Gun Mystique: The Sequel that the Western is 
“a time and culture bound historical production.” That while there are some general 
constants in the archetypal nature and structure of the Western, “the Western as an 
evolving and changing expression of different stages of American cultural history” is also 
of importance.33 Cawelti’s argument is applicable to the Cowboy Presidents and their 
relationship with the Frontier Myth and it is in this spirit that my dissertation will 
examine the presidential deployment of the myth in the context of each president’s own 
                                                          
33 John Cawelti, The Six-Gun Mystique Sequel (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green University 
Popular Press, 1999): 6. 
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times. In addition, significant changes to the Frontier Myth in literature and popular 
culture during the Presidents’ respective periods in office and their influence—in the 
novels, film, radio and television of Owen Wister, Zane Grey, John Ford, John Wayne, 
Gene Autry, Louis L’Amour, Clint Eastwood and others—will be discussed as they relate 
to the individual chief executives and their administrations. And as indicated in the 
previous discussion of the historiography, the influence and uses of the frontier myth in 
shaping presidential policy and intertwined relationship between events, structure, and 
the changing frontier myth itself will be analyzed. 
For the most part, “Cowboy Politics” is organized chronologically. The first two 
chapters examine Theodore Roosevelt’s Presidency, the establishment of the first 
Cowboy President and his deployment of the frontier and western myths to explain and 
justify not only foreign and domestic situations (events), but also the specific policy 
agendas Roosevelt adopted. Roosevelt is unique among presidents in that as an 
historian, a celebrity, and politician he played a significant role, along with his friend the 
novelist Owen Wister, in establishing the Frontier Myth in the popular mind. TR’s 
administration also represents the first time that the myth was accepted and used as a 
discursive framework sufficiently robust to account for the full range of American 
experience and policy (not simply a regional view).  
Chapter III presents the limited deployment of the myth during the Presidencies 
spanning from William H. Taft through John F. Kennedy. This section is especially 
significant, though, for its examination of how, during the early to mid-twentieth 
century, the myth establishes itself firmly in American literature and popular culture as 
the single most pervasive and persuasive interpretive framework for understanding not 
only America’s past but its solutions to present concerns. The influence of this mid-
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century brand of the myth not only shaped the ideas of the American public but of future 
presidents LBJ, Reagan, and Bush 43. 
Relying heavily on the documentation housed at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas, 
the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters reveal Lyndon Johnson’s conscious decision to “go 
Western” for liberal causes in 1958 through the end of his administration in 1969. LBJ’s 
policies aimed at countering communism in Vietnam, promoting the “Great Society,” 
War on Poverty and Civil Rights, and winning the space race fit with his early to mid-
twentieth century visions of the frontier experience, but the liberal version of the myth 
ultimately fails to account for a tragic series of events that unravel American society and 
ultimately transform the myth itself. Chapter IV will focus on LBJ’s pre-presidential 
years, his “passage to power” after JFK’s assassination, and the 1964 presidential 
campaign; Chapter V on the first optimistic phase of Johnson’s presidency including his 
unrolling of the “Great Society” and high-water mark of his presidency in 1965; and 
Chapter VI examines LBJ’s tragic “second presidency,” his credibility gap, race riots, the 
counter culture the quagmire of Vietnam, and his decision not to seek a second term. 
The late 1960s, as we shall see, set the stage for a frontier myth in hiatus. 
Chapter VII explores the event-structure relationship, “the hinge” as events bring 
about a left-to-right transformation of the frontier myth from LBJ to Reagan. Analysis 
includes the rise of the anti-Western, reaction against LBJ, his legacy, the turning away 
from the Cowboy myth during the presidencies of Nixon, Ford and Carter, with 
remaining elements of the Western story being portrayed through other genres and its 
resurgence in conservative form with the 1980 Reagan campaign. This volatile era was 
rife with events (such as assassinations, race riots, the counter culture, collapse in 
Vietnam, Watergate, a series of economic crises, and the Iranian hostage taking) that the 
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structure of LBJ’s liberal democratic expression of the frontier myth found itself ill 
prepared to deal with.  In this milieu the stage was set for a conservative revival of the 
Frontier Myth in American politics.  
Chapter VIII and IX look at Reagan’s capturing of the cowboy image for the 
Republican right in the 1980s: how events and changing contexts caused reduction of 
government assistance programs, deregulation, tax cuts and a “big stick” military to 
counter Soviet “aggression.” How RR’s declaration of himself as a “Sagebrush rebel,” 
and business frontiers agenda now also came to dominate presidential ties to the 
frontier mythology. Chapter VIII explores Reagan’s image, philosophy, and the 
conservative revision of the Frontier Myth depicted in TV’s JR Ewing-like tycoons and 
Hollywood’s Right Stuff cowboys. Perhaps for the first time, the White House was 
occupied by a president who believed that history reflected movies, rather than the 
reverse. Chapter IX covers Reagan’s foreign and domestic policy frontiers—what the 
myth’s change in emphasis enabled him to do, how it constrained him, and how we can 
understand the Reagan Administration in terms of how its actions were a product of the 
Frontier Myth.  
George W. Bush and his Dirty Harry-style “Cowboy Diplomacy” is the subject of 
Chapter X as he deploys cowboy and frontier rhetoric in response to 9/11, raising both 
hopes and expectations concerning America’s mission in the Middle East and indeed the 
world. And Chapter XI examines the shift in popular music’s reception and then 
rejection of the Bush frontiers, the president’s unsuccessful efforts to play down the 
rhetoric once his “mission accomplished” claims did not materialize, today’s 
Republicans and their use (or abuse) of “Cowboy Reagan” into an icon of the GOP, 
Democrats reluctance to deploy the image, and the role that the currently waning and 
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less inclusive Frontier Myth has played in creating the current state of American 
national politics. The conclusion will summarize my main findings and discuss the 
implications of the power of the Frontier Myth in American presidential politics and 
society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
I. 
Theodore Roosevelt: The Rise of the Frontier Myth  
and Education of the First Cowboy President 
 
 
It was still the Wild West in those days, the far West, the 
West of Owen Wister’s stories and Frederic Remington’s 
drawings, the West of the Indian and the buffalo-hunter, the 
soldier and the cow-puncher….In that land we led a free and 
hardy life, with horse and rifle….and ours was the glory of 
work and the joy of living.  
 —Theodore Roosevelt, “In Cowboy Land,” 
Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt (1913)34 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Theodore Roosevelt was the original Cowboy President and the Chief Executive 
with the closest political and personal ties to the Frontier Myth.  Unlike his three later 
frontier-style successors—Johnson, Reagan and W. Bush—Roosevelt not only responded 
to and employed the ideas and symbolism of the myth as President, he had lived out and 
helped develop many of its features and wrote about them in a plethora of publications. 
TR modeled himself closely on the romantic cowboy/frontiersman image and, through 
his highly publicized exploits, writings and orations, contributed substantively to the 
myth’s shape and power in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and dawn of 
the twentieth. Possibly the best known American of his times, Roosevelt came to be 
idolized by millions of Americans as a tough and tenacious, self-made frontiersman who 
pushed his wilderness adventures to the limit—in locales ranging from the Dakota 
                                                          
34 Theodore Roosevelt, “In Cowboy Land” (Chapter 4) in The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt 
(New York: Octagon Books, r1975): 58-59. 
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Territory to San Juan Hill—then carried his trademark “strenuosity” and “get action” 
philosophies over to his presidency. TR was the key political figure in creating a way of 
looking at the frontier as a way for Americans to look at themselves.  
One cannot fully understand both the origins of the modern Frontier Myth 
structure and the extent of its power without also having an understanding of Theodore 
Roosevelt and of how his own experiences and related ideas developed alongside it. As 
the myth became increasingly influential it adapted and changed. Likewise many of 
Roosevelt’s views would not remain static over time. Employing the Frontier Myth as his 
mantra, TR typically placed himself on the leading edge of an era of intense social 
change and modernization. Man and myth were inseparable—joined at the hip—and 
underwent a kind of evolution from the 1880s through Roosevelt’s death in 1919. 
This chapter explores Theodore Roosevelt’s formative years in the context and in 
direct relation to the rise of the Frontier Myth. Most notably, we will examine 
Roosevelt’s own lessons learned from his cowboy experience in the badlands of North 
Dakota and how this helped shape his ideas on the role of government, values of 
individualism vs. community, the common man, democracy, and America’s future. We 
will also look at The Winning of the West series and other writings that articulated and 
publicized these ideas, ensuring his place as a chief proponent and shaper of the 
Frontier Myth. Next we examine his promotion of masculinity, American-style heroism 
and the frontier ethic for Westerners and Easterners alike, all of which reached an apex 
with his hugely publicized Rough Rider “adventures” in Cuba. Related to this was his 
skilful employment of new technologies and use of the media to promote both the 
symbolism of the Frontier Myth and the parallel trajectory of his own career (“I rose like 
a rocket”). Also important was his role in the 1900 presidential campaign as the perfect 
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“cowboy” foil for the relatively bland head of the ticket, William McKinley. And finally 
this chapter examines Roosevelt’s presidential association with the rise of the cowboy in 
popular culture and its entrenchment in the American self-image through, in particular, 
Owen Wister’s bestselling novel, The Virginian.  
Throughout these years of Roosevelt’s own education and transformation, his 
thoughts focused on many of the cultural preoccupations of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. These preoccupations included: the realization that the US 
was becoming predominantly urban rather than rural; the influx of “new immigrants” 
from eastern and southern Europe that was changing the nation’s ethnic mix; an 
increasing awareness of the dramatic changes being wrought by industrialization and 
new technologies; a growing sense of the complexity of modern society and related 
treatment of those working in it; belief that morals and men’s physical strength and 
closeness to nature were declining; and the quest for some sense of regeneration and 
reassurance.  
It was during these last two decades of the nineteenth century that an increasing 
number of Americans challenged the prevailing theory that government should stay out 
of the affairs of business. More and more Americans vigorously questioned and doubted 
the assumption that the individual left to their own discretion would always act in the 
public interest. They insisted that there was a public interest that had to be protected 
from the private interest and became suspicious of the growing power of big 
corporations. Roosevelt grappled with and carefully considered these issues too along 
with what role government could and should play in them. And TR did this against the 
backdrop of his, and increasingly the nation’s, idealized vision of earlier generations’ life 
on the frontier. How Roosevelt responded to these matters would ultimately strike a 
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responsive chord with much of the American public as the vision he shared of the 
Frontier Myth appeared to satisfy the seemingly contradictory needs of reaffirming old 
values whilst seeking solutions to new problems in an increasingly urban, industrial 
America.   
In foreign affairs Theodore Roosevelt and millions of his fellow Americans also 
held to (and in his case, lived by) the frontier concept of American exceptionalism and 
an American “mission.” Roosevelt was acutely aware of America’s new role of becoming 
a world power and also of its brief historical experience for creating a clear sense of 
national identity and unity and this provided a motivation for both of these concepts. 
The belief in an American “mission” was nothing new; Manifest Destiny being the 
nineteenth century equivalent. Indeed the idea of the West as a kind of safety valve for 
the problems of an increasingly urbanized, corporatized and now modern industrial 
nation, dated back to Thomas Jefferson’s colonial period and had intellectual roots 
planted even before that in the Old World.  
As Brian Dippie and other scholars demonstrated, myths held in the past could be 
extremely influential—particularly when grabbed hold of by a public relations 
powerhouse like Roosevelt. The social milieu of the late nineteenth century was in many 
respects a watershed period of change in American society and perfectly suited to the 
rise of TR and emergence of a powerful strain of the Frontier Myth. Though the regional 
frontier itself was now “officially” closed, the idea of the American Frontier would 
emerge stronger than ever.  
The forceful, optimistic bent of TR and the Frontier Myth, as identified by Ray 
Allen Billington, provided a sense among turn-of-the-century Americans that the 
“taming” of the West—so tough yet so successful in the eyes of most Euro-Americans—
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could now be applied to all of the nation’s challenges ranging from crowded cities to 
foreign affairs. Sahlins demonstrates that social/cultural structures based on myths are 
highly influential because they have the ability to accommodate almost everything that 
occurs in society. The close relationship between events, structure and the Frontier 
Myth are unmistakable. And it will be asserted here that Roosevelt’s accidental rise to 
the presidency in the context of contemporary events of his day essentially guaranteed 
that the Frontier Myth would establish itself as the symbolic unifier of the nation: 
enabling a more robust transition from the traditions and concerns of the old frontier of 
the nineteenth century to the challenges of the new frontiers of the twentieth.  
 
Earning his Spurs: A “Frontier” President in the Making 
Theodore Roosevelt’s experiences in the badlands out West, while coming of age in 
his ‘twenties, have long been viewed as having changed forever his ideas about the 
history of the United States and his vision for the nation’s future. His political force of 
will and constant battles “for the right” in fitting out a new Navy, challenging the tainted 
meat industry, or promoting his New Nationalism, are attributed by scholars and 
popular observers as resulting in large part from his experience out West. This is not 
merely perception. Roosevelt very consciously recognized this relationship himself. 
While visiting Fargo in 1910, Roosevelt told a large crowd: “If it had not been for what I 
learned in North Dakota, I never in the world would have been President of the United 
States.”35 Roosevelt’s learned willingness to take risks, good versus evil conception of 
                                                          
35 “Immense Throng Hears Labor Day Address,” Fargo Forum and Daily Republican, September 5, 
1910, p. 8, quoted in Stacy Cordery, “The Western Brand of Roosevelt,” May 25, 2011 Blog at the Theodore 
Roosevelt Center, online at http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Blog/2011/May/25-The-Western-
Brand-of-Roosevelt.aspx (accessed 29 January 2016).  Today this quote or some variation of it appears in 
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the world, sense of democratic egalitarianism and of community, and seemingly 
limitless “strenuosity”—that became integral parts of his Dakota Territory experiences—
all arguably made direct connections to his later political career. What has not been 
understood previously is that as Roosevelt acted on his own belief and faith in the 
emerging Frontier Myth he also played a more significant role in helping shape its early 
manifestations and several of its long-term features than any other politician. 
At this point some background is required to better understand TR’s entry on to 
the myth-making scene. The Frontier vision’s central figure at the turn-of-the-century, 
the cowboy, had been receiving attention in the eastern press since the 1870s. Initially 
these cowmen or “herders” were depicted as a mangy, squalid crew of peace-disturbing 
yahoos. But in 1882, while attending the first Wild West show in North Platte, Nebraska, 
popular writer Prentiss Ingraham had already begun to create a more heroic cowboy 
figure in his own series of frontier stories. Wallace Stegner has written that “Ingraham 
immortalized this rodeo cowboy, first in a fictitious biography and then in a series of 
dime novels. He devised for him some colorful semi-Mexican garb that made him 
picturesque, and he endowed him with all the skill, courage and masculine grace that 
have marked every heroic expression of the folk mind from Leatherstocking to 
Superman.” About the same time that Ingraham was putting pen to paper, Roosevelt 
was propagating a similarly romantic legend of the western frontier by living it and 
ensuring that the press was close at hand to report on his adventures in the 
“wilderness.” Ingraham and Roosevelt were soon to be joined by their two other 
distinguished Eastern contemporaries, western author Owen Wister (a close friend of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
numerous North Dakota tourist brochures, and on signs at national parks, shopping malls and paintball 
fields.  
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TR’s dating back to their Harvard days) and the artist Frederic Remington.36 But what 
brought TR west in the first place? 
Theodore Roosevelt had been born into one of the wealthiest families in New York, 
and his deep and abiding interest in politics and experiences out West were atypical of 
his eastern establishment heritage. During Theodore’s early days in the New York State 
Assembly (at a time when politics was snubbed by most of his privileged class), several 
colleagues viewed him as effete and taunted him with names that included “Punkin’ 
Lily” and “Jane Dandy.” Though such comments made Roosevelt’s hair stand on end, 
tenaciousness was his forte. In 1883 Roosevelt came West partly as a tourist but also to 
share in the tough day-to-day existence that defined the ranchman. TR wanted to be 
viewed across the nation as having earned his spurs. The first frontiersman photos taken 
of Roosevelt at a New York studio that same year (see Figure 1.1) were almost certainly 
shot, and widely distributed, to impress and to shrug off those who earlier criticized his 
manliness. TR decked himself out in attire that combined the popular images of Daniel 
Boone with Davey Crockett: “Putting on the buckskin,”37 he appeared in a fringed shirt 
along with a beaver felt cap and a hunting knife purchased at Tiffany’s. Roosevelt’s first 
brief sojourn out West, followed by the photo shoot, might have ended his adventures 
on the vanishing frontier right then and there. Apparently he had achieved what he had 
set out to do. But on Valentine’s Day of 1884, the future president suffered a heart-
wrenching double tragedy when his beloved young wife, Alice, and his mother, Martha, 
                                                          
36 For a description of the early eastern image of the cowboy see Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: 
The American West as Symbol and Myth (New York: Vintage Books, 1950): 109. Wallace Stegner quoted 
in Ben M. Vorphal, “My Dear Wister”: The Frederic Remington-Owen Wister Letters (Palo Alto, CA: 
American West Publishing, 1972): viii-ix.  
37 Roosevelt admitted to a Dakota companion that he was “most anxious to get a buckskin suit….the 
most picturesque and distinctively national dress ever worn in America.” TR quoted in White, Eastern 
Establishment, 83-84. 
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both died within a twelve hour span in the same house. At first the devastated Roosevelt 
attempted to throw himself full bore into his work but before long it became evident that 
a stronger tonic was needed and TR escaped from his sorrows to a Cattle Ranch that he 
purchased on the Little Missouri River, just a few miles from the town of Medora in the 
Dakota Territory.  
In the Badlands, for much of the next three years, Roosevelt immersed himself 
completely into what became the two of the great passions of his life: the American 
frontier West and hunting. A glance at the second photo below (Figure 1.2) of his 
cowboy image, this one taken two years later than the “buckskin” photo, gives a sense of 
the impact that this more serious Western experience had on TR. Gone is his fancy 
costume and garb of 1883, now instead he appears tough and self-assured in a Stetson 
and working boots. Having “hardened up” his body and added 30 pounds of muscle, we 
no longer see a young Roosevelt looking off into the distance at make believe prey in a 
New York studio; instead it is a transformed TR standing tall, facing us, glaring at the 
viewer. These images were part of a broader life story which Roosevelt himself 
documented and published to a degree not matched by any President before or since. 
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Figure 1.1: Frontiersman TR in 1883; and Figure 1.2: Cowboy TR c1885. The TR at 
right is no “Punkin’ Lily” but instead the cool and toughened up kind of individual 
that Owen Wister had in mind when his Virginian responded to an insult with: 
“When you call me that, SMILE.”38 (Left: Courtesy Library of Congress, Photographer: George 
Grantham Bain, Photographs Division, #LC-USZ62-41723. Right: Courtesy of the Theodore 
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, R500.P69a-012).  
 
 
 
During this Western phase of his life, Roosevelt wrote to his close friend Henry 
Cabot Lodge: “You would be amused to see me, in my broad sombrero hat, fringed and 
beaded buckskin shirt, horse hide chaparajos or riding trousers, and cowhide boots, 
with braided bridle and silver spurs.” Roosevelt was aware of his own performance and 
he worked hard to show the public, his ranch hands, and himself, that there was 
substance to his new persona too: that while an Easterner by birth, this hombre was not 
only playing cowboy—he was a cowboy. And as early as December 1884, journalists took 
                                                          
38 Owen Wister, The Virginian: A Horseman of the Plains (New York: Macmillan, 1904 ed.): 29. 
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notice of the toughened up Roosevelt. On Christmas Eve, the New York Times posted a 
front page story describing what must have been an odd sight on the streets of Gotham: 
“Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, dropped into the Grand Pacific Hotel this morning 
enveloped in an overcoat of coonskin, wearing a fur cap, and carrying a rifle and 
shotgun.” If he were acting, TR was playing out his role to the hilt and with conviction. 
Describing TR’s “trophies” on a recent hunting trip to Montana, the Times detailed that: 
“He killed three grizzly bears, six elk, and innumerable antelopes. Several buffaloes also 
fell before his rifle, and he represented that he had stopped counting the small game he 
bagged.” The nearsighted TR was reportedly most proud of the skin of a twelve hundred 
pound grizzly which had ambled within nine feet of the hunter before he saw it. “The 
animal had seen the Assemblyman,” the Times conjectured, “and was doubtless 
preparing to embrace him in brotherly fashion when a well-directed rifle ball struck him 
in the forehead.” By the mid-1880s TR meant business on the hunt, typically setting out 
with three powerful and custom made rifles and 1200 rounds of ammunition. Richard C. 
Rattenbury speculates in Hunting in the American West that: “Clearly, if surrounded by 
a battalion of bears, he [Roosevelt] could stand a protracted siege….As it happened the 
bears came up one at a time.” Roosevelt’s well publicized hunts were not just about the 
beasts he bagged: even more so they were appreciated by TR and much of the public for 
their association with the imagined origins of the country and its heroic individuals in 
the wilderness. Here TR was maintaining both personal and promoting national virility 
as he labored diligently to create an iconic image for himself that placed a high value on 
his self-reliant and individual interactions with the frontier. His “putting on the 
buckskin” and later the Stetson in New York symbolized the distance between his new 
 
 
39 
 
Western persona that connected with the primeval origins of the nation and that of the 
modern, industrial, urban areas.39 
In addition to these hunting exploits, TR was becoming well known as both a 
cowboy and a rancher out West. In his writings Roosevelt emphasizes that he put in as 
many hours in the saddle as his companions: “Once when with Sylvane Ferris,” TR 
recalled, “I spent about sixteen hours on one horse, riding seventy or eighty 
miles….Another time I was twenty-four hours on horseback in company with Merrifield 
without changing horses.”40 Roosevelt also describes himself as more than willing to 
tackle the toughest and riskiest jobs on the ranch (such as branding duty) and off of it as 
well. In Ranch Life and the Hunting-Trail (1896) he tells of his encounters with a 
barroom lout, the time he alone faced down five armed Sioux Indians, and led a posse to 
capture a gang of thieves who stole his boat. In this latter grueling effort, TR’s heavily 
publicized refusal to be bullied went so far as to have Roosevelt posing for press photos 
during a staged reenactment of his making the arrest of the three boat thieves. TR knew 
how to cultivate both good press and his celebrity status.  
Biographer John Milton Cooper wrote that “The West seemed to complete 
Roosevelt’s self-transformation.” From this point onward, TR’s “frontier experience” 
became an integral part of TR’s political philosophy and public life. In both myth and 
reality, TR came out of the Badlands and returned to the East robust and transformed: a 
man who had been remade emotionally, physically and mentally. TR was now convinced 
                                                          
39 TR correspondence to Lodge quoted in Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt (New 
York: The Modern Library, 1979): 283; “Theodore Roosevelt as a Hunter,” New York Times, December 
24, 1884: 1, in ProQuest Historical Newspapers (accessed June 25, 2012); Richard C. Rattenbury, 
Hunting the American West: The Pursuit of Big Game for Life, Profit, and Sport, 1800-1900 (Missoula 
MT: Boone and Crockett Club, 2008): 333. 
40 Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Octagon Books, 
r1975): 72. 
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that only through one’s encounters with the wilderness and wild beasts could national 
vigor be maintained. Out West in the 1880s, he witnessed firsthand the loss of game due 
to unregulated hunting along with the destruction of grasslands due to overgrazing. 
These frontiers, he began to argue, needed to be set aside and regulated so that men 
could disconnect themselves from their regular lives and immerse themselves in a 
wilderness and live out the frontier experience. Roosevelt wrote: “The free, self-reliant, 
adventurous life, with its rugged and stalwart democracy; the wild surroundings, the 
grand beauty of the scenery, the chance to study the ways and habits of the woodland 
creatures—all these unite to give to the career of the wilderness hunter its peculiar 
charm.” Conserving wild spaces in an age of rapid urbanization and development was 
also a key to TR’s vision and increasingly the nation’s of preserving manhood and 
national identity.41  
In his autobiography Roosevelt admitted that “There were all kinds of things of 
which I was afraid at first, ranging from grizzly bears to ‘mean’ horses and gunfighters; 
but by acting as if I was not afraid I gradually ceased to be afraid.” Arguably then, TR’s 
experience in the Dakotas also reinforced his belief that evils and dangers in the world 
needed to be confronted where possible and faced down. Relatedly, he had concluded 
from personal experiences in the West that aggression and insult could only be defeated 
through determination and strength (“a cowboy,” Roosevelt explained, “will not submit 
tamely to an insult, and is very ready to avenge his own wrongs”). For the TR of the late 
nineteenth century, projecting American power throughout the Western hemisphere 
and the Pacific—whether this meant annexing Hawaii and Cuba or teaching the Spanish 
                                                          
41 John Milton Cooper, Jr. The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983): 30; Theodore Roosevelt, The Wilderness Hunter (New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1893): xv, online from Google Books (accessed June 25, 2012). 
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a lesson in the Philippines—was a logical projection of American power westward that 
flowed, logically, from the “winning of the West” experience on the Frontier. 42 
Another important but often overlooked aspect of Roosevelt’s days living out the 
“frontier experience” is that it convinced him that mutual support could be crucial to 
individual well-being and that practicing communal habits could positively impact on 
the lives of individuals. Many of his stories out West include references to how his 
comrades helped one another out in their frequently dangerous work. In his writings, 
TR explains at some length that he was much more successful at the hunt with his 
skilled companion William Merrifield, the foreman of his ranch, than on his own and 
that more than once his friend helped get TR out of awkward predicaments. Near the 
end of  Hunting Trips of a Ranchman, he tells us: “The first thing that a Western 
plainsman has to learn is the capacity for self-help, but at the same time he must not 
forget that occasions may arise when the help of others will be most grateful.” Likewise 
in Ranch Life and the Hunting Trail, TR explains that despite their code of self-reliance, 
ranchmen are working more and more together—uniting to form associations such as 
the Montana Stock Growers’ Association which reaped “countless benefits.” At various 
points in these stories, Roosevelt underscores the fact that “manly qualities” not only 
include toughness, individualism, and bravery, but also hospitality, cooperation and 
camaraderie.  Character was key to success on the frontier as well. Selfish, lazy, mean, 
cowardly and dishonest types were not welcome in the cattle country and, in TR’s 
narrative, could not prosper there. Roosevelt himself organized the Little Missouri 
Stockmen’s Association which created and enforced new regulations, dismissed the 
                                                          
42 TR quoted in David McCullough, Mornings on Horseback (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1981): 345; Theodore Roosevelt, “The Round Up,” Century Illustrated Magazine, Vol. 35 (1888): 855. 
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region’s failed livestock inspector, and banded together to thwart cattle rustlers. Long 
before TR’s talk of a Square Deal and the New Nationalism, then, his Western 
experience had taught him that mutual support is crucial to individual well-being.43  
TR’s related concepts of democratic egalitarianism were also, almost certainly, 
strongly influenced by his Dakota life. In the Badlands the once snobbish Roosevelt of 
his Harvard and Columbia Law School days came to acquire, first hand, a genuine 
respect for “regular” folks and their values. Related to this his ranch hands and 
neighbours later insisted that TR always treated them decently rather than as lower 
class types. And this attitude of respect stuck. When Roosevelt, as President, travelled 
out West to visit local farmers and ranch hands in 1903, he wrote his secretary of state, 
John Hay, that “For all the superficial differences between us, these men and I think a 
good deal alike or at least have the same ideals.” Speaking to an audience of primarily 
cowboys and cowgirls in Cheyenne, Wyoming, Roosevelt stated that the ideals 
represented on the frontier were those of the whole country. In terms of progress he told 
the crowd: “In continually and earnestly striving for [the] betterment of social and 
economic conditions in our complex industrial civilization, we should work in the old 
frontier spirit of rugged strength and courage, and yet with the old frontier spirit of 
brotherly comradeship and good will.” It is a set of themes—mutual respect, 
“strenuosity,” pursuing the public good, democracy, and national unity based on 
                                                          
43 TR quotes appear in: Paul M. Rego, American Ideal: Theodore Roosevelt’s Search for American 
Individualism (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2008): 60; Ibid, 61; Description of Roosevelt’s role in the 
Stockmen’s Association described in Ibid, 52. 
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frontier principles—that TR would refer to and act upon frequently during his 
presidential years and in the decade which followed them. 44 
 
Historians Roosevelt and Turner: Foundations of the Frontier Myth 
Biographer Edmund Morris has described Roosevelt’s best-selling six part book 
series, The Winning of the West (1889-1896) as “the first comprehensive statement of 
his Americanism, and by extension (since he ‘was’ America), of himself.” Here, to a 
greater degree than in any of his other writings, TR combined his western adventures 
with his scholarly ambitions of being an historian. The field of history for Roosevelt 
meant history more as a form of literature (as in the tradition of the historian whom he 
most revered, Francis Parkman) rather than as an academic profession. And TR had 
certain agendas in mind, which in turn helped shape the evolving contours of the 
Frontier Myth. Significantly, the first two volumes of TR’s magnum opus, published in 
1889, both placed an emphasis on glorifying the individualistic, free, outdoorsmen of 
action: Anglo-Saxon heroes who defeated stubborn Indians who stood in their way. But 
by Volumes III and IV, published in 1894 and 1896 respectively, there is a very 
noticeable shift in tone. Less confident on the declarations of Anglo-Saxon superiority, 
Roosevelt instead places an emphasis on the need for a strong central government to 
unify the nation’s sense of effort and purpose. Also, in contrast to the earlier editions, 
too much independence and individualism now emerge as serious threats to the nation’s 
well-being and its efforts to establish an empire. Roosevelt warns his readers that by 
failing to understand the vital need for “‘a strong, efficient, central government, backed 
                                                          
44 Theodore Roosevelt, Cowboys and Kings: Three Great Letters by Theodore Roosevelt 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954): 2; “Roosevelt Speaks at Cheyenne on Western Frontier 
Life,” Wall Street Journal, August 29, 1910: 3. 
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by a good fleet and a well-organized army’ the men of the West were almost lost to the 
nation.” He even ends the third volume on a prophetic note: “At the close of the 
Revolution the West was seething with sedition….If the spirit of sedition, of lawlessness, 
and of wild individualism and separatism had conquered, then our history would merely 
have anticipated the dismal tale of the Spanish-American republics.” Roosevelt’s 
Frontier West, and that increasingly envisioned by the nation, was now first and 
foremost not a celebration of Anglo-Saxon superiority and isolated individualism but of 
the triumph of national unity, community, and the efforts of a relatively strong national 
government.45 
Roosevelt’s later volumes of The Winning of the West also advanced the brand new 
idea of an American melting pot: years before that phrase was coined by playwright 
Israel Zangwill. “Under the hard conditions of life in the wilderness,” TR explained to 
his readers, the frontier experience “was enough to weld together into one people the 
representatives of these numerous and widely different races.” In their frontier 
encounters, immigrants from across Europe in particular were required to adopt the 
values of individualism “tempered by common sense,” and of democratic community. 
Together these frontier values would allow them to throw off their decadent Old World 
cultures and embrace the new: transforming them into “Americans pure and simple.” 
While having the “right” ethnicity still may have mattered to some (including TR’s 
friends, the novelist Owen Wister and artist Frederic Remington) to Roosevelt, the 
frontier experience mattered even more. For the Myth had provided both citizens and 
recent arrivals to America and to the West, in particular, the opportunity to build a 
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national culture from its diverse elements. As Turner had explained, in this unique 
country where “the wilderness masters the colonist” the “outcome is not Old 
Europe…here is a new product that is American.”46 
Roosevelt’s own evolving ideas about the meaning of the frontier—and beginning 
in 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner’s—were clearly related to the social and political 
issues of their day, including the Populists cries for sectionalism in the 1890s, the “new 
immigration” from southern Europe and Russia,  and the strong impulse for American 
imperialism. The relationship between events and the evolving Frontier Myth’s 
structure (re: Sahlins) is unmistakable. Not surprisingly then, Roosevelt’s Winning of 
the West and Turner’s “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (which 
John Mack Faragher describes as the most influential piece of writing in the history of 
American history) have numerous connections and resonances. Turner himself had 
described TR as one who embodied those frontier ideals of the “all-around American” 
(Turner’s emphasis) who rose to what he became because he “lived the West, as well as 
studied it.” Beginning in 1893, the two men would correspond for at least two decades 
and it was their legitimizing histories that provided a key substantive foundation to the 
myth. Turner, as Michael L. Collins notes, owed a huge debt to Roosevelt. Months 
before the young scholar delivered his paper at Chicago’s World’s Fair, Roosevelt had 
addressed the State Historical Society of Wisconsin—Turner in the audience carefully 
taking notes—and declared the Old Northwest as the “‘heart of the country.’” A year later 
after reading Turner’s “Significance” essay, Roosevelt sent off his first letter to Turner 
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writing of the thesis that: “It comes at the right time for me, for I intend to make use of it 
in writing the third volume of my “Winning of the West”….I think you have struck some 
first class ideas, and have put into definite shape a good deal of thought which has been 
floating around rather loosely.” As historian Douglas Brinkley points out, TR was being 
generous in his comments and the two men formed a kind of alliance in promoting the 
frontier hypothesis: TR being the “popular oracle” and Professor Turner promoting it 
among his fellow academics.47 
Historian Richard Slotkin offered a somewhat darker interpretation of Roosevelt’s 
evolving vision of the frontier than I do here. Slotkin asserted that TR, during his pre-
presidential career, remained caught up in an elitist, imperialist and racist view of the 
frontier that caused him to act as a class biased and moralizing bully.48 Slotkin was 
correct in stating that Roosevelt’s (and Turner’s) imperialist view of Western expansion 
offered an arrogant view of the victors in the long campaigns to “win the West” (with 
Native Americans cast in the anti-progressive role of the few who stood in the way of the 
many) but this study also contends that, by the 1890s, Roosevelt’s views were becoming 
more nuanced and complex than has been widely assumed. In TR’s mind, American 
exceptionalism and in particular its relationship to the frontier model now trumped 
many of the racial stereotypes of his day. Like Turner, TR had claimed that upon contact 
with the wilderness, pioneers were stripped of their European traits and that people of 
diverse ancestry were blended together into a great “melting pot” which made up the 
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West. And Roosevelt, in particular, did not believe that the old society could ever be 
restored and accepted: instead TR embraced and sought to directly influence the 
changing realities of the twentieth century. For the essentially optimistic Roosevelt, 
progressivism would continue moving Americans toward a better way of life: one that 
had continually evolved from its frontier roots. Never one to be left in the dust, TR 
recognized that society was changing and that the meaning and relevance of the frontier 
experience was also changing. In so many respects Roosevelt was among those at the 
forefront of these evolving attitudes. 
 
Roosevelt’s “Everyman” Attributes and Cowboy Hero Image 
In his classic study of Roosevelt’s years in the Badlands, Hermann Hagedorn 
describes how during his first days out West the cowboys of North Dakota did not know 
quite what to make of him.  Indeed, TR’s large, round glasses made him look to the 
ranchmen “very much like a curiously nervous and emphatic owl.” But according to later 
interviews with the ranchmen who worked for and with Roosevelt, he soon came to be 
respected for his grit, stamina, and willingness to take on the toughest and riskiest jobs 
without complaint. This relationship of camaraderie along with TR’s cowboy prowess, 
was played up in the press for years to come. The Galveston Daily News offered a 
typical example in 1895 when reporting: “It is said of him [TR] that when in the west 
among the cowboys and the hunters of the Rockies…he is an excellent shot, a superb 
rider and a master of the pioneer’s craft, he has invariably succeeded in winning and 
holding the respect of those with whom he came in contact in the wilds.” Though 
Roosevelt did not make such claims of exceptional abilities himself (he let others do this 
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for him) he did encourage the perception that he left on very good terms with those of 
his “kind.”49 
While much was made of TR’s acceptance by his fellow-cowboys, almost as much 
was reported about his respect for them and of “Ol’ Four Eyes’” apparent transformation 
from an aristocrat to a democrat as a direct result of his experiences out West.50 If TR 
had been born with blue blood, the red-blooded Roosevelt has been regarded as a 
product of his years in the Dakota Territory. Based on the accounts of those who knew 
Roosevelt best, there appears to be substance to these assertions. George Bird Grinnell, 
co-founder of the Boone and Crockett Club, believed that TR “learned his first lessons in 
real democracy” on the frontier since it was there that he was “constantly associating 
with men of various classes and types.” Roosevelt’s long-time friend, the author Owen 
Wister emphatically agreed, adding that Roosevelt’s western frontier experience “played 
a very important [role] in his intellectual growth and his outlook as a statesman.”51 And, 
as suggested above, TR himself later acknowledged that “I owe more than I can express 
to…the men and women I met in the West.” He adds that they “quite unconsciously 
helped me, by the insight which working and living with them enabled me to get into the 
mind and soul of the average American.”52 Roosevelt’s comments only contributed 
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further to his invaluable persona as a man of the people—as when he stated publicly 
that: “I regard my experience during those years, when I lived and worked with my own 
fellow-ranchmen on what was then the frontier, as the most important educational asset 
of my life.…I know how the man that works with his hands and the man on the ranch are 
thinking, because I have been there, and am thinking that way myself.”53 Roosevelt saw 
himself as having gained an understanding of the American public at large and as one 
who could and should look out for the general public’s interests. 
Roosevelt’s increasingly “common man” persona and closely associated Western 
experience only heightened his popularity and status all the more with the American 
public and the press. “Though enriched by the best culture of the East,” the Zion’s 
Herald reported in 1895, “Mr. Roosevelt has always found delight in the adventures and 
progress of the wild West….How greatly he delights in his visits to this Western Tadmor 
[his ranches] is evident from the way he has written about them. He is as much at home 
with the ranchers and cowboys of the frontier as at the city club dinner or in the office of 
the New York Police Board.” Before long TR’s “everyman” attributes were contributing 
directly to his growing heroic persona as well. And Roosevelt helped this along himself 
by always ensuring that his heroic exploits were fully covered in the press. At the mid-
point of the 1890s decade, almost every newspaper account of TR it seemed, included a 
sketch of cowboy TR reeling and firing from his horse, next to his horse, or in some kind 
of gritty, heroic pose. All along his alleged “commonplace” origins were played up while 
his own actual privileged upbringing in New York was not mentioned. One remarkably 
lengthy headline in the Washington Post summed up the overall take on TR succinctly: 
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“Roosevelt on a Ranch—Gotham’s Reformer Appears in the Role of a Cowboy—Terror to 
Typical Badmen—Teddy Can Shoot, Ride, and Box with the Best of Them, and Has 
Plenty of Grit, Too—How He Brought Order Out of Chaos in the Border Town of 
Medora.” Remarkably, Roosevelt  the future President was quickly becoming the living, 
breathing prototype for ten thousand later fictional cowboy figures—all tailored to fit the 
peculiar social environment in which they were created—in a Western industry that 
would move from dime novels to quality Western literature, to pulp magazines, movies, 
radio and TV shows.54 
 
Tough Guy Roosevelt: Masculinity, the Rough Riders and the Frontier Myth 
The social environment of the late nineteenth century, with help from Theodore 
Roosevelt’s own persona, created the right conditions for establishing masculinity as a 
key element of the Frontier Myth. Michael Kimmel has observed that Theodore 
Roosevelt’s transformation from his frailty as an asthmatic youth into a robust, vigorous 
man “served as a template for a revitalized American social character” and “elevated 
compulsive masculinity…to the level of national myth.” Just at a moment in history 
when male gender identity appeared threatened by the closing of the frontier, machine 
age with its drudge work in the factories, and by soft and cushy urban living, along came 
TR with his male-centered conquest of the wilderness as a kind of “new ‘safety valve’ or 
‘frontier’.”55 Through self-described accounts including his lengthy cattle drives, story of 
laying out with one punch a drunk tough who had been waving pistols in a bar, and his 
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tracking down of three outlaws who he then forced walked 45 miles to jail, Roosevelt 
became the most popular iconic image of American masculinity. He was the ultimate 
man’s man: a model of “strenuosity” and willpower for American males of all ages to 
emulate. 
Theodore Roosevelt’s journey to masculinity was both a personal one and a call for 
national action. The politician-cowboy escaped “the bugaboos of his own emotional 
past” by constantly hammering against moral weakness, spineless passivity, and the 
pampered servants of greed and sloth. One of TR’s most influential speeches, aptly 
entitled “The Strenuous Life,” was based on a theme that he would pound home 
repeatedly. Roosevelt insisted that, as with the ancient Romans, Americans now more 
than ever needed to reconstruct “a thoroughly manly race—a race of strong, virile 
character” that would not shrink from the challenges of the new century. Through living 
out the frontier vision, the moral stagnation of American society could similarly be 
reversed and its “strenuosity” regenerated by a self-determined effort to live with 
strength, vigour and determination: every hardship and extra effort would only add 
value to the test. Characteristically, TR was not just talk: he repeatedly forced himself to 
do tough and dangerous things. When advised that he had a bad heart and should not 
climb stairs, Roosevelt scaled the Matterhorn. Out West he claimed that he had 
encountered the offspring of the frontier first hand and all reports were that he had met 
the test himself. As a cowboy he was admired by millions of Americans as a role model 
with steady nerve who repeatedly put himself in mortal danger by standing toe to toe 
against gun-wielding bullies, Indians, and crooks. As an accomplished hunter, he 
aggressively pursued, faced, and took down grizzlies, rhinos and other horrible beasts. 
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When required, the public knew that Roosevelt would fight it out with a rifle or hand 
and knife against tooth and claw if that was what it took.56 
The nation’s number one frontier-politician faced his ultimate private and public 
test in 1898. After months of agitating, now Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt 
finally got a war with the Spanish in Cuba following the mysterious sinking of the 
battleship Maine in Havana harbor and subsequent outbreak of the Spanish-American 
War. Having read about warriors all of his life, this was TR’s chance in front of all the 
American public to prove his own courage under fire and himself their equal. When 
word got out that Roosevelt was looking for volunteers for his own regiment, 23,000 
men applied. Roosevelt handpicked 1,000 recruits including cowboys, miners, hunters, 
Ivy League polo players, ranchers, and a few football players. Cherokees, Chickasaws 
and Creeks were among the group as well. “All—Easterners and Westerners, 
Northerners and Southerners,” wrote Roosevelt, “officers and men, cow-boys and 
college graduates, wherever they came from, and whatever their social position—
possessed in common the traits of hardihood and a thirst for adventure.” Significantly, 
by de-emphasizing the older Civil War era distinctions of region and promoting cowboy 
imagery, Roosevelt helped reinforce the idea of the West as a mythic place and “crucible 
for the idea of a modern unified nation held together by its parts.”57 The watershed 
event in American history, the Civil War determined for the long haul that the structure 
of the Frontier Myth and idea of the West itself would of necessity be a national vision as 
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opposed to a regional one. It was a particular vision of American unity which would hold 
for more than a century. 
Michael Collins writes that Roosevelt’s Rough Rider experience only strengthened 
TR’s own faith in the frontier ethic: “The western values, ideals, and attitudes which had 
been deeply ingrained in his thinking during the Dakota years seemed reaffirmed by his 
association with the cowboy regiment.” Significantly, TR tells us that the bulk of the 
First Volunteers regiment hailed from the Southwest: “where the conditions of life are 
nearest those…on the frontier” and Americans from all regions had chosen to settle. 
These troops were said to be products of the very seedbed of democracy, a locale where 
subscribers to the Frontier Myth hoped to find their true identities after sectional 
conflict and the age of factories and machines had threatened to rob them of it. Turner’s 
new American prototypes, like the frontier itself, were simultaneously touted as superior 
to the decadent Spanish of Old Europe. The unit’s regimental war cry promised to make 
short order of their backward adversaries: “Rough, tough, we’re the stuff, We want to 
fight and we can’t get enough!”58 
The cowboy image always remained paramount in descriptions of the First 
Volunteers and Roosevelt chose their uniforms carefully. “In their slouch hats, blue-
flannel shirts, brown trousers, leggings, and books, with handkerchiefs knotted around 
their necks,” wrote TR, “they looked exactly as a body of cow-boy cavalry should look.” 
Roosevelt had his own uniform custom made by Brooks Brothers in New York for a 
Custer and Codyesque look with a “blue cravennet [sic] regular lieutenant-colonel’s 
uniform without yellow on collar, and with leggings.” His pearl-handled revolver, spurs 
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and belt buckle all came from Tiffany’s. Though Roosevelt was second in command of 
the regiment, its commander—Colonel Leonard Wood—seemed to quickly fade into the 
background for, as the New York Press observed, the first in command “is lost sight of 
entirely in the effulgence of Teethadore.” In no time the First Volunteers became known 
not as Wood’s regiment but as the cowboy “Rough Riders,” the “Roosevelt Rough 
Riders,” and “Teddy’s Terrors.”59   
Once in Cuba, TR exercised both heroism and considerable recklessness. With 
bullets flying all around him, TR mounted his horse at every opportunity or stood erect 
at the front of the line, moving back and forth, and drawing attention to himself in front 
of his troops. Remarkably through all this he only sustained a “flesh wound” on his wrist 
and was practically the only Rough Rider in the field who escaped illness of any kind. 
Gary Gerstle writes that: “In the Cuban Campaign, Roosevelt brought to life the mythic 
past that he had invented for the American people in The Winning of the West.”60 At 
San Juan Hill, embedded reporters accounts and newsreels seared Roosevelt’s heroic 
persona into the public mind as his leadership drew exaggerated acclaim. 
Popular images of the charge up San Juan Hill had it all wrong factually. In reality, 
TR had led the charge up Kettle Hill, not San Juan, as the Rough Riders only arrived 
after San Juan had been captured by the regular army. Unlike the widely accepted 
images, Roosevelt did not carry a sword, crested the hill without his horse, and by the 
time his force had reached the summit most of the Spanish had deserted their positions. 
But none of these details mattered to the public. The press version of the charge seemed 
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for many to capture the essence of American exceptionalism. As muckraking journalist 
and TR biographer Jacob Riis recalled after reading the stories of Roosevelt and 
Company’s charge in the paper: “In how many homes was that splendid story read that 
morning with a thrill never quite to be got over?....We laid down the paper and gave two 
such rousing cheers in Richmond Hill that fourth of July morning, one for the flag and 
one for Theodore Roosevelt!” TR had come to embody the belief in the innate 
superiority and uniqueness of character that had emerged from the American westering 
experience and now the Rough Riders as a group, and “The Colonel” in particular, found 
themselves elevated to the level of national icons.61 
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Figure 1.3: “Teddy the Terror,” on the cover of Life, August 4, 1898. (Photo ID 
- Roosevelt R611.L62, courtesy of the Houghton Library, Harvard University) 
 
The Rough Riders fused the cowboy with the soldier, as personified in Theodore 
Roosevelt himself. One month before the regiment was mustered out of service, “Teddy 
the Terror” made the front cover of Life magazine. TR in his Rough Rider uniform, 
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sleeves rolled up atop a bucking bronco, had his six guns blazing. His rise in politics was 
intertwined with his association as a westerner and a soldier. Less than a week after he 
took office as New York’s Governor, in January 1899, he published the first of six 
installments of his book The Rough Riders, in Scribner’s Magazine. Roosevelt’s account 
of the war met with criticism from some quarters for having built himself up too much 
but the book was an immediate popular success and added all the more to the growing 
cult of TR and the Rough Riders. Together with representations of Roosevelt and “his” 
Rough Riders in cinema, Buffalo Bill’s Wild West shows, in parades, and vaudeville 
stage, the written accounts created a national fiction which helped carry Roosevelt to the 
White House.  
 
Tall in the Saddle 
In just four years, from 1897 to 1901, Roosevelt would rise, in his own words, “like 
a rocket” from his position as assistant secretary of the navy to the highest public office 
in the nation. During that period, along with his stint with the Rough Riders, he was 
elected Governor of New York (1898), Vice President (1900), and then following 
William McKinley’s assassination in September 1901, accidentally became the youngest 
man ever to serve as President at the age of 42. Though much of the media coverage of 
TR had been flattering throughout his career, his Vice Presidential nomination was not 
without considerable controversy. Many Democrats and some within his own party were 
initially convinced that the “wild” and “maverick” Roosevelt would run amok as Vice 
President. Kentucky newspaper publisher Henry Watterson feared that TR’s cowboy-
brain would lead to a dictatorship and reckless imperial adventures. Most famously, a 
horrified Republican boss Senator Mark Hanna declared: “Don’t any of you realize that 
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there’s only one life between this madman and the White House?”62 And indeed, there 
was.  
Throughout his re-election bid in the 1900 campaign, McKinley appeared in so 
many respects the perfect image-making foil for Roosevelt. In photographs the 
President looked old, plain, hesitant, dour and out of shape, while TR was highly 
animated, aggressive, physical, ready for action, and clearly in his prime. McKinley 
seemed indecisive while Roosevelt was full of purpose. Roosevelt’s dream for a war with 
Cuba, and his role in it, made him appear the right man for the right war at the right 
time. 
 
 
       
Figure 1.4: Larger than life VP candidate TR towers in the saddle over a diminutive 
President William McKinley in this cartoon from the 1900 Campaign (cartoonist unknown) 
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Figure 1.5: VP Roosevelt: “Gentlemen! The Senate Will Come to Order!” (J. Campbell Cory, 
New York World, March 4, 1901) 
 
In the 1900 Election, McKinley and Roosevelt won a convincing victory over their 
Democratic opponents William Jennings Bryan and Adlai E. Stevenson.  TR quickly 
became bored with his official, humdrum VP duties, though, and was looking forward to 
a chance to run in his own right for the Republican nomination the next time around 
when suddenly McKinley was fallen by an assassin’s bullet and TR was thrust into the 
presidency. Just 42 years old (the youngest president ever), Roosevelt came to the office 
with an unusual myriad of experience, knowledge and talents and quickly made good on 
his own trademark phrase to “get action.” Writing to Henry Cabot Lodge, TR confided 
that “it is a dreadful thing to come to the Presidency this way; but it would be a far worse 
thing to be morbid about it. Here is the task, and I have to do it to the best of my ability; 
and that is all there is about it.”63 
When Mark Hanna learned that McKinley had died, the Senator’s worst fears had 
come true: “Now look! That damned cowboy is President of the United States!” To most 
Americans at the turn of the century, though, Roosevelt seemed to personify the 
positive, heroic image of the rugged and masculine cowboy figure of literature and 
popular culture. And to the disappointment of his opponents (as we shall see in Chapter 
II) a side of Roosevelt’s personality would emerge which few had noticed: caution and 
tact.  
In terms of intellect, Theodore Roosevelt had never been a typical cowman; in fact, 
he was the most learned of all the presidents since Thomas Jefferson. Roosevelt read 
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books and articles at high speeds on dozens of subjects, wrote 38 books and well over 
100,000 letters, absorbed great literature in six languages, and remembered what he 
had learned. He was a respected historian, an authority on military and naval warfare, a 
student of biological sciences, and a critic of writings on the sciences. TR also kept 
himself informed, knew how to seek out advice, and how to apply it. A cowboy, 
naturalist, politician, hunter, rancher, police commissioner, explorer and historian, TR 
was the renaissance man of his generation with an apparently never satisfied desire for 
knowledge and for action. In describing himself as a “literary feller” he assigned himself 
both high-brow and low-brow status: one that remarkably few Americans could have 
pulled off successfully in any age and one that helped make the Frontier Myth even 
more appealing to all classes of Americans. TR the old-wealth Establishment Easterner 
came to consider himself, in spirit, a bona fide Westerner and most Americans 
embraced him as such. Likewise his views of the frontier West carried an especially 
“awful stamp of authenticity” that no other national politician could match since, as TR 
himself wrote: “I have been part of all that I describe; I have seen things and done them; 
I have herded my own cattle, I have killed my own food; I have shot bears, captured 
horse-thieves and ‘stood off’ Indians. The descriptions are literally exact; few Eastern 
men have seen the wild life for themselves.”64 
 
The Virginian and the President 
In 1902, just months after Roosevelt became President, the publication of The 
Virginian: A Horseman of the Plains by TR’s old friend from his Harvard days, Owen 
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Wister, catapulted the frontier cowboy hero to immortality by elevating him to the 
status of icon and literary figure and beyond the status that dime novels could ascribe. 
The novelist Wister’s overall plot involving the heroic cowboy, the Virginian, evil villain, 
Trampas, and schoolmarm, Molly, would be replayed countless times throughout the 
twentieth century. Details of the story also recurred relentlessly. Wister’s creation of the 
showdown, the Western gunfight with all its attached rituals—including the villain 
giving the hero until sunset to leave town—would quickly become part of a larger 
structure known as ‘the code of the West’. David Murdoch observes: “Particularly in The 
Virginian, Wister gave the impression that the chivalry and honour of the cowboy was 
not merely the expression of an inner purity of spirit, but a well-understood code of 
behaviour which bound all men in the West—Trampas is a villain not just because he is 
a rustler, but because he shoots a man in the back.”65 The heroic Virginian, by contrast, 
was slow to anger but volcanic and invincible when aroused. Even later anti-hero 
characters were heavily influenced by the details Wister’s cowboy epic, with “no name” 
Virginians appearing in Akira Kurosawa’s samurai films and in the Westerns of Sergio 
Leone. None of these mythic characters would allow themselves to be pushed too far. 
Conservative columnist George F. Will once wrote that The Virginian hero’s iconic line: 
“When you call me that, smile!” could appear on the seal of the United States.66 
Like Roosevelt, Wister came from an established eastern family, underwent a 
neurotic crisis in his youth, and found personal regeneration in the West. His 
biographer, Gary Scharnhorst, writes that “paradoxically,” Wister was a class elitist who 
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created a folk hero.67 The novelist gave readers of his Virginian a near-perfect cultural 
hero for the Progressive era: a period dominated by aggressive and virile male heroes 
who were infused with values of both the primitive and the civilized. 
TR himself was “deeelighted!” with The Virginian and had every reason to be. 
Wister was the first writer to create a Western hero who was noble and chivalrous 
enough (due, in part, to his Southern origins) to marry a cultured, educated easterner. 
In doing so he unified the “best” elements of the nation’s supposedly polarized regions. 
As in TR’s The Rough Riders, Wister’s Virginian depicts and celebrates the triumph of 
national unity over the threat from sectionalism.  And the novelist’s own eastern 
heritage enabled him to communicate the frontier experience in a manner that seemed 
to blend the elements of James Fenimore Cooper and Horatio Alger—values that would 
resonate with his eastern contemporaries. Roosevelt wrote to his friend “old Brigham 
Smoot” (TR’s nickname for Wister) that he was “immensely proud of the dedication” of 
The Virginian to the President himself, adding that “I am genuinely proud to be 
associated with such a work.”68 And Roosevelt later lent credence to Wister’s 
romanticized tale when he wrote: 
 
I have sometimes been asked if Wister’s “Virginian” is not overdrawn; 
why, one of the men I have mentioned...was in all essentials the Virginian 
in real life, not only in his force but in his charm. Half of the men I 
worked with or played with and half of the men who soldiered with me 
afterwards in my regiment might have walked out of Wister’s stories or 
[Frederic] Remington’s picture.69 
 
                                                          
67 Gary Scharnhorst, Owen Wister and the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015): 4. 
68 Roosevelt to Wister, 29 May 1902, Container 33, Owen Wister Papers, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
69 Roosevelt’s autobiography quoted in Murdoch, The American West, 77. 
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Significantly, Wister’s cowman bore a strong resemblance to the new occupant of 
the White House himself (the book’s dedication to President Roosevelt was no 
coincidence). For many at the turn of the century, TR embodied the rugged, self-reliant, 
masculine cowboy hero who lived by a code and protected the less fortunate and 
becoming so prominent in popular literature and culture. Wister’s bringing together of 
all the elements of a classic American morality play also strongly facilitated the 
President’s self-promotion as the nation’s first cowboy Chief Executive. Biographer Gary 
Scharnhorst writes that: “Wister mythologized the western hero as a type of avenging 
angel who metes out justice. As Larzer Ziff concludes, Wister ‘produced a literature fit 
for the followers of Theodore Roosevelt, leaving his realism to smoulder in his journals 
while his fiction spoke of other things.’”70 The Virginian also underscored what TR’s 
image represented. “Strenuosity” personified the same types of national traits that he 
advocated and encouraged Americans to lead. For Roosevelt as President, the same 
courage and strength that his friend Wister had described as characterizing America’s 
frontier horsemen of the Old West, needed be applied to the problems of the modern 
age. 
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Figure 1.6: Printed in 1962, illustrator Everett Henry’s map entitled “The Virginian from 
America’s First ‘Western’ Novel, Written by Owen Wister” highlights various scenes from 
the story. The book struck a responsive chord with readers and critics throughout the 
twentieth century, and beyond. (Geography & Map Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC) 
 
The Virginian’s impact would be difficult to overestimate: it is possibly the most 
read novel ever written by an American.71 Wister’s success unleashed a tsunami of 
westerns, mostly cowboy books that found a huge market while carrying readers deeper 
and deeper into their belief in the Frontier Myth. Even today, Wister’s Virginian 
continues to be received by many Americans (and others) as a highly engaging and 
                                                          
71 The Virginian went through sixteen printings and sold 300,000 copies in its first year. More than 
2,000,000 hardcover copies had been sold by 1990 and there is no record of paperback sales. The book 
was the basis of five feature films and the 1960s TV series starring James Drury and Doug McClure. As the 
editors of the Time-Life series on the Old West put it, “The Virginian was the archetype that fixed the 
myth of the West.” (Robert Shulman, Introduction to Owen Wister, The Virginian: A Horseman of the 
Plains [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998], p. vii.). Also see Jane Kuenz, “The Cowboy 
Businessman and ‘The Course of Empire’: Owen Wister’s The Virginian,” Cultural Critique, Vol. 48 
(Spring 2001): 120. 
 
 
65 
 
believable personification of their “exceptional” national identity.72 In the first decade of 
the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt greatly benefitted from its immense success 
and timely publication. 
 
Conclusion 
With some help from his friends, the new President was poised to be the first 
occupant of the White House to deploy the Frontier Myth structure not only to foreign 
and domestic situations (events) but also to specific policy agendas that Roosevelt 
developed and implemented. TR’s Presidential administration and active years in 
politics which followed, would represent the first time that the myth became so 
entrenched as a wide-ranging framework that it could account for the complete range of 
the American national experience. The symbolism of the frontier seemingly matched 
historic experience to a “T” (as in Theodore), confirming and strengthening the myth—
just as Marshall Sahlins had contended in his work, Historical Metaphors and Mythical 
Realities. As Brian Dippie explained in The Vanishing American, these ideas had 
consequences as influential Americans accepted these evolving ideas as fact, they 
applied them to shifting government policies and programs. As the nation’s number one 
cowboy and commander in chief, Theodore Roosevelt—the myth personified—would 
now apply those lessons, values and ambitions of the frontier experience to bring 
significant change to the American political system and society: some to be achieved in 
the short term and others in the administrations of future presidents. When he took 
                                                          
72 For The Virginian’s enthusiastic reception among students in contemporary times, see Stanley 
Corkin, “Cowboys and Free Markets: Post-World War II Westerns and U.S. Hegemony,” Cinema Journal, 
Vol. 39, No. 3 (Spring 2000): 66-67. 
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office by accident in 1901, a new century was dawning that would see the Frontier Myth 
reach the peak of its influence in presidential politics and in American culture. 
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II. 
  
The Progressive Frontiers at Home and Abroad 
 
Theodore Roosevelt…said the spirit of the West was still 
alive. 
He spoke of progress. ‘The West stands for growth, for 
progress. So must the whole American people stand. A great 
democracy must be progressive or it will cease to be either 
great or democratic….It must either go forward or back, and 
it becomes useless if it goes backward.’ 
He spoke of pioneers. ‘As our civilization grows older and 
more complex…we need a greater and not less development 
of the fundamental frontier virtues. These virtues include the 
power of self-help, together with the power of joining with 
others for mutual help and, what is especially important, the 
feeling of comradeship and social good-fellowship. Any man 
who had the good fortune to live among the old frontier 
conditions must, in looking back, realize how vital was this 
feeling of general comradeship and social fellowship.’ 
 —The Washington Post (1910)73 
 
 
Introduction 
From the time of his Badlands days going forward, Theodore Roosevelt’s belief in 
and adherence to “frontier principles” would remain paramount in both his self-identity 
and his vision for the nation. As Americans underwent major societal changes at the 
turn of the century—and with Roosevelt now holding the highest office in the land—the 
structure of the Myth in terms of presidential politics would be defined with a sense of 
                                                          
73 “Cheyenne’s Big Day,” The Washington Post, August 28, 1910: 1; similar sentiments were 
expressed in Theodore Roosevelt, “The Pioneer Spirit and American Problems,” The Outlook (September 
10, 1910) reprinted in Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt. Memorial Edition. Volume 
XVIII (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925): 23. In the article, though, TR also applies these “pioneer 
virtues” to foreign policy: in particular, the cruise of the Great White Fleet around the world and the 
digging of the Panama Canal. 
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liberal optimism, proactive government, unity and purpose that would dramatically 
shape the contours of national politics for decades to come.  
Roosevelt was not only the first but, arguably, the most fascinating of the Cowboy 
Presidents because he lived out his life and career with the constant aim of self-
improvement and progress. By the end of the nineteenth century, especially after the 
announcement of the closing of the frontier, Americans strongly desired a cure and 
healing of their social wounds and the seeming malaise of their condition. They were 
amazed by what industrialization had achieved but also painfully aware of the fact that it 
had destroyed a great deal of what they regarded as unique about their nation too. The 
power of machines and the nature of America’s cities left the impression that they had 
strengthened the country at the price of weakening Americans as a people. The public 
experienced deep aspirations and anxieties over these changes. This milieu fed the 
powerful ideas of the Frontier Myth, and with some less than subtle direction from their 
on-the-spot Frontier President, Americans endeavoured to work through these tensions 
in an era of rapid change. 
 
Pioneer Principles for a New Century 
As discussed in Chapter I, long before Theodore Roosevelt reached the Presidency 
he had been praising frontiersman and pioneers who spread American institutions and 
the spirit of freedom. TR himself had become revered for his cowboy image. Now using 
the “bully pulpit” of the Presidency, he would put this philosophy to action on a broad 
scale. The message he drilled into a crowd in Colorado Springs was the same as he 
would deliver across the country. America’s frontier pioneers were, he said, “at once the 
strongest and most liberty-loving among all the people who had been thrust out into 
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new continents.” He insisted that every American had an obligation in both their public 
and private lives to serve the principles of the pioneers including loyalty to the United 
States, bravery, toughness, responsibility, freedom, integrity and fairness. These spirited 
traits of the Frontier West, Roosevelt contended, were the prescription for the success of 
any nation.74 It was an inclusive message of American exceptionalism and hope, steeped 
in Frontier Myth that rang true in the minds of millions of Americans of his day and 
would be used again more than half a century later, for different purposes, by fellow 
“Frontier” Progressive Lyndon Johnson. 
John Morton Blum observes that almost from the moment he took office, 
“Roosevelt yearned to grapple, as no president yet had, with the whole complex political 
and social agenda of modern industrial society.”75 Approaching the presidency with the 
same kind of whoop and enthusiasm he had shown in the Badlands, Roosevelt used the 
precepts of the Frontier Myth to support his expansion of the presidency and to take on 
responsibilities that his recent predecessors had not even imagined. TR also kept his 
mind open on domestic issues most of the time and had the rare ability to grasp and stay 
ahead of where the nation was moving: positioning himself just a little out in front and 
pulling the American public along with him. Roosevelt accepted massive corporations as 
a fact of early twentieth century life but also consistently championed the rights of 
ordinary Americans against the “Powers that Prey” and their corporate wealth.76 With a 
deeper understanding of the wider world than that possessed by most of his 
contemporaries, some of his most important presidential positions on foreign policy 
would likewise, arguably, prove ahead of their time. In particular, Roosevelt’s way of 
                                                          
74 Theodore Roosevelt’s Address at Colorado Springs quoted in and paraphrased from Rego, 
American Ideal, 124-125. 
75 John Morton Blum, The Progressive Presidents, 26. 
76 TR quoted in Rego, American Ideal, 57. 
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thinking about the United States role in world affairs—including its new role as an active 
power, the need for a close Anglo-American alliance, and use of credible deterrent 
power—would become what amounted to the conventional wisdom in the mid-twentieth 
century.  
The era of Roosevelt’s presidency was a kind of watershed period where the 
Frontier Myth and presidential politics became inescapably intertwined. But to a greater 
degree than any other President before or since, what Roosevelt did in the years after he 
left the White House, also had a dramatic impact on the course of US politics and 
government in the twentieth century. As political historian Arthur Link once described 
it, TR’s post-presidential “Confession of Faith” at the 1912 Bull Moose Party convention 
was “’a statement of the most advanced thought of the time.’”77 A discussion of Theodore 
Roosevelt’s activities and the Frontier Myth during these post-presidential years is thus 
essential to understanding the relationship between mythic structures and American 
politics. 
 
TR’s “Big Stick” Philosophy on the International Stage 
 
While Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the 1890s, Roosevelt had pushed hard for 
naval expansion and a greater role for the United States in the Western hemisphere. 
After he became President these visions came to fruition, most notably: the 
strengthening of the Navy, securing of the right to build the Panama Canal, successful 
containment of the Germans and Japanese, and American hegemony in the Caribbean.  
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TR’s great respect for the skills of the frontiersman and citizen soldier tradition, which 
he believed came directly out of Americans experience out West, encouraged Roosevelt 
to reorganize and modernize the military. Relatedly, in his view, perceived evil 
aggression and insult could only be overcome through strength, courage and 
preparedness. TR liked to tell the American public that whether on the hunt or alone on 
the frontier, he had ensured that he was always well armed in the event of trouble. 
Similarly Roosevelt expected that the US should be able to defend itself and protect its 
interests in the sometimes dangerous frontier of international politics. In explaining his 
“speak softly and carry a big stick” philosophy (based on an old African proverb), TR 
recalled his experiences at law enforcement in North Dakota. In one example, Roosevelt 
explained: “Years ago I served as a deputy sheriff in the cattle country. Of course I 
prepared in advance for my job. I carried what was then the best type of revolver, a .45 
self-cocker. I was instructed never to use it unless it was absolutely necessary to do so, 
and I obeyed instructions. But if in the interest of ‘peace’ it had been proposed to arm 
me only with a .22 revolver, I would promptly have resigned my job.”78 TR frequently 
drew such lessons from and analogies between his days on the frontier and projected 
these into his future vision for international affairs: an approach which had considerable 
impact in an era when his fellow Americans looked to the Old Frontier for guidance.  
Before, during and after his presidency, Roosevelt often asked his fellow 
Americans to ask themselves, essentially, what would Daniel Boone or Davy Crockett 
have done? In his writings, TR wanted to revive a frontier spirit both at home and in 
foreign relations and wrote himself into the ranks of legendary frontier heroes – all 
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seasoned in the West. His frontier stories were intended to energize modern life, politics 
and civilization, which TR fully embraced. Roosevelt wrote in the fifth volume of his 
Winning of the West series that those who denied this need for preparedness were 
“either so ignorant or of such lukewarm patriotism that they do not wish to see the 
United States prepared for war.”79 Again readers were asked to ponder how a mountain 
man or frontiersman would have fared in their ongoing life and death challenges if they 
too had been similarly unprepared. The Roosevelt Administration’s “big stick” 
philosophy, along with their head ranchman’s own Western frontier dictum: “Don’t 
draw unless you mean to shoot,” permeated many aspects of its foreign policy. Roosevelt 
believed that his experience in the West had taught him how his nation should behave in 
the international arena and used the myth to promote his foreign policy agenda in 
response to events of his day. Significantly, as historian H.W. Brands contends: “For all 
his strenuous life, glory-of-war language, Roosevelt as president conspicuously skirted 
such opportunities for war as they presented themselves. He fully understood the 
difference between carrying a big stick and having to use it.”80 And as will be discussed 
in later chapters, TR’s approach to world affairs both shaped and was shaped by a liberal 
and inclusive Frontier Myth structure that would be employed by some of his 
presidential successors.  
 
Roosevelt’s Forward-Looking and Strategic Cowboy Diplomacy 
                                                          
79 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, Volume 5, pp. 229-230 quoted in Richard Slotkin, 
“Nostalgia and Progress: Theodore Roosevelt’s Myth of the Frontier,” American Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5 
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Roosevelt went global with his “big stick” and “gospel of strenuosity” when he 
pushed aggressively for the construction of the Panama Canal in 1903. For a leader so 
sensitive to the role of naval power and its impact on foreign relations, nothing to his 
mind could be more important than the linking of the Atlantic to the Pacific—which 
allowed the American fleet to pass quickly from one coast of the United States to the 
other. Roosevelt was convinced that “If we are to be a really great people, we must strive 
in good faith to play a great part in the world....81 TR was determined not to allow 
strategic places in the world to fall into the hands of powers that might undermine 
American interests. Brands contends that it is for these reasons that he kept a close 
reign on the Hawaiian Islands, where Japan might be the challenger, and the Caribbean, 
where Germany was viewed as meddling in the affairs of the Western hemisphere. But 
while TR advanced important goals in American foreign policy, and at times 
aggressively so, he was not an advocate of an empire for the sake of having one: apart 
from some key naval bases and supply stations, as president he had no ambitions for 
acquiring territory and was even less interested in managing the affairs of others. As as 
Commander-in-Chief, he revealed a side of his personality that would prove 
indispensable to America’s respect and reputation abroad: caution and tact.  
Roosevelt’s levelheadedness and inclination to look forward to future frontiers 
helped to make him an outstanding strategic thinker with a knack for predicting a 
number of world upheavals that would occur both during his lifetime and decades after 
his death. Roosevelt thought deep and hard about strategic affairs. The President’s 
personal efforts on behalf of security and world peace and his innovative commitment to 
the idea of a balance of power in the world—something he had advocated for during his 
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lawman days out West—provided a model that would be heavily relied on by his 
executive office successors in the years following the Second World War. As President, 
Roosevelt kept America out of war and helped prevent tensions between other nations 
from escalating into war. As he told one of his closest friends, British diplomat Cecil 
Spring Rice, “we must trust in the Lord and keep our powder dry and our eyes open.”82 
For TR, the best way to stay out of war was to remain well-prepared for it. By the end of 
his presidency, the United States had moved up the ladder from the world’s fifth to the 
second most powerful naval nation—second only to Great Britain.83 In 1907, the 
successful and “pioneering” circumnavigation of the globe by the “Great White Fleet” 
was considered by Roosevelt himself to be his most important contribution to world 
peace. TR’s views in foreign policy, as in domestic affairs, continued to evolve 
throughout his lifetime as did the Frontier Myth: he was a man of the twentieth century 
who took lessons from the frontier past about toughness, and a moral obligation to stop 
unnecessary wars that did not involve American national interests. Roosevelt looked not 
only to his past experiences Out West but to new frontiers – believing that American 
ingenuity and spirit would help propel his nation to world leadership status in the 
century ahead. And he greatly benefitted (for the most part) from the fact that his 
cowboy hero persona, sometimes consciously and other times not, helped to achieve his 
goals along the way.  
TR’s cowboy/Rough Rider persona was a potent national and international 
symbol. When Roosevelt visited the ongoing works at the Panama Canal project in 
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November 1906, his own celebrity status as a Western hero was celebrated in Panama 
City where he was welcomed by “great throngs of people and was escorted to the 
cathedral steps by a specially organized squad of ‘Panamanian Rough Riders,’ clothed in 
Rough Rider uniform and mounted upon prancing horses.” The most famous photo of 
Roosevelt in Panama, on what was the first foreign trip ever taken by a sitting president, 
showed him having substituted his horse with one of the giant steam shovels at work 
digging out the Culebra Cut. TR sits as calmly at the controls as he would in the saddle, 
surveying the work around him. The construction of the Canal, as Michael T. Brown 
asserts, “marked the triumph of [specifically American] industrial technology over the 
chaos of the tropics” as “new technological icons emerged that glorified the power of 
engineering, and Roosevelt was a key part of the process.”84 
Theodore Roosevelt’s personal fascination and embrace of new technologies 
became an integral part of his frontier persona and outlook as well. He was the first 
president to embrace numerous ground-breaking inventions of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. These included, among other things, putting in an appearance 
in front of motion picture cameras whenever he was given the opportunity, being 
submerged in a Naval submarine, and taking to the air without any protective gear in a 
modified version of the Wright Brothers Flyer. TR was seen by the public as opening up 
new frontiers for the century ahead. This conflation of the Western myth and 
intellectual frontiers—joining the past to the future—developed into a peculiar and 
prominent feature of the twentieth century Frontier Myth that carried on through the 
age of space flight. TR was repeatedly portrayed through the motion picture camera 
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itself as an adventurous pioneer type who did dangerous things as he led the nation in 
conquering new challenges in the air above or under the sea. Roosevelt and the Frontier 
Myth now came to be closely identified not only with earlier generations out West but 
with innovation and new technologies. Frontier imagery, in this sense, could be 
compared to the rapid pace of change and Roosevelt could commend Americans for 
their role in shaping that change and the nation’s destiny. In the field of foreign 
relations, TR liked to identify “the two great feats” of America’s technology over the 
period of his presidency: the sending of the “Great White Fleet” of American battleships 
around the world on its “peace mission” and the successful digging of the Panama 
Canal. Both deeds of the nation, Roosevelt wrote in The Outlook in 1910, had been made 
possible by a combination of new knowledge and training combined with the “old 
virtues.” Indeed, TR wrote, “the need for the special and distinctive pioneer virtues is as 
great as ever.”85 These virtues included many of the same ones that Turner had 
identified years before along with a new one: the steady determination to “work for the 
common good, for the advancement of mankind.”86 
At the 1915 Panama-Pacific International Exposition in San Francisco, Franklin E. 
Lane, Secretary of the Interior, spoke at the opening of the festivities and made this 
Roosevelt connection between national history and the triumph of technology specific. 
Lane celebrated the tremendous task of literally moving mountains to build the canal 
that allowed America to control the seas. Looking forward to the decades ahead he 
declared that while this frontier adventure may have closed, the spirit of “the sons of the 
pioneers” would live on: “The long journey of this light figure of the pioneer is at an 
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end,” Lane told the large crowd, “the waste places of earth have been found and filled, 
but the adventure is not at an end; the greatest adventure before us, the gigantic 
adventures of advancing democracy—strong, virile, kindly—and in that advance we shall 
be the true indestructible spirit of the American pioneer.”87 The pioneer had thus 
fulfilled his destiny of settling the frontier west and connecting the continent but the 
mission continued for, as Michael T. Brown observes, “the spirit of the iconic figure of 
the pioneer remains, put to use in the ongoing expansion of a powerful nation.”88 These 
events related to modernization and technical prowess were thus mutually informing. 
During Roosevelt’s era and in keeping with the contentions of anthropologist Sahlins, 
they served to strengthen a Frontier Myth as images of the past and hopes for the future 
reinforced one another. 
Significantly, in Roosevelt’s day (and as already suggested), more references were 
still being made to frontiersmen and pioneers than to the more recent late nineteenth 
century, western, cowboy hero. Davy Crockett, Daniel Boone and those frontiersmen 
and tough pioneers who were said to have wrested American civilization out of a savage 
wilderness remained the most talked about of the frontier heroes across the country. For 
Roosevelt and his fellow Americans at the outset of the twentieth century, the frontier 
was not only limited to the West of the late nineteenth century but also included the 
frontiersmen, mountain men and pioneers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
East, Mid-West, Southwest and Far West. But as we shall see in Chapter III, as the 
cowboy and gunfighter imagery spring-boarded by president/historian Roosevelt, the 
artist Remington, author Wister, and showman Buffalo Bill Cody took hold and 
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expanded into an enormous “Western” industry during the early to mid-twentieth 
century. As a result, it was this cowboy hero west of the Mississippi that would take 
center stage and help shape the content and expression of presidential foreign and 
domestic policies. 
From 1901 to 1909, the main elements of the thinking behind Roosevelt’s style of 
foreign policy not only included security interests but moral obligations: or more 
precisely, the Myth’s philosophy of exceptionalism. TR, like most of his fellow 
Americans, believed in his heart that other peoples of the world could not really improve 
their lot unless they attempted to copy the United States. Historian Norman Graebner 
comments that “Manifest destiny left a heritage that continued into the twentieth 
century in the form of American Exceptionalism—a belief that the country had a 
superior virtue and obligation to correct the world’s ills.”89 But TR’s application of this 
principle differed from other presidents who preceded and immediately succeeded him. 
Roosevelt had a coherent overall strategy to select those areas of the world of vital 
interest to the United States (including the Western hemisphere, the Pacific and allied 
nations in Europe) and focused his attentions there—not everywhere that seemed to be 
threatened. In retrospect, Roosevelt’s vision for America’s extended frontier, his overall 
strategic plan was arguably decades ahead of its time. And as we shall see in later 
chapters of this study, his successors in the 1940s through the 1960s would rely 
increasingly on the Frontier Myth to garner support both spiritually and materially for 
this vision. 
 
The Reasonable Cowboy 
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The hawkish view of Roosevelt as President, popular among historians, stems from 
his substantive build-up and modernization of the American military, his 
interventionism in the Caribbean and Central America, and his plethora of public 
pronouncements about national strength and the need for global influence of America’s 
new great power status. But like a few political cartoonists of his day (see L.C. Gregg’s 
1904 cartoon in Figure 2.1, below), some scholars of diplomacy have had a tendency to 
overplay TR’s role as a warrior, especially in the years following his Rough Rider days. 
Thomas Bailey, for example, characterized Roosevelt as “an apostle of Mars” in his 
classic, A Diplomatic History of the American People.90 On occasion while in the White 
House, TR would show flashes of his loud and bullying rhetoric—but for the most part, 
this dissertation contends that he displayed rare talent for complex and sophisticated 
strategic thought and devoted much of his energies toward maintaining the peace. The 
American public, after all, was benefitting substantially from the status quo of the early 
twentieth century. At the same time they recognized their nation’s new role as a leading 
player in world affairs. In this milieu, TR established a kind of model and plan for future 
presidents which confirmed America’s coming-of-age in the arena of foreign policy. 
The Frontier Myth of Roosevelt’s presidential years was a forward looking 
phenomenon and as the nation’s number one personification of this myth, TR 
concurrently was a future leaning, twentieth-century man. His enthusiasm for foreign 
ventures and imperialism waned after he entered the White House. But President TR, in 
keeping with the emerging liberal Myth of his day, still showed a strong willingness to 
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commit resources and deploy government influence against perceived threats and in 
support of vital interests—including those within the United States (such as corporate 
corruption) and from outside. In the arena of foreign affairs, he would now rely not only 
military “muscle” but on a judicious blending with informed and strategic diplomacy. 
The liberal Frontier Myth and Roosevelt’s promotion and pursuit of 
internationalism was in direct contrast to that of his political opponents in the more 
reactionary Democratic Party of William Jennings Bryan and the later, conservative 
GOP of the 1930s and early 1940s—which by then had reoriented itself as the party of 
isolationism. “Theodore Rex’s”91  active involvement in international affairs (a policy 
later revived by the failure of appeasement in Europe and the outbreak of World War 
II), creation of a credible deterrent power, and efforts to solidify and Anglo-American 
alliance. All became key foundations of American foreign policy from 1945 onward.  
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Figure 2.1: “For President!” TR as fanatic militarist. A view held over in large part from his 
pre-presidential years (L.C. Gregg, Atlanta Constitution, 1904).  
 
Figure 2.2: TR’s Great White Fleet of 1907-1909 as “President Roosevelt’s Idea of the Dove 
of Peace” (W.C. Morris, Spokane Spokesman-Review). According to TR, every nation had 
accepted the cruise of the American battle fleet around the world as “proof that we were 
not only desirous ourselves to keep peace, but able to prevent the peace being broken at 
our expense.”92 
 
Today, the phrase “Cowboy diplomacy” has taken on connotations of international 
bullying and recklessness but in his day Roosevelt’s style of diplomacy was much more 
sophisticated and diversified. Brands has argued persuasively that Roosevelt has to be 
ranked right at the top of the presidents as a strategic thinker.93 Perhaps the exercise of 
power had a softening influence on Roosevelt. Having purged himself of the need to 
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prove his manhood after the stint with the Rough Riders in Cuba, TR as President 
seemed much less prone to speaking the language of a warmonger. Roosevelt was far 
more reflective and cautious when he spoke for the United States as its President than 
when he spoke merely for himself. As contended earlier in this chapter, he carried a big 
stick but usually spoke softly as a reasonable cowboy who preferred not to use force 
unless American interests were seen as directly threatened.94 TR, the former ardent 
imperialist, now turned his attention to building up a strong defense at home and 
dropped the idea of further expansion. By 1907, he even came to believe that the US 
would be better off getting out of the Philippines (America’s “Achilles heel” in 
Roosevelt’s thinking) and that its annexation had been a mistake. Three years later he 
called for the creation of a League of Peace.  Like the best of the twentieth century’s 
cowboy heroes, TR had an impressive range of personal skills and tools at his disposal to 
achieve his nation’s objectives and to get the job done. 
Perhaps the best known example of the cautious Roosevelt was his mediation of 
the Russo-Japanese War for which he was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize on December 
10, 1906. This peacemaker role for Roosevelt seems especially significant as it provides a 
window into his wider thinking by the time he had entered the presidency. To prevent 
the Japanese from becoming too powerful and to keep some semblance of a balance of 
power in northeast Asia, TR made use of the presidency to act as a mediator between 
Japan and Russia. It was tricky business for as he told his son Kermit: “I am having my 
hair turned gray by dealing with the Russian and Japanese peace negotiators. The 
Japanese ask too much…but the Russians are ten times worse than the Japs because 
they are so stupid and won’t tell the truth.” Eventually, though, he convinced the 
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Russians to face reality and the Japanese to tame their demands. The resulting Treaty of 
Portsmouth kept Japanese expansion in check without requiring the use of American 
gunplay and won Roosevelt international recognition as a reasonable, even 
“peacemaking” cowboy. Increasingly the Frontier Myth was establishing itself in the 
world of foreign relations as a phenomenon where a cowboy president could use his 
diplomatic skills to rope in international “yahoos” and was not limited to employing his 
shotgun or revolver.95 In a similar vain to his domestic policies, the maturing TR was 
willing to listen and to make an effort to understand others across their cultural and 
political differences: to explore new frontiers in the arena of ideas. As the first American 
to win a Nobel Peace Prize, he also helped the United States to gain greater respect and 
leverage among foreign nations. 
 
The Frontiers of Race, Gender and Inclusiveness 
 
Richard White, Patricia Limerick and the “new western” historians have chastised 
both Theodore Roosevelt and Frederick Jackson Turner as the foremost proponents of 
Anglo-American settlement on the continent. Both men, in Limerick’s words, believed 
that the frontier was “where white people got scarce, or alternatively, where white people 
got scared.”96 These New West historians, writes Douglas Brinkley, contend that 
Roosevelt treated Native tribes, Spanish settlers, and even French Canadians as “riffraff 
who needed to be cleared away like so many weeds.”97 Anglo-Saxon frontiersmen, on the 
other hand, could seemingly do no wrong. At best, they assert, the Natives in The 
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Winning of the West were portrayed as noble savages. White, Limerick and Company 
are correct to point out that Roosevelt’s early ethnocentrism was a widely accepted 
aspect of the late nineteenth century Social Darwinism. Part of his narrowness was no 
doubt part of a larger American response to the greater number of immigrants from an 
increasingly mixed array of ethnic groups who immigrated into the country in the 1880s 
and 1890s. But as Kathleen Dalton’s excellent study has convincingly argued, as years 
passed TR took on a more liberal and compassionate view towards race, class and 
gender issues than the New West historians have given him credit for. Dalton and other 
scholars such as Elliot West, have brought perspective to the studies of TR.98 Over time, 
an array of his youthful prejudices faded and even disappeared and Roosevelt’s ideas 
about other demographic groups became more complex and experienced.  
TR’s attitudes about race were flexible and evolved into much more sympathetic 
and inclusive views with each passing decade. As Thomas G. Dyer explains in his 
comprehensive study, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race, by the early twentieth 
century, the learned President now insisted “that if he were to rewrite his histories he 
would use neither the terms Scotch-Irish nor Anglo-Saxon” as he had done frequently in 
The Winning of the West. 99 TR was also “‘very doubtful’” that such thing as an “Aryan” 
race had ever existed.100 Though he had once viewed blacks as hopelessly inferior and 
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supported some immigration restriction gimmicks, later in life the tenets of scientific 
racism made him ill.101  
By the time he had become president, Roosevelt was much more interested in fully 
integrating Native Americans, African-Americans and other minorities into the fabric of 
national life than in armchair eugenics. His own account of the Rough Riders, a 
founding document that helped shape and was shaped by turn-of-the-century Frontier 
Myth, is in large part the story of how a group of individuals overcame their wide 
ranging differences to work together as one united unit with a similar purpose: to 
liberate the persecuted Cubans. And these Riders, he pointed out, were made up of 
whites, blacks, American Indians, cowboys, farmers, and soldiers from all regions of the 
country. TR showered praise on Native American members of the Rough Riders and 
stated (though very paternalistically) that some Native communities were now worthy of 
“‘absolute equality with our citizens of white blood.’”102 No longer viewed as a threat or 
obstacle to progress, Roosevelt wanted to welcome and embrace Native Americans as 
part of the broader mix of the American nation: provided it was on terms that he 
perceived would strengthen rather than weaken national unity. Meanwhile TR’s well-
known invitation of Booker T. Washington, founder of the Tuskegee Institute, for dinner 
in 1904 had made him the first president to entertain a black man in the White House. 
Roosevelt claimed that he did not know any single white Southerner who was as decent a 
man as his friend Washington. TR also appointed several accomplished blacks to 
substantive federal offices. Many white Southerners were livid, viewing these actions 
and associations as a direct challenge to Jim Crow. One South Carolina appointment 
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that sparked considerable controversy prompted Roosevelt to reply in his 
correspondence: “I cannot consent to take the position that the door of hope—the door 
of opportunity—is to be shut upon any man, no matter how worthy, purely upon the 
grounds of race or color. Such an attitude would, according to my convictions, be 
fundamentally wrong.” 103 
Roosevelt did not completely escape the racism of his times, though, and measured 
by today’s terms stumbled badly at least twice in his presidential and post-presidential 
years. On one occasion in 1906, TR ordered that all the men of a black regiment be 
discharged without trial after a white bartender was killed in an allegedly wild midnight 
raid in Brownsville, Texas. Then, six years later and for reasons of political expediency, 
he relented to Southern delegates’ insistence that black delegates should not be seated at 
the “lily white” 1912 Progressive Party Convention. TR’s critics were given plenty of 
ammunition here and used it with some effectiveness. 
But despite these two inconsistencies, Roosevelt was not the one-dimensional, 
bombastic racist that some “New West” scholars have portrayed. As President, TR’s 
views fit closely with those of his friend Booker T. Washington. Historian John Gable 
explains that “‘Roosevelt did not think that any race was inherently or biologically 
inferior to any other. But he was anthropologically and philosophically provincial in his 
views of culture and ‘civilization.’”104 At odds with his three close friends Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Owen Wister and Frederic Remington—who each longed for a purely Anglo-
Saxon nation—TR came to celebrate hybridity among race, especially between Native 
Americans and whites. As President, he asserted that individuals needed to be judged on 
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their abilities and nothing else, preached broad-mindedness, and encouraged Americans 
to put away their regional differences. The maturing Roosevelt came to possess a deep 
and abiding faith in the power of simply living in America to break down all racial and 
ethnic barriers and to produce a kind of common American identity. Roosevelt moved 
about as far away from the racism of his day as one could and helped carry the 
increasingly liberal Frontier Myth with him: embracing the idea of the “Melting Pot” 
years before Israel Zangwill even coined the phrase for his 1912 play which was aptly 
dedicated to TR.  
Roosevelt’s thoughts on race and on the need for a unified nation based on the 
frontier virtues were revealed vividly in his speeches and correspondence. 
Conservationist and Aryan supremacist Madison Grant, who Theodore Roosevelt 
corresponded with for many years, once wrote to TR about a man who claimed he could 
demonstrate with evidence that men from white, old-stock American units of New 
England and the South fought better than other races in the First World War. Blacks and 
the “lower races” this gent reported, “cannot stand the strain of the war.”105 But 
Roosevelt would have none of this and called that man “an addlepated ass and the 
alternative is worse.” TR responded that one’s ethnicity made no difference since men of 
foreign backgrounds from around the country, including Jews, fought well. Region was 
also irrelevant to Roosevelt: “I don’t for one moment believe that they are better than the 
men from the western and middle Pacific Coast States. They are all fine.” For TR, 
regardless of race or region, all Americans who had a spark of Galahad or of the 
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frontiersman did their part in the war, fighting against the “unendurable” trait of “race 
prejudice” found among their German enemies.106 
Roosevelt had once bought fully into the late-nineteenth century racism that in 
time would spawn a resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s. But TR, like some of 
his other fellow countrymen and women, had seen the patriotic support of blacks with 
the Rough Riders in Cuba and later in the First World War and this appears to have 
enabled him to accept racial equality and repudiate racists like Madison Grant. His 
initially harsh descriptions of Native Americans had softened during his presidential 
years as well. According to historian Thomas G. Dyer, this was all part of TR’s “growing 
sense of social justice and reform.”107 Again, Roosevelt seemed to be able to see beyond 
the bigotry of his own time and major events, the World Wars in particular, helped 
broaden the parameters of the national Frontier Myth itself, making it generally more 
inclusive. Further, it was one’s character, rather than race, which made them a success 
or failure in the wilderness and in modern American life. By the time of his presidency, 
Roosevelt sought to pull the nation together and though he was not, even with the 
changing parameters of the myth, able to overcome the barriers to judging individuals 
based on merit, he did strongly deliver a new message at the dawn of the twentieth 
century that inclusion and equality were a key cornerstone of national unity. In the quest 
for a unique and uniform American culture, based on the equalizing frontier experience, 
Roosevelt utterly rejected ethnic “hyphenation.”108 It could even be argued that the 
integrationist dreams of Martin Luther King and future Frontier President Lyndon 
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Baines Johnson grew out of the same source of civic nationalism that TR and others 
were advocating at the outset of the twentieth century. 
Race and region were not the only inclusiveness issues to engage Roosevelt. On the 
issue of gender politics, TR was the first prominent male political figure to openly 
endorse nationwide women’s suffrage. Though he had tended to avoid the suffrage issue 
during his Presidency, in 1912 he waded into the issue and, in his autobiography 
published the following year, referred to himself as a “zealous supporter” of women’s 
suffrage. But how could this symbol of frontier masculinity help lead the charge for 
women’s rights? Historian Arnaldo Testi contends that TR’s deference to women’s 
politics and social reform was possible not despite his cowboy machismo but because of 
it: no one could accuse Rough Rider, ranchman Roosevelt of being an effeminate 
reformer.109 
 
 
“The Cult of the Wild”: Conservation Policy and the Power of the Changing 
Frontier Myth 
 
Coinciding but not coincidental to Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, a “Cult of the 
Wild” emerged in the early twentieth century as a celebration of wilderness and the 
frontier. This cult-like phenomenon grew in opposition to the material occupation of an 
increasing regimented and industrialized society. For the first time, the idea of a 
vanishing, unspoiled wilderness was looked upon by a wide range of Americans with 
regret. The “Wilderness Cult” was inspired by John Muir, Aldo Leopold, et al, and 
committed to protecting the wilderness and promoting those frontier values which its 
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members believed had made America great. Muir, an original founder of the Sierra 
Club, acted as a kind of publicizer, a person who echoed the ideas of Henry David 
Thoreau and in the changing context of the times was able to articulate and promote 
them with an enthusiasm that drew widespread attention. Even Owen Wister got into 
the act. In The Virginian, the novelist reveals that he was sickened by the piles of trash 
that littered the Western frontier. The narrator describes “the empty sardine 
box…rusting over the face of the Western earth” and the “thick heaps and fringes of tin 
cans, and shelving mounds of bottles cast out of the saloons: on ‘the ramparts of 
Medicine Bow.’”110 President Roosevelt’s belief that contact with wilderness would help 
the country rid itself of “flabbiness” and “slothful ease” was also influential.111 With 
irony Roderick Nash observes in Wilderness and the American Mind, that enthusiasm 
for the wilderness began in the cities, not in the wilds, and that this appreciation 
increased as the nation’s pioneer past receded and came to rely on it less—with the 
“wilderness cult” emerging just as Turner lamented that the frontier was vanishing.112 
In his recent work, The Wilderness Warrior: Theodore Roosevelt and the Crusade 
for America (2009), historian Douglas Brinkley contends that both the changing values 
of the times and Theodore Roosevelt’s exposure to natural wonders in his early life also 
shaped his environmental values and policies as president. Changes in values at the turn 
of the century brought about changes in thinking about the frontier that would again 
directly and substantively influence presidential policy decisions. While in office, TR set 
aside five times more lands to create federal parks than all of his presidential 
predecessors combined: establishing the first five national parks, 51 wildlife refuges, 18 
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national monuments, four national game preserves and 21 national federal reclamation 
projects. During Roosevelt’s years in office, US forest reserves shot up from about 43 
million acres to 194 million acres: an area larger than the combined land mass of 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands.113 Centralization of national resources into the 
hands of the national government, rather than business and private interests, was key to 
this process. All along Roosevelt, with some irony (given his well-known hunting 
exploits), cast the frontiersman as one who used the environment wisely. TR 
emphasized a Frontier Myth where its finite nature was tied directly to economic 
opportunity while, at the same time, he tended to deemphasize its value for business 
interests in favour of its spiritual value. Conservation of the remaining American 
wilderness frontier did more than just help secure the nation’s economic future: it 
provided the opportunity for regenerating the American spirit. 
As President, TR not only perpetuated the myths and symbols of the Frontier Myth 
he helped adjust and reshape the emphasis of those myths as well. As a rancher, he had 
foreseen the risks of overgrazing while also developing a strong desire to protect public 
lands for the benefit of everyone rather than only the privileged classes. Now the frontier 
would not merely be a source of wealth but become a key means for achieving 
wilderness conservation. As William Cronon observes, “In the myth of the vanishing 
frontier lay the seeds of wilderness preservation in the United States, for if the wild land 
had been so crucial in the making of the nation, then surely one must save its last 
remnants as monuments to the American past—and as an insurance policy to protect its 
future.”114 By the dawn of the twentieth century, the wild frontier out West was 
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becoming increasingly appreciated not only for its resource value but as a scarce site of 
national identity formation. After all, for Roosevelt, Turner and other promoters of the 
Myth, the frontier process had been the crucial experience that had enabled Americans 
to forge their unique, democratic national identity. The rapid urbanization and 
industrialization of the United States appeared to them and to millions of Americans to 
threaten all of this. Manliness, vigour, and strength could only be maintained by helping 
preserve those national spaces where the story could be lived out.  
Fittingly then, in his first annual presidential message to Congress in December 
1901, TR clearly set out his conservation agenda with an emphasis on its democratic 
incentives. “The forest reserves should be set apart forever,” Roosevelt declared, “for the 
use and benefit of our people as a whole and not sacrificed to the shortsighted greed of a 
few.”115 Conserving nature and making it available to all citizens for rest and recreation 
was not only vital because it provided them a break away from the anxieties of the 
urban, industrial life but also because by implication it strengthened democracy. 
Valuing the wilderness as the nation’s main source of masculine vigor and democratic 
fortification made its preservation a matter of national health. For more than a decade, 
TR had been a key figure in promoting the Cult of the Wild which tapped directly into 
this concept: contact with (and relatedly protection of) the wilderness would help 
America rid itself of its perceived “flabbiness” and “slothful ease.”116 As a result, TR’s 
version of the myth dictated that it was vital to provide all classes of Americans space to 
experience the frontier. The Boone and Crockett Club had been part of this effort to save 
wilderness so that the Frontier Myth could be perpetuated and new stories of frontier 
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adventure told. Now Roosevelt wanted to broaden this opportunity to all Americans 
regardless of class.  
With the successful implementation of the Antiquities Act (1906) in his second 
term Roosevelt became more proactive and more dangerous to western developers, oil 
interests, and railroad companies than ever. The first “green” President even used his 
attire to deploy America’s most powerful myth in the service of wilderness protection. 
Brinkley describes how TR typically wore a Stetson with a bandana around his neck, and 
filled his public speeches with cowboy talk, Indian words, and western place names 
seldom heard in the east. Using his bully pulpit in Washington, he cast himself as a 
Rocky Mountain westerner to help promote his radical conservationism. His Western 
symbolism was not only intended to represent a region but the entire nation. After all, 
America had initially been all frontier and this, so went the implication, had provided 
for a unique American past and national identity. Powerful business interests who saw 
these ideas as a direct threat to their own profits, along with political allies of the timber 
industry became enraged at Cowboy TR. Republican Senator Charles Fulton of Oregon 
and others in Congress believed the entire Antiquities Act was nonsense and were fed up 
with executive orders that gave priority to spotted owls and petrified wood over 
corporate profit. But their anger only emboldened Roosevelt. On March 2, 1907, TR 
created 32 new forest reserves overnight catching Congress off-guard and delivering a 
devastating counterthrust to those promoting states’ rights. It was perhaps the boldest 
example of Roosevelt’s “unappeasable conservationism.”117 According to Fulton, TR and 
Pinchot had sneakily withdrawn 16 million acres. “Why didn’t Roosevelt burn the 
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Constitution while he was at it?” some business interests asked.118 But TR later boasted 
about his success in An Autobiography: “The opponents of the Forest Reserve turned 
handsprings in their wrath; and dire were their threats against the Executive: but the 
threats could not be carried out, and were really only a tribute to the efficiency of our 
action.”119 
Just before leaving office in 1909, Roosevelt once again described the need to 
adhere to frontier conservation. He told a joint session of Congress that “it is irrefutable 
proof that the conservation of our resources is the fundamental question before this 
Nation, and that our first and greatest task is to set our house in order and to begin to 
live within our means.” Roosevelt added that he urged “where the facts are known, 
where the public interest is clear, that neither indifference and inertia, nor adverse 
private interests, shall be allowed to stand in the way of the public good….It is high time 
to realize that our responsibility to the coming millions is like that of parents to their 
children, and that in wasting our resources we are wronging our descendants.”120 The 
American Frontier was not the limitless bonanza that some corporate interests had 
claimed: now conservation would be necessary to allow America’s uniqueness, its 
exceptionalism, to be maintained long into the future. These areas, he said, would also 
serve as a refuge from the problems of tyranny and corruption caused by those same 
individuals who wanted America’s sacred places exploited in the service of profit and 
greed. Americans had overcome the deadly challenges of the frontier experience but 
now needed to protect those same untamed wilds out West so that they could maintain 
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the frontier “edge” required to meet and conquer any problem or challenge that faced 
the nation far into the future. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: President Roosevelt and John Muir—two frontier heroes—perched on the 
edge of a cliff at Yosemite Valley in commemoration of their much talked about camping 
trip in May 1903. The confident TR, in his riding boots, looks as if he might be reaching 
for a weapon while the shrewd Muir looks off to the side with his hands positioned 
humbly behind his back. (Underwood and Underwood, Accession Number: #LC-USZC4-4698, 
Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC) 
 
As in so many other aspects of his presidency TR was operating on the precepts of 
a forward-thinking Frontier Myth. In this way, Roosevelt had laid the foundation for 
LBJ’s “New Conservationism” program of the 1960s and promoted the idea of 
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sustainability almost a century before the idea came into fashion during the Bill Clinton 
administration. TR was essentially promoting an agenda of closing much of the western 
frontier to settlement and development and wanted tough laws to throw poachers and 
the like in the slammer.  
But scholars and pundits have often pointed out a glaring irony in all of this too. 
Until his death, TR could not seem to match up his understanding of the need to respect 
and protect nature from greedy business interests, with his own personal drive to kill it 
as a hunter. During some of his African safaris later in his life, Roosevelt killed 
thousands of animals (Figure 2.4). The hunter was part of the old Frontier Mythology 
which Roosevelt would not let go of and remained key to his self-image as a self-reliant 
and masculine individual. Detractors of TR, in particular William Randolph Hearst, 
delighted in this fact so much that his papers released dozens of political cartoons 
pointing out the paradox; these barbs even became the basis of a comedy motion picture 
entitled Terrible Teddy, the Grizzly King (1901).121 But most Americans continued to 
like this image and Roosevelt himself continued to publish stories of his hunting 
exploits.   
The Frontier Myth in its early manifestations contained both conservationist and 
resource exploitation elements. The myth was flexible and existed on a spectrum. As its 
structure was challenged by events these activities could sometimes be still subsumed by 
the myth but at other times the myth’s structures themselves were forced to change and 
adapt. Over time a growing acknowledgement among the President and that American 
public that the over-exploitation of western lands and frontier resources could rob 
future generations of their unique, national heritage caused key aspects of the structure 
                                                          
121 Terrible Teddy, the Grizzly King (1901), Dir. Edwin S. Porter, Edison Manufacturing Company. 
 
 
97 
 
to be changed. But during Roosevelt’s time, substantive conservation policies and 
government intervention to protect wildlands initiated by Roosevelt’s administration, 
and on a personal level, Roosevelt’s participation in events that only seemed to degrade 
these spaces (including his own hunting expeditions) all continued to exist side by side 
and to be subsumed by a Frontier Myth which still saw merit and explanations for both 
protecting the vanishing wilderness and the manly, character building activities of the 
hunt. The seeming dichotomy would not disappear anytime soon either—as we shall 
observe upon encountering our second liberal Cowboy President, LBJ. 
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Figure 2.4: “The Roosevelt Big Game Specimens Sent to the Smithsonian Institution.” The 
results of Roosevelt’s African trip, 1909-1910, with the initials “TR” painted on every piece, 
sometimes twice. (Photograph by Paul Thompson, New York, c1910).122 
 
A “Square Deal” and Sense of Community 
The Frontier Myth, changes to American society, and Roosevelt’s own experiences 
out West had instilled in the President a strong faith in progress, a preference for a 
strong federal government as protector of both national interests and the poor and 
downtrodden over a laissez faire sectional one, and a view of the need to balance 
individualism out with a broader communal awareness and concern. The myths of the 
Old West had arisen in American society partly as a response to massive 
industrialization and concentrations of wealth which Roosevelt and millions of other 
Americans viewed as having strengthened the forces of evil in the world. By the late 
nineteenth century, an increasing number of Americans—including a rapidly growing 
middle class—were rejecting the conventional post-bellum theory that government 
should stay out of business and that individuals left to their own discretion would act in 
the public’s interest. Now there was a growing sense of a vital public interest its own 
right and that this interest was in need of protection from the growing corruption and 
greed of large corporations. Along with many others, Roosevelt was caught up in these 
changing ideas about the nation. In The Winning of the West, explored in the last 
chapter, TR recognized the need for rugged individualism to be reined in by a larger 
communal concern. An individual’s success, as Turner had articulated, depended on 
their self-reliance, a masterful grasp of material things, know-how, and the like; but 
frontiersman Roosevelt came increasingly to believe that society also needed to provide 
                                                          
122 Photograph by Paul Thompson appears in Charles Morris, The Marvelous Career of Theodore 
Roosevelt (New York: John C. Winston, 1910): page not numbered. 
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a more level playing field—or equality of opportunity—by taking away economic 
obstacles and protecting individuals from the gross misconduct and exploitations of 
others. By acting collectively through the Federal Government, American citizens could 
play a positive role in that evolution and in maintaining a balance of power in society. 
Merit should be rewarded but Roosevelt also wanted everyone running the race on fair 
terms. Cowboy toughness, honesty, courage, energy and self-reliance would combine 
with compassion and service to others to create a healthy and vigorous nation. TR, then, 
came not to see individual effort and government control as mutually exclusive rather he 
asserted that a powerful federal government would need to intervene in order for 
individuals to experience the kind of personal freedom that they could not have if left on 
their own. 
During his first term in office, Roosevelt’s “Square Deal” became the title of his 
presidential program. Here the President was not just talking about playing fair, he 
wanted the rules of the game changed. TR would make full use of his bully pulpit to 
shape the national agenda for change, invigorate the federal government by attracting 
many of the best and the brightest bureaucrats in the nation, and set up an innovative, 
action-oriented federal government that would intervene on behalf of individual citizens 
to defend their interests and promote new rights. In terms of the latter, conservation of 
natural resources, control of corporations and consumer protection were highest on 
TR’s list. This trail blazing by the first of the Frontier presidents was all part of his role 
in the creation of the modern presidency that would reshape the landscape of American 
politics and government far into the future. 
When Roosevelt received news of his victory on election night, 1904, he was 
reported to have said: “Tomorrow I shall come into my office in my own right. Then 
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watch out for me.”123 Bolstered up by his big victory, Roosevelt veered further leftward 
in his second term. Now he would be able to fully play out his role as the nation’s 
number one frontier cowboy casting himself as lead egalitarian democrat who would 
challenge the phony and corrupting influences of the eastern robber barons. In addition 
to conservation his legislative achievements included regulation of the railroad industry, 
the Pure Food and Drug Act (first in a series of acts aimed at consumer protection), and 
a proposed inheritance tax for the wealthy. Through it all Roosevelt maintained his 
constant preaching against the perils of “materialism” and the lavish “malefactors of 
great wealth.”124 For TR, wealthy easterners as a group were much more degenerative 
and effeminate than those self-reliant but kind-hearted, good neighbor westerners 
whom he was proud to live and work with. Related to this view, Roosevelt prescribed a 
formula for the American people based on a sense of moral purpose. “If ever our people 
become so sordid as to feel that all that counts is moneyed prosperity, ignoble well-
being, effortless ease and comfort,” TR cautioned, “then this nation shall perish, as it 
will deserve to perish, from the earth.”125 Roosevelt came with time to reject that 
attitude of Social Darwinists and instead felt that men at the roundup, in battle, or 
working the fields deserved shorter hours of labor, better housing, and greater 
opportunities to reach higher levels of existence. What he desired instead was to create a 
great a balance between individualism and collectivism—something which he regarded 
as a fair, timeless solution. 
                                                          
123 Election night Roosevelt quoted in James MacGregor Burns and Susan Dunn, The Three 
Roosevelts: Patrician Leaders Who Transformed America. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001): 
78. 
124 TR’s descriptions of wealthy types in Naylor et al, Theodore Roosevelt: Many Sided American, 
501. 
125 TR quotation in Burns and Dunn, The Three Roosevelts, 95. 
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As President, Theodore Roosevelt sought in particular to cut down to size the 
accepted equation of wealth with virtue and the popular blending of the image of the 
successful businessman with the good and upright citizen. Riches and virtue were as 
much opposites, TR believed, as money and spirituality. He saw the main problem of his 
age as the unchecked power of corporate capitalism and wanted to use the federal 
government to help maintain at least some level of equality of opportunity and fairness 
in American life.126 Roosevelt openly attacked “wealthy men of enormous power, some 
of whom have shown themselves cynically and brutally indifferent to the interests of the 
people.”127 These “representatives of predatory wealth—of wealth accumulated on a 
giant scale by all forms of iniquity” from exploiting wage workers to destroying 
competition to scamming the public—need to be overthrown by making their corrupt 
and “hideous” practices known to the public.128 As the leader of this “ethical movement,” 
TR promised to “cut out rottenness from the body politic” and announced that his 
mission was to stop “those rich men whose lives are corrupt and evil” from controlling 
the “destinies of this country.”129 While Congressional income tax and inheritance taxes 
would not be brought in until the decade after TR’s presidency, his hammering at these 
points began to change Americans’ perceptions of their society and provoked a 
nationwide debate on the issue of inherited wealth and power in an egalitarian 
democracy. Roosevelt, then, played a major role in creating the climate that made these 
changes possible. And he was, in fact, the first president to grapple with a question that 
Americans still struggle with today: what should be the relationship between the federal 
government and concentrations of business power? TR realized that it could be many 
                                                          
126 See Ibid, 95-96. 
127 TR quoted in Ibid, 96. 
128 Ibid, 104. 
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years before his radical “campaign against privilege” might have the desired effect: “it 
must be a slow process of education through generations,” he admitted to a friend, but 
these changes he believed would come with time.130 The eternal optimist TR believed 
that the progressive-frontier dynamic, which he saw himself as having been an integral 
part of, would carry forward for generations to come.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: President Roosevelt on horseback leaping a split rail fence (1902). Though TR 
saw many hurdles to be overcome he believed that the progressive-Frontier dynamic would 
ultimately carry the day: providing Americans with equality of opportunity based on a 
balance of power in society. Roosevelt and his supporters viewed this is as a timeless 
solution. (Courtesy: Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, #LC-
USZ62-11960) 
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TR’s New Nationalism 
For Roosevelt, being a cowboy out West and governing in the East were the two 
most exciting businesses on earth. He clearly did not like sitting on the sidelines during 
his post-presidential years. In keeping with his personal need to maintain a certain level 
of “strenuosity,” Roosevelt did more than any other President in the years after he left 
the White House to have a substantive impact on the direction of US politics and 
government. 
For his times, the progressive Theodore Roosevelt grew increasingly liberal, even 
radical, on issues such as government regulation and intervention, conservation, the 
distribution of power and wealth, and race relations during his presidency and in the 
years after he left office. These positions became tied in the popular mind to Roosevelt 
and his cowboy ways. And this was not all simply image and perception. As President, 
TR had already surprised many with his reasonableness at home and, for the most part, 
restraint abroad. Roosevelt had even become the first American President (not without 
some irony) to win the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in negotiations at Sagamore Hill to 
end the Russo-Japanese War. The first in a line of “progressive presidents” (which 
continued especially with Woodrow Wilson, FDR, JFK, and ended with fellow-cowman 
LBJ in the 1960s), TR used his cowboy credentials in office, and in the decade which 
followed, to promote greater federal government involvement in social, economic and 
foreign policy—helping set the stage for increasingly “liberal” presidential agendas 
which would follow. 
In August 1910, Roosevelt made arguably the most important speech of his career 
on the subject of the “New Nationalism” at Osawatomie, Kansas. Here he adamantly put 
national ahead of sectional or regional interests and unbuckled his holster on 
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Republican President William Howard Taft when he announced that “Labor is the 
superior of capital and deserves much the higher consideration.”131 Throwing his lot in 
with those supporting the eight-hour day, workmen’s compensation laws and labour’s 
right to organize, TR told the cheering crowd that “The man who wrongly holds that 
every human right is secondary to his profit must now give way to the advocate of 
human welfare, who rightly maintains that every man holds his property subject to the 
general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare 
may require it.”132 Placing himself at the head of the liberal movement he insisted that 
conservation, currency reform, the direct primary and regulation of child labour were all 
needed in order to bring about the greater good of “national efficiency” or the “New 
Nationalism.”133 The collectivist responsibilities of the broad community, he continued 
to insist, could assure the increased opportunity for all to realize this full potential. It 
was a philosophy that was placed in the realm of federal law the same kind of principles 
that TR had been advocating in his publications from his ranching through his post-
presidential days in Ranch Life and the Hunting Trail, Wilderness Hunter, and African 
Game Trails just to name a few. All of these books were intended to instruct readers on 
the kinds of qualities that would make them better citizens who could both support 
themselves and the common good: they also emphasized that success in the hunt often 
depended on teamwork. For Roosevelt, “manly qualities” did not only include toughness 
and individualism, but also cooperation, hospitality and camaraderie. As TR had 
asserted in The Winning of the West: “colonization was not done by individuals, but by 
                                                          
131 TR quoted in William E. Leuchtenburg, ed., Theodore Roosevelt: The New Nationalism 
(Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961): 24. 
132 Ibid, 32-33. For descriptions of the crowd and its response see footnotes in Ibid 21-22. 
133 Ibid, 35. 
 
 
105 
 
groups of individuals.”134 Long before his talk of a Square Deal and New Nationalism, 
TR told his fellow Americans that his Western experience and profound adherence to 
the Frontier Myth had taught him that mutual support can be crucial to individual well-
being. 
When Roosevelt’s friend Wister prepared a new illustrated edition of The 
Virginian in 1911 his revised introduction was obviously intended as a political 
endorsement of TR, who Wister knew was considering a 1912 presidential run. “Ten 
years ago, when political darkness still lay dense upon every State in the Union,” Wister 
began, “this book was dedicated to the greatest benefactor we people have known since 
Lincoln. Today he is a benefactor even greater than he was then; his voice, instead of 
being almost solitary, has inspired many followers.” If Wister’s novel was “anything 
more than an American story,” the novelist concluded, it was “an expression of 
American faith” or, in other words, faith in Roosevelt.135 
After TR was unsuccessful in his bid to capture the Republican Party nomination in 
1912 (though TR had the more popular appeal, Taft had the GOP Party machine behind 
his re-election bid) he declared himself “as fit as a Bull Moose” and led the formation of 
a third party, the Progressive Party, which attempted to recapture the presidency under 
that new banner. Before long the Bull Moose became his party’s new emblem in the bid 
for the presidency as TR “called for the creation of a full welfare state by advocating 
social security insurance to cope with the ‘hazards of sickness, accident, invalidism, 
involuntary unemployment, and old age….’”136 Roosevelt thus became the first president 
or former president to begin the process toward the Medicare Act which would be 
                                                          
134 TR’s Winning of the West quoted in Rego, American Ideal, 89. 
135 All quotations of Wister appear in Scharnhorst, Owen Wister and the West, 192. 
136 TR quoted in Max J. Skidmore, “Presidents and the Development of Medicare in the United 
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signed into law by LBJ in 1965. TR’s new party also pushed for more direct democracy 
through promoting women’s right to vote, direct primaries, referendums and the direct 
election of US Senators. Reiterating the same essential philosophy and trajectory that he 
had established during his presidency, Roosevelt continued to insist that American 
society, as in frontier society, had a responsibility to ensure that everyone got a fair 
chance to show his worth and that it was up to government to ensure that this happened 
by levelling the playing field of conditions under which Americans were forced to live. 
Too much individualism without any feeling or sense of obligation to the rest of the 
community was viewed as promoting selfishness and allowing for the exploitation of the 
weaker members of society. The frontier theme that had benefitted Roosevelt so well in 
previous campaigns continued to take centre stage in 1912 to the point that TR even 
displayed 69 year-old Frank James as his Bull Moose bodyguard.137 
Since Theodore Roosevelt’s death in 1919, many Americans have lost sight of his 
leftist, radical side and his image has sometimes been applied to phony claimants 
hoping to benefit from Roosevelt’s star power. Ultra-conservative Warren G. Harding 
had labeled TR a communist in 1912 but, as President, exploited his fellow Republican’s 
memory to win the White House in 1920 (and Harding, as we shall see, would not be the 
last presidential hopeful to do this). William Allen White, the Kansas newspaper editor 
and Progressive movement leader, once declared that had TR been brought back to life 
in the 1920s and spoken his mind: “the various societies, security leagues, minute men 
of the republic, and 100 percent Americans would start a whispering campaign that his 
real name was Feodor Roosevisky and that he was sent here as an agent of the 
Bolshiveki.” Douglas Brinkley, author of The Wilderness Warrior, contends that a TR 
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today might not be too far off of that perception when he writes that “The truth of the 
matter is that Roosevelt today would be on the left.”138 
The Frontier Myth is not property of one major political party or the other: both 
parties have laid claim to the myth during different periods in time. The myth emerged 
from the social realities and events that preoccupied the country at the turn of the 
century and was then shaped and deployed through the ideas, words and actions of its 
major proponents, of which TR was the number one political protagonist. It was a vision 
that drew on a legendary past to create a future that was impervious to regional 
characteristics and, initially, promoted predominantly liberal policies of inclusiveness 
and federal government programs of intervention both at home and abroad. The 
Republican Convention of 1912 was arguably a historical turning point in terms of Party 
domination of the Frontier Myth. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: “‘By rejecting 
Roosevelt, the Republicans turned their backs on responsible conservatism.’”139 When 
Roosevelt and the Progressive Republicans bolted the GOP they left the old guard fully 
in control. TR had for the most part championed an inclusive party and a program of 
reform and innovation; but these elements now departed the GOP and would eventually 
take shape, instead, in the Democratic Party of FDR and the next cowboy president 
Lyndon Baines Johnson. In the arena of presidential politics, TR’s frontier-style 
progressive reform would carry the Frontier Myth forward—for the most part under the 
mantle a party different from his own—until the rise of Reagan conservatism in 1980. 
That same year TR’s eldest daughter, Alice (a supporter of Democrats JFK and LBJ), 
passed away at the age of 96. 
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Conclusion 
Theodore Roosevelt is unique among US Presidents for the crucial role that he 
personally played in establishing the foundations of the Frontier Myth as the foremost 
interpretive framework for American society. His was also the first presidency to deploy 
the Frontier and Western myths and symbolism to understand, explain, and justify 
foreign and domestic situations (events) and to shape specific policy agendas that his 
administration adopted. The myth was accepted during the Roosevelt Era and used as a 
discursive framework that would become durable and dynamic enough to explain the 
entire range of America’s experiences and policy in the twentieth century. No longer was 
it restricted to the geographic area of the West. Roosevelt’s frontierism is one of the 
most important historic examples in support of Brian Dippie’s contention that myths 
are more important than facts in shaping some public policy. Ideas that existed in the 
popular mind, the arts, and various movements, had consequences for the shape of 
American society and presidential politics. TR’s thesis of forward-thinking liberalism, 
proactive government, selective intervention abroad, and greater inclusion through a 
“melting pot” established the early contours of the Frontier Myth. This shaping of ideas 
about the Western frontier experience would carry a great deal of power for decades to 
come and had major consequences for the attitudes, policies and decisions made by 
future progressive Presidents: in particular Lyndon Johnson.  
Roosevelt came to the White House during an age of tremendous industrial growth 
and his modern approach to the presidency—with its heavy deployment of the Frontier 
Myth—raised questions which Americans are still grappling with more than a century 
later. In the decades between TR and LBJ, there would be a much more limited 
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deployment of the myth by American presidents. It was during these early to mid-
century decades, however, that the myth firmly established itself in American popular 
culture as the most persuasive structure for interpreting America’s past and providing 
solutions for the present and future. The entrenchment of the Frontier Myth 
phenomenon in the mind of the American public and at least three of its future 
presidential leaders will be the focus of Chapter III. 
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III. 
 
 
“Print the Legend”:  
The Early to Mid-Twentieth Century Frontier Myth  
In Popular Culture, Media and Politics 
 
The eye of the [TV] camera let the living room viewer travel 
freely in time and space, backward to the Alamo, forward 
to the moon. 
   --Karal Ann Marling, As Seen on TV140 
 
Introduction 
From the early through the mid-twentieth century, the set of past experiences that 
Americans ascribed to their frontier heritage became guideposts for the present and a 
vision to inspire the future because they chose to view them as something crucial in their 
experience. “The West of the Imagination,” as the Goetzmanns coined it in their classic 
study of the Western frontier as people imagined it,141 informed Americans’ sense of 
identity, sense of community and place, foreign policy, and their purpose on Earth and 
into the “final frontier” of space. Frontier western imagery permeated American popular 
culture which was finding new expressions through literature and twentieth century 
technologies of film, radio, and TV, and the images transmitted through these media 
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informed American policy and political life in profound ways that had meaning and 
consequences for Americans of all regions, races, religions and political inclinations. 
This chapter explores the Frontier Myth’s pervasiveness and more specifically the 
ways in which popular culture reflected the changing myth during the early to mid-
twentieth century in ways that promoted both liberal and conservative values. Major 
events such as the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War and early Civil Rights 
movement challenged and shaped the changing contours of the Frontier Myth. First and 
foremost the various forms of popular culture during this period reflect and reveal 
Americans’ ongoing searches for answers and guidance in an increasingly complex and 
rapidly changing world.  
 
The Historian and the Artist 
Despite being dismissed by most academics as incomplete and inaccurate in its 
details, Frederick Jackson Turner’s nationalistic world view had rolled through the 
American popular and political consciousness like a tsunami. In the most famous 
passage from his “Significance” essay, describing the new breed of person who had been 
created from conquest of the wilderness, Turner had told Americans that it was “To the 
frontier that the American intellect owes its striking characteristics….” The westering 
experience, then, was not over because its spirit had forged its way into the American 
character for all time. In Paul A. Carter’s Revolt Against Destiny (1989), the author 
contends correctly that the Turner essay “is, without a doubt the single most influential 
essay ever written by an American historian; influential not merely upon other 
historians but also upon the public at large—many members of which have grasped, and 
been moved by, the general idea contained in the essay even if they have never heard the 
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name Frederick Jackson Turner.”142 As we have already seen, politicians, including 
Presidents, are highly susceptible to its effects as well. For as historian John Hellman 
writes, regardless of what the West was really like: “[mythic] stories are always true in 
the sense that they express deeply held beliefs.”143 
 
 
Figure 3.1: John Gast, American Progress, 1872. (Chromolithograph published by George A. 
Crofutt. Courtesy: Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC) 
 
The vision of the frontier Turner had expressed so eloquently in words had already 
made up part of American popular thought before he, Roosevelt, Remington and Wister 
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Oxford University Press, 1989): 17. 
143 John Hellman quoted in Murdoch, The American West, 120. 
 
 
113 
 
had arrived on the scene. Many of the Frontier Myth’s fundamental features are 
highlighted in the 1872 painting of John Gast, titled variously as American Progress or 
Westward Ho (Figure 3.1). Here we see, in mythologized form, a painting that conveys 
the movement westward along with a strong sense of time passing. Groups of figures 
viewing from left to right, include Indians, bears and buffalo retreating in the face of 
Euro-American prospectors who are followed in succession by farmers and settlers. 
Obvious symbols of progress are presented in the image: from telegraph lines to 
railroads, with the former being extended by the left hand of the floating Columbia, a 
personification of the United States, who carries in her right hand a book of laws. As she 
leads the march of “civilized” progress coming from the East to the West, the imagery 
reveals that the frontier would be developed by the same sequential waves of peoples 
later described by Turner. Tough, self-reliant pioneers follow the “sacred plow” 
westward while Indians, unable to adjust to the forward movement of history, flee 
toward the Pacific in a shrinking, continental frontier. The ideas presented in Gast’s 
painting not only contain the main elements that Turner would draw upon for his thesis, 
they suggest that by the time his essay reached the American public these ideas were 
already recognizable to them.144 
  
Scholars of the “Myth and Symbols” School and the Frontier Myth 
For more than half a century scholars have explored literature, films, television 
and other forms of popular culture in an effort to understand the American character 
and the role that the frontier myth has played in shaping it. In 1950, Henry Nash 
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Smith’s classic, cross-disciplinary study of Western myth, Virgin Land: The American 
West as Symbol and Myth (uniting the fields of literary criticism, history, cultural 
anthropology, and psychology), the author described for the first time the mythic 
qualities of Turner’s thesis—including prophesies of the American empire that the 
victorious experience of World War II seemed to have fulfilled. Smith viewed the 
contribution of the Western region as its capacity to inspire. He demonstrates how 
Turner had brought back time-worn themes some of which had appeared since the early 
1600s, and that these added a heroic character to his frontier thesis.  Smith conceded 
that while western history continued to be used for political purposes the language of 
the frontier had a history that long preceded TR’s generation. Drawing on different 
elements of Turner’s thesis, his underlying premise is compelling: “History cannot 
happen, that is, men cannot engage in purposive group behavior—without images which 
simultaneously express collective desires and impose coherence on the infinitely 
numerous and infinitely varied data of the experience.”145 For Smith—as Brian Dippie 
demonstrated repeatedly in The Vanishing American—myths make history: perceptions 
of “facts” and the emotional appeal of ideas are often what mattered most in shaping 
action. In this sense, myth trumps “reality.” 
Richard Slotkin followed a similar methodological “myth and symbol” school 
approach to Smith when he released the first in his trilogy of works on the frontier in 
American culture in 1973.146 But Slotkin, a product of the 1960s, intended his work to be 
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a corrective to Smith’s upbeat analysis. His “regeneration through violence” theme is 
essentially that the civilized must engage in acts of barbarity to defeat savage enemies 
and that, in the process, they are spiritually regenerated. The Roosevelt frontier myth, as 
Slotkin interprets it, became engrained in America’s collective experience as a symbol of 
the notion of progress and of new potentials for moral, spiritual and physical renewal. 
By the twentieth century, when America had run out of frontier at home, Slotkin 
contends that it had to pursue this overseas. Slotkin, like Smith, provides us with 
numerous examples of this frontier philosophy appearing in literature—and in popular 
films too. As with Smith, he argues forcefully that the image of the nineteenth century 
West had a profound impact on American culture. Much of the symbolism presented in 
Virgin Land, however, was positive: the pull of the West on the Eastern imagination; a 
Garden of Eden, larger than life heroes, the West as a land of opportunity, and the 
stories of Empire building. Smith’s self-congratulatory approach was well received by 
Americans at mid-century. In keeping with the changing attitudes of the times, Slotkin’s 
much darker, revisionist interpretation received an enthusiastic reception in the early 
1970s. In short then, the two authors agree that ideas about the frontier caused people 
to act, that myths make history; but while Smith looks at the more patriotic vision, 
Slotkin focuses on the negative impact of the Western movement: at imperialism, 
racism and violence. 
In the most recent major analysis of the origins of the Frontier Myth and popular 
culture/media, The American West: The Invention of a Myth (2001), historian David 
Murdoch asserts that a myth “plot” was hatched by the likes of Buffalo Bill Cody, TR, 
Frederick Remington and Owen Wister as a purposeful effort to create a “functional 
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myth” of the West. The constructed myth in this conspiratorial view, would then act as a 
means of guiding the American people through a decade of crisis. Murdoch sees the 
“deliberate” creation of the “entirely” manufactured Frontier Myth and its central 
cowboy hero147 as a response to a deep sense of loss associated with a better past in the 
face of disturbing change in the present, including: corporate corruption, massive 
immigration, urban despair, and the loss of manly virtues among native-born American 
males. Along with academics of their day such as Turner, this group of myth-makers 
allegedly felt a post-frontier society desperately needed this myth for the nation to 
continue thriving into the future. In later decades, Murdoch contends that Westerners of 
all descriptions bought into the self-flattering frontier imagery for a variety of reasons. It 
is a myth that, Murdoch believes, intentionally distorts, conceals and misleads. Along 
the way, twentieth-century politicians were supplied with a host of powerful images to 
manipulate.  
While I accept some elements of David Murdoch’s post-modern argument, in 
specific circumstances, my concern with his approach is that he tends to trivialize myth, 
defines his audience as hopelessly gullible, and characterizes the Frontier Myth’s 
protagonists as, more often than not, cynical. Overall, in my view, Smith, Slotkin and the 
Goetzmanns have argued more convincingly that myth cannot be created so much as it 
can be discovered. As they contend, the idea of the frontier resonates so much with 
Americans because it grew out of a fundamental creation myth and this myth, in turn, is 
revealed rather than created by popular culture.  As the Goetzmanns contend, “in 
describing the myth, we are also describing a perceived reality that has profoundly 
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affected both Western and American behaviour patterns and values.”148 Thus, 
understanding the Frontier Myth as it appears in American culture (including novels, 
films and political speeches) is key to understanding America’s preoccupations at a 
given period in time. John Cawelti contends that the Western story is likewise “a time 
and culture bound production”149 and that “the myth shifted significantly at the 
beginning of the twentieth century to revitalize the significance of certain values 
associated with the wilderness, i.e. manliness, vigor.” But this, I would contend, was 
(usually) more a reflection of the cultural milieu of the times—which influenced both the 
elites and common folk—rather than a result of deliberate and manipulative 
salesmanship. This said, I concede that there are some specific cases—as we shall see—
when the myth does appear to have been employed more cynically by the Frontier 
Presidents to help promote themselves or their policies. 
The crucial half century of the Frontier Myth, between liberal frontier presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, would set the stage for the full blown 
acceptance and deployment of the myth in the “frontier presidencies” of LBJ, Ronald 
Reagan, and George W. Bush. It also laid some of the groundwork for the wholesale 
political shift in the myth’s emphasis from liberalism to conservatism that would follow 
in the wake of the tumultuous events of the late 1960s and 1970s.   
 
Zane Grey’s West 
The unprecedented success of novelist Owen Wister’s The Virginian (1902) 
brought forth a plethora of westerns, including cowboy hero books that carried 
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Americans further and further away from the nineteenth century West that was and 
into the West that ought to have been. From 1912 to 1939, no frontier novelist came 
even close to being as popular as Ohio-born Zane Grey. His first successful Western, 
Riders of the Purple Sage, sold more than two million copies in 1912.150 In the decades 
to follow, Grey produced a near constant flow of Westerns, the majority of which 
became best-sellers. Murdoch notes that:  
 
Like Wister, Grey was another outsider who (after his first visit to Utah 
in 1907) became infatuated with the West….Grey’s version of the myth 
was the one which sold—and his plots ran to a rigid formula, his 
cardboard characters had relationships unknown in the adult world and 
his heroes were models of rugged rectitude.151 
 
Many of the conventions set by novelist Owen Wister and reinforced by Zane Grey 
would come close to defining the frontier hero in novels, radio and cinema for the next 
half-century. These mythic outriders of freedom were strong, silent types–frequently 
lone heroes who fought, often as not, on behalf of the community against those enemies 
who impeded “progress” and democracy. They were kind to women, children and 
animals (if not necessarily in that order), instinctively knew the right course of action, in 
tune with God and nature, and delivered absolute justice, absolutely. Wister and Grey’s 
heroic gunmen also adhere to a special code of the West and resort to violence only 
when provoked or when some crazed villain(s) threatened a weaker person or 
community that cannot mount an adequate defense.  
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Perhaps Grey’s most memorable lone gunman characterization appears in Riders 
of the Purple Sage with his stirring account of the arrival of the avenger in black leather, 
Jim Lassiter:  
 
Jane Withersteen wheeled and saw a horseman, silhouetted against 
the western sky, coming riding out of the sage. He had ridden down from 
the left, in the golden glare of the sun….An answer to her prayer!” 
“Do you know him? Does anyone know him?” questioned Tull, 
hurriedly…. 
“He’s come from far,” said one…. 
“Look!” hoarsely whispered one of Tull’s companions. “He packs two 
black-butted guns—low down—they’re hard to see—black agin them black 
chaps.” 
“A gun-man!” whispered another. “Fellers, careful now about movin’ 
your hands.”152 
 
 
Stirring descriptions of such heroic strangers, sensational gunplay, and “orgies of 
violence” that made use of the southwestern terrain were all Zane Grey trademarks.153 
Mormons were another staple of Grey-Westerns. While the author admired 
members for what he viewed as their strong work ethic, he apparently despised the 
church’s treatment of women: in particular its support for the practice of polygamy. 
Riders tells the tale of a Gentile American man, Lassiter (described above) and his 
redemption of a gentle and virtuous Mormon woman named Jane. Her rescue from the 
evils of a polygamist society— a practice likened by Grey to slavery—is connected both to 
the preservation of monogamy in the American home and to the symbolic of the 
assimilation of the Mormon Empire into the American Empire. As literature scholar 
William R. Handley observes: “The rescue of Jane points to the virtue of…Mormon 
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assimilation and American acceptance.”154 The national Frontier Myth touted in 1912 by 
Bull-Mooser Roosevelt and accepted by most other Americans viewed monogamous 
marriage as the cornerstone of Christian civilization; concurrently, in fiction, Mormons 
were required to shed their almost “Other” status by rejecting polygamy, treating 
women as individuals, and embracing the security of a monogamous relationship. Love 
between one man and one woman was depicted by Grey as the noblest activity of all 
people. Jane Withersteen is a reasonable Mormon, a genuine American as opposed to 
an extremist. Further, she personifies the courageous and determined frontier woman (a 
figure ignored by Turner two decades earlier) whose role in taming the West is 
presented as “indispensable.”155 These themes of domesticity and virtuous frontier 
womanhood appear in Grey’s fiction featuring non-Mormons as well. In “Call of the 
Canyon,” an initially resistant Eastern, flapper girl rejects a shell-shocked and gassed 
World War I veteran who settles in Arizona. By the end of the tale, however, she has 
straightened herself out and restored her American-style femininity by surrendering her 
heart to this man of stellar character, embracing the wide-open landscape, and 
determining to devote her life to raising a family on a ranch out west.156 
Of Grey’s Western works, his biographer Carlton Jackson writes (in a description 
that might have been applied to TR’s liberal frontier as well): “The cowboy is the most 
innocent figure….The guilty parties generally are established businessman who are 
crooked underneath all of their respectable appearances.”157 The “McCoy-Slaughter 
Combine” provides a typical example of this latter characterization in Grey’s 
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Depression-era Knights of the Range (1939). Sewall McCoy and Russ Slaughter were 
respected ranchers on the surface but in fact were behind a flurry of cruel, avarice-
driven violence and cattle rustling. By contrast the Knights or “cowboys” of the story 
were so exemplary that their spiritual leader, Brazos Keene of Texas, even swore off of 
racial discrimination. Drawing attention to the heroes’ only black cowboy Brazos 
declares: “I’m sinkin’ race prejudice an’ all theta other damn selfish rot. We’ve got a 
common cause men.”158 The good versus evil dichotomy, then, was clearly established 
both in terms of class and racial inclusiveness.  
Grey also made what his biographer Carlton Jackson contends were “highly 
significant” contributions to the American conservation movement. Jackson observes: 
 
In dozens of articles he lamented wasteful practices—whether 
perpetuated by sportsmen or by business corporations. In numerous 
novels he railed against factions that were apparently bent upon 
scourging the land of its timber and other resources for economic 
gain….159 
 
Zane Grey’s literary contributions through the Interwar period to highlighting a 
distinction between business crooks and honest men, the significance of gender and 
ethnic diversity in the West, and the cause of conservation cannot be understated. 
Though Grey passed away suddenly in September 1939, each of these themes had 
significant implications for the character of the Frontier Myth continuing through the 
Second World War and postwar eras. Before his death, Grey had published some 60 
books titles and half that number were in manuscript; by 1958, approximately twenty-
eight million copies of his books had been sold in the United States alone and four 
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million abroad.160 If serious critics ignored many of his works, the public certainly did 
not and his stories of stellar cowboy characters taking on greedy crooks, fanatics who 
threatened the sanctity of marriage, racists, and those who would sully America’s 
pristine wilderness and wildlife for profit, found their way into countless Hollywood 
films, radio and later TV programs. 
 
The Great Depression Era: From “Kiddie” Westerns to Stagecoach 
In the realm of presidential politics, after Theodore Roosevelt’s failed Bull Moose 
campaign two decades passed before his fifth cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, came 
to office and implemented the New Deal. Only at this point was it possible to secure the 
liberal programs that Theodore had called for.  
In the meantime, post-TR Republicans occupied the White House from 1920 to 
1932 in an era when there was no Roosevelt and no progressive Republican. Warren G. 
Harding’s scandal ridden administration had called for a “Return to Normalcy” while 
President Calvin Coolidge (Cowboy President Ronald Reagan’s favourite) was passive 
and inactive but popular. The hyperactive, progressive Theodore and indolent, 
conservative Cal struck a remarkable contrast.  
Later in the interwar period, the faith that Herbert Hoover and the Republicans 
placed in business prosperity was badly shaken when, a few months after his 
inauguration in 1929, the bubble burst with a colossal stock market crash. The 
catastrophic Great Depression which followed contributed to the election of Democrat 
FDR in 1932 and to the implementation of his experimental New Deal policies. Before 
long this translated into across the board federal government intervention throughout 
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the American economy and society. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal set the tone for the 
next 35 years. From this point forward the substantive role of the Federal government, 
which both Roosevelts had advocated for, looked as if it were in place to stay. In the 
early post-World War II era even conservative Republicans’ loudest protest was no 
longer over whether the Federal government had a right to intervene, but to what 
degree. 
J. Fred MacDonald describes radio as both a reflector and solidifier of popular 
attitudes and myths in the years between the two world wars. Since the turn of the 
century, self-sacrifice and assistance for the downtrodden had already been a part of the 
Western formula but during the Great Depression, MacDonald believes it was 
sometimes deployed on radio as a key weapon of liberalism and cooperation against the 
oppressive social and political problems of the Great Depression. On the June 5, 1933 
broadcast of NBC radio’s variety program Hollywood on the Air, kiddie-Western 
cowboy Buck Jones directed his “Rangers” (young Americans who tuned in faithfully to 
his broadcasts and believed in “Americanism, good fellowship, and helpfulness”161) to 
help him save the nation from the horrible plight of the Depression:  
 
Far be it for me to make a patriotic speech. But we’ve got a man in the 
White House that’s doing a mighty sweet job of organizing America, and 
headin’ her back towards prosperity. With summer vacation time coming 
around, I want to call your attention to a few little things you can do to 
help Mr. Roosevelt put this big job over in a big way. Times have been 
pretty tough, times have come when every youngster—boys and girls, 
too—must pitch in and do something that will help ma and pa make the 
home a little happier, and the going a little easier. This Depression is like 
a kink in the rope, and you youngsters can straighten it out by doing a 
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little fancy roping yourselves, that is if you set your mind to it. You’re 
growing up, you children, and you’ve got to look years ahead.162 
 
 
MacDonald points out that this cooperative form of morality, as epitomized by the 
Bible’s Ten Commandments, was communicated whether unconsciously or intentionally 
to its citizens and that children above all else were exposed to and most influenced by its 
messages.  
At the movies, Western director extraordinaire John Ford was making commercial 
hits that seemed to resonate perfectly with many adult Americans’ images of 
themselves, and with their aspirations. For Ford, film was the perfect media for 
exploring and creating dramas that portrayed how the American West was settled and 
civilized. The kinds of tensions that Ford and other directors dealt with in Westerns 
were brought to Americans’ attention by scholars at mid-century. Henry Nash Smith 
had first described a popular theme of Western film, the competing images of garden 
and wilderness. In 1964, Leo Marx followed up with his study, The Machine in the 
Garden, which explored Americans’ tendency to affirm a state of balance, or what Marx 
termed “the middle landscape,” to preserve the best features of pastoral and mechanized 
conditions, of the settled and the nomadic.163 Smith and Marx also considered the 
experience of being uprooted and searching for one’s origins, of leaving home, going 
into exile, and of returning. All of these frontier themes that helped make up the basis of 
Americans’ sense of identity were tapped into by Ford, whose directing career spanned 
half of the twentieth century (1917-1966) and included numerous classic Westerns. 
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John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939)164 has been hailed by French film theorist Andre 
Bazin as the ultimate classical Western: “as symmetrical and balanced as a wheel”165; a 
Depression era film, it was also thoroughly populist in tone and in tune politically with a 
nation undergoing a severe economic crisis. Stagecoach, the foundational Western, had 
it all: the frontier archetypes, an epic journey across an enormous and stunning 
landscape, and the final conflict between savagery and civilization, good and evil. The 
East is depicted here as both the origin of enlightenment and of corruption while the 
West represents heroism and savagery. The wandering hero, Ringo (John Wayne), 
makes such a splashy entrance early in the film that the camera comes close to running 
him over as it goes out of focus, then captures the gunman up close twirling his rifle in 
an impressive, theatrical gesture.  
Most importantly, the politics of Ford’s most classic of Westerns captures the 
mood of Depression era America perfectly. The villain(s) of Stagecoach is not so much 
the hostile Indians—who are portrayed primarily as a force of nature and part of the yet-
to-be-civilized landscape—but rather, the wealthy banker Henry Gatewood (Berton 
Churchill). This evil hypocrite preaches to a group of men on the benefits of saving while 
at the same time preparing to embezzle the $50,000 they bring to his bank for deposit. 
Even Mrs. Gatewood takes part in the hypocrisy routine as head of a ladies’ league 
which forces the impoverished and goodhearted prostitute Dallas (Claire Trevor) to 
leave town. On the stagecoach, while carrying the embezzled funds in a bag on his lap, 
Gatewood harangues a fellow passenger with off-putting conservative political slogans 
such as: “America for Americans! The government must not interfere with business” 
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and “Reduce taxes! Our national debt is shocking!” For Ford and American movie 
audiences of the period, those corrupt business types which Gatewood personifies were 
viewed as the problem that had brought on the nation’s contemporary economic 
catastrophe in the first place. Conversely, goodness in the film is personified in the 
marginalized common people, in particular Ringo and Dallas. Perceptive townsfolk, 
including alcoholic Doc, have the smarts and decency to perceive of the couple’s good 
nature and give them a chance for a new life. The story’s implication of class warfare 
reaches its climax when Ringo and Dallas emerge redeemed while the disgraced 
Gatewood is hauled off to jail as audiences cheer. The harrowing frontier experience has, 
in the end, positively transformed everyone as class prejudices fade away; everyone but 
the reactionary Gatewood that is, who remains as selfish, bombastic, and two-faced as 
when the story began.  
 
The Red Menace and Cold War Retool the Frontier Myth 
During World War II and the Cold War, the Frontier Myth in popular culture 
provided a compelling phenomenon for Americans as they attempted to interpret the 
world. By dividing people and nations up into civilization and savagery, right and 
wrong, black and white, the frontier struck a highly responsive chord at times when 
Americans mobilized to face “evil” foreign enemies such as Nazi Germany, militarist 
Japan, and Soviet Russia. 
Following the Second World War, in particular, the superpower standoff helped 
shape much of the United States self-identity as it engaged in a colossal, lengthy 
Manichaean contest with the USSR—a struggle that many compared with that 
experienced by pioneers of an earlier time as they travelled West on their own or in their 
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wagon trains to “tame” and settle the continent. Between 1947 and 1950, Westerns 
accounted for nearly one third of Hollywood’s total production of feature-length films. 
During these years the cowboy, with his unique combination of community leadership 
and individualism, came to represent what film historian John Lenihan has described as 
“a democratic Oedipus and Hamlet who acted on behalf of, but apart from, the larger 
society to correct some injustice or moral imbalance in the universal scheme.”166  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Thomas Hart Benton’s mural, Independence and the Opening of the West, 
1961, at the entrance lobby to the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum in 
Independence, Missouri (Unknown photographer). 
 
Several years after Democratic President Harry S. Truman left office at the height 
of the Cold War in 1953, at the entrance to the Oval Office replica in his presidential 
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museum, a huge mural was created by the regionalist painter Thomas Hart Benton in a 
kind of collaboration between Benton and the former president himself (Truman helped 
design the mural and painted a section of the sky). Identified by its title: “Independence 
and the Opening of the West,” the painting depicts the concept of Manifest Destiny in 
what is an obvious parallel drawn between the success of the pioneers and settlers of the 
Old West and the success of stalwart leaders like Truman during the Cold War.167 The 
scene portrays in a huge, sweeping, and high energy arc that reflects the popular 
perception of the westward movement of American civilization as it continues beyond 
Independence, Missouri (foreshadowing America’s future) and engages the shifting 
frontier. The idea of Manifest Destiny—a concept still popular among conservatives and 
liberals at mid-century—is portrayed throughout the artwork. A pioneering family with 
its wagon train appears at the top centre, representing the pinnacle of heroism and 
progress, alongside them is a pair of rugged frontiersman and below (to the West) we 
eye a Euro-American bringing goods for trade with Native American villages. A family of 
settlers is shown with a “good” Indian chief who accepts the arrival (even implied 
dominance) of the settlers and offers a peace pipe. But, in the meantime, a “bad” 
Pawnee warrior stalks the family with a bow and arrow. Conflict seems inevitable. The 
peaceful Indians will be accommodated but those who refuse face a bleak future.  
Ignoring the historical realities behind the dispossession of Native Americans, 
Benton himself described the scene using a curious blending of conservative racial 
stereotypes and liberal attitudes about the importance of collective action. The artist 
wrote: “The Indians were individualistic and acted more frequently on purely personal 
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initiative than the whites who traversed the prairies. The whites knew the value of 
disciplined cooperative action. That is one reason why they dispossessed the Indians.”168 
At the same time, some of the Native Americans in the painting are industrious, 
accepting that change is coming, two African American blacksmiths work vigorously in 
the middle ground and to the right of it, and a Mexican vaquero holding on to a mule, 
capture the efforts of the artist and president to celebrate America’s ethnic diversity. 
Truman’s civilized hometown of Independence is positioned to the East (on the right) 
and the world of the frontier about to be dramatically changed to the West (left): a 
buffalo skull in the foreground of the mural signifies Native Americans’ passing way of 
life and the progressive changes being brought to the American West and the nation. 
Notably, the mural also depicts a broader frontier mythology beyond that of the 
constrained, lone cowboy image that would be more the focus of future conservative 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. At the mural’s dedication ceremony on 
April 15, 1961, Chief Justice Earl Warren’s succinctly describes the intended meaning 
behind the work—in keeping with the forward looking, liberal Frontier Myth at that 
point in time. “As our people come to visit the Truman Library,” said Warren, “their 
eyes will fall upon this great mural….The knowledge of our heroic past will open vistas 
for them into the future.”169  
Significantly, when visitors to the Truman Library pass the Benton mural, they 
realize that it acts as a framing device for the first replica of the Oval Office to be built in 
a presidential museum. The increased power of the federal government and the office of 
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the presidency—as pursued by liberal Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and his cousin 
Franklin, and enhanced by the realities of the nuclear age—all seemed represented 
there. Benjamin Hufbauer writes that at the Truman Library visitors gain a sense that 
“the whole ship of state, was in a sense steered from one room—the Oval Office.”170 Here 
the power of the presidency and the Frontier Myth are brought together in one place in a 
kind of continuing narrative of the nation’s most influential idea and its highest office. 
This symmetry was especially important in the early 1960s when the mural appeared: a 
time when the Berlin Wall was being erected and the Soviet-American confrontation 
was especially intense. Further, the image of white women and children being protected 
by the armed men in the Benton’s mural seems an obvious metaphor for the “free 
world” being protected by the United States from the Red Soviet Menace during the 
Cold War. 
The darker, cultural undercurrent of anti-communism in the United States also 
had important long term implications for the nature of the Frontier Myth. For many 
American conservatives, and some liberals, life in Soviet Russia became one that was 
envisioned as a kind of opposite definition of America itself. One of the conservative 
tenets of the Frontier Myth, individualism, along with Americans’ accompanying 
concerns for civil liberties and property rights, were known to be disdained by the Reds 
in Moscow who emphasized collective rather than personal rights. In a system which 
placed society ahead of the individual, Americans increasingly viewed the Russian 
people as having been reduced to manipulable objects that were incapable of 
independent thought or action.  Those on the right were particularly hostile toward the 
“Commies” in the Kremlin and their alleged “cradle to grave” control over Soviet 
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citizens. As Reader’s Digest reported with regularity, “there is no room…for mental 
independence. The only way to survive is to conform.”171 Throughout the popular media, 
robotic, enslaved Soviets were depicted as stirring up revolutions, craving power, and 
living “in a godless, gray and regimented world. Worst of all, these miserable Russians 
intended to make the rest of the planet in their own dismal image.”172 In the Digest’s 
September 1949 reprint from Life magazine, Life’s editors likened the dystopian novel 
Nineteen Eighty-Four’s sinister character of Big Brother to a “mating” of Hitler and 
Stalin, adding that “Behind the iron curtain,” Orwell’s nightmare “will not seem strange 
or imaginative at all.”173 The terms mass society, the Holocaust, atomic warfare, 
propaganda, and totalitarianism became infused with fear and urgency by the mid-
twentieth century and while there was a great deal of optimism for a progressive future 
among most Americans this co-existed with a sense of fear that gripped the United 
States as well.  
In Hollywood, this fear played itself out through a purge of leftists with alleged 
links to Communism which took place in the motion picture industry. Beginning in 1950 
a little known Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, fast became the 
most known public figure representing a period in which Cold War anxieties stoked 
widespread fears of Communist subversion. McCarthy gained enormous publicity for 
himself by insisting that the United States was riddled with large numbers of Soviet 
spies and Communists—along with their sympathizers—in the federal government, 
Hollywood’s film industry, and elsewhere. The inclusive and collective liberal myth was 
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thus challenged head on by McCarthy and company. Though, in the end, the Senator 
himself would eventually be exposed as a reckless bully who ignored due process and 
attacked others more respected than himself, some of the ideas he represented 
continued to fester for years to come.  
According to historian John Lukacs, by the late 1940s, anti-Communism had 
become for American conservatives a kind of substitute—“and often even more than a 
substitute”—for what they considered patriotism in the United States.174 Increasingly, 
American audiences of popular culture were encouraged both implicitly and explicitly to 
carry the fight to the Reds in the international arena by turning to the same kind of core 
values that had allegedly sustained their forebears through the frontier era. Westerns of 
the 1950s were relevant drama that embodied the psychology of the struggle between 
the Soviet East and “Free” West. For Americans wary of the Reds, in particular, it was 
there on that “virgin land” that the simple and rugged truths of pre-industrial America 
thrived: individualism, “know how,” self-reliance, and higher values. In an age of 
anxiety and growing international tension, the cowboy hero answered to a higher law 
and offered straight solutions that conservative and populist Americans in particular 
appreciated. The Western story’s pervasiveness during the postwar era is in part 
reflective of American’s fear of their Soviet enemy and of determinism, and of their 
desire for simple answers in difficult times.  
During the Depression era, Westerns such as Stagecoach and singing cowboy 
entertainers including “The Sons of the Pioneers”175 had bolstered American 
communities against corrupt bankers and malicious crooks. The Second World War 
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period saw these stars stand against the extremist foes of Hitler and Tojo. Likewise 
during the Cold War, Western and frontier heroes continued to promote simple and 
practical solutions to complicated geopolitical issues abroad and at home. Calling upon 
conservative nostalgia and promoting a liberal rhetoric of community, these idealized 
images of an older America were even, to some degree, applied to Harry Truman’s 
successor. 
Moderate Republican President Dwight “Ike” Eisenhower, had grown up in the 
central plains of Abilene, Kansas and the 1950’s “Eisenhower Western,” as it became 
coined by film critics, was one that reflected the persona of the President himself. 
Typically these featured a good guy in white (Ike) facing down an evil black-hat 
(especially Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev) or their gang which sprang from the 
hostile landscape (like Soviet proxy wars), taking over towns and generally terrorizing 
otherwise decent folk who called out for nothing more than some basic freedoms and 
justice. For the purposes of this study, what is most significant about this connection 
between Ike and films about the frontier west is that elements of American society, 
especially conservatives, were beginning to seek out idealized images of an older 
America and to counterpoise them against the negative images of modern life and 
bureaucratization, which for them the Soviet Union came to symbolize. Beneath the 
broadly accepted political liberalism of the early postwar era, a growing undercurrent of 
suspicion arose as Americans believed that they needed to be vigilant to head off threats 
to their own traditional ways of life. The Cowboy hero and landscape were, in effect, 
being retooled for the Cold War. And this reality would have long term implications for 
the political nature of the Frontier Myth—compromising some of its liberal values even 
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in advance of Lyndon Johnson, arguably the most liberal of all the “Frontier” 
Presidents. 
 
The Cold War’s Frontiers of the Left and the Right  
From the early 1950s through the late 1960s, in particular, the Western was the 
dominant genre of American film and television entertainment. Amid the intensity of 
the Cold War, Westerns portrayed the conquering of the frontier to help assure a 
troubled citizenry worried that their country, and rest of the world, might not survive 
the current struggle with their Soviet enemies. At their height, Cold War juvenile 
westerns provided American boys and girls with the ultimate “hero” role model to 
emulate. In 1951 Gene Autry, an avid supporter of FDR’s New Deal, promoted his 
“Cowboy Code”–or what amounted to a kind of frontier Ten Commandments—reflecting 
the power inherent in the genre to express dominant ideals and to persuade. Autry’s 
code declared, solemnly, that: 
1. A cowboy never takes unfair advantage, even of an enemy. 
2. A cowboy never betrays a trust. 
3. A cowboy always tells the truth. 
4. A cowboy is kind to small children, to old folks, and to animals. 
5. A cowboy is free from racial and religious prejudice. 
6. A cowboy is always helpful, and when anyone’s in trouble, he lends a hand. 
7. A cowboy is a good worker. 
8. A cowboy is clean about his person, and in thought, word, and deed. 
9. A cowboy respects womanhood, his parents, and the laws of his country. 
10. A cowboy is a patriot.176 
 
 
Significantly, the popular “The Lone Ranger” TV program focused especially on 
Commandment 10, with a patriotic bent being written directly into its production 
company’s statement of standards: “The Lone Ranger is motivated by love of country—a 
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desire to help those who are building the West….Patriotism means service to a 
community; voting…the development of schools and churches [and]…the preservation 
of things for which our ancestors fought and died.”177 The creator of the program, 
George W. Trendle, also wanted a hero who was tolerant, had no bad habits, and could 
“fight great odds, yet take time to treat a bird with a broken wing.”178 The Masked Man, 
then, was both a patriot and a progressive paladin. No doubt TR and future president 
LBJ would have enthusiastically approved. But while the Cold War Western’s for little 
cowpokes remained predominantly liberal, some of the most influential frontier and 
cowboy productions of the age had clearly conservative elements as well. 
J. Fred MacDonald argues that the most concentrated lesson for youth in Cold War 
Americanism came from the Walt Disney blockbuster film Davy Crockett, King of the 
Wild Frontier (1955) in theatres, and the supplementary five-part serial that aired on 
ABC-TV. The Disney version of frontiersman Crockett possessed an innocent belief in 
direct action in the cause of right, represented the honest common folk, and promoted 
democracy without hesitation. The honest pioneer, Davy made the ultimate 
frontiersman sacrifice, traveling to Texas to lend a helping hand because “Americans are 
in trouble” and because it was there on the southwest frontier that “freedom was fightin’ 
another foe.”179 Disney’s version of Davy Crockett seemed to fit the times perfectly as 
one willing to fight and die at the Alamo, so the story went, to spread democracy and 
justice on the lands beyond the United States’ existing borders. But Crockett was hardly 
a strict adherent to the Cowboy Code: using his knife, rifle and cannon to kill dozens of 
Mexicans without government sanction. Davy spoke with conviction about the rights of 
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Cherokees, but also killed warring Creek Indians. On the whole, then, Disney’s Crockett 
was a kind of blending of hawkish imperialism and progressive enlightenment, mixing 
his conservative with his liberal qualities. One popular image of the frontiersman was of 
one who died heroically at the Alamo: both in the name of democracy and justice and in 
the cause of American (or more accurately Texican) imperialism and expansion. The 
celluloid Crockett was one that could appeal equally to Americans on different sides of 
the political spectrum, depending on which qualities one chose to emphasize. 
Another highly popular and critically acclaimed Western of the 1950s was director 
George Stevens Shane (1953) based on the Jack Schaefer novel of the same name. Along 
with its impressive landscape cinematography the film’s most notable and innovative 
feature is its emphasis on the narrative from the viewpoint of a young boy, Joey 
(Brandon deWilde), who mythologizes the gunslinger. The story, featuring a lone rider 
helping a group of homesteaders stand up against a cruel and greedy cattle baron, has 
been a standard plot convention used in numerous Louis L’Amour novels, B-Westerns, 
and historically relates to the Johnson County War of 1892. Shane’s cattle baron is 
Rufus Ryker (Emile Myer), who tries to run the pioneer homesteaders out of town by 
seizing the land they claimed under the Homestead Acts.  Like most Cattle Barons (a 
metaphor similar to that of “Robber Baron” or “Railroad Baron” in TR’s day), Ryker is a 
frontier heavy who desires to crush any independent ranchers who get in his way as a 
means of adding to his own ill-gotten power and wealth. In the end Shane (Alan Ladd), 
frontier society’s equalizer, must reluctantly strap on his guns to defeat Ryker’s 
villainous and psychotic hired-gun, Jack Wilson (Jack Palance). 
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Jenni Calder writes that Cold War Western dramas in all media featured heroic 
“individuals willing to risk everything to guarantee the well-being of average folks.”180 In 
popular culture, the Frontier Hero represented law and order and individualism, along 
with support for the community and the progressive future in the West. Often they knew 
that their time as a gunman was passing, that the civilizing process would soon leave 
them an anachronism, but before then their unique gift for violence was desperately 
needed by those innocent and honest Americans being victimized by evil and sadistic 
villains. The Second World War had repeatedly displayed the extremes of human cruelty 
and, for many Americans, the Cold War saw things get even worse behind the 
Communist Iron Curtain. If Americans saw little about the recent historical past to put 
their minds at ease about the future, they could always turn to the frontier hero who 
answered to a higher law. Whether in its original radio and TV orientation toward 
children, or in the “adult” western that soon emerged, it was there on that “virgin land” 
that all of the alleged rugged and simple truths of frontier life could be portrayed most 
effectively. At its height, as many as sixty million viewers per night watched television 
westerns and, by January 1959, eight of the top ten programs were of that genre. 181 The 
western story's pervasiveness during the postwar era is indicative of Americans' fears of 
totalitarianism, of global war in a nuclear age, and of the desire for simple answers in 
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difficult times.182 The Frontier Myth of this period, though not completely transformed 
by the event of the Cold War, was accommodating it in important ways.   
In movie theatres in particular, some of the most innovative Westerns of the 
postwar years also complicated the Frontier Myth politically by introducing conservative 
as well as liberal elements and by challenging the hero’s goodness and virtue and even 
that of American society itself. Two such “superwestern”183 films of the 1950s that 
clearly resonated with future “frontier” Presidents are Director Fred Zinnemann’s High 
Noon (1952) and John Ford’s The Searchers (1956).  
High Noon’s Marshall Will Kane (Gary Cooper) cannot find anyone in Hadleyville 
to help him in a noon showdown with four dangerous outlaw gunmen, the Miller gang. 
Tension in the film is greatly enhanced by having it take place in “real time.” As the 
clock ticks toward the noon showdown, Kane’s beliefs are tested to their absolute limits 
when the cowardly hypocrites and opportunists in town all find excuses for not getting 
involved. Carl Foreman began drafting the script early in 1951 and soon found himself 
forced to appear before the House on Un-American Activities. He saw a great deal of 
himself in the role created for Gary Cooper. “I was the [Gary] Cooper character,” he said, 
referring to his standing on principles by refusing to aid in naming names of alleged 
“Reds” in Hollywood and being shunned by others as a result. “There are scenes in that 
film that are taken from life. The scene in the church is the distillation of meetings I had 
with partners, associates, and lawyers.”184 Dumped by his long-time partner, Foreman 
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would always maintain that the movie was about McCarthyism and the blacklist. The 
context for the writing of High Noon reflects an undercurrent of powerful conservative 
forces at work in Hollywood: though the screenwriter’s response (whether audiences 
interpreted it this way or not) was a decisively anti-reactionary one. The town of 
Hadleyville (America) had dishonoured itself through its cowardice and hypocrisy but, 
thankfully, the one who stood up for the country’s true ideals prevailed anyway—
removing and dropping his Sheriff’s badge in the dirt in the closing scene. As we shall 
observe in future chapters, though, Cold War anti-communism which crept into the 
prevailing Frontier Myth would push Lyndon Johnson toward pursuing the war in 
Southeast Asia a decade later and ultimately trap him and the nation in a war with no 
exit strategy. 
 
Civil Rights and Feminism in the Celluloid West 
The superwestern that Lyndon Johnson would identify after his presidency as his 
favourite contains different messages.185 In The Searchers (1956), John Ford—the 
master of the genre—alters and deepens his ideas about the Western hero and Native 
Americans. It is not difficult to see how the film’s setting of early Texas and its story of 
hardship and sacrifice would resonate with the Hill Country LBJ. In one key scene of the 
film, Mrs. Jorgensen—whose family has undergone tremendous hardship in wresting 
civilization out of the tough landscape—tells her husband: “It so happens we be 
Texicans. A Texican is nothing but a human man out on a limb.” She concludes her 
speech by expressing her belief that one day, after the two of them are in the ground, a 
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better life will be enjoyed for their posterity.186 Here Ford is acknowledging with a sense 
of honesty that the personal trials and sacrifices made by those who built civilization 
may only lead to benefits somewhere down the road—after the pioneers’ lives have been 
spent. This is a point that LBJ would return to repeatedly during his presidency: that by 
everyone pitching in together, risking, sacrificing and acting responsibly, Americans 
could build a greater nation for their children. In accordance with the liberal Frontier 
Myth which TR had lived out (and promoted as president through policies such as his 
“Square Deal” and creation of “green” spaces), Johnson likewise envisioned new 
frontiers of economic advancement and inclusiveness for all Americans. In another 
Western precursor to the 1960s, the idea of sacrifice for the future was one that LBJ 
would work into the promotion of his “Great Society” programs; thanks to the spirit of 
those hearty frontier folk, he would say, America now had the resources and will to 
create a society as great as the Western landscape itself. 
Perhaps Ford’s most notable achievement in The Searchers, though, and the one 
that in later years apparently resonated with Johnson and critics of the film alike, is 
what seems to be his intentional metaphor for African-American/ white relationships in 
the era of Brown vs. the Board of Education: the Supreme Court’s school desegregation 
case. Shot in the summer of 1955, The Searchers was released in May of 1956, just two 
years after the Supreme Court ruled that separate but equal segregated schooling was in 
violation of the constitution. As Jim Kitses has argued, The Searchers is Ford’s most 
powerful mediation on America’s troubled racist history. Alan LeMay’s 1954 novel, and 
the screenplay which followed, were heavily worked over by director Ford to include 
crucial changes. Until the film version, race was not a substantive issue. But in Ford’s 
                                                          
186 The Searchers (1956), Warner Brothers, Dir: John Ford. 
 
 
141 
 
film version, race relations is a focal point for the protagonist Ethan Edward’s (John 
Wayne) intense hatred of Native Americans, his quest to kill his captured and “tainted” 
niece, Debbie, his scalping of Scar (an absolute violation of the Cowboy Code), and the 
eventual change of heart Ethan exhibits in sparing Debbie. At the same time, Ford’s 
decision to banish Ethan from the comfort of a home and a family as punishment for his 
deep-seated hatreds also carry significance.187 As the film’s theme asks: “What makes a 
man to wander? What makes a man to roam? What makes a man leave bed and board, 
And turn back on his home?”  Ford was a product of his times as we all are. The 
Searchers was structured as a revenge fantasy but then the director turned the story on 
its head to expose the destructive and self-destructive forces of racism. As President, 
Lyndon Johnson, a former segregationist, would (not unlike Ford) surprise many, 
including African-Americans, by using his “bully pulpit” to champion the cause of Civil 
Rights head on. 
The Searchers contains some key “lessons” for Americans at mid-century which 
may also provide further insight into Johnson’s choice of this particular Western as his 
favourite. The character of Ethan represents in so many ways the old, white, male West 
who reveals racist and patriarchal flaws in America itself, as well as in the character who 
has been scarred by his immersion into violence on the side of the “lost cause” during 
the Civil War. In the end, John Ford reclaims this character after many years of 
prolonged purgatory and suffering. Ethan Edwards finally accepts his racially violated 
niece, comes to respect his half-breed step nephew (who marries a white girl), and 
begrudgingly becomes accepting of the fact that the nation is changing around him. 
Ethan’s character, forged in the gun violence of the Civil War, in the end comes to accept 
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the multiethnic diversity of the nation so much on the minds of 1950s movie-goers. This 
transformation, as difficult and painful as it was for Ford’s main character, is perhaps 
metaphorical of the vision that Lyndon Baines Johnson held out for all of America. The 
profound character development may have even impacted on the usually arch-
conservative actor John Wayne himself who named his son Ethan. 
The politically liberal stance taken by numerous Western films, TV and radio series 
in with respect to inclusiveness in the latter part of the 1950s and early ‘60s is striking. 
As one editorial insisted, these morality tales “speak a language very close to the heart of 
the American Dream: the dream of righteousness…a sense of community, the respect for 
the poor, for the downtrodden, for the tempest tossed.”188 
In adult television and radio Westerns, Native Americans were portrayed more 
fairly than in the juvenile series and by the late 1950s several series, such as Gunsmoke, 
took up civil rights themes that focused on the mistreatment of American Indians.189 In 
one radio episode of Have Gun Will Travel, Paladin sides with an Indian, Whitehorse, 
and his pregnant wife in a confrontation with white racists who are harassing them. At 
the end of the program, Paladin offers his mercenary fee of $2,000 to the Whitehorse 
family with an apology for white racism: “Please accept it for your child, with my 
apologies for this imperfect world we have to offer him, and my hopes for a better one in 
his lifetime.”190 Related to this development was the more general theme of 
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brotherhood. In Dr. Six-Gun, even animals took up the cause when a pet raven kept 
reminding viewers that “all men are brothers.”191 
Liberal feminism in Fifties Westerns has also been the subject of considerable 
discussion among analysts of the genre. In West of Everything (1992) Jane Tompkins, 
Professor of English at Duke University, explores what she considers the Western 
frontier genre’s major characteristic: a preoccupation with male violence and female 
subordination. The genre, she writes, has nothing to do with the West but “is about 
men’s fearing of losing their mastery and hence their identity.”192 The Western, then, is 
a male response to female culture. I find her chapter length descriptions of Owen 
Wister, Zane Grey and Louis L’Amour quite compelling. Certainly the social 
environment of the late nineteenth century, with help from Theodore Roosevelt’s own 
persona (Chapter I), helped to create the right conditions for setting up masculinity as a 
key facet of the Frontier Myth. But Tompkins is somewhat less convincing in her 
handling of assorted films, mostly from the post-WWII era which do not fit as well with 
the assertion that they are a reaction to Victorian values. And if the marginalization does 
apply in many Westerns of the postwar years there are notable exceptions: Barbara 
Stanwyck in practically any Western she made from The Furies (1950) to Cattle Queen 
of Montana (1954, and co-starring Ronald Reagan) does not fit the female 
subordination role at all. Tompkins also fails to note and recognize that Kathleen Hite 
was the most popular and arguably the best writers of the Gunsmoke TV episodes and 
that she infused them with liberal feminist and inclusive themes.193 The deadly gunman 
                                                          
191 Ibid. 
192 Jane Tompkins, West of Everything: The Inner Life of Westerns (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992): 45. 
193 Kathleen Hite (1917-1989), Writer, IMDb database, online at 
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0386928/ (accessed 16 February 2016). 
 
 
144 
 
Shane (Alan Ladd), meanwhile, hardly represents overt masculinity with his supersized 
horse (or undersized rider) and his fringed and dudified clothing. This said, the 
perceived need for masculine dominance is an idea which does appear to have held a 
particular grip not only on Theodore Roosevelt at the turn-of-the-century but, as will be 
demonstrated, on Lyndon Johnson as well. Interestingly, both of these presidents 
supported liberal, even feminist causes in certain respects, but their adherence to the 
Frontier Myth also contained patriarchal (and in TR’s case, Victorian) elements that 
reflect how the myth itself had become a kind of battleground between liberal and 
conservative elements on issues such as collectivism versus individualism, regulation 
versus corporate power, civil rights versus segregation, and feminism versus the 
celebration of virile and paternalistic masculinity. Tensions between “progress,” both 
social and technological, versus a nostalgic and pastoral longing for “the good old days,” 
framed a political battleground as well. 
 
Technology and the Frontier: From Lindbergh to Sputnik 
During the postwar years Americans came more and more to envision themselves 
as frontier folk, pioneers, and cowboys. In fact, these ideas had engrained themselves so 
deeply into the popular mind that for individuals and new communities, incorporating 
them into their identities had seemed to become what cultural historians have 
characterized as “an unthinking act.”194 In the twentieth century, this often resulted in 
crossover comparisons between the old pastoral frontier and advancement of new 
technologies. As Leo Marx contends, Americans wanted to have their cake (the garden) 
                                                          
194 John M. Findlay and Bruce Hevly, Atomic Frontier Days: Hanford and the American West 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011): 99. 
 
 
145 
 
and eat it too in order to square the machine with the pastoral ideal. Sometimes this 
even resulted in drawing direct comparisons between these two seemingly incompatible 
aspects of American life. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, for Theodore Roosevelt a fascination with 
both the frontier values and new technologies held center stage. As President, TR 
embraced and actively engaged with numerous inventions of his day from the motion 
picture camera to submarines to the Wright Flyer. Roosevelt had spoken of combining 
the older values with the new technology and thus enabling Americans to take on the 
great challenges and adventures that lay ahead in the twentieth century.  
News of Charles A. Lindbergh’s trans-Atlantic flight from New York to Paris in 
1927 provoked numerous responses celebrating the kinds of frontier characteristics 
portrayed by artist John Gast, described by historian Turner, and put into action by 
President Roosevelt. One newspaper in Ohio declared Lindbergh as a “self-contained, 
self-reliant, courageous young man [who] ranks among the great pioneers of history.”195 
Theodore Roosevelt’s son and namesake, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, told reporters at 
Oyster Bay that “Captain Lindbergh personifies the daring of youth. Daniel Boone, 
David Crocket [sic], and men of that type played a lone hand and made America. 
Lindbergh is their lineal descendant.”196 And Outlook magazine (in a piece that could 
have been written by its former associate editor, TR, Sr. himself) asserted: “Charles 
Lindbergh is the heir of all that we like to think is best in America. He is of the stuff out 
of which have been made the pioneers that opened up the wilderness, first on the 
Atlantic Coast, and then in our great West. His are the qualities which we, as a people, 
                                                          
195 Ohio newspaper column quoted in John William Ward, “The Meaning of Lindbergh’s Flight,” 
American Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1958): 9. 
196 Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., quoted in Ibid. 
 
 
146 
 
must nourish.”197 Other frequent metaphors describing Lindbergh’s adventure included 
the claim that he had opened a new “frontier.”198 The significance of the frontier in 
American history had thus been expanded to include products of a highly industrialized, 
urban society. This connection between modern technology and the frontier would 
influence and be emphasized not only by TR but by later presidents who are the subject 
of this study.  
During the early years of the Cold War, the city of Richland, Washington was 
created as a company town whose residents made explosives: or more precisely worked 
at the Hanford atomic facility which produced plutonium for making atomic and later 
nuclear bombs. In the 1940s and ‘50s townsfolk almost immediately took on the identity 
of frontier folks who espoused liberal, progressive, and conservative values along with 
other mythic visions related to technology that could be applied to most Americans at 
mid-century. Richlanders declared themselves to be modern American pioneers whose 
own movement westward helped fulfill the nation’s Manifest Destiny and, in doing so, 
they  envisioned themselves as bearing personal burdens and sacrifices for the 
betterment of the country and future generations.199 Historians John M. Findlay and 
Bruce Hevly have described in detail how this played out during the city of Richland’s 
“Atomic Frontier Days,” an annual event scheduled for the Labor Day weekend. 
Townsfolk in attendance were encouraged to act and dress like pioneers of the Old West 
as parade floats sauntered by celebrating the “natural” progression from wagon trains to 
atomic power.200 The “Atomic Frontier” connected the past to the future and its annual 
festival honoured the communities’ supposed similarities to “‘the mining and lumbering 
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towns of the early West.’”201 Richland residents imagined themselves to be full 
participants in conquering “‘the Atomic Wilderness on this, our last frontier.’”202 In this 
way Richlanders could not only take on the personas of earlier generations but also saw 
themselves as forward-looking innovators. As Findlay and Hevly explain: “They used 
frontier imagery to comment on the rapid pace of change in front of them, and 
commended themselves for their role in shaping that change and, with it, the future. 
Existing on the cutting edge of industry and technology meant that Richland was 
pioneering tomorrow.”203 Turner’s “masterful grasp of material things…powerful to 
effect great ends” and the pioneering past were thus mutually reinforcing.204 
As we shall see in future chapters, and not without some irony, the intertwining of 
the frontier past and technological future that began with Theodore Roosevelt would 
become a prominent idea in the minds of Cowboy Presidents Lyndon Johnson and, in 
some respects, Ronald Reagan. When the USSR sent its trash can-sized satellite Sputnik 
into orbit in 1957, it challenged America’s view of itself as the world’s pioneer leader in 
technology. “‘Americans were suddenly jarred out of what the British writer C.P. Snow 
called their ‘technological conceit’ which was based in part on the belief that science and 
totalitarianism were incompatible.’”205 Risk, progress, democracy and success were all 
integral elements of the Frontier Myth and needed to be perpetuated. The vision’s power 
to persuade would soon be demonstrated through the major role it played in bringing 
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the entire NASA program into being in 1958, a development we shall return to in 
Chapter V of this dissertation.206 
 
The Sci-Fi Frontiers and Dynamic Tensions within the Myth 
The period of the 1940s and 1950s is often referred to as the Golden Age of Science 
Fiction. With respect to the Frontier Myth, as the heroes of these stories moved into and 
occupied allegedly empty spaces, it was again the story of the advance of civilization in 
the struggle with a new wilderness, with Indigenous aliens, and cruel villains. Science 
fiction frequently worked off of the same kind of imperial formula found in Westerns 
including the theme of expansion across the continent, what was known and what was 
unknown, and a nostalgic past entwined with an eternal future. Carl Abbot correctly 
demonstrates how widely read sci-fi anthologies of the 1950s with titles such as 
Frontiers in Space, Beachheads in Space and The Space Frontier led  their audience to 
the seemingly natural assumption that space travel and exploration “worked” just like 
the nineteenth century frontier that they had become so familiar and comfortable with. 
As Abbot contends: “Science fiction extends western openness to infinity, from cold 
desert surfaces of the moon or Mars to the wide-open spaces of entire galaxies, making 
the western plains and desert actually as well as metaphorically boundless and 
extending their possibilities and dangers to the ends of the imagination.”207 By mid-
century the American colonial-style adventures of Hawkeye and the Virginian were 
transferred to outer space where once again, men and women set out on missions, such 
as that of Star Trek’s Starship Enterprise of the 1960s, to “explore strange new worlds” 
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and “seek out new life and new civilizations.” Robert A. Heinlein wrote a great deal 
about pioneering life on other planets in novels such as Red Planet (1949), a story about 
immigrants to Mars, and Farmer in the Sky (1950), featuring a family that moves to 
Ganymede. In The Martian Chronicles, Ray Bradbury writes an outer space version of 
American expansion into the frontier west, with Martians serving as stand-ins for Native 
Americans, displaced and marginalized by pioneers. Humans pushed out into the galaxy 
to explore all new adventures involving the meeting of civilization and savagery, heroes 
and heroines, interplanetary settlers, and a plethora of challenges. These outer space 
frontier-folk often grappled with the same kinds of issues concerning conquest, setting 
up communities, and progress that the pioneers out West had faced. But now the 
conventional frontier setting became virtually endless.  
Leo Marx’s identification of the Machine in the Garden as a central tension in 
American culture has in one sense been reconciled through science fiction. In describing 
an alien future, literary scholar Gary Wolfe articulates a phenomenon that amounts to a 
clear continuation of Americans’ obsession with the frontier out West as: 
 
an arena for the kind of heroic individualism that increasingly seemed 
to be disappearing in the urbanized and industrialized East. With the 
closing of that frontier, the popular audience sought promises of yet 
new areas to explore, and science fiction gained popularity as a kind of 
literature which not only offered new frontiers but did so without 
sacrificing the technological idealism that had equally come to 
characterize industrial America. Science fiction offered its audience 
both the machine and the wilderness.208 
 
 
Other tensions that science fiction explore are also remarkably similar to those ongoing 
tensions of the Frontier Myth.  The conflict between individualism/self-reliance and 
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community frequently emerges along with the question: is it better for individuals to 
break away from their community in favour of freedom and self-reliance, or should they 
remain within a connected and helpful support system? The answer is not always clear 
in Sci-Fi since heroes often break away from some communities but then discover or 
help create new ones.  On TV’s Star Trek, the Enterprise’s crew became a true 
community in itself, where personnel support each other through dangerous weekly 
adventures on strange new worlds. Conversely, The Prisoner TV series featured a retired 
spy, “Number Six,” a tough individualist who finds himself imprisoned in a secret 
“Village” where an unidentified organization attempts week after week to break his will 
in their cruel efforts to learn the true motives behind his resignation. In another 
example of this dichotomy, while outer space miners in the “space western” Moon Zero 
Two (1969)209 are shown to fight as a community for their mining rights just as settlers 
in the early West allegedly hung together to defend their land and new life on the 
American frontier, the cowering miners of Jupiter’s moons in Outland (1981) must rely, 
pathetically, on one tough and self-reliant Marshal (Sean Connery) engaged in a lonely 
crusade against corruption and murder.210 Another of the myth’s key tensions, the 
impact of social and technological change on people’s way of life, though often portrayed 
in a positive light, could sometimes have apocalyptic implications as well. Underground 
frontier stories such as Daniel F. Galouye’s Dark Universe (1961)211, for example, 
describe the plight of desperate settlers who are forced to migrate below the surface 
following a nuclear war.  
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In a famous quote from the mid-nineteenth century, Henry David Thoreau stated 
that his feet always took him westward when he went outdoors for a walk, since “‘the 
future lies that way and the earth seems more unexhausted and richer on that side.’”212  
In the American mind, the West had long been about abundance, challenges and 
possibilities. Territorial, military and economic expansion into the Pacific, meanwhile, 
was a major goal of many American presidents—including Theodore Roosevelt and 
Lyndon Johnson. Likewise science fiction often built on this transition in the history of 
the United States from an Atlantic to a Pacific orientation, or what Wallace Stegner has 
called the need for “’a different and a larger universe.’”213 The past’s obsessions about a 
frontier past were thus often extended into the future as were its contested politics. 
 
JFK and the “New Frontier” 
President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) did not care for Westerns; he preferred the 
slick, “license to kill” image of James Bond. But even the Ivy League Kennedy realized 
the power of drawing on images from America’s frontier past. 
If you landed in the United States at the beginning of the 1960s, you would find the 
public’s thoughts about the future of their country and the world to be an odd mixture of 
anxious concern and complacency. A content optimism still lingered from the 
experience of World War II and from the unprecedented postwar economic boom. But 
beneath this seeming satisfaction lie an undercurrent of concern about the state of the 
nation and the world in the coming decade. The Soviets were winning the space race, 
Fidel Castro’s revolution in nearby Cuba had left a Communist state just 90 miles off of 
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Key West, Florida, there was the Berlin Wall crises of 1961, fear of dominoes collapsing 
in Southeast Asia, and anxieties over the possibility of a nuclear confrontation with the 
Soviet Union—all of which had Americans on edge. At home, change was also in the air 
with Civil Rights. At the outset of the new decade, President Eisenhower appeared old, 
tired and sick. Entering a new decade, many Americans sensed that their nation and 
their world were about to transform. 
JFK’s “New Frontier” was the key phrase used in his acceptance speech as the 
Democratic Party’s nominee for President in 1960. Kennedy’s program was to be a 
reaffirmation of some of the values and beliefs central to the Frontier Myth. Americans 
had previously been challenged to fulfill their manifest destiny and obligation to settle 
the North American continent. The “motto” of pioneers who settled the west, the 
candidate declared, “was not ‘every man for himself’—but ‘all for the common cause.” 
These frontier folk “were determined to make the new world strong and free—an 
example to the world, to overcome its hazards and hardships, to conquer the enemies 
that threatened from within and without.” Kennedy then recalled some of the same 
ideas that Theodore Roosevelt had tapped into five decades earlier: 
 
Today some would say that those struggles are all over—that all the 
horizons have been explored—that all the battles have been won—that 
there is no longer an American frontier….But I tell you the New Frontier is 
here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond that frontier are uncharted areas 
of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered 
problems of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty 
and surplus. It would be easier to shrink from that new frontier, to look to 
the safe mediocrity of the past, to be lulled by good intentions and high 
rhetoric….I believe that the times require imagination and courage and 
perseverance. I’m asking each of you to be pioneers towards that New 
Frontier….For courage—not complacency—is our need today.214 
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Here JFK was picking up on TR and Turner’s belief that the frontier and westering 
experience was not only geographic but an idea that could be applied to social relations, 
politics and foreign policy: a kind of innovation that was still relevant for the 1960s.  
As President, Kennedy’s charisma helped his administration implement a new 
vision where the old values emerged with a reinvigorated sense of virtue from another 
kind of wilderness. The establishment of the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, 
Council for Physical Fitness, the space programme—all emerged on Kennedy’s watch as 
his deputies put together a series of initiatives to implement this vision. In hindsight, 
though, Kennedy’s Camelot mystique had a much larger impact on his legacy than did 
his actual accomplishments. For the most part he was ineffective at persuading 
Congress to adopt New Frontier legislation, including Civil Rights and anti-poverty 
programs. JFK’s foreign policy, meanwhile, included substantive failures (including the 
Bay of Pigs and early involvement in Vietnam) along with its successes (most notably, at 
least in the popular imagination, the Cuban Missile Crisis).  
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Figure 3.3: A rare JFK as cowboy cartoon. Here white hat Kennedy is poised to shoot down 
bad man Nikita Khrushchev and his gun-twirling, mule riding sidekick, Fidel Castro in 
“Cuban Missile Showdown.” (Leslie Gilbert Illingsworth, October 5, 1962, SWANN no. 1587, 
Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Reproduced under the 
Fair Dealing [educational purposes] provision of the Canadian Copyright Act) 
 
Western Cinema of the Kennedy Years: The Magnificent Seven 
In October 1960, less than two weeks prior to the Presidential Election, a 
celebrated and big budget Western landed in American theatres: Director John Sturges’ 
The Magnificent Seven. The film was based heavily on Japanese director Akira 
Kurosawa’s critically acclaimed and popular film The Seven Samurai (1954). As 
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Kurosawa later said: “All I was doing was trying to make a Japanese Western.” But 
Kurosawa also added numerous innovations of his own. Essentially, the plots of both 
The Seven Samurai and The Magnificent Seven are about how a group of people with a 
great deal of fighting expertise make use of their talents in the defense of a group weaker 
than they are. In each case, a village of farmers/peasants harangued by bandits, hires 
seven professionals to protect them. As in the Western films of John Ford, George 
Stevens and others, Kurusawa and Sturges’ stories of heroism taught that life should be 
more about the needs of others than about yourself. Solidarity with others, the heroic 
Samurai and gunmen demonstrate through their selfless actions and words, is the 
meaning of life. In both cases, the Seven are magnificent because they follow the codes 
of “pride” and “honor” rather than acting out of self-interest. In the case of The 
Magnificent Seven, film scholar Kenneth S. Nolley notes that they “speak for the ideals 
of American democratic society [and] the American liberal tradition.” In a scene near 
the beginning of the film, veteran Cajun gunslinger Chris (Yul Brynner) takes a stand in 
defense of an integrated Boot Hill cemetery.215 Here the frontier values of tolerance and 
the needs of community transcend those of individualism. 
Another key theme in Kurusawa and Sturges’ films of relevance to the Frontier 
Myth is the fact that the experts in both—the Samurai and the gunmen—are part of a 
social group that’s time is coming to an end yet they still find a way to be useful. In the 
world of The Magnificent Seven, individualism, violence and gun slinging are becoming 
increasingly obsolete as the frontier becomes increasingly “civilized”: but this evolving 
process is not quite complete yet. By compromising their individualism and acting 
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collectively, Chris and his men can use their violence one last time for good—in the 
cause of defending the Mexican village—before the gunmen become truly redundant. To 
be successful they work as a collective and re-direct their violence away from self-
serving goals to altruistic ones. The better world that they create for the Mexican 
villagers in the town is a metaphor for the future of America, where individualism and 
raw violence will be displaced by collective help and support not only for whites but for 
visible minorities as well. Unlike 1950’s Davy Crockett and Jim Bowie, the Seven do not 
take over the lands of Hispanics, instead these early Sixties heroes make this Mexican 
community across the border safe for the Hispanics themselves. In the end, then, the 
film’s power is its remarkable ambiguity: a balancing of conservative nostalgia for a 
disappearing way of life along with liberal foresight for an inclusive and collective 
future. 
 
John Ford’s Revisionist Vision of the West: Nostalgia and Progress 
As Paul Monaco observes in History of the American Cinema: The Sixties, a shift 
in the American Western, somewhat modest at first, toward the themes of alienation 
and resistance to modern authority, pushed the basic formulas and conventions of the 
traditional horse operas to reinterpret the western frontier as a lost ideal.216 This shift 
set the stage for what was to come in the Seventies: a re-orienting of the Frontier Myth 
in American politics from a predominantly liberal vision to a conservative one. 
The initial change in the cinematic tone and interpretation of the frontier West 
from the end of World War II through the early 1960s is perhaps best demonstrated by 
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comparing two of John Ford’s most famous films, My Darling Clementine (1946) and 
The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962). While both films feature similar storylines, 
their mood and message is different. Clementine and Liberty Valance explore Ford’s 
vision of America’s mission to civilize the wilderness without removing the positive 
elements of wilderness from civilization. Both postwar Westerns accommodate liberal 
and conservative elements. But here, as film scholars Mike Yawn and Bob Beatty assert, 
one finds a rather stark contrast between the forward-looking optimism that pervades 
My Darling Clementine and the darker pessimism that backgrounds The Man Who Shot 
Liberty Valance.217  
In Clementine, town Marshall Wyatt Earp is able to achieve a successful balance of 
order and liberty. Here Ford delivers the message that, as in World War II, the rule of 
law will prevail over tyranny, religion over barbarism, and the qualities of rugged 
individualism and unity of community can coexist. In this early postwar vision, the West 
can be civilized without giving up the positive qualities of the frontier that make 
Americans unique in the world. To be more specific, the best qualities of the East and 
the West come together in the figure of Earp. Here, film scholar Robert Lyons writes, 
“Ford reveals his confidence about American by emphasizing Earp’s Western values, 
tempered by respect for those of the East.”218 The bright, symbolic scene of the dance 
between Earp and Clementine is a kind of celebration of a rebirth for the citizens of 
Tombstone. The scene comes at the crucial transformation stage of the film where the 
civilizing symbol of the church is being constructed and just before the savage Clantons 
are destroyed at the OK Corral. In their study of John Ford, Joseph McBride and 
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Michael Wilmington writes of the dance scene: “In this glorious moment, the infant 
civilization draws its first pure breath of optimism. Without quite realizing what he has 
done, Wyatt Earp has hewn a garden out of the wilderness.”219 Earp’s heroic status has 
become almost godlike, setting the stage for the gunfight a few minutes later as he and 
his companions destroy the Clantons. When Wyatt departs, he has transferred custody 
of the town to Clementine Carter and the other good citizens while he moves on to tame 
another town. 
Henry Fonda’s Earp, then, was Ford’s affirmation of American society as one that 
could both achieve civilization and progress while at the same time retaining those 
Turnerian qualities that had made the nation both great and exceptional.  John Ford’s 
West was the best place on Earth where the noble frontier traits of freedom, 
individualism, self-reliance, and American “know how” could synthesize with 
civilization into a purely American character, just as Wister had done with his Virginian.  
Of course, Ford’s movie-west, a key product and promulgator of the Frontier Myth, 
ignores the historic “reality” of a west of American violence and wars inflicted on 
indigenous populations, wars of expansion against Mexico in the southwest (1846-
1848), and the inherent racism in the savagery versus civilization dichotomy; the focus 
instead is on the self-serving idea of American exceptionalism. Ford, like most of his 
fellow postwar Americans, had accepted the idea that the United States had fought 
Indians and Mexico and acquired the Southwest in self-defense (just as it had reacted in 
response to Nazi expansion in Europe and Japanese treachery at Pearl Harbor in World 
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War II); but as historian Mark Anderson observes “the evidence shows precisely the 
opposite.”220 
The structure and plots behind Clementine and Liberty Valance are remarkably 
similar. Both films address the tension between the individual and the community or, in 
the broader sense, between individualism and community.  Yawn and Beatty point out 
that, in fact, the latter film can be viewed as a remake of the former. But a comparison of 
the nuances of both films reveal some starkly different visions of the West and of 
America as a whole. 
Ford filmed The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance in black and white and almost 
entirely within Paramount Studios—though he had used colour film and magnificent 
vistas throughout the 1950s—because he wanted to create a darker, more claustrophobic 
and anachronistic work.  The menace of progress had apparently hit home for the aging 
director. Ronald L. Davis writes in his study John Ford: Hollywood’s Older Master 
(1995) that “No longer did he feel like celebrating the course of civilization, which he 
accepted, but did not necessarily see as progress.”221  
The movie’s sadistic villain, Liberty Valance (played by Lee Marvin), beats Rance 
Stoddard (Jimmy Stewart) senseless because he represents his greatest fear: the arrival 
of civilization. Valance must crush everything that Rance represents: his Eastern ways, 
knowledge learned through books, and the law. But in an interesting twist, if there is a 
genuine parallel of characters it is between the hero, Tom Doniphon (John Wayne), and 
Valance. Both are frontier types living in a world where: “Out here a man settles his own 
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problems.”222 What separates the two is Doniphon’s ability to make decisions based on 
morality while Valance is driven by greed and a desire to commit evil. In time, after 
arriving in Shinbone, even the bookish Stoddard comes to the realization that principles 
on their own will not put an end to the barbarity of Liberty Valance. Before long, the 
lawyer attempts to take on popular frontier-type qualities as were described by Turner, 
including: “the practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients, that masterful 
grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends.”223  
In the key sequences, Valance challenges Stoddard to a gunfight for the future of 
Shinbone—with the code of the west versus civilization (through an election that would 
grant the territory statehood) at stake. The showdown looks to be a pathetically one-
sided affair with Valance mocking Stoddard but then being hit by a bullet that came not 
from Stoddard as it appeared but, we later learn, from Tom Doniphon across the street. 
Valance sprawls beneath a sign reading, “Mass Meeting Elections.” The scene is one of 
historical transition, marking the death of the frontier, and one that impacts on Tom 
Doniphon almost as swiftly as the terminated Valance. The frontier is no more and with 
it gone, Doniphon is destined to lose the girl, Halley (Vera Miles), to Stoddard, and 
degenerate into a figure who now lacks both his power and sense of dignity. In the end 
civilization is achieved but at a terrible cost: killing its hero, Tom Doniphon, and with it, 
the spirit and vitality of the frontier. It is a bitter statement about the price of progress 
as all that is good and honest in frontier life is destroyed. In contrast to Ford’s earlier 
films, most of which concluded with the theme of glory in defeat, Valance’s ending is not 
romantic or noble at all. Stoddard wins immortality and has risen to the position of a 
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United States Senator but if it were not for Doniphon, Stoddard would be dead. 
Doniphon, meanwhile, dies a destroyed and forgotten man. Stoddard is honourable and 
his risen to the position of state Senator, but he is not a hero. When Senator Stoddard 
tells the story of what really happened on the day of the showdown to the editor of the 
Shinbone Star, the newspaper man, in the end, tears up all of his notes. Stoddard asks: 
“Well, you’re not going to use the story, Mr. Scott?” “No sir,” he responds. “This is the 
West, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.”224 
The final scenes drive this point home even further. When Stoddard returns to the 
room holding Doniphon’s coffin he tells Hallie it’s time to leave, then notices a cactus 
rose placed on top of the casket (a symbol of Doniphon’s love for Hallie earlier in the 
film). On the train ride home, as Hallie looks out the window she comments that “It was 
once a wilderness, now it’s a garden. Aren’t you proud?” But Stoddard knows who the 
real hero is and understands that Hallie also knows. Sadly, he asks, “Hallie, who put the 
cactus roses on Tom’s coffin?” “I did,” Hallie replies. Nothing more is said between 
them. The contrast between the glorious and optimistic dance between Wyatt Earp and 
Clementine Carter and the shot of Stoddard’s sickened expression at the end of Liberty 
Valance speak volumes for the different outlooks of the two films. 
When Ford filmed Clementine in 1946, he appears to have thought that the unique 
and exceptional qualities of the frontier could continue as a vital part of American life. 
But by the early 1960s, Ford’s optimism had seemingly subsided as had his faith in 
American values. If at one level, “print the legend” helped to protect the myth of the 
frontier hero, he was also showing at a deeper level how the legend can destroy the 
individual. Ford’s world had changed around him and at least one of his biographers has 
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indicated that Ford was not pleased with what had transpired.225 Further, film critic and 
historian Scott Eyman explains that in Ford’s later years his own physical health and his 
spirit was failing.226 
After having defined the Western for 4o years, John Ford’s later films played a 
significant role in changing the Western genre by inserting dark elements into the 
Frontier Myth and the fear that the nation was losing those same traits which were 
believed to have created the American character and made their nation exceptional. 
Liberty Valance lacked Ford’s past poetic flourishes and depictions of traditional 
rituals: instead it affirmed the myth over the real. It was also the closest Ford, a liberal 
Democrat, would come to an indictment of self-reliance for here it is depicted as 
“destructive and ultimately self-defeating.”227 Ford, like everyone else, was a product of 
his times but his questioning of frontier optimism foreshadowed a much more critical, 
revisionist tide that would sweep through the Western genre at the end of the sixties. 
This said, for viewers of Liberty Valance in the early 1960s, it still delivered a key 
message inherent in The Searchers, The Magnificent Seven and other prominent 
Western films of the postwar era: that the values of a conservative frontier past—
individualism, violence, self-reliance, and American “know how”—could contribute in a 
meaningful and noble way to the building of a liberal and progressive future. 
 
Conclusion 
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In the 20th century the power of popular culture/media and the Frontier Myth 
were mutually reinforcing. Through film, television, radio, novels and journalism, the 
growth of modern mass media in the twentieth century reflected and in turn propagated 
the myth in American presidential politics and all other parts of American society with a 
sense of urgency and intensity never experienced before. The code of the West 
established early in the twentieth century by novelists, movie-makers, and others 
adjusted in response to the rising influence of technology and the crises of the Great 
Depression and World War II. In the postwar period, the underlying tensions of the 
Cold War combined with new forms of media to cause the Frontier Myth to be infused 
and propagated with particular urgency. In a century that was becoming increasingly 
complicated, Americans at mid-century found great comfort in the myth. And the more 
versions of the frontier that were released in various types of media, the more the myth 
was reinforced. But the myth had also become more complex than in Theodore 
Roosevelt’s day as the experience of the Cold War and other major events saw 
conservative interpretations often competing with liberal ones. Ambiguity and tensions 
within the Frontier Myth were accelerating. It would not be until the 1960s, though, that 
a series of shattering events would come together and cause the traditional myth to 
undergo a more skeptical analysis followed by a dramatic shift in nature and emphasis 
for reasons outlined by the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins. The change began modestly 
in the early 1960s but would prove much more intense in the latter years of the decade. 
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IV. 
Lyndon Baines Johnson: Return of a Liberal Cowpoke 
 
Sell the Johnson image….You know, like Marshal Matt 
Dillon…big, six-feet-three, good-looking—a tall, tough Texan 
coming down the street. 
    —VP candidate Lyndon B. Johnson’s advice to JFK Press 
Secretary Pierre Salinger, 1960228 
 
 
If ever there was a president who was larger than life it was the United States’ 
second Cowboy President, Lyndon Baines Johnson. LBJ was so towering, in fact, that he 
had what some scholars refer to as “two presidencies.”229 His “first presidency,” from 
1963 to 1965, focused on domestic issues and would see LBJ flourish in the presidency 
as the postwar, liberal Frontier Myth reached the peak of its influence and popularity. 
The “second” Johnson presidency from 1966 to 1969 (Chapters 6 and 7), however, 
would place an emphasis on the War in Vietnam—an event so powerful and 
transformative that the structure of the Frontier Myth as applied by Johnson would 
collapse under its own weight.  
This chapter and the one that follows will examine the “first presidency” including 
a careful development of Johnson’s Western persona (Chapter IV) and his related 
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efforts in support of civil rights, anti-poverty programs, and the space race (Chapter V): 
frontiers where a liberal Democratic cowboy president could draw on the frontier past to 
craft a new future. The postwar Myth had reached the peak of its power and influence 
during the early years of the LBJ Administration with the President riding a huge wave 
of national popularity. Historians have explained this remarkable support as deriving in 
large part from sympathy for the slain JFK. But this study argues that Lyndon Johnson’s 
adherence to the Frontier Myth structure and deployment of related symbolism played 
at least as important a role in his initial successes. By tapping into the powerful ideas 
and symbolism of this frontier-as-America vision, LBJ was able to move more domestic 
legislation through Congress than at any time before or since. Indeed, it was a rare 
period when the Federal Government, suddenly, moved as fast and decisively as a Texas 
Ranger of old. 
 
The Hero 
As a youth, Alfred Steinberg writes in Sam Johnson’s Boy, Lyndon Baines Johnson 
dreamed of becoming a millionaire, a cowboy hero and a powerful politician. When 
outside politicians came to Johnson City, Texas, they would often pay courtesy calls on 
Lyndon’s father. Among the names he remembers hearing his father and guests mention 
on the front porch was that of Theodore Roosevelt. They described with great 
excitement how TR came to San Antonio to assemble his Rough Riders for the “War of 
Eighteen and Ninety-Eight.” Every afternoon, Roosevelt would come galloping down to 
the Alamo plaza near the hallowed shrine (which LBJ’s father had helped preserve), toss 
his reins to one of his men, and “plow into the Menger Hotel for his big daily ration of 
snorts at the bar.” On his 58th birthday in 1966, President Johnson reminded members 
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of the press who had gathered at the LBJ Ranch that many of his liberal programs 
including education, poverty and NYA had been advocated by Theodore Roosevelt. “I 
am a great admirer of the contributions he made to the Nation,” gushed Johnson, “as 
you can see reflected in our conservation program….The Presidents of that period and 
the President of today have a good many things in common—and we are getting some of 
them done now.”230  
The editor of the Texas Observer was told by LBJ in 1967 that TR was one of his 
biggest heroes and role models, “a great conservationist…a great cowboy.” Significantly, 
Johnson admired Theodore Roosevelt first and foremost, not for his charge up San Juan 
Hill, but for his protection of the wilderness and his “courage to stand up to predatory 
interests.”  Years later LBJ explained to historian Doris Kearns that TR was the big local 
hero and that, “Whenever I pictured Teddy Roosevelt, I saw him running or riding, 
always moving, his fists clenched, his eyes glaring, speaking out against the interests on 
behalf of the people.” Johnson greatly admired the cowboy president TR, a man’s man 
of action, who seemed to epitomize the frontier code as an individual and as a forward-
thinking Chief Executive. LBJ staffers later drew similar portraits of their boss to those 
that Johnson had rendered of TR (LBJ as “a man in a hurry,” of “driving determination; 
and every time he got interfered with the sparks flew”). Johnson took every opportunity 
to establish himself in the eyes of the public as a man of the frontier West who, like 
Roosevelt, could improve the lives of those who had not been given a “square deal” 
opportunity to improve themselves. Though the Frontier Myth structure had been 
jostled and undergone some significant changes in emphases since TR’s day, its overall 
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trajectory had returned to a similar course by the time LBJ became the nation’s Chief 
Executive in 1963.231 
 
The Pre-Presidential Years: LBJ Goes Western 
Lyndon Johnson was raised in the Texas Hill Country, a region just west of Austin 
where the agricultural south and ranch country west meet. Over the course of his career 
the astute future President used this geographic and cultural intersection to full 
advantage. From Johnson’s own actions, and testimonies of his aides, it is clear that in 
the postwar era he fully understood that a “Western” frontier political image and 
persona would serve him much better at the national level of politics than a southern 
one. When Johnson had run locally for Congress and, initially, for the Senate, he 
emphasized his Southern roots to garner regional support (the “Johnsons” were 
originally from Georgia); but this changed drastically once LBJ, as Senate Majority 
leader, began setting his sights on the presidential office.  
Senator Johnson’s need to remake himself as a Westerner stemmed from his 
determination to separate his own image from the postwar images of an old, 
anachronistic and decadent South and connect instead with the West, the region directly 
associated with the frontier myth experience and seemingly brimming with potential 
and new developments. During his Senate days LBJ gradually replaced his 
southernness, a quality that had been crucial in his rise to majority leader, with his 
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westernness. Westward expansion had been tied closely to the American creation myth 
and promoted in the films, TV, and literature which, as explored in Chapter III, were 
especially prominent in the 1950s and early 1960s. After World War II, the West was 
booming, seemed new, dynamic and full of promise—and with it the attention to 
frontiering and the frontier myth re-entered the American consciousness with as much 
impact as during Theodore Roosevelt’s day. The West (and by implication Johnson) was 
about the future, the South about the past. In addition to moving away from his 
southern, regional persona, LBJ would also add the qualities described in Turner’s 
frontier thesis such as freedom, individualism, self-reliance and honor to his range of 
imagery.  It was a transformation that was crucial to LBJ’s rise to national leadership 
and to his apparent ultimate goal of the presidency. 
In 1957, an aide of Senator Johnson’s sent him a memo offering her boss some sage 
advice: “Western Films and Stars are very popular right now as you know,” she wrote. 
“And I can’t think of a more perfect Western Star than the tall, dark and handsome, 
horse-riding, gun-toting-shootin’ ’n huntin’ Lyndon Johnson of the Hill Country of 
Texas.” The aide conjured up the idea for an episode of the popular TV show, This Is 
Your Life, in which LBJ would be the lead rider “in a cloud of dust…coming over the rise 
from…in back of the ranch house.” Then she provided what was perhaps the most 
compelling rationale for the creation of a new LBJ. “This kind of appearance 
would…discredit those who write of you as a Southerner.” No Southerner had prevailed 
in a presidential election since before the Civil War and Lyndon Johnson, and his staff, 
knew what he needed to do.232  
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During his first two decades in Congress and the Senate, from 1937-1957, Johnson 
had voted as a white Southerner, with other Southerners, 39 times on civil rights issues; 
including 6 times against proposals to abolish the poll tax, and twice against legislation 
to prohibit and punish lynching. But by the late 1950s, Senate Majority Leader Johnson 
had pulled up anchor from his Southern sensibilities to pursue the broader goals of 
national politics. Now Johnson increasingly embraced and projected the mythic image 
of an iconic western frontier rancher, supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 
arguing that if Democrats did not support the bill they would pay for it at the polls 
during the 1958 Congressional elections. Since World War II and the fight against the 
racial oppression of Nazi Germany, America had been moving further away from its 
“Gone with the Wind” image of the South, embracing instead the much more inclusive 
image of frontier western democracy. LBJ’s actions indicate that he sensed this change 
in mood and adjusted his own political image and actions accordingly. In what appeared 
to some as a complete turnaround, he now tried to convince his old friend Senator 
Richard Russell of Georgia and other Southern Senators in 1957 and 1960 that the time 
had at least come not to oppose civil rights legislation. This reorientation for Johnson—
most clearly demonstrated by his creative and successful support as Majority Leader for 
the Civil Rights Act of 1957—was an act not of the stereotypical hotheaded, emotional 
Southerner, but of a determined, pragmatic Westerner. LBJ had given up his twenty 
years as an Old South segregationist and attached himself instead to the values of the 
postwar Frontier Myth—playing to a national audience rather than a regional one. 
Moderate columnist Roscoe Drummond concluded that: “Because he [LBJ] voted for 
and is an architect of the right-to-vote law, he is the first Southern Democratic leader 
since the Civil War to be a serious candidate for the presidential nomination.” Johnson 
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built on this momentum in 1959 when he shifted his membership from the southern 
caucus to the caucus of Western Democrats. More and more Lyndon Johnson appeared 
in front of the media wearing his Stetson and boots while riding on horseback. Pushed 
by national changes in attitudes toward race relations (including, quite possibly, his 
own) and enticed by the looming Presidential campaign, he broke repeatedly with his 
Dixie cronies until, in 1960, he opposed them by voting in the affirmative on eight roll 
call votes for civil rights. Johnson was at work to form an interregional consensus that 
would benefit his own national aspirations and looked toward the future rather than the 
past. In so doing, he became a national figure tied to the frontier mythic West. 233 
A key aspect of Lyndon Johnson’s growing reliance on the Frontier Myth structure, 
and the related increase in his national appeal, involved emphasizing personal, cultural 
connections with the West through his dress, speeches, published writings, campaign 
literature, and the extensive development of the LBJ Ranch near Austin. Bedecked in 
Western wear and relaxing at his 2,700 acre spread, the Hill Country Texan attempted 
to rid himself of his magnolia scent (at least outside of Dixie) and intentionally looked 
and played out the role of a Westerner during the years immediately leading up to, and 
including, his terms as Vice President and President. Overnight, it seemed, LBJ began 
authoring articles that appeared in journals such as The Cattleman with the Senate 
leader promoting the importance of federal support for misunderstood ranchers out 
West. Georgia Senator Russell’s executive assistant, William Jordan, described the 
puzzling dilemma in Dixie: “Senator Johnson came here a Southern Senator, but then 
                                                          
233 Johnson’s membership switch is discussed in Stanley Walker, “Is Texas ‘South’, ‘West’, Both or 
More?” New York Times Magazine (April 12, 1959): 35-36 in LBJ Library, Reference Files; for additional 
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all of a sudden he began to claim he was Western senator. Texas was no longer a 
‘Southern’ state, it was a ‘Western’ state. As time moved on and Senator Johnson’s 
career developed, he became a ‘Westerner’.” Jordan added that by the late 1950s, 
“Senator Johnson was a Western Senator…self-described.”234  
In the final years of the Eisenhower Administration several members of the press 
corps, also caught up in the power of the frontier paradigm, bought fully into the new 
Johnson as cowpoke image. In early 1959, Stewart Alsop of the Saturday Evening Post 
reported that the “country around the LBJ Ranch was the true American frontier, and 
there is still a smell of the vanished frontier about it.” The LBJ Ranch, meanwhile, 
“could be rented out as a background for a Wild West movie, and the ranch house itself 
is most decidedly a Western ranch house—it has nothing at all in common with the 
pillared and magnolia-draped Southern plantation house of tradition.” Alsop, a 
favourite journalist of Johnson’s (and spotted from time to time lounging in the 
Johnson’s kidney shaped swimming pool) then applied “the smell of the frontier” to LBJ 
himself. “The closeness of his frontier background,” he contended, “also explains a good 
deal of things about Johnson—the restless optimism of the man, and also the roughness 
and rudeness of which he is markedly capable….These… are the first three things to 
understand about Johnson—that he is a frontiersman by instinct, with the roughness 
and restlessness of the frontier; that he is a Westerner at heart rather than a Southerner; 
and that he is driven and harried by the need to succeed.” Here, in Alsop’s vision of 
Johnson, was the Frontier Myth once again personified in a major political figure. With 
the passage of the Civil Rights bill, his full-on cowboy imagery, and a ranch to bolster his 
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Understanding,” The Cattleman (May 1957) in LBJ Library, Reference Files; William H. Jordan Interview, 
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credentials, LBJ remade himself into a national politician based on the Frontier Myth. 
Enhancing national, forward thinking aspirations symbolized in values of the postwar 
myth—optimism, determined pragmatism, expanding opportunity, promise of 
prosperity for all, conservation of America’s “wild” spaces, manly toughness, inclusion, 
democracy, and an obligation to those who had sacrificed (including not only frontier 
pioneers and those American veterans of all races who had recently defended their 
nation)—as opposed to the widely perceived backwardness of the South with all its race 
problems and seemingly feudal social and economic circumstances, LBJ now allied 
himself with a different set of concerns than those which predominated regional, 
Southern politics. 235 
Johnson’s identity-switching effort to shake off the burden of section was not all 
smooth sailing in the years leading up to his national bid, though. George Reedy, 
Johnson’s staff director in 1959, described his own preference for presenting Johnson 
“as a western candidate rather than a southern candidate” in order to “break the so-
called southern mold.” As Reedy recalled: 
 
At that particular point, coming from a Confederate state was not a very 
good platform as a spring toward the presidency, and, God, it kept 
bobbing up all over the place. I’ll never forget one of the meetings on the 
way back he [LBJ] decided to land in Las Vegas to spend the evening. 
That was very popular with the press, they wanted to see Las Vegas. 
And, damn, we walked into the hotel and they had a review “Save Your 
Confederate Money. The South Will Rise Again.” And that stupid 
bastard of a publicity man for the hotel kept trying to point out to me 
what a great picture it would make of Johnson alongside of this 
Confederate general. You know, with ten newspapermen standing there! 
I could have broken his neck. I would have if the newspapermen hadn’t 
been there. It was just something hard to shake.” 
 
                                                          
235 Stewart Alsop, “Lyndon Johnson: How Does He Do It?” Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 231, Issue 
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Johnson staffer Gerald W. Siegel concurs that “the word Southern” was “completely 
obstructive…in politics at that time…an obstacle that somehow had to be overcome.” 
Like Reedy, Siegel recalls that “obviously the important thing to try to do was to have 
Mr. Johnson thought of either as a Westerner or at least a Southwesterner. Of course, 
Westerner was preferable to Southwesterner, and the fact is that he didn’t think like a 
Southerner.” For Siegel, then, Johnson and his staff’s efforts “to try to shed himself of 
the burden, especially the Democratic Party political burden of a Southerner” was not 
simply a deliberate political ploy but something more complex. LBJ and his staff were 
pursuing liberal and civil rights policies much better attuned with mid-twentieth 
century Western imagery (and contained within the structures of the contemporary 
frontier myth) than to the public’s association with the South. To Siegel, Johnson 
“thought like” a Westerner. His off the cuff assumption that being a Westerner was the 
most “preferable” of possible identities for his boss, meanwhile, is a telling reflection of 
the nation’s mindset at that point in time: that the most appealing American values and 
imagery were to be found in the West, or at least in the idea of the West.236 
Though Johnson did not officially announce himself as a candidate for the 
presidency until one week prior to the Democratic National Convention in July 1960, 
LBJ the cowboy had hit the campaign trail long before that. As early as February, 
Newsweek magazine reported that Johnson’s “deputized posse of at least 75 Texas 
supporters—tall, virile men in boots who boomingly referred to their leader as ‘The 
Great Westerner’” had launched “the great Texas invasion” at Albuquerque’s Western 
Skies Hotel. The deputies’ occupation had one objective: “To convince Western 
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Democrats at the Western States Democratic Conference that Texan Lyndon Johnson is 
really one of them—a true son of the purple sage.” The magazine’s editor reasoned that 
LBJ was trying hard to “shuck off” his Southern ties and persona to throw his lot in with 
the West. Posing with a Confederate General was poison now but, in contrast, LBJ 
happily “entered into the spirit of the Western motif” by posing with a burro and waving 
his Stetson high in the air for photographers. Colorado’s Governor Steve McNichols was 
reported as saying that “Johnson looked like an honest-to-gosh Westerner.” All this was 
not lost on editorial cartoonist John R. Fischetti, who drew a tall, lanky Cowboy 
Johnson leaning, almost falling, in the direction of a young “Western Delegates” cowgirl 
while an infatuated Southern belle—no longer Johnson’s first choice— looked onward 
from across the room. “There’s plenty of me for everybody,” the cartoon-LBJ still 
contended. But many culturally conservative, southern Whites would have none of this 
and soon editors from the former Confederacy were labeling LBJ as an opportunist who 
had turned his back on the South and adopted a frontier persona and values that 
directly threatened the very “way of life” he had allegedly been voted in to protect. The 
Jackson Daily News tore into Johnson and his “synthetic Western” campaign in 
Albuquerque: “Now that he is safely across the border [in New Mexico],” fumed its 
editor, “we hope he finds comfort in the cactus bed that he has made for himself, 
sleeping snugly alongside the NAACP, AFL-CIO, the Civil Rights Selfish Committee and 
a host of other Texas-hating left-wing punks who delight in slaughtering the South in 
the pious name of tolerance.”237 
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When all the ballots were counted at the Democratic Party National Convention on 
July 15, 1960 Johnson finished second to John F. Kennedy in the run for the party’s next 
presidential contender. A substantive proportion of white Southern Democrats were 
even more shaken by the fact that LBJ then agreed to throw his lot in as a Vice 
Presidential candidate on the Kennedy ticket. Their “own” candidate had taken up the 
values of JFK, a liberal New Englander, and of the frontier west, as opposed to those of 
Johnson’s own “homeland.” Johnson, they all knew, had come up through the ranks in 
the South, campaigned as a Southerner (especially in east Texas), and worked in the 
House and his early Senate days with Southern members more than those from any 
other region. (Though these observers seemed to forget that Johnson had come to the 
House not under the auspices of a Southern president but as an ardent New Dealer). 
Now LBJ was being labeled by these white southerners as a turncoat for embracing the 
values of inclusion on Civil Rights and for rejecting the symbolism of the Old 
Confederacy and “state’s rights” in favour of the enforcement of rights for blacks and 
other minorities. Like JFK, and in many respects, TR, Lyndon Johnson was embracing a 
frontier discourse of social justice, equality of opportunity and democracy that he 
believed would chart a secure and brighter course for America’s future. Attuned with the 
rest of the nation and its traditions, values and aspirations, Johnson understood the 
messages and power of the frontier myth at that point in time. As he put it himself, the 
nation “is moving to the left; you can either move with it or be crushed.” In the end, LBJ 
did not “lose” the South in the process of emphasizing this liberal, national agenda, but 
his support base among whites in the region was weakened (just as it was strengthened 
throughout the rest of the country) and, at least as importantly, his decisions and 
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actions would have long term consequences that continue to impact on the party politics 
in the South today (a point we shall return to in later chapters).238 
 
 
Figure 4.1: For the conservative South magazine, Lyndon 
Johnson had become a “political polygamist.”239 
(“Chapman” cartoon is reproduced under the Fair Dealing 
[educational purposes] provision of the Canadian Copyright Act 
                                                          
238 For a summary of Southern editorial attacks on LBJ see James Jackson Kilpatrick, Editor, 
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from James Jackson Kilpatrick, “Lyndon Johnson: Counterfeit 
Confederate,” Human Events, 34:17 [August 25, 1960]: 373) 
 
In the context of the late 1950s American politics and society, Lyndon Johnson 
understood where the wind was blowing and hoisted his sail. As Senate Majority Leader, 
the Civil Rights Act had been his signal achievement, the first Civil Rights bill since 
Reconstruction. The act served as a large step in his transformation from a southern to a 
Western frontier national figure. Like millions of Americans, including some 
Southerners, Johnson would clearly associate himself with the principles of the multi-
regional frontier myth—a vision in sync in many ways with the New England Senator, 
John Kennedy, who himself promised “New Frontiers” for America’s future. JFK was no 
cowboy figure for the nation in the literal sense but his running-mate Lyndon Johnson, 
the “Westerner,” surely could be. In 1960, JFK needed LBJ as his running mate at least 
as much and maybe more than McKinley had needed TR six decades earlier. As the 
Kennedy-Johnson campaign geared up, LBJ sought to sell the inclusive Democratic 
ticket by preparing to harness frontier symbolism in a way not seen since TR ran for 
office.  
Of Lyndon Johnson’s numerous “cowboy spectacles” of the 1960 campaign—and 
there were many—one early stunt exemplifies the determination with which LBJ was 
willing to flaunt his frontier persona and demonstrates the growing national appeal of 
the Frontier Myth. It happened far from the Hill Country in a region that has always 
been a world apart from Texas. Elizabeth Rowe, a long-time friend of the Johnsons, 
describes her experience when she joined Lyndon and his wife, “Lady Bird” Johnson, to 
begin campaigning for the Vice Presidency in Boston, Massachusetts:  
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The plane came in, and lined up at the Boston Airport were a dozen and 
more little dumpy women, all with great big cowboy hats on. They were 
all the Italian population of Boston, all good Democrats, and all 
absolutely overpowered by these great big hats….Then we got over to the 
Copley Plaza. There was a policeman directing traffic on a horse, and 
[Lyndon] just said to the policeman, “If you will get off that horse, I’ll get 
on.” So he got on the horse and pranced around the square a little while. 
This was the starting of “from Boston to Austin.”240 
 
 
 
                                                          
240 Elizabeth Rowe Interview, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Lyndon Baines Johnson 
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Figure 4.2: VP Candidate Johnson’s grin comes across as a bit forced 
in this photo taken in Boston (perhaps he was calculating the stunt’s 
impact on voters). The commandeered Beantown police horse, 
meanwhile, appears somewhat ill at ease with its Texas Hill Country 
rider. (LBJ Library Photo #60-9-26, Date: 09/08/1960. Courtesy of FayFoto, 
Boston MA) 
 
Without Johnson’s help in squeaking out victories in Texas, key states in the West, 
and part of the South, JFK would most certainly have gone down to defeat to Richard 
Nixon in the 1960 race—the closest Presidential contest ever up until that time. By the 
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slimmest of margins, this odd couple of running mates pulled out the first White House 
victory for the Democratic Party since 1948.  
 
The White House Looks West 
After serving 1,000 days as John F. Kennedy’s Vice President, Lyndon Johnson 
became the second “Cowboy” to be elevated to the presidency following a Chief 
Executive’s assassination. The iconography of the American leader from John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy to Lyndon Baines Johnson changed suddenly and drastically. Johnson had no 
inclination to copy JFK and the Eastern Establishment “Harvards”—which would not 
have worked for him anyway—he had something better in mind. 
The Texas Observer, which had followed Johnson’s political career for decades, 
saw changes coming in its November 29 piece, “President Johnson’s Frontiers.” The 
Johnsons were “country people” and Lyndon “the President from the rocky hills where 
Texas begins to be western.” Many of the Harvard-types would have “less to do in 
Washington now, and different sorts of people, Western sorts, Texas sorts, and 
moderate Southern sorts will have more to do there.” In an article that not only 
contained the word “frontier” in its title but used it repeatedly in its text, the Observer 
pondered whether LBJ would continue on with his “national” liberal agenda or revert to 
his more provincial “middish” positions as a southern Senate majority leader. Here the 
frontier and the west were viewed as accommodating America as a whole, and Johnson 
the cowboy president, through the deployment of his frontier persona, could seek to 
craft himself as a truly national president. “President Johnson has his own frontier to 
remember, and” the Observer concluded optimistically, “a great frontier to seek.” 
Similarly, Tom Wicker of the New York Times observed that “there are distinctive 
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things about a him, springing from his environment and the myths and traditions to 
which it gave birth….For the new President [like TR again] thinks big, in the expansive, 
can-do, believe-me style of the West.” Journalist Jim Bishop declared that “the 6000 
odd acres of hill country which [Johnson] owns are not land and pasture and stone—
they are him.” Lady Bird too liked her husband’s front and center frontier persona as the 
right “type” to lead a grief stricken nation. Once she commented that she sometimes 
daydreamed that the hero of her favourite TV show, Gunsmoke (who Lyndon believed 
he resembled), visited the LBJ Ranch. While driving past a little house on the edge of 
the hill Lady Bird told Bishop: “I can just picture Marshal Dillon riding up to that 
place.”241 
Just days after Kennedy’s assassination, one presidential advisor recorded how he 
never forgot the image of a mover at the White House packing up JFK’s trademark 
rocking chair while another walked in and deposited LBJ’s cowboy saddle. The saddle 
signaled Johnson’s own attachment to his Western environment and allowed the new 
president to help project himself as a national leader with a national message that would 
serve an atemporal and unassailable American agenda embodied in the frontier myth: 
one that included freedom and equality of opportunity for all people. The testing points 
of regional (southern) bigotry and economic disparity, under the worn regional voices of 
mere sections of America could not stand in opposition to a national mandate—and thus 
self-evident mandate—which included Civil Rights, a War on Poverty, conservation of 
America’s wilderness, along with the promotion of Turner’s frontier qualities of 
optimism, progress, and unlimited opportunity. And, as we shall see, the host of federal 
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programs that lay on the horizon in an LBJ Administration would actively and 
aggressively seek to carry on the alleged achievements of the American frontier 
experience through the power and will of the national government.242  
The pervasiveness and persuasiveness of the Frontier Myth meant that—as with 
the Vanishing American myth—it would consciously and unconsciously be understood. 
Likewise the deployment of the myth’s associated symbolism, whether intentional or 
not, was a key aspect of its power and influence—and of Johnson’s early success as 
President. Americans recalled that Owen Wister’s classic cowboy character, the 
Virginian—foreman at the Shiloh Ranch—was deliberately infused with the values of 
both the primitive and the civilized, fitting in just as well in the land of the gentlemen of 
the east (with his tailor and appreciation of the classics) as he did in Wyoming. LBJ 
projected a similar image that appeared to personify and reaffirm the old values of 
individualism and self-reliance in a changing “eastern”-directed future. Sometimes this 
manifested itself in policy but other times this was more aesthetic in nature. Look 
magazine reported, in pictures and words that “As the occasion demands, Johnson can 
be urbane and sophisticated amid the splendor of his Washington office or ruggedly 
‘rural’ as he relaxes on his large Texas ranch.”  Bert Niver, head of Niver Western Wear 
in Fort Worth told the Wall Street Journal that LBJ hats “are being seen increasingly on 
the streets of such cities as New York and Washington.” And Men’s Wear Magazine 
proclaimed that: “The daily publicity of LBJ’s hats will help restore hat wearing…as a 
masculine act that calls for no apologies.” But it was, above all else, the LBJ Ranch that 
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offered the most vivid projection of the President in his new role as lead cow man for the 
nation. 243 
 
Home on the LBJ Ranch 
The LBJ Ranch, purchased in 1951, served Lyndon Johnson as the epitomizing 
symbol of his frontier persona and policy making. During the 1950s it was the locale LBJ 
used to hone his political image as he used the Ranch and his own style of “barbeque 
diplomacy” to highlight his growing identification with the West and the future. In 1959 
he purchased a JetStar Aircraft, built a 3,570 foot airstrip at the ranch and laid plans for 
improved guest rooms designed to accommodate national and international activities. 
The ranch was being transformed both in the physical and symbolic sense: a reflection 
of LBJ’s efforts to create a persona conducive to his goals of national office. In Western 
movies and other forms of popular culture, ranches had become symbolic and a setting 
that Americans of all regions felt culturally at home with. The frontier experience 
transcended regionalism and represented what the public initially saw as the 
quintessential American experience. By owning a ranch, Johnson benefitted from the 
myth to strengthen his standing with an electorate which increasingly shared the values 
of the mass media and its infatuation with the frontier myth. Within a few short years he 
used his new rancher persona and the symbolism of the ranch to help reinvent himself 
by not only transforming his image from that of a regional to a national figure but by 
showcasing himself as a self-made man—two themes especially inherent in the Western 
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myths of the mid-twentieth century. Johnson, it seemed, was never far from his “Heart’s 
Home.” In his five years as President, Johnson flew to the ranch on 74 occasions and 
spent about one quarter of his time there. 244 
As explored in Chapter III, Johnson’s rise to national prominence paralleled the 
rise in the popularity of the “western” and the belief that it represented the national 
character. Western movies and TV programs encompassed national anxieties and 
aspirations. The West itself became a kind of parable for American society and the 
challenges offered up in the past and how Americans resolved these offered ways of 
dealing with new tensions in the present and of planning for the future. Americans could 
return to their alleged origins to find the determination and means of facing problems of 
the modern world. The nation as a whole shifted westward in the postwar years and LBJ 
plugged into the nostalgia of an older, simpler America. Many of the “American” 
characteristics described in the Frontier thesis, the qualities self-reliance, hard work, 
straight-shooting, and the frontier spirit were shown as embodied in the LBJ Ranch. For 
Harper’s magazine, it only seemed natural and “about time” that an “LBJ” ranch-boss of 
the Texas Hill Country would inhabit the White House. “It strikes one as curious that 
out of the geography of this great common national romance, the national legend,” 
wrote Marshall Frady, “out of the landscape of Tom Mix, Randolph Scott, John Wayne, 
Marshal Dillon—only in this decade did a President finally emerge.”245 
For Johnson, his purchase of the ranch, the land where he grew up, was symbolic 
proof that if someone worked hard enough and long enough, and possessed enough will 
and intelligence, they could reach new heights and put the troubles of the past 
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permanently behind them. LBJ, so the story went, had purportedly fulfilled all the hopes 
and dreams of his pioneering ancestors. America was the land of limitless opportunity 
where enterprising men—like the frontier forefathers—were said to have “made it big” 
by pulling themselves up out of their lower class status by their bootstraps. LBJ’s 
portrayal of himself, purposefully or not, as a kind of blending of the elements of James 
Fenimore Cooper and Horatio Alger was part and parcel of the frontier myth—which  
featured tough, enterprising pioneers said to have gone West to carve out better lives for 
themselves, their families and ultimately the nation.  
As Ronnie Dugger has contended, LBJ was certainly aware that he could enhance 
his own political posture as a man “rooted in the soil” if he owned a ranch near where he 
was born. But for Lyndon Johnson, a Texan complete with his Stetson hat, drawl and 
working cattle ranch (like TR, LBJ had a working ranch as opposed to Ronald Reagan’s 
hobby ranch or George W. Bush’s ranch with no livestock), the West appears to have a 
connection that was not only opportunistic but was personal and ideological as well. In 
his 1965 State of the Union address LBJ posed a question to himself on where he found 
guidance to lead the country, responding that “The answer was waiting for me in the 
land where I was born.” LBJ’s twentieth century ranching and Western connections 
were part of his own sense of identity and an apparently genuine belief in: a national 
mission; a “Golden West” of great wealth and opportunity for enterprising men (like 
himself); and a place of promise and democracy. In short, as with TR, Johnson equated 
his own sense of identity with that of the nation’s. And, as Marshall Sahlins might 
explain, it was personal and ideological for LBJ because the frontier experience and its 
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surrounding myths were so entrenched as the dominant discourse that they explained 
American society and with that, LBJ himself. 246  
The film about Lyndon Johnson’s life still shown at the LBJ National Historical 
Park (or LBJ Ranch) today emphasizes this frontier “man of the land” theme. The Hill 
Country: Lyndon Johnson’s Texas was produced by NBC News and first broadcast on 
TV on May 9, 1966. In the opening scene the narrator declares: “A land of big skies and 
long horizons….When the chance comes to refresh his spirit, renew his strength, Lyndon 
Johnson goes back to the place of his roots. To the people and the land he has known 
and been part of all his life. The President goes home.” LBJ then describes how his own 
ancestors lived on the edge of civilization and savagery, as Indians attempted to loot and 
kill at the Johnson homestead. His grandfather drove cattle up the Chisholm Trail to 
Abilene, Kansas, and would put his guns “there” in the local old fort “used against the 
Indians” and in detail LBJ conveys how his grandmother, Eliza Bunton, and her child 
survived an Indian raid on their house. Johnson then describes his hard work ethic as a 
boy, drilled into him by his father, when he spent the summers on the ranch “riding this 
pasture from daylight until dark, every day”; and once again how with pluck, hard work 
and determination anybody could be President. Later in the film, LBJ boasts of his 
ranch’s “revolution with soil conservation” and especially about its access to cheap 
electric power “that all resulted from the power of government [that is, LBJ] to bring the 
greatest good to the greatest number.” At one point the interviewer asks: “Mr. President, 
do you suppose that you’ll be the last President to come off the land?” to which Johnson 
responds: “No, I don’t think so. I think there is something about the land…that gives you 
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an understanding of humanity, and gives you an appreciation of other countries and 
other civilizations.”  Employing Jeffersonian-like ideals, he adds, “I believe that land is 
our greatest source of wealth and a man who understands and appreciates it would 
better understand democracy itself, our system of government, and all the people who 
live on the land.” Here was Turner’s egalitarian democracy springing directly from LBJ’s 
heartland in the Texas Hills. Here too LBJ’s ranch provided a kind of safety valve from 
the problems and complexities of the cities, a place where savagery and civilization had 
once met and improved upon the American, “this new man,” opening up new 
possibilities of inexhaustible wealth, the promise of new innovations and social 
improvements all—in the context of the twentieth century—with the helping hand of the 
Federal government.247 
 “LBJ Country” was not portrayed as anything like Manhattan or Washington DC 
but a mythic “real” America inhabited by folks who were free from the corruptions of the 
East, worked the land for a living, and when they shook hands meant business. This 
“hard scrabble” region provided the perfect stage for the Democratic Party’s liberal 
programs. Johnson frequently used the Hill Country to illustrate the problems of rural 
America and the poor. In the Hill Country documentary he told viewers that rural 
electrification of the 1930s had brought some relief and lifted his region into the 
twentieth century but that much more had to be done there and in the nation as a whole. 
Johnson regularly cited his experiences as a young man growing up in rural Texas as a 
kind of cornerstone of the rationale for poverty, social and education programs.  
                                                          
247 The Hill Country: Lyndon Johnson’s Texas. NBC-TV Special, first aired May 9, 1966 [film shown 
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Of all the programs LBJ thought crucial to the success of the Great Society, 
education topped the list. The Education Bill of 1965—one of sixty education measures 
brought in during his presidency and LBJ’s personal favourite—was signed at a 
ceremony in the Junction Schoolhouse that Lyndon had attended as a boy. For LBJ, 
education would serve as the great equalizer in American society—giving Americans 
from even the most impoverished background the chance to “make it” in mainstream 
society. As such, education served the same purpose as the frontier had in days gone by. 
He wanted “every child to have all the education he could take.” And his goals included 
free, public education through college for every child. It epitomized LBJ’s “bootstraps” 
philosophy that once the friendly federal government stepped to offer a helping hand 
and level the playing field of opportunity—the trials of the past could be overcome. 
Alongside these goals, LBJ declared an “unconditional war on poverty,” which he drove 
through Congress with enormous fanfare. The Sunday Times of London commented 
that “it was perhaps the most bellicose program of social reform in history. It was to be a 
war on poverty” explained in the media with western metaphors and symbols: “Federal 
funds were to be ‘fired in’ to the pockets of poverty in what was known in Washington as 
‘the rifle-shot approach’.”248  Along the way, Johnson either imagined or felt the need to 
exaggerate the poverty of his own youth to achieve these goals because he did so…often. 
It was a manipulation of Western symbolism that, apart from Ronald Reagan, only LBJ 
(at least in his “first” presidency) could have pulled off so successfully. 
The significance of the LBJ Ranch as a place of “Westerness” and as a national 
symbol was only enhanced by the fact that almost every event held there was quickly 
                                                          
248 Sunday Times quoted in William E. Leuchtenburg, A Troubled Feast: American Society Since 
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reported and hyped in the press. The White House Social Files also reveal that before 
long, churches, rotary clubs and schools from around the country began writing in to 
Lady Bird’s personal secretary enquiring how they could recreate the “Western” LBJ 
Ranch/BBQ events in New York, Minneapolis, and Massachusetts. A school in 
Weymouth, MA, staged “Christmas in Texas at the LBJ Ranch” as the theme of its 
Christmas pageant; while a senior class party in Belleview, Missouri, a Sunshine Club 
just outside Boston, Fall Fair in Pittsburgh, and an Annual Sports, Vacation and Trailer 
show in Long Beach, California likewise all planned to host their own faux “Bar-B-Que 
at the LBJ Ranch” or “Presidential Barbeque…in the old western style” events. 
Throughout every region of the country, “frontier”/”LBJ” events were being celebrated 
and embraced.249 
Recreating one of these BBQ-at-the-Ranch affairs with much accuracy would have 
made for an expensive undertaking. Richard “Cactus” Pryor—a Will Rogers-like radio 
personality on the Johnsons’ radio station KTBC in Austin—performed the role of 
master of ceremonies at a dozen or more LBJ Ranch get-togethers. In an oral history 
interview from September 1968, Cactus describes his colourful experiences at LBJ’s 
“Western” barbeques for a variety of dignitaries and heads of state. Local caterer Walter 
Jetton would set up his “chuck wagon,” portable BBQ pits and a whole beef on a rotating 
spit (apparently this was for optics as Jetton “use[d] the same beef over and over”), cows 
staked out on the other side of the river for atmosphere, round tables featured checkered 
                                                          
249 LBJ Library, White House Social Files, LBJ Ranch – B, Correspondence from Bess Abell (Lady 
Bird Johnson’s Social Secretary) to Mrs. Eleanor C. Brooks, Weymouth, Massachusetts, December 10, 
1965; LBJ Library, Reference Files, Barbeque file, Correspondence from Bess Abell to Mrs. S.P. Hitchings, 
Belleview, Missouri, April 6, 1965; White House Social Files, Alpha File, Box 1345, LBJ Ranch Barbeque 
(Only), Correspondence from Bess Abell to Mrs. Rose O. McIntyre, Westwood, Massachusetts, April 14, 
1965 in Ibid; Correspondence from Bess Abell to Mrs. John A. Odell, Pittsburgh, June 2, 1965 in Ibid; 
Correspondence from Bess Abell to Mr. C. Lynn, Long Beach, California, January 28, 1965 in Ibid.  
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tablecloths and coal-oil lanterns, iron wash pots full of butter were scattered around for 
guests to dip their corn on the cob, bales of hay were added, and all the helpers dressed 
in strictly Western attire. “It had all the look and feel,” said Cactus, “of a ‘chuck wagon’ 
dinner.” For entertainment there was Mary Tuggle, “an expert with a bull whip…She is a 
very attractive blonde girl, and came riding in on a horse full speed, cracking a whip.”  
The Johnsons also liked inviting Bill McElroy of the Texas Rangers to put on a pistol-
shooting demonstration. Gene Autry, a friend of the Johnsons since the 1940s, and 
other cowboy stars often attended the Johnson’s barbeques. LBJ himself would typically 
be dressed in his Stetson poplin jacket, tan sports shirt, boots and spurs. The Johnson 
staff served up their western barbeque with six-shooter coffee (a brew “so strong it will 
float a .44”) and passed out numerous gifts. Sometimes the President ordered batches of 
300 official “LBJ” Stetson ranch hats to give away, along with western saddles, spurs, 
and cowboy outfits for adults and kids—one having been fitted out for the 22 month old 
crown prince of Iran.  At an evening with German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in late 
December 1963, LBJ presented cowboy hats to all the visitors, “and they put them on to 
the glory of the Press.” Newsweek had dubbed the latter event as “Stetson 
Statesmanship.” The quintessentially eastern New Yorker’s assessment of the LBJ 
Ranch and the ‘64 Presidential Campaign, meanwhile, was that the LBJ “barbeques as a 
symbol compare favorably with the 1952 hole in Adlai Stevenson’s shoe.” Again, the 
cowboy hats, barbeque, and frontier entertainment were not just regional themes they 
were national themes, the part representing the whole. The Western talk and symbolism 
reflected the whole country, regardless of regional geography, for in the eyes of 
Americans and foreign visitors alike the western frontier of the imagination had long 
since ceased to be so much a location as an idea of a place and time. The myth also 
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provided guidance to the present generation of Americans as they contemplated the 
future that they wanted to build. 250 
LBJ, like Theodore Roosevelt and Frederick Jackson Turner, believed that to 
understand the history of the United States one had to understand the history of the 
American frontier. In the spring of 1967, Johnson flew 30 Latin Ambassadors from 
Washington to the ranch for an enormous barbeque bash that would include LBJ’s 
vision of the Frontier Myth. Cactus Pryor describes how the President hired actors to 
“perform” re-enactments of the settlement of the West to the amazed foreign 
dignitaries, friends and the press. “The Fandango” featured buckboards, stage coaches, a 
calliope pulled by horses…“they have Indians and battles, the whole thing you know.” 
The actor-Spaniards came down the Pedernales first with friars and Indians meeting 
them. Then the white settlers arrived. “They came roaring down on horseback, shouting, 
the stagecoach coming full speed, the buckboards, the settlers in their old costumes, and 
they sang songs of windmills and cattle drives,” said Pryor. For one song, “Punching 
Cows,” even Johnson’s Herefords got into the act as props with “cowboys across the 
river actually herding LBJ cattle.” Savagery and civilization, in the form of theatre, met 
right there on the LBJ. In Cactus Pryor’s view, these lavish productions were “the most 
successful entertainment that we’ve ever had at the ranch.” The grandiose display gave 
many visitors a sense that it was all a window into the powerful character, rugged 
individualism, and moral building experience thought to characterize the old cattle 
                                                          
250 Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, University of Texas Oral History Project, #AC 69-
72, Interview with Richard S. “Cactus” Pryor (September 10, 1968):  8a-12, 20, 22; Dugger, The Politician, 
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drives. Almost every visitor who had seen a Western movie or bought into the national 
myths of the United States could understand the symbols being communicated at the 
LBJ Ranch. As Hal K. Rothman observed, “It was as if the world of the Western movie 
had come to life.” These outdoor theatrics, then, were not just entertainment but a vivid 
example of how the idea of the frontier, as the definition of American society and 
culture, had become deeply entrenched in national thought and in the President’s own 
mind. As for most of his foreign guests, their impressions of how Americans saw 
themselves and the world around them must now appear to have been confirmed. 251 
 
 
Figure 4.3: A Texas “Fandangle” performed at the barbeque for Latin American 
Ambassadors, LBJ Ranch, April 1, 1967. (Photo courtesy of the LBJ Library, #C4932-A8) 
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The LBJ Ranch “experience” demonstrates the power of social/cultural structures 
such as the Frontier Myth to accommodate a nation’s self-identity and almost 
everything that occurs in society. Americans and those familiar with the myths and ideas 
of the frontier west saw in the Ranch a cultural resonance that fit their preconceived 
notions of the “real America.” Not cities and industry but a rural “spread” that seemed to 
represent a simpler vision of a nation of working people who appreciated community 
and order; but the Ranch was also the place where many of LBJ’s “helping hand” 
progressive programs were conceived and promoted. An April 1961 visit from 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, a nation fascinated with the fiction of 
Karl May and other Western writers, provided the first clear example of the Johnson 
locale being transformed from one of national iconography to international symbolic 
meaning.  Here was a genuine American, Lyndon B. Johnson, in the genuine America. 
And here in Stonewall, Texas, was the tangible expression of a frontier experience that 
seemed to provide for an American past as impressive and spectacular as those of other 
nations which could trace their histories back much further in time.252 
 
“Tall in the Saddle” 
During the early days of his presidency, when the Frontier Myth had reached a 
pinnacle of its influence, LBJ’s much-hyped cowboy skills and battles of man against 
beast also played well with most of the American public—only enhancing further the 
significance of his ranch while bolstering Johnson’s own frontier credentials. “He’s a 
                                                          
252 The Ranch as international meeting place was not without its limitations, though, as was the 
case when Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan, a devout Muslim, arrived for a barbeque 
later that year and pork appeared on the menu (luckily for LBJ, Khan gently overlooked it as a mistake). 
During his “second presidency,” as America attempted to export its frontier vision abroad, more startling 
differences than mishaps on menus would soon challenge the frontier myth and its applicability abroad as 
well. Khan’s visit is described in Rothman, LBJ’s Texas White House, 103. 
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crack shot, a fine horseman, a no-nonsense angler, and he knows every blade of the hill 
country of Texas,” proclaimed Argosy magazine in its special October 1964 feature, 
“LBJ Outdoor Sportsman.” LBJ was described as an avid naturalist, “soil-loving 
rancher,” the “first real ‘outdoorsman’ since Teddy Roosevelt, the first since T.R. who 
can sit on a horse, rope a calf and handle a gun with the casual ease of a man who has 
lived much of his life out of doors.” After this big build-up, friends of Johnson’s were 
quoted as saying that “He’s a damned fine shot…real deliberate with a gun…the hardest 
hunter you ever saw….can navigate by the stars,” rides a horse “with the grace and 
bearing of a man born to the saddle” and has “an insatiable appetite about nature in 
general.” The friendly columnist for Argosy must have had his tongue in his cheek when 
he also wrote that LBJ was a talented fisherman but did not exploit his fishing prowess 
in front of the press “because he’s basically honest” and “has never encouraged this 
approach to his political image [!].” Johnson’s long-time staffer and Press Secretary 
George Reedy’s account of LBJ’s outdoorsman abilities were not quite as glowing. Reedy 
tells us that the ranch was close to Johnson because it gave him a sense of identity. But 
he also reveals that LBJ’s “self-painted portrait of a cattleman tending his herds…was 
difficult to accept with a straight face. He did know something about cattle but he 
‘tended’ them from a Lincoln Continental with a chest full of ice and a case of scotch and 
soda in the back seat.” Reedy’s shot of reality aside, the plethora of good press for LBJ’s 
“rancher and outdoorsman” persona may have had much less substance to it than TR’s 
did but the puffed up Johnson-as-hunter-frontiersman imagery became fixed, striking a 
responsive chord with much of the American public in the early 1960s. 253 
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Figure 4.4: The President celebrates his Presidential Election victory the previous 
day by demonstrating his cattle herding prowess for the press at the LBJ Ranch, 
November 4, 1964. (©Bettmann/CORBIS) 
 
Through the LBJ Ranch and stories of the president’s hunting, riding and shooting 
acumen, LBJ could personally and politically tap into part of the Teddy Roosevelt 
mystique and its vigorous, masculine elements of the Frontier Myth. LBJ, “Tall in the 
Saddle” as the Washington Post described him, was no longer viewed predominantly as 
a DC Beltway insider or a Southerner but as a Western frontiersman, a President who 
maintained a level of both personal and national vitality though his individual 
interactions with the frontier. So long as the Frontier Myth remained an explanation for 
the American experience and life ways (as depicted in LBJ’s virtual frontier re-
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enactments for willing press writers)—it served Lyndon Johnson extremely well. It was a 
Frontier persona so desirable at this time, in fact, that another major political figure 
would attempt to rope the White House away from LBJ by beating him at his own game. 
But the Frontier Myth of the early to mid-1960s was not able to accommodate this rival 
cowboy’s ultra-conservative style and less inclusive brand of politics…at least not just 
yet.254 
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V. 
Domestic “Showdowns for Progress”  
and Outer Space Frontiers 
 
Each of us, in our own way, is the product of a frontier, and 
the builder of a frontier in their time. America is the land of 
the perpetual frontier. We must carry with us the old virtues 
that we have needed on every frontier….but we must add a 
new indispensable: the ability to…give wings to our hopes. I 
have in mind for this country a Great Society. 
    —Johnson’s remarks at a “Salute to President Johnson” 
Dinner in Cleveland, 1964255 
 
 
Although it wrestled with liberal and conservative symbolic elements, the Frontier 
Myth had re-established itself as the interpretive framework for American society in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. At this stage it had both encompassed and was key to the 
Johnson Administration’s promotion of its ambitious “Great Society” programs. 
Frontier visions were symbolic of an optimistic and hopeful future that was inclusive of 
the Civil Rights movement, Medicare and Head Start education programs, aimed to 
ensure equality of opportunity, provided a rationale for the “New Conservation” 
greening initiatives, and inspired the pioneering of space exploration. The myth’s 
structure was emerging for LBJ as a given and the President’s programs slid right into 
place alongside popular western imagery of the day. But like accidental Cowboy 
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President TR, before seeing his initiatives fully through Johnson first required the kind 
of mandate that he could only obtain at the polling booth. 
 
‘64 Campaign Shootout  
Given the stature and influence of the Frontier Myth during this era, it was only 
fitting that 1964 would be the only US Presidential election campaign featuring two 
verifiable Cowboy candidates: President Lyndon Baines Johnson of the Texas Hill 
Country and Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Phoenix, Arizona who would face 
each other in the final race. Both liberals and conservatives hoped to exploit the myth 
and its symbolism as representing their visions for the nation. But in the context of the 
events and myth structure of 1964, the liberal Democrat LBJ held the upper hand. 
Barry Goldwater’s constituency was made up for the most part of those Americans 
who were unhappy with liberalism and the state of the nation and who admired a style 
of action that seemed frozen in the nineteenth century. In terms of regions he appealed 
especially to white voters in the Deep South and conservative Southwesterners. 
Goldwater told Americans that “freedom today is dependent on government 
confinement” and actively opposed virtually every federal government policy initiative 
since the Hoover Administration. In the area of foreign policy, the Arizona Senator 
insisted that the nation needed to pursue a domino theory in reverse by promoting 
American democracy and values to topple communist regimes, belligerently calling 
upon his fellow Arizonans and countrymen to “declare the World Communist movement 
an outlaw in the community of civilized nations.”256 
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Of all the frontier values outlined by Turner and TR, rugged individualism was 
Goldwater’s number one and most pervasive theme. The Republican presidential 
candidate lauded the “simple” wisdom of America’s past with black and white solutions 
that de-emphasized international cooperation and believed that increased freedom and 
liberty could only be achieved in individuals, businesses and communities if they were 
allowed to manage their own affairs. As for his own persona, like LBJ, Goldwater 
claimed that his frontier family in Arizona personified bravery, self-reliance and the 
strenuous life. (Also, like his opponent, he left out some facts that did not appear to fit 
the stories: most notably that his parents, Baron and Jojo, got rich not only from hard 
work but through lucrative federal government contracts.) Goldwater told audiences of 
his family’s frontier heritage in Arizona and attempted to fit into this mold on twentieth 
century terms by becoming an explorer, jet pilot, innovative businessman, and an 
outdoor photographer. Images taken of “AuH2O,” sometimes by himself, typically 
showed him in frontier guises. In one well-publicized image by the renowned 
photographer, Yousuf Karsh, the Senator posed in a cowboy hat, buckskin jacket, and 
jeans with a rifle at the ready on a faux background of huge Sonoran Desert cacti (Figure 
5.1). Karsh apparently understood the obvious contrast between myth and reality 
(perhaps better than did the candidate himself) as he chose to shoot Goldwater not 
defending helpless frontier folk but in front of a swimming pool surrounded by lawn 
chairs. Goldwater, Robert Goldberg has observed, was cast as a “legitimate son of the 
Old West.”257 
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Figure 5.1: Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, 1963. Photograph by Yousuf Karsh. 
(Reproduced with permission. © Estate of Yousuf Karsh). 
 
Through pursuing this frontier persona, Goldwater had effectively freed himself of 
the old negative portrayals of Republicans as stiff, country-club, starched collar types. 
Unfortunately for the GOP, the successes of his rugged individualist persona which 
helped lead to his nomination was not ultimately a good fit with the much more middle-
of-the-road and liberal Frontier Myth of the 1950s and early 1960s and the majority of 
American voters who adhered to it. Barry Goldwater’s own appeals to the “silent” 
Americans who went about their daily business without “demands for special 
treatment”—his “Platform for the Forgotten America”—seemed to many moderates as 
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seriously compromised by his simultaneous strategy to woo white voters from the South 
with his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Goldwater also did not help himself at 
the Republican National Convention when he grimly declared that “Extremism in the 
defense of liberty is no vice.” And, once out on the campaign trail, his speeches seemed 
to lose their frontier foundations and came to more closely resemble, as Goldberg has 
put it, “Old Testament jeremiads.” LBJ’s campaign staff immediately recognized 
Goldwater’s cranky and out of touch, frontier persona and saddled up.258 
The Democratic Campaign worked overtime to portray LBJ as a responsible liberal 
cowpoke while dusting up his opponent, the reactionary Senator Goldwater, as a bad 
man and crazy cowboy with his itchy finger on the nuclear trigger. One Democratic 
Party tract insisted: “Goldwater wants a ‘Showdown’—a duel between nuclear nations, 
and his own statements prove this beyond a shadow of a doubt.” The Republican 
candidate himself only fed into this kooky-cowboy image when he wrote, “In the Old 
West, the six-gun was called the equalizer; it made all men the same height and the 
same strength. The atom bomb and its offspring, the nuclear bomb, have become the 
six-guns of today’s world.”259  
By early September, Special Assistant to the President Jack Valenti had advised 
Johnson by confidential Memorandum on the course the presidential campaign should 
                                                          
258 Former President Dwight Eisenhower was among those “confused” by Barry Goldwater’s 
comment that “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice…” and told the Republican candidate 
directly that he “could not actively support the Republican ticket unless the Senator satisfactorily clarified 
himself.” Roscoe Drummond, “Extremism: GOP Embattled,” Christian Science Monitor (July 27, 1964) 
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259 Characterization of Goldwater and quote from his book Why Not Victory? (4th Ed., August 1964) 
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take. Valenti was blunt and animated, contending that “we ought to treat Goldwater not 
as an equal, who has credentials to be President, but as a radical, a preposterous 
candidate who would ruin our country and its future.” Valenti continued: “We ought to 
get some gag writers to destroy Goldwater….We must make him ridiculous…trigger-
happy, a bomb thrower.” Fellow-Special Assistant Lawrence O’Brien echoed Valenti’s 
advice when he wrote to LBJ “The Bomb is the biggest issue by far. Voters are frightened 
of Goldwater and don’t want him in the same room as the nuclear trigger.” Apparently 
LBJ agreed. Over the final months of the campaign, Goldwater was consistently 
portrayed by Democratic campaigners as a crazy, kook-right, nuclear gunslinger who 
was grossly irresponsible, anti-peace, anti-Social Security, anti-Medicare, and anti-
government. President Johnson himself delivered essentially the same message about 
his opponent but with a few LBJ enhancements borrowing heavily from the 
conventional wisdom of America’s frontier experience.260 
In a speech given in Reno, Johnson employed in his own “high road” style of 
frontier imagery—emphasizing the needs of the frontier community and role of the 
Federal Government—to drive at what had now become the key message of his 
campaign, “responsibility”: 
 
Here on the frontier of the West, the watchword has always been 
freedom….We know how the West was won. It wasn’t won by men on 
horses who tried to settle every argument with a quick draw and a shot 
from the hip. We here in the West aren’t about to turn in our sterling 
silver American heritage for a plastic credit card that reads, “Shoot now; 
pay later”…. We didn’t build this Nation by everyone scratching and 
clawing for himself. We built it, like we built the West, by pitching in 
together and by always acting responsibly…. ‘We the people’ are going to 
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stay in business and ‘we, the Government’ are going to do together the 
things that we can’t do alone. One candidate is roaming around the 
country saying what a terrible thing the Government is….Somebody 
better tell him that most Americans are not ready to trade the American 
eagle in for a plucked banty rooster. He better know that most people 
just don’t believe the United States Government is a foreign power or an 
enemy. 
 
 
For LBJ, working together “responsibly” in an optimistic, community minded milieu, 
with a little help from the Federal Government, would enable Americans to help 
preserve world peace and do more than they could do alone, bringing more personal 
freedom for the individual. The ’64 Democratic Platform spoke of ending discrimination 
on the basis of race, age, sex or national origin so that Americans not only had the “right 
to be free” but also would have “the ability to use their freedom.” Under the Bill of 
Rights Johnson contended that Americans had more personal freedom in 1964 than 
they had ever had before in the nation’s, or world’s, history but that more needed to be 
done to reach the ultimate goal of equal opportunity and equal treatment for all 
Americans.261 In making these statements, LBJ (and the Democratic Party platform) 
was tapping directly into a liberal, national Frontier Myth so deeply entrenched in 
American thinking that it did not need specific explanation. Here was more than a party 
platform, it was a national vision for the future—based on a legendary past—that was 
impervious to regionalism and its peculiar characteristics of segregation, unequal access 
to education and even economic disparity. 
In his remarks to the 1964 Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, the 
chairman of the Platform Committee, Carl Albert, employed this same forward-looking 
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version of the Frontier Myth when he declared: “This is a progressive platform. This is a 
platform that profits from the past, but looks to the future. This is a Lyndon Johnson 
platform.” The optimistic future promised by LBJ versus the pessimistic past of 
Goldwater also appeared as a frame in the ’64 Democratic Party campaign literature. 
One pamphlet, “Why Rural America Needs Johnson–Humphrey,” told readers that if 
Goldwater were elected, the US would be turning the clock back to America’s rural past: 
“And those who recall the past with its back-breaking labor, its inconvenience, its 
insecurity and its poverty of hope do not want this.” Happily, “man of the soil” LBJ 
would “continue to give the farmer his rightful place and rightful share in American 
society.” Throughout the race, Goldwater’s own words were used against him repeatedly 
and with great effectiveness to make the Arizonan appear as a callous dunce who voted 
against rural school lunch programs and uttered such statements as: “I’m not a farmer, 
and I don’t know anything about farming”….“I would get rid of the Agriculture 
Act”….and “I fear Washington and centralized government more than I do Moscow.”262 
Goldwater had failed to recognize the power of the mid-twentieth century Frontier Myth 
as a great equalizer: with a little help from the Federal Government, the frontier through 
ranching and farming had given even impoverished folk the opportunity to pursue the 
American Dream of “making it” through hard work and a spirit of community and 
optimism for a brighter future. 
 
                                                          
262 LBJ Library, Democratic National Committee Files, Series 1, Box 173, President Johnson, 
Convention Platform file, Press Release “Remarks by Rep. Carl Albert on the Platform,” August 25, 1964: 
1; LBJ Library, Democratic National Committee Files, Series 1, Box 175, President Johnson. Campaign 
’64: Official Campaign Slogans, Songs, Materials, Etc. file, “Why Rural America Needs Johnson—
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Figure 5.2: Johnson’s ’64 Presidential Campaign at full gallop with campaign buttons 
declaring Easterners from TR’s home state for the “reasonable” and forward-thinking 
cowboy, LBJ, versus his “trigger-happy,” “backward” and regionalist opponent, Arizona 
Senator Barry Goldwater. (Images taken by the author at the LBJ Museum, Austin TX, 2011) 
 
 
A plethora of evidence indicates that Johnson took every opportunity to be seen as 
an “American cowboy” and ranch man as he stole the thunder away from Goldwater’s 
own rugged persona by riding his horses and rounding up cattle for the press, and 
donning his Stetson and shiny boots. So constant were his cowboy antics that LBJ’s 
conscious efforts appear to have been bordering on obsessive. Both Johnson and 
Goldwater disliked the media, but unlike his opponent, LBJ appears to have much better 
understood its power to persuade (and his own power, at this point, to persuade the 
press) as he launched the far more effective “Cowboy” campaign. He even received help 
from some little cowhands. According to the Washington Post, “to children, the greatest 
Western hero since Hopalong Cassidy is President Lyndon B. Johnson.” Describing a 
new, pre-election book by Bill Adler, Letters to the President, the Post reported that half 
of 2,500 letters that Johnson received from children each week referred to his Western 
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persona or his ranch. “To the kids,” Adler proclaimed, “he’s a cowboy.”263 The shrewd 
and calculating Johnson, who had cut his teeth during the New Deal era of the 1930’s 
and now wanted to “out-[FD] Roosevelt Roosevelt,” also knew how to out-cowboy 
Goldwater by using his Frontier-President image to full advantage.  
Barry Goldwater, meanwhile, did not do himself any favours. He failed to live up to 
the mid-1960s interpretation of the Frontier Myth by appearing less and less as a 
confident and optimistic Western hero and more and more as a backward and unstable, 
conservative extremist who was out of touch with the times. To make matters worse for 
the Republicans, he did not seem to represent the entire nation, but rather, specific 
constituencies of ultra-conservatives, Deep South white Democrats, and localized 
supporters in his home state of Arizona. The structure of the Frontier Myth at that point 
in time was quintessentially national in nature, inclusive, and appeared to offer a way 
forward for all Americans except Goldwater supporters and the Republicans of his day 
who backed his campaign did not “get” this and, as a result, failed to deploy those 
elements of the myth that had been taken as a given. Goldwater’s campaign could not 
convince most of the public that he represented them, all regions of the country, or the 
public’s mostly optimistic visions for America’s future.  
By contrast, for the rhetorical LBJ on the campaign trail in 1964, it was the people 
of the frontier that had brought faith and light to the entire nation. He told a breakfast 
audience in Portland, Oregon that he had flown across a continent to see them in just a 
few hours: “A continent it took decades of daring to conquer. It took brave men and 
strong men to make that crossing. But, most of all it took men of faith—men of great 
faith in themselves, in their country, in the future of this land.” The President continued: 
                                                          
263 McLendon, “LBJ’s Tall in the Saddle…,” B5. 
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“The West is not just a place. It is an idea. The Bible says, ‘Speak to the earth and it shall 
teach thee.’ And here, in the West, we learned man’s possibilities were as spacious as the 
sky that covered him. We learned that free men could build a civilization as majestic as 
the mountains and the rivers that nourished him. We learned that with our hands we 
could create a life that was worthy of the land that was ours. And that lesson,” Johnson 
proclaimed,” has illuminated the life of all America—east, west, north and south.”264 
Johnson’s own rhetoric, in keeping with the nationalistic Frontier Myth and popular 
vision that the Old West encompassed all of the best that America had to offer, ignored 
the fact that much of the process he described also involved heavy-handed colonialism 
toward Native Americans, a grasping imperialist war with Mexico, and encompassed a 
number of nineteenth century ideas of assimilation, progress, and faith in social 
evolution. But what mattered most to LBJ and his throngs of supporters was that 
America’s mythic past was still relevant to the world, provided that it was national in 
scope and was being projected forward into the future. Furthermore, as Gerald Nash has 
asserted in The American West in the Twentieth Century, it was the postwar West that 
had become the trendsetter for the nation on issues ranging from race relations and 
immigration to the environment to technological innovation.265 In the context of mid-
1960s America and its faith in the liberal Frontier Myth, it was LBJ’s message of 
positive, progressive, forward-looking change and not Goldwater’s reactionary vision 
which, initially, rang true for most Americans voters. 
                                                          
264 Lyndon B. Johnson, Presidential Papers, “Remarks on Conservation at a Breakfast in Portland 
Saluting the Northwest – Southwest Power Transmission Intertie,” September 17, 1964, American 
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26507 (December 23, 2011).   
265 Gerald D. Nash, The American West in the Twentieth Century: A Short History of an Urban 
Oasis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1973): 6. 
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On November 3, 1964, Lyndon Johnson was elected to his first full term as 
President by winning the largest percentage of the popular vote in US history. While his 
Republican opponent in the campaign was a westerner who had attempted to assume 
political stances credited to the character of the American frontier, LBJ cleaned 
Goldwater’s plough and swept every state in the West except Arizona (Barry Goldwater 
captured his own state with a margin of only 0.5% of the vote).266  
 
A “Great Society” Mandate & the Frontier Myth as Symbol for the Future 
Johnson now had a mandate for his ambitious liberal programs. The structure of 
the Frontier Myth as a unifying national myth capable of explaining and answering 
America’s questions—essentially the same message deployed by LBJ—had dislodged the 
competing campaign of Goldwater and set up the ushering in of the most extensive 
program of liberal legislation since the New Deal. “The Great Society,” Johnson told the 
nation, “rests upon abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and 
racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time.” In keeping with the 
myth, LBJ was a kind of liberal nationalist, who perceived a broad consensus for a 
strong defense against external threats and for domestic programs that eased the 
problems that emerged with an advanced industrial society and reduced poverty and 
racism. Put simply, he was following the conventional “frontier wisdom” of his times 
which thought that government should be about improving the lives of its citizens. 
Johnson reaped the benefits of the myth with powerful public support. In January 1965, 
Gallup polls showed that 71 percent of the American public approved of LBJ’s 
                                                          
266 Ross R. Rice, “The 1964 Elections in the West,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 
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performance as President with a disapproval rate of just 15 percent: impressive figures 
in any era for a President already serving in his second year in office. 267 
 
Figure 5.3: “Where Seldom is Heard a Discouraging Word.” 
Charles Brooks, The Birmingham News, January 20, 1965. 
(Reproduced with permission of Barbara Brooks Bankhead and 
Charles Brooks, Jr.)268 
                                                          
267 Johnson quoted in William E. Leuchtenburg, A Troubled Feast: American Society Since 1945 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983): 138; George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 
1935-1971, Vol. 3, 1959-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972): 1222. 
268 Charles Brooks cartoon in Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Special Files: Cartoon Collections, Box 1, 
File 1, Political Issues 1956-1964.  
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In the Foreword to the 1965 edition of Walter Prescott Webb’s The Texas Rangers, 
President Johnson (or at least his White House speech writers) presented what might 
have come closest to his own vision of the Frontier Myth and what it meant for the 
nation and his Administration’s policies: 
 
The American Frontier cannot properly be described in the past tense. 
The influence of the Frontier has been great upon our political 
institutions, our social patterns, our values and aspirations as a people, 
and, especially, upon the democratic character of our society. The 
influence of the Frontier as a molding force in our system is far from 
spent…. 
 
‘The West’ is not so much a geographic place as it is a symbol—a symbol 
of America’s confidence that on beyond the moment, on beyond the 
present terrain, the world will be brighter, the future better…. 
 
As we become a more populous and far more urbanized nation, an 
instinct develops—a right and just instinct—to preserve the heritage of 
the open country, the clear skies, clean streams. More importantly 
another instinct develops—an instinct to preserve the equality of 
opportunity, the dignity of the individual, the commitment to justice for 
all that derive from the spirit of the Frontier era. Our affluence, our 
abundance, our strength and power have not dulled the values 
experience taught us through the challenge of opening the Frontier…. 
 
In the challenging and perilous times of this century, free men 
everywhere might consider the motto [of Texas Ranger Captain L.H. 
McNelly] that ‘courage is a man who keeps coming on’…. 
 
We cannot be sure that in our own time we will reach and fulfill the 
goals of our society or the ideals on which our system stands. But we 
can, by dedication and commitment, be the kind of people who ‘keep on 
coming on.’269 
 
By recalling part of America’s history and quoting the nation’s heroes, presidents and 
politicians in general connect themselves with America’s past, with its mission, values 
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and goals. As LBJ characterized the nation in flattering Western terms he was redefining 
his readers or audience as the kind of folks who have always supported the excellent 
ideas like those in his programs. The influence of the frontier, Johnson insists, will 
continue to sustain and shape the Federal government and the nation’s values and 
democratic character. The West remains a symbol for a better and brighter future and 
the “spirit of the frontier” an ongoing force for shaping Americans commitment to 
equality of opportunity, justice, and the dignity of individuals (distinct from 
emphasizing individualism in and of itself). Most of all, Americans must “keep coming 
on’” not to preserve what was, but to meet modern challenges and work toward reaching 
goals and ideals of American society which have not yet been met.  
In moving toward these goals and ideals, LBJ tied his Western credentials and 
“lessons” from America’s pioneering days to his own administration and his rationales 
in 1964-66 for engineering the passage of more liberal, domestic legislation in a two year 
period than any U.S. President.  According to the Johnsonian view, then, the values of 
the Frontier Myth were not a symbol of better times past, but of preparing for better 
times ahead. This optimism for the future described by Ray Allen Billington as the 
myth’s most “outstanding feature” was already the accepted view of most Americans of 
the early 1960s who supported LBJ’s policies and voted him back into office. 
In the film currently shown at the LBJ Museum, Lyndon Baines Johnson: 36th 
President, this same message continues to be directed at viewers. The narrator describes 
the opening, serene shot of Johnson Country but then sets the tone for the ‘pioneering’ 
section of the film by adding, “The gentle beauty of springtime in the Hill Country of 
Central Texas offered little warning of the harsh life awaiting early settlers.” Johnson’s 
Western background and persona here and in his written accounts are depicted as 
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having helped to define and promote the Great Society programs—which look to make 
life better for Americans than the tough existence of the past. Joseph Califano was later 
in awe of his former boss’ ambitions for the nation: “There was no child he could not 
feed, no adult he could not put to work, no disease he could not cure.” For Califano, 
LBJ’s forward-looking and optimistic domestic program was his gift to the nation. As 
this dissertation also contends it was a view derived from the nation’s culture and value 
system—as defined by the myth—which promoted optimism, opportunity and 
inclusiveness and meant driving forward with the kind of boldness and innovation that 
pioneering Americans so the story told,  had exhibited the century before. 270 
 
“We Shall Overcome”: Community, Civil Rights and Inclusiveness 
The Frontier structure had gained its most influential adherent of the 1960s in 
Lyndon Baines Johnson. In the pronouncements of the President, the environment had 
forced old customs to conform to new realities and so it would be for American society 
of the late twentieth Century. And like any good master explanation for American 
development, LBJ’s touchstone seemed to account for past and future.  
As implied in his Foreword to The Texas Rangers, for Johnson, meeting the 
challenges of future frontiers also meant promoting an agenda of cooperation, 
community, a democratic spirit, equal opportunity, tolerance, civil rights and 
immigration: the more inclusive shades of the Frontier Myth. At a fundraising dinner in 
New Orleans, he told his audience that: “The years have been long. The trials have been 
many. The burdens have been great. But the times are beginning to respond to 
                                                          
270 Transcription to “Lyndon Baines Johnson: 36th President.” Film shown to visitors to the LBJ 
Library and Museum, Austin TX in October 2011; Joseph Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of 
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America’s steadfast purpose….The platform which I stand says: ‘The Federal 
Government exists not to grow larger, but to enlarge the individual potential and 
achievement of the people.’” And “we are not going to lose [our vision of] tomorrow in 
divisions over things of the past.” Breaking from his prepared text, LBJ then went for 
the jugular of the southern segregationists’ right on their home turf, asserting: “Equal 
opportunity for all, special privileges for none”….this “is no time to preach division or 
hate. If there was ever a time for us to try to unite and find areas of agreement, it is 
now.” The President added, “It is time for us to have a little trust and a little faith in each 
other, and to try to find some areas that we can agree on so we can have a united 
program….and do what is right.”271 No President addressing a Deep Southern crowd in 
person had ever spoken in such terms. 
LBJ also told audiences at speaking engagements and in televised addresses that 
the “purpose of democracy is fulfillment for every individual.” The abundance of 
opportunity, meanwhile, was to his mind what made the United States exceptional from 
other countries. Relatedly the term “Frontier” continued to mean a place to be 
discovered and a place of opportunity. Today, LBJ liked to say, “Something is happening 
which is as exciting—even more exciting—than the winning of the West.” Then he would 
go on to describe one of his Great Society programs such as Federal Medicare or aid to 
education, or laws guaranteeing the equality of its citizens. The President would usually 
remind his listeners that those afraid to take this new pioneering journey or who 
claimed it was “too expensive” would not be dealt with kindly in the history books. Like 
the early settlers who “built a new world out of the wilderness,” Americans had to stay 
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the course. LBJ likened his wide-ranging liberal programs to a new “great age of 
exploration” that would prove even more glorious an accomplishment that that of 
Americans ancestors in the previous century. But to reach the Promised Land 
Americans would need to come along on the journey with him. 272 
In what was perhaps LBJ’s most lauded message to Congress on March 15, 1965 he 
came out strongly in support of voting rights for African-Americans, he told the 
American public: “There is no Negro problem. There is no Southern problem. There is 
no Northern problem. There is only an American problem. And we are met here tonight 
as Americans—not as Democrats or Republicans—we are met here as Americans to solve 
that problem….”273 Johnson was determined to achieve a solid and sweeping national 
civil rights bill and to defeat the “enemies” of America’s past: racism, poverty, ignorance 
and disease. Driven by his dream of ending the Civil War for good, his belief in a 
national, not a regional vision, and inclinations about the equality of men, Johnson went 
for broke—quoting directly from a key anthem of the American Civil Rights Movement: 
“We Shall Overcome.” The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 were the most outstanding accomplishments of his career, and Johnson owed 
much of his success to the mobilization of the frontier myth. Along the way, Lyndon 
Johnson frequently peppered his speeches with stories of Western heroism in urging 
“all-American” equal rights—and not just those featuring Anglo-Saxon types. On several 
occasions, he read from the roster of the battle of the Alamo, “the Lexington and 
Concord west of the Mississippi,” where the name of a black man who died there was 
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read out alongside those who were at least part Irish, German and Spanish.274 Through 
such stories, Johnson achieved another presidential first, acknowledging and promoting 
the heroic role of minorities in the popularly perceived “Winning of the West.” LBJ’s 
reforms and programs—buoyed by the “spirit of the frontier” and its demands for 
equality on a national scale in his own mind and in the minds of millions of Americans 
in all regions—were sweeping.  
 
Gun Control 
As Brian Dippie, Rush Welter and other cultural historians have argued, the power 
of myth to not only explain but to shape events and policies is key to our understanding 
of America’s past. Lyndon Johnson not only emphasized his own connections to the 
frontier experience and common folk, along with “real life heroes” to promote his 
ambitious programs and social reforms, he garnered support from Hollywood Western 
movie, TV and radio stars “to get the word out.” In one example from the final year of 
the Johnson presidency, Charlton Heston, Jimmy Stewart, Gregory Peck, Kirk Douglas, 
and Hugh O’Brian (star of TV’s long-running Wyatt Earp: Frontier Marshal) all 
actively worked with the Johnson Administration in passing the 1968 Gun Control Act. 
White House Special Counsel Larry Levinson sent a memo on June 12, 1968 to a speech 
writer stating: “At the President’s suggestion, Jack Valenti has agreed to hold a luncheon 
in Los Angeles…June 17, at which a number of famous movie actors—particularly those 
who played cowboys—will speak out in favor of the President’s gun legislation….we need 
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two pithy, one-page statements which will be read by two of the cowboys (probably 
Charlton Heston…), supporting the President’s Gun Control Bill.” A few days later the 
“cowboys” read the same prepared statement to a nationwide TV audience on the Joey 
Bishop Show and, in a letter to Special Assistant Joseph Califano, PR man Dick McKay 
wrote that “Charlton, Gregory and Hugh personally planted this statement with the 
bureau chiefs at AP and UPI.” The considerable publicity generated by these celluloid 
lawmen in the waning days of the myth’s influence helped the President secure passage 
of the bill.275   
 
The “New Conservation” 
Reminiscent of TR and prior to the redirection of his energies toward American 
involvement in Vietnam, LBJ threw the full force of his tremendous energy into the 
preservation and protection of public lands. In perhaps his most quoted statement on 
the issue leading up to the 1964 Election, Johnson said: “We have always prided 
ourselves on not only being America the strong, America the free, but America the 
beautiful. Today that beauty is in danger. The water we drink, the food we eat, the very 
air we breathe, are threatened with pollution. Our parks are overcrowded. Our seashores 
overburdened. Green fields and dense forests are disappearing.” In early February 1965 
he called for a “New Conservation,” a program which resulted in the creation of twelve 
task forces to address environment problems and ultimately the signing into law almost 
300 conservation and beautification measures (more than any other president) at a cost 
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of over $12 billion. By 1966, LBJ boasted that for the first time the United States was 
saving more land than it was losing to development. And during his five year presidency, 
recreation tripled on public lands.276 
Johnson’s New Conservation program called for a national effort and echoed many 
of the rejuvenating rationales for preserving the wilderness that were claimed in 
Theodore Roosevelt’s day. In The Honolulu Advertiser the editor responded to the new 
program by describing at length how LBJ and Udall were the “spiritual descendants” of 
Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, and that it was in this context that Johnson’s 
conservation message should best be viewed. Even TR’s and LBJ’s language, the 
Advertiser insisted, were similar. Both called for a coordinated, many-fronted effort to 
rescue the “beauty and quality of the continent we have conquered—perhaps over-
conquered.”277  
But LBJ’s Administration went beyond the conservation philosophy of TR’s day by 
emphasizing those mid-twentieth century aspects of the Frontier Myth that highlighted 
the need of the community, both rural and urban, to meet their obligations to future 
generations. LBJ explained that this modern, forward-thinking conservation needed to 
go further than the “classic conservation” of the past, encompassing not only the 
countryside but cities and our man-made environment as well. Once again, LBJ 
appealed to the nation’s conscience and suggests that only by meeting and expanding on 
past ideals can the needs and goals for the future be met. “For centuries, Americans 
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have drawn strength and inspiration from the beauty of our country.” This generation, 
LBJ insisted, needed to live up to its historical and national responsibility to “preserve 
and extend such a heritage for its descendants.”278 Traditionally, conservation had been 
a means of increasing the power of the federal government; as a result, the issues of 
economic growth versus natural scenery, private versus public rights, and states’ versus 
federal rights were always at the heart of the debates over the history of the program. 
The momentum of the Johnson presidency on the “new conservation” would still carry 
some weight during the Nixon, Ford and Carter years. As we shall see, though, 
conservation initiatives would face serious opposition during the Reagan presidency—
after a tumultuous series of events caused the Frontier Myth to shift sharply to the right.  
 
The Final Frontier 
Following the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957, Senate Majority Leader 
Lyndon Johnson exploited the sluggish response of the Eisenhower Administration and 
became the nation’s leading political spokesman on Outer Space for more than a 
decade—delivering 40 speeches on the subject between 1957 and 1962 alone. The 
Soviets had aroused some of Americans deepest fears and anxieties during the postwar 
era. As the Reverend Billy Graham told Americans at an evangelical rally in 1953: 
“Almost all ministers of the gospel and students of the Bible agree that it [Communism] 
is master-minded by Satan himself.” The success of Sputnik only intensified Americans’ 
desire to rise to the challenge of the westering mission to spread frontier values and 
counter those of the “Red Menace” (the very antithesis of Americanism). In the minds of 
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many Americans who had lived through the first two decades of the Cold War, the 
political, cultural and spiritual canyon separating the experience of the American 
Frontier from the Soviet East stretched as far as the imagination could reach.279 
Not surprisingly then, many of LBJ’s own pronouncements combined anti-Soviet 
imagery with frontier themes. Senator Johnson expressed his deep concern that in 
allowing Russia to get ahead of the USA in space, his own nation had faltered in “an 
American specialty from the beginning—pioneering.” Tapping into Americans deepest 
fears about their hated enemy and the future, Johnson proclaimed in 1958 that “Outer 
space will be explored. It will become the domain of free men or of men whose minds 
are enslaved. Either we meet our responsibilities or abdicate to the totalitarianism the 
dimension which will shape the lives of the coming generations.” Less than four years 
later, Vice President Johnson had some good news for the American public when he 
announced that returning astronaut John Glenn had “ridden a covered wagon across the 
frontier of space” after successfully orbiting the Earth. The following year, in 1963, when 
asked by a member of the press if it was worth spending enormous amounts of money 
required to fund the Apollo missions, Johnson described the ominous alternative: “The 
question is which kind of philosophy, democratic or Communist, will dominate outer 
space? I for one don’t want to go to bed by the light of a Communist moon.” Rather, 
Johnson intended to rope in the man on the moon himself. On one of his visits to the 
ranch the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, Dr. Wernher von 
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Braun, was handed a Stetson by President LBJ and told “to put it on the moon by 
1970.”280 
During the troubled second half of Johnson’s presidency, when the TV show Star 
Trek challenged viewers each week to imagine future visits to “Space: the final frontier,” 
LBJ persisted with his wagon-train-to-the-stars speech-making. The Star Trek series 
explained repeatedly how human society had evolved from its past of warfare, ecological 
destruction and racism and into a better future society of tolerance, self-determination 
and peace under the United Federation of Planets. Its creator, Gene Rodenberry, had 
been head writer for the Fifties TV-Western, Have Gun Will Travel, before he sold NBC 
Network executives the rights to a kind of “wagon train to the stars.”281 Johnson 
described his hopes for the future in similar terms—provided that Americans, like the 
crew of the Starship Enterprise, would be willing, in effect, “to boldly go where no man 
has gone before.” Referring to Sputnik ten years after its launch, LBJ reflected that 
Americans were comparatively “backward because we did not choose adventure. We did 
not choose to have vision. We did not choose to look forward.” Competing demands of 
the Vietnam War and War on Poverty would compel Johnson to remind listeners that 
America had made tremendous strides during the 1960s and that “the great pilgrimage 
of man—like all adventures—costs money….We will not abandon our dream. We will 
never evacuate the frontiers of space to any other nation. We just must be the space 
pioneers who lead the way to the stars.” Americans, as Johnson had been saying for 
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years, were the world’s greatest pioneers—and in each instance of the experience, from 
New England to California and now beyond into space, “the single greatest effect has 
been upon our political institutions and political concepts.” Here LBJ, as in his 
introduction to The Texas Rangers, is in tune with Frederick Jackson Turner on the 
frontier’s greatest benefit—the democratic spirit. In a commentary which seemed to 
combine the ideas of Turner and Star Trek creator Gene Roddenberry, Johnson added 
that “As we found our national character in the frontiers of the American West, so, I 
believe, we can recapture our confidence and fulfill our greatness in the frontiers of the 
universe and beyond the atmosphere….We are moving to extend the frontiers of 
freedom—personal freedom, social freedom, economic freedom, and the freedom from 
the liberation of war.” These themes appeared again in a special message to Congress, 
this time with Johnson quoting directly from the Turner thesis itself:   
 
‘Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie 
the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet 
changing conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact 
that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an 
expanding people….’ 
 
This represents a valid exposition of the vitality of our democratic process 
as it has endured for almost two hundred years. 
 
 
For the President, America remained an exceptional nation and the most democratic 
society on earth due to its frontiering experience—adapting and changing as its people 
moved outward first across the frontier West, then out to the Pacific, and now into outer 
space, all the while adapting to change and becoming freer, fairer, more inclusive and 
more democratic. For FJT and LBJ, political democracy was central to American 
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distinctiveness and it was the frontiering experience that, more than anything else, 
fostered democracy. But for Johnson, it seemed, America’s frontiers were limitless.282 
Donald F. Hornig, Johnson’s Director of the Office of Science and Technology, 
apparently bought into this philosophy as well when he praised his boss’ efforts in 
broader terms of the American character that was and continued to be formed: “This 
country has thrived on a spirit of adventure…of the frontier [which] is still an important 
ingredient of what I consider the American national character. I think that space…has 
been one of the most important embodiments, and this President has had a lot to do 
with that, with the 1960’s expression of it.”283 
Again and again, Lyndon Johnson’s policy focus was consistently on the future, not 
the past. Repeatedly, Johnson claimed that technological innovation (especially as it 
related to the space program) was what would preserve American lives and freedoms. 
“American soul and American genius is big enough to conquer all obstacles,” he would 
say, “and this is what we shall and must do.” Johnson, then, possessed a similar 
“optimistic” mindset that his contemporary, New Turnerian Ray Allen Billington, had 
identified as “the outstanding feature of the frontier thesis.” In accordance with the 
Frontier Myth, “can-do” Americans with their “masterful grasp of material things” 
would prove themselves capable of meeting any challenge. Outer space, Johnson liked to 
say, was the New World of the next 500-1,000 years as “men will be as deeply impelled 
                                                          
282 Lyndon B. Johnson, Papers of the Presidents, 1967, “Remarks Following an Inspection of 
NASA’s Michoud Assembly Facility Near New Orleans,” December 12, 1967, 1123-1124; LBJ Presidential 
Library, Office Files of White House Aids, Box 29, George Reedy, “Statements of LBJ on Space 
Exploration,” Prepared by the NASA Historical Staff, Washington DC (no date): LBJ’s  “Address before 
the International Symposium on Physics and Medicine of Atmosphere and Space,” San Antonio TX, 
November 11, 1958; Lyndon B. Johnson: “Special Message to the Congress on Election Reform: The 
Political Process in America,” May 25, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28268 (accessed June 18, 
2012). 
283 Transcript, Donald F. Hornig Oral History Interview I, 12/4/68, by David G. McComb, Internet 
Copy, LBJ Library: 29. 
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toward space exploration as the men of the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th centuries were to 
explore the Western Hemisphere….Freedom as we know it would not have come into 
existence, and certainly would not have survived, without the opening of this great new 
frontier on earth.” The implication was clear: as with the American frontier, pioneering 
in Space would enable democracy and freedom to endure, defeat or at least contain the 
Soviets, and change the rules and responsibilities of government for the better.284 LBJ’s 
most enduring priority, sending an American to the moon ahead of the Soviets, never 
wavered, and six months after leaving office that goal was reached.285 
Tellingly, Johnson’s fascination with space flight and pioneering appears to have 
manifested itself in his own personal efforts to fuse modern technology with the Old 
West. The LBJ Ranch blended a rural world that represented the frontier image of an 
older America with a host of modern conveniences. Along with more than 200 
registered brood cows and calves, four bulls, a flock of sheep and goats, numerous hogs, 
and about one dozen horses and ponies, the Ranch featured an enormous 
communications tower replete with satellite dishes, canned muzak piped through LBJ’s 
home and five live oak trees beyond it, his personal JetStar aircraft, a custom-fitted 
Sikorsky helicopter, a mile-long airstrip with LBJ’s pure-bred Herefords grazing 
alongside, an 18-foot speedboat, 28-foot cabin cruiser, white Lincoln Continental 
convertible with a specially rigged electric “cattlehorn,” Corvettes, an Amphicar, more 
than a dozen colour TVs, 30 two-way radio sets, a 300+ foot radio tower, video and 
                                                          
284 Address Before Dolphin Club Meeting, Port Arthur, TX, October 22, 1959 and The 
Congressional Record (May 3, 1960): 8532-8533 in the  LBJ Library, Office Files of White House Aids, 
Box 29, George Reedy, “Statements of LBJ on Space Exploration,” Prepared by the NASA Historical Staff, 
Washington DC (no date). 
285 One of the most balanced and complete assessments of LBJ’s motives and role in the Space 
program is Robert A. Divine, “Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of Space,” in Robert A. Divine, ed., The 
Johnson Years, Volume Two: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 
1982): 217-248. 
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audio reel-to-reel tape machines, and 70 telephones (six phone outlets were placed 
conveniently around his heated pool, and one even underneath the dining room table). 
Like LBJ himself, the Ranch cherished the past but also looked forward and seized 
newness and change. The President believed that “his people” had been victorious in 
their conquest of the continent; perhaps for Johnson the ultimate triumph was to 
experience the mysteries of the sublime Pedernales River country in comfort. LBJ’s 
emphasis on new technologies to resolve problems out West certainly resonated with 
the views of University of Texas historian Walter Prescott Webb, who had been 
appointed by VP Johnson as the premier historian of the 98th meridian. LBJ, arguably, 
used such gimmicks in an effort to appeal to voters and build cordial relationships with 
foreign leaders through creating his own image as the nation’s number one high-tech 
Cowboy. But just as significantly, it was consistent with the mid-twentieth century 
interpretations of the Frontier Myth that blended the nation’s past heritage with its 
hopes for future sustained progress.286 For most Americans, science and technology 
itself were frontiers. 
 
                                                          
286 These numerous technological devices are described in detail in a series of displays at the 
Lyndon Baines Johnson National Historic Park, visited by the author on September 30, 2011; Webb, The 
Great Plains; William W. Savage, Comic Books and America, 1945-1954 Norman: University of 
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Figure 5.4: President Johnson and Vice President-elect Hubert Humphrey in front of 
Marine One at the LBJ Ranch, November 4, 1964. (Courtesy the LBJ Library, Photo No. 436-253-
WH64) 
 
LBJ: Cowboy Colossus 
In terms of his personality, LBJ seemed to epitomize Turner’s famous line about 
the “typical” American frontiersman who was said to be “lacking in the artistic but 
powerful to effect great ends.” Johnson was the consummate DC political power player 
who could get things done for the folks back home, but also possessed a Western 
frontier style that most Americans could relate to and that many could see in 
themselves. Though in the thick of beltway politics he was also viewed and admired as a 
maverick: a genuine colossal presence reminiscent of Wister’s Virginian—though 
markedly less subtle. Historian Robert Caro has vividly described the overwhelming 
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force of Johnson’s character. When on the floor as Senate Majority Leader, Johnson 
tended his herd, “prowl[ing] the big chamber restlessly, moving up and down the aisles, 
back and forth along the rows of desks….Moving over to a senator seated at a desk, and 
then to another, he would sit down beside a man or bend over him, sometimes with both 
his arms planted firmly on the target’s desk, so that he could not rise and get away.” In 
the apt words of one journalist, Lyndon Baines Johnson was “‘the Western movie 
barging into the room.’”287  
Unlike President Reagan, “the great communicator” who would have handlers, 
Johnson “the great persuader” had advisors—most of whom were handled by LBJ 
himself. Tom Wicker of the New York Times observed in “Lyndon Johnson is 10 Feet 
Tall,” that LBJ’s Western “nature” was the reason why he loomed over his 
administration: “the breezy, two-fisted, overpower range king who rules from horizon to 
horizon and from can-see to can’t see with iron will and fast gun. Lyndon Johnson,” 
Wicker quipped, “may be the best John Wayne part ever written.” Like TR, LBJ believed 
in the “the bully pulpit”—always teaching, preaching, writing, pleading, complaining, 
“always coming on.” In his first two years in office, LBJ had pushed through Congress 
laws which had overthrown legal segregation in the South, gained Southern blacks the 
right to vote, created Medicare and Medicaid, and moved to bring substantive new 
protections to the nation’s environment. LBJ wielded power in a way that few 
presidents, including certainly his predecessor, ever had. And his frontier mannerisms 
and all-American, cowboy colossus image, whether deliberate or not, had arguably 
played a significant role in his ability to garner tremendous support for his programs 
                                                          
287 Caro, Master of the Senate, xviii; Unnamed journalist quoted in Ibid, xviii. 
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from across the country.288 But the Frontier Myth structure he had been shaped by and 
relied upon so heavily for his political success was about to undergo a series of serious 
challenges. And as events caused the myth to lose its power and influence, Johnson too, 
in the second phase of his presidency, found that his own undeniable strong-suit—the 
power to persuade—would begin to elude him. 
 
Conclusion 
The ideas of the first Cowboy President, TR, were used in many ways as a basic 
template for President Lyndon Johnson to follow in his updated interpretation and 
deployment of the Frontier Myth in domestic policies. In the years leading up to his 
Presidency, LBJ and his staff worked hard to cut his image loose from its backward-
thinking Southern connections and promote a new Western frontier-of-the-future 
persona that would win over the nation. For the most part, this shrewdness served 
Johnson remarkably well helping him win the presidency, overwhelmingly, in his own 
right against the Conservative Cowboy Goldwater in 1964, and in promoting a frontier-
inspired liberal agenda for the mid-1960s. 
Like TR, Lyndon Johnson thought big. During the first half of LBJ’s presidency, he 
committed the bulk of his energies toward bringing greater equality of opportunity to all 
Americans and increasing emphasis on community through promotion his liberal 
programs. For Johnson the forward looking Frontier Myth was a catalyst for creating his 
Great Society, establishing Civil Rights, and exploring outer space. Johnson deployed 
                                                          
288 Tom Wicker, “Lyndon Johnson Is 10 Feet Tall,” New York Times Magazine (May 23, 1965): 88-
92 in the LBJ Library, Democratic National Committee Files, Series 1, Box 147. Another journalist drew 
some similar comparisons of LBJ to TR, stating that “Like Theodore Roosevelt, Johnson has a compulsion 
to be ‘the corpse at every funeral, the bride at every wedding.’” Stewart Alsop, “The One Weakness of 
L.B.J.,” Saturday Evening Post (September 19, 1964): 12. 
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the frontier imagery as a medium for communicating a message that drew on the past to 
explain the future and to create a future that was impervious to the regional 
characteristics that had previously facilitated such non-progressive characteristics as 
southern segregation, unequal access to education, economic despair and state control 
over the nation’s wilderness heritage.  The President cast himself, and was projected as, 
“a man of the land” who would lead all Americans to a “better and brighter” future by 
carrying on the tradition of his pioneering ancestors who had worked so hard to build up 
infrastructures that would make life better for their own children and future 
generations.  Johnson aimed to be the most successful progressive president of the 
twentieth century. The “restless optimism of the man,” as one admiring observer put it 
and Johnson’s own oft-repeated belief that “can do” Americans could rise to any 
challenge tapped into that same kind of optimism that Ray Allen Billington had 
identified in the 1950s as the outstanding feature of the Frontier Myth. Until mid-1965 
this approach appears to have worked in spades for LBJ, in part, as this dissertation 
contends, because events of this period reinforced or, at least, worked within the 
parameters of the myth. Johnson called for much more government intervention and 
projected frontier imagery forward in time to create what he hoped would be a nation 
free from the pioneer struggles of the past with its vexing poverty and discrimination. In 
terms of legislation no President before or since made a greater effort to be inclusive in 
supporting the poor and minorities, leveling the playing field of opportunity for all 
Americans, and preserving the nation’s park lands for future generations. Being “on the 
people’s side” in terms of domestic programs remained, in Johnson’s mind, a priority of 
his administration and he consciously summed up the domestic, liberal victories in 
Congress in frontier terms: proudly referring to them as his “showdowns for progress.” 
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His promotion of space exploration, meanwhile, was bolstered by the belief that outer 
space exploration would continue to stoke that “socio-cultural furnace” [the frontier] 
from which American democracy was forged. The Frontier Myth of the mid-twentieth 
century and early Johnson years with its Cowboy Code, Gunsmoke, and Magnificent 
Seven philosophy of liberal democracy, selflessness and community had become so 
deeply entrenched as a structure of American society that many of these ideas were 
accepted—even without specific explanation—by most Americans. But, just as it seemed 
destined to reach its zenith, the myth of the frontier as a thesis of liberalism and 
inclusion was about to begin toppling over a cliff.289  
An acceleration of events, including a major war on the other side of the world in 
Southeast Asia, and the eruption of violence and rapid social change at home, would 
throttle many Americans’ assumptions about Johnson and the Frontier Myth. As we 
shall explore in the next chapter, a series of explosive developments, occurring both 
inside and from outside the United States (and worsened still by a growing public 
distrust of the “Cowboy Colossus” Johnson himself), would combine to destroy the 
Frontier Myth consensus and turn the myth increasingly against LBJ’s Administration 
and many of its programs. In the process, these events would destroy or seriously 
undermine Johnson’s efforts to bring some of his progressive vision of the Frontier 
Myth forward into the latter decades of the twentieth century, and beyond. 
  
 
                                                          
289 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at a Reception in Fort Worth Honoring Representative James C. 
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VI. 
Myth in a Quagmire:  
Vietnam and LBJ’s ‘Second Presidency’  
 
Hell, Vietnam is just like the Alamo….Well, by God, I’m 
going to go—and I thank the Lord that I’ve got the men who 
want to go with me, from McNamara right on down to the 
littlest private who’s carrying a gun.  
 
   —President Johnson to the National Security Council, 
1965290 
 
 
In so many aspects of his Presidency, Lyndon Johnson would have done much 
better had he followed the old West African proverb often quoted by his hero Theodore 
Roosevelt: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” The Frontier image served him so well as 
he transferred from the Senate, through the Vice Presidency, and into the early years in 
the White House, began to turn sour on LBJ in his “second presidency.” From 1963 to 
1965 Johnson had taken on some of the nation’s largest domestic problems like a bronco 
buster but, along with initiating some remarkable and innovative achievements, from 
1966 onward his efforts would be overtaken by a series of tragic events. The Frontier 
Myth had shaped LBJ’s own expectations for himself as President, how he viewed 
America’s “mission” in the world; it had also shaped the media and public’s expectations 
of success for their President and of how he would achieve it. During his first term in 
office, the Frontier Myth had provided an adequate and powerful narrative for Lyndon 
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Johnson’s programs and policies both at home and abroad. But Johnson’s own strict 
adherence to the liberal frontier myth structure—one encompassing optimism in dealing 
with any problem or challenge, promoting American democracy and social change at 
home and abroad, and of inevitable progress—proved incapable of explaining and 
accommodating the tumultuous events of 1966-1969.  
As will be asserted over the next two chapters, the failed experience of Vietnam 
and plethora of national crises that swept over the nation from the late 1960s through 
the end of the 1970s would bring about a collapse of the liberal nationalist frontier myth. 
During this watershed period, Americans experienced failure to bring democracy to and 
produce a frontier-like victory in Southeast Asia; a wave of domestic race riots and 
assassinations; the growing “credibility gap” between the presidency and the public; a 
severe economic decline; the humiliations of the Iranian hostage crisis; and a perceived 
shellacking at the hands of an economically resurgent Japan.  These events taken 
together created a kind of avalanche of perceived national failures causing the entire 
frontier mythic structure to change course in the span of just over a decade. As a result, 
the myth’s structure would buckle under LBJ, recede during the 1970s, and ultimately 
hinge back outward in the 1980s, enabling the structure to be reformed and advance a 
radically different political agenda. Marshall Sahlins reminds us that all social structures 
(such as the frontier myth) have occasionally faced crises so disruptive that events could 
not be fully explained by the tenets embodied in the structures. Here is a profound case 
in point. Unable to deny the importance of the events of this watershed era, Americans’ 
powerful frontier vision would radically change its emphasis away from its ideology of 
liberal progressivism into a temporary hiatus during the presidencies of Richard Nixon, 
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Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, and finally be resurrected in 1980 as a key symbol of the 
conservative “Reagan Revolution.” 
 
 
“Johnson’s War” as a Political Earthquake 
The international event of the Vietnam War dominated Johnson’s second 
presidency and challenged the explanatory power of the Frontier Myth in ways that no 
other event had. The military engagement in this distant part of the world would prove 
his largest mistake and, arguably, the worst foreign policy disaster in American history. 
Much of Johnson’s own rationale for the war was based on Frontier Myth assumptions 
which, in the end, seriously hampered the Administration’s options and flexibility. The 
world was changing and Johnson, like American society in general, struggled to make 
sense of a rapidly changing world where people wondered if the old rules, the old 
assumptions, still applied. The structure strained under the challenges posed by the 
events of the later 1960s, each seeking to give new meaning to the other. LBJ believed 
that the Frontier Myth, provided it was applied in a forward looking fashion (as had 
been the case in domestic affairs) rather than a nostalgic and backward looking one, 
remained relevant both at home and abroad. But the inherent obligations that gave 
meaning to the frontier myth fed into what would become known as the tragedy of 
“Johnson’s War” in Southeast Asia and ultimately tore into the existing interpretations 
of the myth and caused his own ruination. The final year of Cowboy Johnson’s 
presidency, 1968, was nothing less than a “political earthquake” that would change the 
cultural landscape of the nation. The Frontier Myth would face a series of crises so 
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disruptive that it could no longer be invoked to explain the events taking place both at 
home and abroad.291 
 
Trouble at “Credibility Gap” 
Since his early days in Congress, LBJ’s actions indicated that he felt the need to 
persuade the press to become his supporters and even his partisans. As President, 
Johnson manipulated individual journalists, carving out a special relationship with 
those who reported what he wanted. But over time his relationship with journalists 
became increasingly strained. LBJ had entered the presidency just at the time when the 
media was beginning to put politicians under a more intense spotlight; Johnson 
frequently made things much more difficult for himself by breaking the cowboy code 
and noticeably distorting the truth. As the print media fought with television to retain its 
share of the market, reporters became more and more analytical and critical—going 
beyond merely reporting the day’s events. Regarding frontier freedoms (such as the 
freedom of information) as something for himself but not for the American nation as a 
whole, Johnson had hoped to have direct control over and be the dispenser of 
government information, just as many of his predecessors had done. But along the way, 
he sometimes misled reporters to gain favorable news stories or to avoid open 
explanations of his policies. In the new media milieu of the 1960s, this approach 
backfired.  
LBJ was so confident of America’s frontier mission in the world that he behaved as 
if the ends justified the means. This attitude hastened the collapse of the Frontier Myth 
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structure that had previously served him so well. A more aggressive and critical 
approach by the media required greater openness and honesty on the part of the 
President but by his second term in office Lyndon’s own penchant for “whoppers” was 
exposed, enhancing the increasingly apparent mismatch between his actions and related 
events in the world, and the relevance of the Frontier Myth to explain them. 
What became publicly known as President Johnson’s “credibility gap,” a term first 
used in 1965 by the New York Herald Tribune, contributed more and more to a decline 
in LBJ’s relations with the press and ultimately in the public’s trust in their president. 
Reporters discovered that the mythic Johnson was not as poor a youth as he had 
claimed, that he bent rules to amass his fortune, and that a number of his public 
statements—such as the alleged size of the 1964 budget and reports of successes and 
predictions for victory in Vietnam—seemed to reek of exaggeration or were simply false. 
Hugh Sidey cites another famous example:  
 
A former Johnson aide tells how LBJ as a Senator was pointing out a 
ramshackle cabin on his Texas ranch which he described in 
Lincolnesque detail as his birthplace. Johnson’s mother was along on 
the ride, and when her son finished she mildly admonished him, ‘Why 
Lyndon, you know you were born in a much better house closer to town 
which has been torn down.’ The listener reports that Johnson replied, ‘I 
know, Mama, but everybody has to have a birthplace.’292 
 
 
In 1965, Johnson committed the first US combat troops to Vietnam, almost 
200,000 soldiers, and this number rose steadily until troop levels reached more than 
half a million three years later. At the outset, number-crunching Defense Secretary 
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Robert McNamara was convinced that victory could be achieved by Christmas 1965. But 
as the Vietnam War dragged on through 1966 and 1967, without any end in sight, 
Johnson’s popularity declined and the rules of the presidential-media relationship 
markedly changed. Throughout the country, optimism was being replaced by cynicism 
about the quality of the nation’s leadership and about American society in general. 
Johnson’s mindset did not help the situation since he viewed reporters who no longer 
offered favorable comments about him or his administration’s policies as treasonous. 
He also suffered from the fact that more and more Americans were no longer judging 
him on his statements or his policies but on the lack of consistency between them. LBJ 
was slipping away from the narrative structures of the Frontier Myth. For, apparently, 
LBJ had never felt that his friend Gene Autry’s Third Cowboy Commandment, “A 
cowboy always tells the truth,” applied to him. Robert Caro tells us that dishonesty was 
not a new practice of LBJ’s and that even in his younger days Lyndon had been given the 
public nickname ‘Bull’. A former classmate of Johnson’s, Edward Peils, explains why: 
“’Because of his constant braggadocio. Because he was so full of bullshit, manure that 
people didn’t believe him. Because he was a man who could just not tell the truth.’”293 
Once the narrative structures of the Frontier Myth were confronted by the stark 
and harsh realities of the Vietnam War—which by 1965 had begun entering American 
living rooms on nightly newscasts—the public soon forgot about the achievements of the 
Great Society. The vague and abstract qualities of the frontier or Western myth still 
encompassed and described many of Johnson’s domestic initiatives but could not be 
used to justify the outright falsehoods and dissembling brought out by the failing of 
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Johnson’s policies in Vietnam. Simultaneously the credibility gap, LBJ’s presenting of 
half-truths to gain political advantage, caused his good ole’ cowpoke persona to wear 
dangerously thin. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Proverbs 26:17 - “He Who Meddles In a 
Quarrel Not His Own…” An early Vietnam War protest 
poster cleverly combines this Biblical passage with a 
controversial AP photo of the President—linking LBJ’s 
“crude and rude” Hill Country behaviors with his 
decision to send American combat troops to Southeast 
Asia, c1965. (Vic Dinnerstein, He Who Meddles in a Quarrel Not 
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His Own, Photograph: AP, c1965, offset poster. Reprinted with 
permission of the Collection of the Center for the Study of Political 
Graphics; 10725) 
 
 
The “Frontier Fight” of Vietnam as a Historical Event 
America’s Vietnam experience is typically spoken of as a policy quagmire that 
spanned more than a decade and ultimately tied LBJ to a tragic legacy that would 
overwhelm his outstanding legislative record. What has been missing from this 
interpretation is a recognition that the war was also an historical event that was so 
profoundly disruptive that it transformed the receptiveness of the American public to 
the long standing frontier mythology, and it was the disconnect of the myth from the 
popular consciousness that is the focus of this chapter.  
Johnson’s decision to drastically escalate the U.S. military’s commitment to South 
Vietnam in its fight with the Communist North was in large part a product of his 
adherence to the significance and “lessons” of the frontier experience. As Ronnie Dugger 
points out, Johnson was well aware that his own family had fought it out in the frontier 
environment of a Texan Hill Country rife with feuding and revenge. After a Viet Cong 
attack on U.S. soldiers at Pleiku in early 1965, LBJ insisted that his decision to initiate 
the bombing of North Vietnam was in “retaliation.” Before long, though, he announced 
that this bombing, dubbed “Operation Rolling Thunder,” would continue indefinitely. 
“Sending President Johnson a telegram to stop the bombing,” writes Dugger, “was 
asking a Hatfield to stop killing the McCoys.”  Johnson further fit the Vietnam War into 
the discourse of the frontier myth by characterizing the conflict as kind of struggle 
between cowboys and Indians, “good” and “evil.” The President pontificated that 
American troops should fight the Reds on the frontier to save the “decent” people and 
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civilize, in time, the Vietcong “savages.” It was a repeat or continuation of the long 
process of civilization versus savagery sequel, only this time the frontier fight was taking 
place in the jungles and rice paddies of Indochina. LBJ relished the danger and romance 
of the American frontier in the lives of his own ancestors. He and his daughter, Lynda 
Bird, were once photographed visiting the cellar where his grandmother, Eliza Bunton, 
hid with her baby during an Indian raid in the Texas Hill Country. Like many Americans 
at mid-twentieth century, he longed to recover the lost possibility of heroic achievement 
that the West seemed to have embodied.294 
As the war in Vietnam escalated in the “second phase” of his presidency, however 
LBJ came under increasing attacks from anti-war protesters, columnists and editorial 
cartoonists who no longer viewed the frontier mythologies as capable of explaining and 
guiding American society—and by extension saw LBJ as a reckless, hapless and bullying 
cowboy. Cartoonists who had once portrayed Johnson’s cowboy persona in terms of an 
optimistic, innovative and humorous liberal figure now increasingly drew the Frontier 
President as a crude, befuddled and ruthless chief executive pursuing a lost cause.295 
The Vietnam draft had proven unpopular from the start in part because the war was 
being fought far away from America’s own shores, was not well understood, and because 
there had never been a formal declaration of war. As opinion about the conflict itself 
became increasingly divided this hostility only grew. The President, meanwhile, used 
“frontier logic” to try to convince himself and the public that he could successfully 
conduct both the war in Vietnam overseas and the War on Poverty at home. Johnson 
later explained his position to Doris Kearns, “I was determined to be a leader of war and 
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a leader of peace. I wanted both, believed in both, and I believed America had the 
resources to provide for both. After all, our country was built by pioneers who had a rifle 
in one hand to kill their enemies and an ax in the other to build their home and provide 
for their families.” Ultimately, Johnson’s personal adherence to the Frontier Myth of 
“sky’s the limit” prosperity would play a tragic role in the fate of the nation and cause 
much of his own political undoing. 296 
 
 
 
                                                          
296 See “US Can Continue the ‘Great Society’ and Fight in Vietnam, Johnson Says,” Washington 
Post (January 13, 1966): A1; Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 283. 
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Figure 6.2 (Blaine MacDonald, Courtesy of the Hamilton Spectator, Canada) 297 
 
 
In the realm of international relations—which had never been Johnson’s strong 
suit—the president’s sly personal cynicism, conniving, and determination not to be 
victimized at the bargaining tables did not prevent him from buying into some 
prevailing American myths. To LBJ the self-reliant, independent cowboy of destiny, 
meeting challenges was what the nation was all about. There was a workable solution to 
every problem and Americans were an inherently “can do” peoples who possessed the 
“know how” to accomplish anything they willed: just as he had (LBJ, the kid from the 
hard scrabble, tough Texas outback, pointed out repeatedly how he had risen to the 
most powerful position in the “Free World”). All problems, Johnson devoutly believed, 
had solutions: America had conquered the Indians on the Frontier, beaten the 
Depression, beaten the Germans and their thuggish allies in two world wars, was 
pounding away at racial discrimination, had risen “above” European nations to become 
the world’s number one industrial giant, and was now meeting the challenge of the 
future to explore outer space. Americans were God’s chosen people: why else, in 
Johnson’s view, would they have become what he believed to be the richest, strongest 
and fiercest people history? America was exceptional just as the Western/Frontier story 
had claimed—the most wonderful place on earth (it was since LBJ had the evidence of 
himself and his ranch to prove it)—and as such, like the cowboy who saves the helpless, 
he had the obligation to export its greatness to the less fortunate.  
                                                          
297 Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Special Files: Cartoon Collections, Box 5, File 18—Vietnam (1 of 5 
files). Blaine MacDonald, Hamilton Spectator (Canada), date unknown. 
Many editorial cartoons, c1966-68, conveyed much the same message as Blaine MacDonald’s. In 
one of my favourites, LBJ is shown riding a Texas longhorn (“The Economy”)—tied to the beast’s right 
horn is a hefty “$” bag entitled “War in Vietnam” and to the left an equally stuffed sack of cash labeled 
“War on Poverty.” An anxious LBJ rides atop while the bull sweats profusely, its eyes cross, legs bow, and 
tongue hangs out from the terrible strain. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Special Files: Cartoon Collections, 
Box 3, File 13a—Economy (1 of 2 files). Burges Green, Providence Journal, December 30, 1966. 
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Using Hill Country talk, Johnson declared more than once that “If you let a bully 
come into your front yard, the next day he’ll be up on your porch, and the day after that 
he’ll rape your wife in your own bed.” Johnson’s bully analogies combined with his 
Indian raid stories and experiences in World War II and Korea all reinforced his belief 
that history had proven the folly of appearing weak in the face of an aggressor, and by 
extension demonstrated his belief in the interpretive power of the frontier myth with its 
simple definitions of right and wrong and the stark choices that guided frontier figures.  
LBJ scholars such as Thomas A. Bailey and Robert Dallek attest that this President 
believed in God, greatness, goodness and gunpowder. Hugh Sidey reports that on a top 
secret visit to Cam Ranh Bay on October 26, 1966, President Johnson faced his field 
commanders at the officers club and shouted over the noisy ceiling fans: “I thank you, I 
salute you, may the good Lord look over you and keep you until you come home with the 
coonskin on the wall.” If victory was what was needed to end the war then Johnson was 
telling them to go out there and win. After all, when a bully (North Vietnam) ragged you, 
LBJ explained to friends, you did not go off wining. Instead, like Daniel Boone, the 
Texas Rangers, TR, and countless other frontier western heroes, you gave him a good 
dose of his own medicine. 298 
Cultural and frontier historians point out that Lyndon Johnson’s background in the 
Hill Country instilled in him a foreign relations mentality that, beyond a certain point, a 
punch in the nose beats talk—and for Johnson this applied as much to foreign relations 
as it did to individual American personal relations. LBJ was born and raised in the heart 
                                                          
298 LBJ’s “bully” quotation in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 
1984): 321; “coonskin on the wall” quotation found in Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency, 150. President 
Johnson is first known to have employed the coonskin phrase much earlier, in a recorded telephone 
conversation about opposition to the Vietnam War with McGeorge Bundy in the spring of 1964. LBJ 
Library Telephone Conversation Collection, LBJ speaking with McGeorge Bundy, Tape# WH6405.10, 
Program No. 6 (May 27, 1964). 
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of the violent hill country region of central Texas and this characteristic of his 
homeland, along with its poverty, helped shape his presidential attitudes and values. 
According to Texas historian T.R. Fehrenbach, “Nowhere was frontier violence in 
America so bloody, or so protracted, as on the soil of Texas….The Mexican-Indian 
warfare, taken together, spawned an almost incredible amount of violence….Because of 
this history, the dominant Texas viewpoint was not that Texans settled Texas, but they 
conquered it.” Walter Prescott Webb writes, meanwhile, that the battle of the 
Pedernales—occurring right in the vicinity of Johnson City and the LBJ Ranch—“has 
good claims to being the first battle in which the six-shooter was used on mounted 
Indians.” In the spring of 1844, Webb adds, Texas Rangers riding out of San Antonio 
and into the Hill Country shot down more than 30 “marauding” Indians with Samuel 
Colt’s remarkable new weapon. Lyndon Johnson’s pride in his no-duty-to-retreat 
heritage was reflected in his relentless determination to defend what he believed to be 
American interests in South Vietnam. During the Congressional campaign in 1966 he 
told crowds in Des Moines that “the American people have never left any ally in a fight. 
And we do not intend to abandon South Vietnam now.” Johnson’s decision to bomb 
North Vietnam and commit large-scale, land forces to the region in 1965 was also 
justified in part through his personal infatuation with the gun fighting Texas Ranger, 
Captain LH McNelly, and related declaration to the American public that “courage is a 
man who keeps coming on.” “And that’s what we do in Vietnam,” he once told Clark 
Clifford, “just keep on a-coming.” The Communists did not respect anything but force; 
you had to let them know who had the biggest guns, the quickest draw, and the toughest 
heart. The tradition of the Texan frontier spirit and of the Alamo that respected physical 
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combat when challenged was a cultural environment which, if he is to be taken at his 
own word, strongly influenced his attitude toward the war in Vietnam.299 
 
The Alamo, The Green Berets and America’s Great Frontiering Mission 
Just how much impact another more widely known event in Texas’ history—the 
Battle of the Alamo and its related “Alamo syndrome”—had on Johnson’s foreign policy 
decisions is difficult to gauge, but it is there. For LBJ, Texas history’s most sacred battle 
dating back 130 years, represented the ultimate expression of human courage and 
sacrifice. Only 100 miles from Johnson City, those heroic frontier figures Davy Crockett, 
Jim Bowie, Colonel William Travis, and James Bonham died, according to the American 
Frontier Myth, in the name of independence and freedom.  
According to Randy Roberts and James S Olson, LBJ believed that the Alamo 
epitomized the American frontier experience and this shaped both his outlook and 
policy decisions—especially as they related to the Cold War and Vietnam: “The Alamo 
was ingrained into Johnson’s intellectual makeup, central to the way he made sense of 
world events.” For LBJ and millions of other Americans, the defenders of the Alamo 
were real life super-heroes who made the patriot’s ultimate sacrifice, carrying freedom’s 
fight to the backward Mexicans in the cause of Texas independence and, ultimately, 
American expansion.300   
                                                          
299 T.R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans (New York: American Legacy 
Press, 1983): 447; Webb quoted in Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency, 22; LBJ quoted in John D. 
Pomfret, “The Johnson Formula: President Seeking to Neutralize G.O.P. On 2 Major Issues in Coming 
Campaign” (July 4, 1966) clipping found in LBJ Library, Democratic National Committee Files, Series 1, 
Box 151; LBJ quoted in Clyde Milner, Carol A. O’Connor, Martha Sandweiss, eds., The Oxford History of 
the American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 422; also see Dugger, The Politician, 41-
42. 
300 Randy Roberts and James S. Olson, A Line in the Sand: The Alamo in Blood and Memory (New 
York: The Free Press, 2001): 279. 
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Lyndon Johnson wanted so much to have a blood connection to those dead heroes 
that in 1966 while on a tour of Vietnam, he created one by boldly claiming that “my 
great-great grandfather died at the Alamo.” Investigative journalists soon discovered, 
however, that the President’s great-great grandfather was actually a real estate trader 
who died at home in bed—forcing Johnson to retract his statement. 301 Johnson 
similarly insisted he personally had been fired upon by “a Japanese ace” during World 
War II; but, as with the claims about his great-great grandfather, no evidence could be 
found to support the claim.302 It could be assumed, and often has been, that Johnson 
was lying about the Alamo connection and the Japanese ace to promote his own status. 
But it is also likely that by this time Johnson’s connection to the Frontier mythology had 
convinced him that these stories and connections were actually true: that the power of 
the narrative’s structure of the Frontier Myth had transformed the actual events of 
history in Johnson’s own mind so that he re-imagined himself and his family as central 
players in the Frontier fight and stories of heroic Americanism. Here was a vivid case in 
point of how the structure had completely transformed LBJ’s own understanding of the 
events of history. By contrast the event of the Vietnam War would, for the nation, play a 
significant role in transforming the structure of the Frontier Myth by starkly revealing 
its shortcomings as a lens through which all American history, past, present, and future, 
could be understood and explained. 
According to biographers, as a boy Lyndon missed few cowboy classics at Johnson 
City’s “Opera House” because its owner paid him off in tickets for passing out handbills 
                                                          
301 Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1966, “Remarks to American and Korean 
Servicemen at Camp Stanley, Korea,” November 1, 1966: 1287. LBJ did have a great-uncle, John Wheeler 
Bunton, who fought (but did not die) in the Battle of San Jacinto—a story his mother related to him many 
times; Roberts and Olson, A Line in the Sand, 279-280. 
302 A discussion of LBJ’s dramatic stories of his encounter with Japanese zeros appears in: Paul K. 
Conkin, Big Daddy from the Pedernales (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986): 108. 
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of coming attractions. But Lyndon and his friends’ greatest obsession was acting out the 
early history of the Lone Star State, especially those revolving around the Alamo. Back 
in 1905 his father, Sam Johnson, had co-sponsored a bill to purchase the Alamo Mission 
for $6,500 to prevent it from being torn down and replaced by a hotel. “He took me as a 
little boy down there,” Johnson recalled with pride, “and showed it to me many times.” 
According to childhood friends, little Lyndon poured over the details of the attack to the 
point that the Alamo recreations became a kind of religious experience for him. No boy 
felt prouder than Lyndon Baines Johnson as he pretended to be Colonel William Barrett 
Travis drawing his line in the earth, or heroic defenders Jim Bowie or Davy Crockett, 
leading the legendary group of 187. Tears flowed down Lyndon’s cheeks when he would 
read Colonel Travis’ letter to his government which included the line, “Take care of my 
son.” No boy who cared could ever forget March 1836 and the glory of the brave men 
who died at the Alamo in the name of Texas’ independence. 303 
Johnson proclaimed repeatedly throughout his life that the men at the Alamo had 
died like “real men” and that to show weakness was unmanly. And just as countless 
Western frontier and cowboy heroes of LBJ’s upbringing had asserted, and TR had 
earlier expounded in his lecture on “The Strenuous Life” and its virtues, nations like 
men could not afford to be unmanly. In the nuclear age—as if pioneering Americans 
were still menaced by Native Americans while attempting to fetch water on the 
frontier—Johnson liked to say, “He’s a good man to go to the well with.”304  Men had to 
be strong, like the Alamo’s 187, his father who had stood up to the Ku Klux Klan in the 
1920s, TR with his big stick, and FDR pushing the country forward to defeat Hitler and 
                                                          
303 LBJ quoted in Dugger, The Politician, 31; Steinberg, Sam Johnson’s Boy, 20.  
304 LBJ quoted in Dugger, The Politician, 144. 
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Tojo. In the President’s mind, all American men fighting in Vietnam should be just as 
ready to give up their lives in the defense of liberty. 
Perhaps of all the characteristics of the mythic Frontier hero, the one that Johnson 
wanted most applied to himself was that of manly toughness and virtue. As a Senator he 
must have been pleased by a Look magazine article from 1959, which makes much of 
Lyndon Johnson’s “masculine appeal to the female voter.” Part of LBJ’s effort to build 
up his own “tough guy,” frontier-type image involved cutting down others for their 
comparative lack of virile manliness. LBJ’s self-promoted machismo, at others expense, 
included: post-assassination mocking of “yellow, sickly, sickly…weak and pallid… not a 
man’s man” Jack Kennedy and his family’s vacationland on that “female island,” 
Martha’s Vineyard; belittling Hubert Humphrey for not being “a real man” because “he 
cried as easily as a woman”; spending lengthy periods at gatherings of those he 
considered “real men” while belittling his favourite target of all, Adlai Stevenson, for his 
sophisticated accent (“tomawto”) and other characteristics he deemed effeminate; and 
dismissing Lady Bird’s doubts about the war because “of course…it was like a woman to 
be uncertain.” “Being a woman” his wife may have had an “excuse” for weakness but to 
say “not a man’s man” were the most damning words in LBJ’s lexicon.305 
The degree to which Johnson had linked his own manhood directly to the Vietnam 
War—America’s modern frontier conflict—was made crudely evident after a 1967 
cabinet meeting. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall stayed behind for less formal 
discussions and before long his boss had launched into a tirade about “his war” in Asia. 
                                                          
305 Bill Davidson, “Lyndon Johnson: Can a Southerner Be Elected President?” Look, Vol. 23 (August 
18, 1959): 64. 
Johnson’s gender-mockery is described in Robert Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson. Volume 4: 
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According to Udall, Johnson shouted at him and the few others present, “Who the hell 
was Ho Chi Minh, anyway, that he thought he could push America around? Then the 
President did an astonishing thing: he unzipped his trousers, dangled a given 
appendage, and asked his shocked associates: ‘Has Ho Chi Minh got anything like 
that?’” Johnson’s self-image of himself was as the lead in America’s twentieth century 
frontier experience. Manly, tough, self-reliant, the cowboy president would lead the 
cavalry’s assault on a weaker, inferior society, defeat the enemy and bring liberation, 
prosperity and democracy to a previously backward region.306 
Early on in the LBJ Presidency, some editorial cartoonists apparently bought into 
Johnson’s comparisons of his own frontier manhood to that of diminutive and petulant 
Asian “Reds”—though in less graphic terms than those used by the President on Udall, 
et al. Gib Crockett’s cartoon in The Washington Star just one week after the 
assassination of JFK shows a tall, cool LBJ in full cowboy regalia with a six-shooter in 
his holster, bent over and looking down—with a paternal, even slightly amused 
expression—on a diminutive version of Mao Tse-tung (Figure 6.3). In contrast to the 
hulking new US President, mini-Mao is behaving like a kid-bully with his fists lifted in a 
“put’em up” position as he jumps hysterically up and down in a tantrum.  
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248 
 
 
Figure 6.3: More-than-a-cowboy LBJ towers over a diminutive Chairman Mao. 
(Gib Crockett, Washington Star, November 29, 1963. Reproduced under the Fair Dealing 
[educational purposes] provision of the Canadian Copyright Act) 307  
  
As indicated, Johnson thought throughout his lifetime in terms of American 
exceptionalism: he believed in American opportunity, responsibility, good intentions, 
superiority, infallibility and destiny. As a child he had learned a poem which he often 
quoted as an adult, proclaiming that “the most beautiful sight his eyes had beheld was 
‘the flag of my country in a foreign land.’” At home Johnson showed great compassion 
                                                          
307 Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Special Files: Cartoon Collection, Box 7, File 24, Foreign Issues: 
India, Kashmir, Pakistan, China, Russia, [Middle East] Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia. Gib Crockett, 
Washington Star, November 29, 1963. 
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for the poor and minorities but in politics and international relations he subscribed 
wholly to the survival of the fittest and the notion that the big fish ate the little fish. 
When it served his goals, LBJ also insisted on “evening the odds” to create a fair fight. 
Among the most complex of presidents ever to occupy the White House, LBJ could be 
both pacifist and aggressive, peaceful and warlike, gentle and tough, a tolerant 
champion of Civil Rights but, at times, still paternalistic. Up against what he viewed as a 
global, Communist monolith, LBJ would lead the pioneering forces westward that would 
bring light into the darkness, reportedly telling his staff that: “We’re going to liberate 
those poor little boogers [the South Vietnamese], and I’ll be known as the great 
emancipator.”308  
Whether Johnson ever actually read Frederick Jackson Turner or Theodore 
Roosevelt’s writings that shaped and gave coherence to the Frontier Myth is not clear 
but what is certain is that the frontier myth permeated and informed all aspects of 
Johnson’s thinking and actions.309 In 1966, Johnson declared as a matter of fact that “So 
many of our pioneer ancestors often ventured into the wilderness with only three 
possessions—their rifle, their axe, and their Bible.” Turner had mentioned the rifle and 
axe in 1910, specifically, as those tools of the greatest necessity to the pioneer. “They 
                                                          
308 King, “Machismo in the White House,” 8-13, 98-101; see also Louis H. Lapham, “Who Is Lyndon 
Johnson?” Saturday Evening Post (September 11, 1965): 70; Johnson’s “poor little boogers” quotation in 
Ronald Kessler, Inside the White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). 
309 LBJ did quote directly from Turner’s thesis in his speech proposing the Residency Voting Act of 
1967. The President stated that: “Seventy years ago, the great American historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner wrote these words: ‘Behind institutions, behind constitutional reforms and modifications, lie the 
vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meeting changing conditions. The peculiarity 
of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of 
an expanding people….’ This,” Johnson asserted, “represents a valid exposition of the vitality of our 
democratic process as it has endured for almost two hundred years.” 
Lyndon B. Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress on Election Reform: The Political Process in 
America,” May 25, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
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meant,” wrote Turner, “a training in aggressive courage, in domination, in directness of 
action, in destructiveness…But even this backwoodsman was more than a mere 
destroyer. He had visions. He was a finder as well as a fighter—the trail maker for 
civilization, the inventor of new ways” for “quite as deeply fixed in the pioneer’s mind as 
the ideal of individualism was the idea of democracy.” Similarly, Lyndon Johnson’s 
fundamental foreign policy was the promise and purpose of a worldwide war on poverty 
in the name of the values of individualism and democracy, along with the use of massive 
firepower to attain the immediate thing, stopping the Vietcong in Vietnam without 
waiting for the United Nations. Johnson once explained: 
 
We have two phases of the war out there. I am going to let you in on a 
secret. You have heard just about the military phase; this other has been 
kept under wraps. We do not know much about it, because Captain 
Carpenter giving an order to come in to bomb his position is much more 
dramatic than some fellow that is washing up the kids, and treating 
their wounds, and teaching them to read and write—a Marine who has 
fought all day, that is working all night to help in these things.  
 
But we are doing a great job there on health…and on conservation, and 
on beautification, and on housing, and on slums in this country [and it] 
is contagious. And it is moving to other countries. It is setting an 
example for other countries.310 
 
 
Johnson’s remarks were consistent with those he had made back in 1965 and captured 
by Fred O. Siebel of The Richmond Times-Dispatch in his “Stretching It Around the 
                                                          
310 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at a Ceremony Marking 1966 as ‘The Year of the Bible,’” (January 
19, 1966), UCSB American Presidency Project ,  
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World” editorial cartoon. Here an animated-LBJ appears in his Stetson, boots and spurs 
proclaiming: “We mean to show that this nation’s dream of a Great Society does not stop 
at the water’s edge. It is not just an American Dream.” As he speaks, Johnson is busy 
wrapping a “The Great Society” ribbon around the globe which lists its features: “War on 
Ignorance, War on Poverty, War on Disease, War on Crime, Etc-Etc-Etc.” In a news 
release by the Democratic National Committee in 1966, LBJ was also quoted as saying, 
“The overriding rule which I want to affirm is that our foreign policy must always be an 
extension of our domestic policy.” This, for Johnson, was America’s great mission and 
gift to the world. LBJ, then, envisioned a continuation of the pioneer’s quest of bringing 
a superior American way of life to foreign frontiers as he now eyed American interests 
throughout the world. But his testing ground, across the Pacific in Southeast Asia, would 
prove ill-suited and highly problematic region to fulfill this alleged “destiny.”311   
Perhaps the most fatal error of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency was his projection 
of the Western image/structure onto the rest of the world. For LBJ, the Frontier Myth 
experience that had made “the greatest country of Earth” could serve as a narrative for 
the rest of the world as well. But what he regarded as creating opportunities for the 
Frontier Myth to take root overseas was interpreted by people in other parts of the globe 
others as an attempt to push American-style democracy, values and aspirations on 
peoples with vastly different outlooks. It was a recipe for disaster and failure. Blinded by 
the Frontier Myth, LBJ could not comprehend alternative possibilities or traditions to 
those that he had whole heartedly committed to defending and promoting himself since 
childhood. In keeping with this myopic view, President Johnson’s first attempted 
                                                          
311 Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Special Files: Cartoon Collection, Box 3, File 12b—Great Society. 
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solution for resolving the war in Vietnam involved the extension of “American” values 
through the offer of a massive economic project to develop the Mekong Valley (“Old Ho 
can’t turn me down, old Ho can’t turn me down,” he kept repeating to aids after making 
the offer). LBJ had read Barbara Ward’s book Rich Nations, Poor Nations over and over 
again and was convinced, through his own simplistic interpretation, that the United 
States could raise the standard of living in any country if the Communists could be 
defeated or at least subdued. What LBJ failed to comprehend was that foreign leaders 
were unwilling to bargain with him the same way that politicians, labour leaders and 
businessmen did back home: that Uncle Ho was not George Meany.  
As the editor of the Waukesha [Wisconsin] Freemen later observed, LBJ 
“wanted the world to work by his clock and when it didn’t he once remarked, the trouble 
with foreigners is ‘they’re not like folks you were reared with.’” Johnson could not accept 
or adjust to the reality that foreign relations had to be handled differently than domestic 
affairs. Insisting that Hanoi would not negotiate, Johnson declared that “freedom’s 
frontiers” were “under attack” and that “I have searched high and wide and I am a 
reasonably good cowboy and I can’t even rope anybody and bring him in that is willing 
to talk reason….” Initially public opinion polls and the popular press supported 
Johnson’s view and his decisions as “prudent.” But by 1967-1968, when it became clear 
that attempts to plug the American system in overseas were not working, confidence in 
this approach and in the President collapsed. Johnson had become a victim in an event 
versus structure dichotomy where the former, Vietnam, was sucking the life from the 
latter: LBJ’s cherished pole star, the Frontier Myth.312 
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Policy analysts might have counseled Johnson to adjust his policies to suit the 
international context.  But Hollywood provided other answers.  Between 1965 and 1967 
LBJ’s Administration corresponded regularly with American movie legend John Wayne.  
The “Duke” wanted to make a movie that would celebrate and justify American military 
intervention in South East Asia – a western set in modern times on the eastern 
continent.  What the Duke wanted in return was government aid in making the film. 
LBJ was ripe for the opportunity.  
LBJ may have been a Democrat, but he was a Stetson-wearing one, and that made 
him a straight shooter in the Duke’s staunch Republican eyes.  Johnson needed help 
communicating the frontier myth (both abroad and increasingly at home).  What John 
Wayne needed was help to finance and film The Green Berets. Wayne wrote to the 
President and told him of his intention to create a feature film to shore up support for 
the Vietnam War both at home and abroad. “Perhaps you remember the scene from the 
film ‘The Alamo’,” Wayne wrote to LBJ, “when one of Davy Crockett’s Tennesseans said: 
‘What are we doing here in Texas fighting—it ain’t our ox that’s getting gored.’ Crockett 
[played by Wayne himself in the film] replied: ‘Talkin’ about whose ox gets gored figure 
this: a fella gets in the habit of gorin’ oxes, it whets his appetite, may gore yours next.’ 
Unquote. And we don’t want people like Kosygin, Mao-Tse-Tung, or the like, ‘Gorin’ our 
oxes.’”313  
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In response, White House aide Bill Moyers informed Wayne that the President 
remembered the film and “does indeed…understand that ox-goring has a way of 
whetting an aggressor’s appetite.” John Wayne wrote back the following month that 
“We want to show the professional soldier carrying out his duty of death; but, also, his 
extra-curricular duties—diplomats in dungarees—helping small communities, giving 
them medical attention, toys for their children, and little things like soap, which can 
become all important.” One promoter of The Green Berets insisted that it “isn’t so much 
about winning the war against the Vietcong as it is about winning the hearts and minds 
of the American public.” After reviewing the script which, along with plenty of killing, 
featured humanitarian Special Forces’ caring for a war orphan nicknamed “Ham 
Chunk,” Moyers responded that he found the project “most exciting.” By 1966, Wayne 
and his son Michael, the film’s producer, had obtained the full military cooperation and 
material from the White House that they had requested.314 
The Green Berets is Hollywood’s only film about the war in Vietnam shot and 
released during the conflict. In terms of allegory, it may also be the last of the 
straightforward, traditional frontier Westerns. Michael Wayne told Variety magazine: 
“We’re not making a political picture; we’re making a picture about a bunch of right 
guys…Cowboys and Indians….Americans are the good guys and the Viet Cong are the 
bad guys….Maybe we shouldn’t have destroyed all those Indians, but when you are 
                                                          
314 Outgoing correspondence from Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, to John Wayne 
(January 18, 1966) in Ibid; Wayne to Moyers (February 18, 1966) in Ibid; Moyers to Wayne (February 24, 
1966) in Ibid. The “hearts and minds” quote appears in Ronald H. Carpenter, “America’s Tragic 
Metaphor: Our Twentieth Century Combatants as Frontiersmen,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 76 
(1990): 12. 
White House Special Assistant Jack Valenti’s initial reaction to Wayne’s movie proposal was 
revealing. In a Memo to LBJ, he wrote: “Wayne’s politics are wrong, but insofar as Vietnam is concerned, 
his views are right. If he made the picture he would be saying the things we want said.” Later that year, 
Valenti resigned his White House post to become president of the Motion Picture Association of America. 
Memorandum from Jack Valenti to President Johnson (January 6, 1966) in LBJ Library, Reference Files, 
John Wayne file. 
 
 
255 
 
making a picture, the Indians are the bad guys.” The structure of the frontier myth had 
thus subsumed the event itself. This Green Berets’ guise for the Old West is also evident 
in: the air cavalry’s arrival just in time to save a Special Forces base where the palisade 
and tower resemble a frontier fort and its gate proclaims “Dodge City”; and the starring 
role of John Wayne himself, as Colonel Mike Kirby, the archetypal screen Westerner 
who seems right at home in in Special Forces jungle fatigues. In the closing scene 
Colonel Kirby explains to double-orphaned Ham Chunk that he will take care of the 
youngster—while in the background the sun sets symbolically, if inexplicably, in the 
West behind the China Sea which lies east of Vietnam.315  
Wayne fought the war in make-believe in a film that offered a memory of American 
greatness and a promise of things to come that many of his fans still wanted to live by. 
By the time of its delayed release in 1968, however, a growing number of critics now saw 
the cost of the war as outweighing its benefits and berated the Duke’s version of the 
Vietnam conflict as simplistic, naïve and absurd. Chicago Sun-Times movie critic Roger 
Ebert gave the film zero stars and chided the film for its “cowboys and Indians” 
approach, endless clichés, and for being “a heavy-handed, remarkably old fashioned 
film.” One New York Times reviewer held nothing back, calling the flic “‘so stupid, so 
rotten and false in every detail….It is vile and insane’.” Despite the terrible reviews, The 
Green Berets managed to pull in enough John Wayne fans, and presumably Vietnam 
War supporters, to make a tidy profit at the box office. But the emotional and mixed 
responses to the film were indicative of a powerful American myth under siege by events 
that, in the eyes of a growing number of observers, it could no longer explain or 
                                                          
315 Michael Wayne quoted in Ronald H. Carpenter, “America’s Tragic Metaphor,” 12. 
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justify.316 As will be explained in the next chapter, The Green Berets “patriotic” pro-war 
stance ran against the grain of late 1960s cinema, an era of revisionist anti-Westerns 
that were aimed, in particular, at calling out the faltering American experience in 
Vietnam as a mistake or worse. 
Despite mounting sentiment against the war in Hollywood and elsewhere, Lyndon 
Johnson stayed the course—driving home the same kinds of messages as those delivered 
by Colonel Kirby. The virtues of the American civilizer—offset by the “savagery” of the 
Vietcong in The Green Berets with their marauding murderers, rapists and torturers—
also appeared in LBJ’s own speeches about the Vietnam conflict. Speaking at Johns 
Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, Johnson enthusiastically praised the heroic efforts 
of Americans in Southeast Asia but then his words took on an ominous tone. Vietnam, 
LBJ asserted, “is a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of 
assassination and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because 
their men are loyal to their government. And helpless villages are ravaged by sneak 
attacks.”  Here, the President told his audience, was civilization and savagery going head 
to head, not in nineteenth century Texas or Arizona, but today on the frontiers of 
Southeast Asia.317 Like the brave pioneers and farmer settlers said to have faced 
marauding Indians and outlaws in the frontier West, the “Ham Chunks” of the world 
now needed help from the U.S. Cavalry. 
                                                          
316 Roger Ebert’s “Review of The Green Berets” (June 26, 1968) appears online at RogerEbert.com 
(accessed 24 April 2012); Reneta Adler’s “Review of The Green Berets, dir. By John Wayne,” New York 
Times (June 20, 1968): 49:1 is quoted in Mark Cronlund Anderson, Cowboy Imperialism and Hollywood 
Film (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007): 92. 
317 Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest."," April 7, 
1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877 (accessed March 2, 2012). 
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The Green Berets and LBJ’s frontier fight descriptions are prime examples of the 
structure of a myth that was being projected onto an event, the War in Vietnam, in a 
manner which created an alternate version of the event than that which was sometimes 
portrayed on the television evening news. With the escalation of the war in 1965 and the 
increasing buildup of network journalists assigned to cover Vietnam, it became more 
difficult for ABC, CBS and NBC TV network reports to resist controversial news. As J. 
Fred MacDonald outlines in Television and the Red Menace: The Video Road to 
Vietnam, the Johnson White House and Pentagon worked aggressively to manage 
reporters…but with dwindling success. The most renowned early instance of controversy 
was triggered on August 5, 1965, with Morley Safer’s report for the CBS Evening News 
that showed US Marines torching thatched huts at the village of Cam Ne with cigarette 
lighters. The image of old South Vietnamese running away while their American 
protectors destroyed their homes and meager possessions made for wrenching TV 
viewing. Safer’s accompanying audio description only intensified the video impact. 
“Today’s operation is the frustration of Vietnam in miniature,” Safer observed. “To a 
Vietnamese peasant whose home means a lifetime of back-breaking labor, it will take 
more than presidential promises to convince him that we are on his side.” Morley Safer’s 
story revealed that the “white hat” American soldiers were behaving in ways which 
dramatically departed from the cowboy code: committing atrocities as bad as any “black 
hat” Communist atrocity. This sense of contradiction would only intensify with the 
passing of time and the mounting of reports describing the wanton killing of hundreds 
of Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers: most notoriously at My Lai in 1968. For 
America’s frontier myth the great irony here lies in the fact that what was being reported 
is strikingly similar to what Frederick Jackson Turner had described in his frontier 
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thesis. For Turner and his contemporaries, the frontier had been a place where 
Americans on the edge of civilization and savagery had descended into the latter to 
overcome it and create a better society for the nation in the process. In Vietnam, 
however, the killing and atrocities on both sides only seemed to ramp up while, 
simultaneously, the false statements and corruption coming from the governments in 
Washington and Saigon intensified. After several years of fighting and escalations, the 
American commitment to the conflict in terms of lives, resources and time frame came 
to be perceived by a growing segment of the public as limitless.318 
By 1967 LBJ was perplexed over the failure of the myth to deliver but remained 
determined to hold out for what he perceived as its promise of victory in the end. 
Journalist Hugh Sidey later recalled a distraught LBJ explaining that as the Vietnam 
situation deteriorated he could not simply cut and run in Southeast Asia, “insisting that 
he had gone into South Vietnam because, as at the Alamo, somebody had to get behind 
the log of those threatened people.” But while LBJ recalled the grim courage of the 
Texas patriots fighting the “double-dealing” Mexicans, he did not appear directly 
cognizant of the downside of this analogy: that the defenders of the Alamo were 
annihilated. Sidey himself thought the “lesson” of the Alamo “served us ill,” explaining 
to one interviewer in 1992 that on many evenings at the White House, he and others on 
the press corps would be talking to the President about Vietnam and that “after he had 
discussed all the theories and rejected all the criticism—it would boil down to Johnson 
saying, ‘Boys, this is just like the Alamo! I grew up forty miles from it. I always felt 
somebody should have helped those men in the Alamo! I’m going to Vietnam! I’m going 
                                                          
318 J. Fred MacDonald, Television and the Red Menace: The Video Road to Vietnam (New York: 
Praeger, 1985): 235-236. 
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to help those people in Vietnam. I’m not going to be the first president to lose a war!” 
The American myth of invincibility, another feature of the Frontier Myth, was clearly at 
work here in LBJ’s mind. Johnson was unwilling to pull the United States out of the 
Vietnam War without a face-saving victory. No President during the Cold War wanted to 
be the one who dishonored the nation’s supposed record of having gloriously won all its 
wars. In reality, these Presidents, from Johnson through Gerald Ford, should have 
either known their history better or been more honest about their nation’s past. The 
War of 1812 was not an outright victory but at best a draw for the United States, as was 
the Korean Conflict—though the latter was officially the responsibility of the United 
Nations. To Sidey, LBJ’s position was “hopeless” on the matter since he felt that he just 
could not violate that sense of history or sense of legacy that he had taken with him from 
Texas to the White House. 319  
Both in the United States and abroad LBJ’s adherence to the Frontier Myth in 
shaping the substance of his policies, and efforts to shape his own frontier cowboy 
image, were near absolute. Further, the myth was not only present in Johnson’s own 
thinking and actions, it had become so deeply embedded in and fundamentally 
supportive of the structures of American society and its sense of self-identity that the 
president and (at least initially) most of his contemporaries were prevented from seeing 
Vietnam for what it actually was. The War in Indochina was a profound historical event, 
deeply impacting on that region and the world and on its number one foreign 
protagonist, the United States. It was an ordeal that affected almost every American 
family and shaped the contours of American society and politics from the mid-1960s 
                                                          
319 Hugh Sidey, “A Question of Belief in Hanoi—and At Home,” Life (October 10, 1969): 4; Hugh 
Sidey’s “History and Presidents” presentation at the Miller Center, University of Virginia, June 30, 1992, 
reprinted in Miller Center Imprimatur, Vol. III, No. 1 (August 1992): 2. 
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onward. But the war could not be explained or interpreted within the existing context of 
the Frontier Myth paradigm: its failure to achieve a victory or to bring about the kinds of 
transformations that the myth had promised made the Vietnam event too much for the 
structure to subsume. As such, “The Nam” challenged and shook the foundation of the 
Frontier Myth to its core. 
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VII. 
From the Failed Event of Vietnam to the Trials of Jimmy Carter: 
The Frontier Myth in Recession 
 
 
The traditional Western at its peak celebrated mainstream 
American values and ideology—the American Dream. In 
the 1960s darkness struck national innocence—the 
cultural, political and sexual revolutions, Vietnam, 
Watergate, assassinations, etc. Westerns continued to be 
made, but they were revisionist and began to speak less to 
the mainstream audience. The positivist, transcendental, 
triumphalist tone was lost. 
    --Film scholar Jim Kitses, 2010 
 
 
There was a governmental secrecy, to exclude the American 
people, to mislead them with false statements and 
sometimes outright lies….I don’t think I would ever take on 
the same frame of mind that Nixon or Johnson did—lying, 
cheating, distorting the truth. 
   —Democratic Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter in 
Playboy magazine interview, 1976320 
 
 
 
Trouble came for LBJ when the bad guys, the Vietcong, refused to be defeated in 
the face of cowboy resolve and when black and white, good and bad were complicated by 
the controversial nightly news reports of the America’s first television war, the rallies of 
the peace movement and the messages of the counter-culture—when the myth could not 
accommodate the event of the Vietnam War. By the final year of Johnson’s 
Administration, American society itself had divided up between those who supported 
                                                          
320 Kitses quotation from Gamepro appears in Andrew Patrick Nelson, Still in the Saddle: The 
Hollywood Western, 1969-1980 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015): 15; Robert Scheer, 
“Playboy Interview: Jimmy Carter—A Candid Conversation with the Democratic Candidate for President,” 
Playboy, Vol. 23, No. 11 (November 1976): 70, 86. 
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the land war in Asia and those who backed protestors shouting such slogans as, “Hell 
no, we won’t go!” and “Hey, hey LBJ…how many kids did you kill today?!!” outside the 
gates of the White House. Vietnam was taking tens of thousands of American lives, 
costing the American taxpayer $30 billion a year and, since 1965, causing the 
Administration to expend all of its energy, eloquence, prestige and Johnson’s patent 
“persuasiveness” on the war. Worse still, the Newark and Detroit race riots of 1967 were 
being brought under control by members of the same U.S. Marine and Army divisions 
that had also turned their weapons against the very cities that they had been defending 
in South Vietnam, creating what Richard Slotkin has identified as a bizarre inversion of 
policies. This inversion was captured in the phrase allegedly used by an American officer 
to explain why the South Vietnamese town of Ben Tre needed to be evacuated so that 
sections could be leveled by the US Army: “It became necessary to destroy the town to 
save it.” Vietnam was not the American Southwest or the Plains. The belief that 
America’s frontier myth traditions and victories could be plugged into Southeast Asia 
came to be viewed by millions of Americans as flawed policy: the events there and its 
spinoffs on the home front could no longer be explained by the Frontier Myth. A 
perplexed Lyndon Johnson felt the heat, confiding privately to Lady Bird: “I can’t get 
out. I can’t finish it with what I’ve got so what the hell can I do?”321  
By 1968, events abroad were wreaking havoc with LBJ’s frontier myth inspired 
domestic programs as well. Critics pointed out that due to the enormous costs of 
                                                          
321 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 535; this famous quotation from an unidentified US 
military officer was published by AP journalist Peter Barnett and appeared in the article: “Major Describes 
Move,” New York Times (February 8, 1968): A14. The NYT article also stated that: “He was talking about 
the decision by Allied commanders to bomb and shell the town regardless of civilian casualties, to rout the 
Vietcong.” The original quote was distorted in later publications into the better known phrase: “We had to 
destroy the village in order to save it”; LBJ quoted in Chester, “Lyndon Baines Johnson, an American 
‘King Lear’,” 325. 
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Vietnam, the War on Poverty was being put on a back burner just at the time when 
enormous expectations had been aroused. What shocked Johnson and supporters of his 
programs most was that Great Society initiatives—along with the Civil Rights Act and 
Voting Rights Act—had not even appeared to improve the levels of hope and good will in 
the inner cities. Instead many TV viewers were left with the impression that the Great 
Society was actually stoking the most violent and widespread riots of the twentieth 
century. Eventually the term itself had to be dropped by an Administration already 
known for tending toward verbal overkill. 
Tragically, unlike the Great Society phrase, the term “frontier” was never dropped 
from LBJ’s list of favourite expressions. Though frustrated by the mounting crises and 
failures, Johnson stubbornly refused to see the limitations of the structures of the myth 
as a lens for understanding complicated foreign affairs and the events of the Vietnam 
War. Rather, in matters of foreign policy, Johnson frequently invoked the term 
“frontiers of freedom” to describe Americans facing down Communists, whether it be in 
Southeast Asia or Europe. LBJ’s press secretary from 1964-1966, George Reedy, was the 
one (and perhaps only) member of Johnson’s staff who did not care for the frequent 
application of the term “frontier” to the Administration’s policies and blamed its 
frequent use as one of the sources of long term trouble for his boss. “I didn’t like the 
term frontier,” he explained years later. The term “bothered me because I knew that this 
was going to get into the international realm….You know, in Europe frontier is a very, 
very unwholesome term, because that’s the way war starts, somebody crosses a frontier. 
The difficulty with it, it’s a word that gets a very warm reception in the United States 
because we think of it as settling the unknown and taming the untamed and that kind of 
thing, but in the world of discourse, it’s a very bad word to use. I wanted it knocked out 
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of his speeches altogether.” Reedy’s protests fell flat. In 1966, after spending many years 
working for Johnson, he took a leave of absence from the Administration over 
differences with his boss on Vietnam. Four years later George Reedy published an 
influential book, The Twilight of the Presidency, which took a critical view of the 
modern presidency—including its reliance on the frontier mentality—and the impact of 
war on the office. Johnson reportedly rejected his former staffer’s frank assessment and 
refused to speak with Reedy again. As Brian Dippie found in the case of the vanishing 
American myth, the frontier myth had caused certain policy decisions to be made 
despite the reality of events that did not fit the myth. Reedy was perceptive enough to 
identify, though in a very general sense, this overall inconsistency in America’s Vietnam 
policy, but LBJ and the majority of his advisors were not. 322 
As I have argued, the belief in a westering mission of the United States to spread 
democracy and its values around the globe led to a massive buildup of American forces 
in South Vietnam: peaking at well over a half million US troops in 1968. That same year, 
Americans had perhaps never before become so frustrated by both an unresolved crises 
at home and an unresolved war abroad. One national disaster seemed to follow another 
for the United States until by late spring, many Americans perceived that their nation 
was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. The lessons of the frontier myth and its 
association with America’s identity and destiny were about to be severely shaken by a 
plethora of events that could not be explained and seemed to challenge the myth at 
every turn. On January 31, 1968, the first day of the Vietnamese New Year (Tet), 
                                                          
322 Transcript, George Reedy Oral History Interview XI, 12/20/83, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet 
Copy, LBJ Library: 48-49. One other member of LBJ’s team who opposed the frontier “mission” in 
Vietnam was Undersecretary of State George Ball, who had argued forcefully but unsuccessfully against 
American military involvement in Vietnam since the Kennedy years. Like Reedy, Ball left the 
Administration in 1966. 
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communist forces launched an enormous, concerted attack on American strongholds 
throughout South Vietnam. Though militarily a failure for the North, what made the Tet 
Offensive so shocking to the TV-viewing public was the sight of communist forces in the 
heart of a supposedly secure Saigon setting off bombs, shooting down South Vietnamese 
officials and troops, and holding down fortified areas including, for a brief time, the 
grounds of the American Embassy. The invincibility of the United States and belief that 
it was an undefeated nation of benevolent conquerors was collapsing in front of millions 
on the evening news. Events were going very badly at home as well. In early April, Dr. 
Martin Luther King, the most influential leader of the Civil Rights movement, was shot 
and killed by James Earl Ray while standing on the balcony of a motel in Memphis. Two 
months later, Robert F. Kennedy, the Democratic candidate for President favoured most 
by those opposed to the war and by African-Americans, was shot and killed by another 
assassin. (Having just won the California Primary, RFK had told his supporters minutes 
before that: “I think we can end the division within the United States, the violence.”) 
Then in August, at the National Democratic Convention in Chicago, there was chaos 
outside the convention hall as thousands of antiwar demonstrators moved toward the 
building and were met by half of the Chicago police force decked out in riot gear. 
Hundreds of protestors were injured in a “police riot” which attempted to disperse the 
crowds with tear gas and billy clubs. Aware that the violence was being televised to the 
nation, the demonstrators taunted Chicago’s finest by chanting: “The whole world is 
watching.”  
American-style democracy—believed to be the most important product of the 
frontier experience—had long been envisioned as being able to solve any crisis but in 
1968 the electoral process itself now appeared to be under assault. A Harris poll showed 
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that more than half of the country shared the view of third party candidate George 
Wallace and his “hardhats”, that “liberals, intellectuals and long hairs have run the 
country for too long.” Certainly the belief that South Vietnam could emulate American 
democracy now seemed an emptier hope than ever. If anything, the reverse seemed to 
be happening with American riots, conspiracies, and assassinations mimicking the vast 
corruption that had long been associated with the regime in Saigon.323 
 
 
Figure 7.1: By the spring of 1968, even “The Spirit of TR” offers little comfort to 
LBJ. The Pueblo Incident, the capture of an US Navy ship and crew by North 
                                                          
323 George Wallace quotation and Harris poll results described in William E. Leuchtenburg, A 
Troubled Feast: American Society Since 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983): 211. 
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Korea in January, added more insult to American injuries overseas. Almost a 
year later, the American crew was forced to write a false confession to secure 
their release. (Ralph Vinson, New Orleans States-Item, 1968. Courtesy of The Times-
Picayune/Nola.com) 324 
 
 
Even before the two assassinations and chaos in Chicago, the division within the 
country which had challenged the prerogative of its cowboy leader to decide on his own 
what was in America’s best interests, led to Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek re-
election. On March 31, 1968 he surprised the nation in a televised address by stating 
that: “I shall not seek, and will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term 
as your President.” After a brutal year for the Democrats and the nation, his Vice 
President, Hubert Humphrey, would eventually secure the Democratic Party 
nomination but not the presidency.325 
 
LBJ and the Anti-Western: The Collapse and Transformation of the Myth 
As discussed, at the time LBJ emerged on the national scene in the late 1950s, 
Western movies, TV and novels were at the height of their popularity. As many as sixty 
million viewers per night watched the television westerns and, by January 1959, eight of 
the top ten programs were of that genre.326 The American West had become a parable 
for American society and the challenges that pioneers and ranchers faced in the past 
inspired them to solve new cultural, social and political problems in the present and 
plan for the future. The national culture shifted westward and the political chameleon 
                                                          
324 This cartoon was located in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Special Files: Cartoon Collections, 
Box 7, File 25—Foreign Issues: United Nations, Europe, Pueblo Incident (North Korea), Latin America, 
Philippines. Ralph Vinson, New Orleans States-Item, 1968. 
325 Lyndon B. Johnson: "The President's Address to the Nation Announcing Steps To Limit the War 
in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not To Seek Reelection," March 31, 1968. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28772 (accessed 27 April, 2012). 
326 MacDonald, Television and the Red Menace, 138-139. 
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LBJ shifted with it. In fact, LBJ became a kind of prototype as Americans turned to their 
mythic origins to provide the inspiration to face the complex tensions of the modern 
world. Tapping in to the nostalgia for an older America, LBJ’s persona, clothing, cowboy 
talk and ranch represented that national heritage and became symbols of self-reliance, 
individualism, democracy, and the frontier age in an era when the nation treated these 
ideas without scorn or cynicism. Here was something authentic and tangible as opposed 
to the allegedly phony values of the Northeast as Johnson represented what the public 
had long viewed as the quintessential American experience. Initially this increased LBJ’s 
power to persuade and to announce as authentic his aspirations and dreams for the 
nation. 
But while Johnson was personally invested in and initially benefitted from a 
Frontier Myth so pervasive in popular culture, the nation had changed by the time he 
left office in January 1969—its’ values moving away from the traditional version of the 
myth so crucial to LBJ’s success and so inherent in his outlook. Now Western movies 
such as Shane (1953), The Searchers (1956) and How the West Was Won (1962) which 
had reflected the idea of a home place (like the LBJ Ranch) had been replaced by anti-
Westerns—The Good the Bad and the Ugly (1966), Hour of the Gun (1967) and later 
Little Big Man (1970) and Doc (1971)—films in which the hero had become the antihero, 
an alienated individual with the need to wander. Anti-heroes of this intense, rapidly 
changing period were not just physically apart from civilization, they were hostile 
towards it. As Paul Newman told Newsweek in 1970, “The old heroes used to protect 
society from its enemies. Now it’s society that’s the enemy.” In fact, outlaws such as 
Butch Cassidy and the actor Clint “The Man With No Name” Eastwood could commit 
crimes against society and still be popular in the hearts and minds of their audiences 
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because the faceless, corrupt and oppressive powers that be were “more worth fighting 
against than fighting for.” The Western anti-hero followed the Counterculture credo of 
“do your own thing” in opposition to the traditional Western story which, for many 
youth, now conjured up unpopular associations with the Vietnam War, race riots and 
the Chicago Democratic National Convention.327 
In 1967, advertisements for Hour of the Gun asked potential movie-goers: “Wyatt 
Earp—Hero With a Badge or Cold-Blooded Killer?”328 Posing such a question about an 
icon such as Earp a decade earlier would likely have been perceived as heretical by many 
Americans, but by the latter half of the 1960s Americans were sickened by the violence 
in their society and seeking new interpretive and explanatory narratives and structures 
to explain the current problems associated with the events of the Vietnam War and its 
related crises and to do so in a way that was consistent and interpretive of its historical 
origins. From 1966 onward the “anti-western” began to appear with greater frequency: 
dominated by greedy, alienated and violent individuals who mirrored the national 
division, cynicism, and alienation of the period. With the white and black hats reversed 
outlaws became the “good guys” while the image of lawmen like Wyatt Earp 
(popularized for the millions by Stuart Lake’s writings, Henry Fonda’s role in My 
Darling Clementine, and later by the milk-drinking hero of the early ‘60s TV series 
starring Hugh O’Brien) reached rock bottom. In the motion picture Doc in 1971, the ads 
left no question concerning Wyatt’s monstrous nature: “On a good day,” the movie-
poster read, “he might pistol-whip a drunk, shoot an unarmed man, bribe a politician, 
and get paid off by an outlaw. He was a U.S. Marshal.” Harris Yulin portrayed Earp as a 
                                                          
327 Paul Newman quoted in Rushing, “The Rhetoric of the American Western Myth,” 21; some 
paraphrasing from Ibid, 22. 
328 Paul A. Hutton, “Celluloid Lawman: Wyatt Earp Goes to Hollywood,” American West, Vol. 21, 
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greedy, self-righteous and sadistic hypocrite. At the OK Corral, the Earp brothers and 
Doc Holliday (Stacey Keach) murder the victimized, long-haired Clantons with 
shotguns. Screenwriter Pete Hamill made his reasons clear for bursting Earp’s bubble: 
 
I went to Vietnam in 1966, and it was evident to almost everyone except 
the military that the war was wrong, but that we were continuing to 
fight because of some peculiar notions of national macho pride, self-
righteousness and the missionary spirit. I started to realize that within 
Lyndon Johnson there was a Western unspooling. In that western the 
world was broken down into White Hats and Black Hats. Indochina was 
Dodge City, and the Americans were some collective version of Wyatt 
Earp. 329 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: In this it’s-all-an-illusion episode of Star Trek, Captain Kirk and his 
Space Cowboys engage in a showdown at the OK Corral against yet another anti-
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hero version of the “hated” Earp Gang: all stone faced and rotten. Spectre of the 
Gun was filmed in May of 1968—the month between the assassinations of 
Martin Luther King and Robert F. Kennedy. (© Paramount Pictures and CBS. 
Reproduced under the Fair Dealing [educational purposes] provision of the Canadian 
Copyright Act) 
 
 
Of all the anti-hero Western directors, Sergio Leone was the most prolific. The 
Italian director’s tales deliberately replaced the genre’s code of honour with a counter-
ideology of double-dealing and self-interest. Using low angle camera effects, extreme 
longshots and composition in depth contrasted with extreme close-ups, ridiculously 
long showdowns, odd-looking secondary characters, and the isolated sounds of single 
instruments (such as a piccolo or human whistling), Leone’s radical style kept audiences 
off balance by making a familiar genre bizarre. Above all else, his Spaghetti Westerns 
were indifferent to the law and to the idea of the civilizing mission behind settlement. 
Instead of “a man’s got to do…” the protagonist in A Fist Full of Dynamite sums up most 
of Leone’s people when he tells us: “I don’t want to be a hero—I just want the money.”330 
It is a West without progress and where everyone is, to varying degrees, corrupt. The 
towns in The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly (1966) and the Dollars films331 are 
noticeably void of women, the law, religion and culture. Filmed in the mountains and 
prairies of Almeria, Spain, the dusty and dirty environment represents a landscape of 
death where savagery and greed can flower. Indians are absent from Leone’s world: 
there is no conflict between savagery and civilization and no progress. And the 
characters are as empty as the landscape. The director’s choice of Eastwood (from TV’s 
“Rawhide” series) in his “Man With No Name” trilogy—as the cynical, minimalist anti-
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hero—ushered in an anti-Western avalanche. Jim Kitses writes that “as if to correct 
John Ford, Leone’s characters, images and action all seem to assert, ‘this is what the 
world is really like.’”332 
Leone’s West with its over the top showdowns and high death counts set the stage 
for the even bloodier, extreme violence of Sam Peckinpah’s The Wild Bunch (1969)333 a 
few years later. In direct contrast to The Magnificent Seven of the early Sixties, the 
Bunch is without purpose: their battle cry of “Let’s go,” is pointless since they have 
nowhere to go. As Paul Monaco observes, most critics see the story’s depiction of the US 
cavalry’s intrusion in the Mexican Revolution as a parable for American military 
intervention in Vietnam.334 Through scenes of ceaseless, intense, graphic violence with 
explosive “squibs” simulating bullets striking victims, Peckinpah shows us that men can 
be animals, that evil exists, and that America’s posture around the globe, its power and 
interference, is in large part derived from that evil. The film’s final killing scene 
underscores this point: lasting nearly half an hour it appears that the Bunch destroys the 
entire Mexican army. The Leone films and the Bunch in particular, mark the end of the 
classical western as the frontier becomes a place without progress: a brutish, vast 
cemetery. Kitses observes that “the Wild Bunch represents a way of life, a style of action, 
a technology with no vision, no values, no goals.”335 According to film critic Robin 
Wood, the Western’s central concern of the growth of civilization, progress and spread 
of democracy had been put down. American civilization was a wasteland. As we shall 
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see, in the 1970s, the terms of the classical western would go a step further and be fully 
reversed.336 
Now the significance of the Western and Frontier Myth was changing as a result of 
a growing movement to expose the longstanding myth for what the counter culture and 
anti-war protests thought it was: a violent cultural tradition based on self-interest, 
greed, and false depictions of good versus evil—not one based on morality or truth—and 
one which was now serving destructive ends. The traditional Western myths were a 
reflection of ideas that had moved off of the national stage. By the end of the turbulent 
Sixties, Johnson’s version of the Frontier Myth had become an anachronism and, for 
many, a dangerous one at that.  
 
 
The End of the Trail for Cowboy Johnson 
LBJ had been elected in 1964 with the largest percentage of the popular vote in US 
history and his approval rating in early 1965 was over 70%. Within two years, though, 
this mandate evaporated. As early as the summer of 1965, US cities exploded with race 
riots. A series of long, hot summers in the years that followed were rife with street 
violence, war protests and assassinations that shook the positive attitude of the country 
and caused some members of the public who were already lukewarm toward Civil Rights 
and the Vietnam War to turn away from them both. By January 1967, Newsweek 
reported that praise of Johnson as a man who “gets things done” had dropped to just 
one third of what it had been two years earlier, while the number Americans who 
identified LBJ as “clever as a fox,” a “power grabber” and a “conniver” had tripled from 
the year before. In the fall of 1967, a majority of Democrats, 51 to 37 percent, preferred 
                                                          
336 Robin Wood, “Man(n) of the West(ern),” Cineaction, No. 46 (June 1998): 27. 
 
 
274 
 
John Kennedy’s younger brother Robert over LBJ to lead their ticket in the next 
presidential election. During the first three years of his Presidency, Cowboy Johnson 
had been the most admired man in the country but the warm relationship with the 
American public and with foreign nations did not last. Now it seemed, almost everyone 
wanted LBJ to hit the trail. By March 1968, just 36 percent of Americans supported his 
handling of the presidency while more than half disapproved.  Much of this decline 
related directly to US military involvement in Vietnam as the public grew more 
unfavourable toward LBJ’s Vietnam policies than toward his policies in general. A study 
of polling data from August 1965 to March 1968 demonstrates that LBJ was caught in a 
kind of political quicksand so that each time he made a move to pull himself out, he 
might slow things down, but did not prevent his continual sinking. Consensus in 1964 
had gradually been replaced by open conflict four years later and an outright rejection of 
the symbolism and values that Frontier Johnson was viewed as representing. By August 
1968, the Tet offensive, Pueblo crisis, assassination of Martin Luther King (and possibly 
RFK as well), and mayhem at the Democratic National Convention all contributed to his 
lowest approval rating during his presidential years: just 35 percent. Johnson’s steady 
reliance on the frontier myth had backfired as events caused its old tenets to be, for a 
time, rejected. Americans questioned their own involvement in a foreign land and their 
own self-assessment of superiority; less confident than before, many gradually began a 
new quest for a sense of national purpose but this would not come before more trials 
and tribulations in the decade which followed.337 
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Historian Paul Conkin writes that “In his five years as president, Johnson moved 
from brilliant early success and from intense but fulfilling engagement to galling 
frustration, a sense of failure, and then to a characteristic withdrawal.” The Frontier 
Myth and related Cold War rhetoric of America’s duties in the world were so pervasive 
and accepted, it would be difficult to blame Johnson or most of his speech-writers too 
much for not seeing where the rhetoric was ultimately leading them. Most of the nation 
had bought fully into the notion of an American duty to extend its superior civilization 
throughout the world, to “go west” as the pioneers had done. The Western seemed to 
embody the psychology of the East-West struggle and had offered clear answers to 
complex questions and a paradigm of dedication to purpose. But in the context of 
Southeast Asia the American experience was something altogether different than had 
been experienced on the frontier. The guidance of the myth no longer provided the 
answers needed to deal with the complex events that confronted and confounded an 
unraveling American nation.338 
Lyndon Johnson worked hard at projecting himself as a “President of all the 
people,” excluding no group with the possible exception of the Goldwater Republicans. 
For Johnson, the domestic frontiers of the future encompassed people helping people 
especially through: federal government programs; protection of the environment at a 
time when the limits of land use and exploitation were becoming increasingly 
understood; freedom, racial equality and the promotion of the democratic process; and 
an overall a determination to make things better for future generations. “The woman I 
really loved, the Great Society,” said Johnson, represented “all my hopes, and all my 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
LBJ Image,” Newsweek (January 9, 1967): 19; William C. Spragens, ed. Popular Images of American 
Presidents (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988): 485. 
338 Conkin, Big Daddy from the Pedernales, 173. 
 
 
276 
 
dreams.” For LBJ, the Frontier Myth encompassed and represented these progressive, 
forward-thinking programs that he believed in and attempted to champion. But they 
also defined the parameters in which Johnson, through his vision of the frontier 
experience, was able to move. Perhaps most important of all, LBJ’s great passion for 
winning in Vietnam and in Congress seemed to cloud his understanding that passing 
legislation on its own does not always fix international or national problems and that 
government resources were not the “bonanza” that he had perceived.339 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: “We’re Gonna’ Make History, Hubert!!” By 
1968, LBJ’s earlier optimistic cowboy-isms had been 
replaced with a much darker image. Here mad LBJ, and 
his frightened sidekick Hubert Humphrey, are depicted 
as Dr. Strangelove’s Major T.J. “King” Kong (Slim 
Pickens) rodeo riding a bomb to its detonation. (Paul 
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Conrad, Los Angeles Times, 1968. Used by permission of the 
Conrad Estate) 
 
 
 
Edward W. Chester’s evaluation of LBJ’s newspaper obituaries in Presidential 
Studies Quarterly reveals the mindset of the nation at the time of Johnson’s death in 
January 1973. The only headline that appeared repeatedly atop the obituaries was the 
word “tragedy.” The home paper of the Kennedy clan, the Massachusetts Standard-
Times in Hyannis summed up the LBJ legacy for many of the editorialists: “Bitter irony 
lies in the fate of Lyndon Baines Johnson, a President who could have been among the 
greatest ever in this country, but who left office in 1969, reviled and repudiated by 
millions.” For most of these obituary writers, the former President’s “guns and butter” 
efforts to conduct the Vietnam War and Great Society at the same time and its resulting 
inflationary spiral were viewed as disastrous. The Baltimore Evening Sun raised a key 
observation, that the American failure to get a win in Vietnam destroyed “an 
oversimplified American notion of national invincibility”—a staple ingredient of the 
Frontier Myth. And Johnson’s credibility gap loomed heavy with the Hyannis Standard-
Times critic determining that “in the end, he took America into the Vietnam War by 
trickery and stealth and deceit.” Immediately following Johnson’s death Vietnam 
appeared as if it were the only foreign policy issue that mattered; even commentators 
who highly commended Johnson for his impressive program of domestic reform always 
added on the condition that it had been tarnished by the Vietnam albatross. Lyndon 
Johnson’s adherence to and projection of the older version of the Frontier Myth which 
had done so much to facilitate his rise to the Presidency would, in the end, be closely 
tied to the inability of this same paradigm to accommodate the Asian War. A political 
and ideological crisis of such intensity as that experienced in 1967-1968 impacted on all 
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areas of American politics, cultural life and expression by challenging the fundamental 
belief that the nation’s presidents, political leaders and institutions were on the whole 
reliable and worthy of the public’s trust. Upon LBJ’s passing, cartoonist Dan Morgan 
depicted “The End of the Trail,” using James Earle Fraser’s 1915 sculpture as a model 
for the Vanishing American—only this time it was Cowboy Johnson mounted and 
slumping on a horse instead of an American Indian. More broadly, the symbolism might 
also be taken to represent the “doomed fate” of the liberal nationalist version of the 
Frontier Myth. 340 
 
The Liberal Frontier Myth Fails the Test 
 
In the eyes of the American public, the Frontier Myth—with which LBJ had so 
closely associated himself—had failed the nation by proving woefully inadequate to 
accommodate the war or to accomplish what the public had anticipated at home.341 The 
myth could not absorb hundreds of Americans dying each week in a war far away that 
was so poorly understood. As historian D.W. Brogan explained in 1967: “The desire to 
be right as well as victorious is deeply embedded in the American psyche.” A connection 
between right and victory and, conversely, that to be defeated is to be wrong, clearly 
existed as a major ingredient of the Frontier Myth. And this time it appeared to many 
that the nationalist liberal version practiced by LBJ (and inherited in many respects 
from Theodore Roosevelt) failed the test. Popular culture’s frontier tradition promised 
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success in battling savage Indians and building successful enterprises from ranches and 
farms to commerce and industry. But the inescapable fact of Vietnam was that America 
did not win. Victory eluded the superpower, thereby undermining national confidence 
in the classic story of the frontiersman/cowboy vs. Indian confrontation. To make 
matters worse, the public watched with horror at home as soldiers drawn from US units 
sent to Vietnam turned their guns against the same inner city Americans that Johnson’s 
Great Society programs had been created to uplift. And with multiple assassinations and 
demonstrations, the system of American democracy itself seemed under assault. 
Journalist Saul Pett wrote in 1970 that “America is no longer immune to history…no 
longer infinite in space or resources or hope. There is no next valley or virgin forest to 
tread.” The gloomy side of the Frontier Myth that Turner had warned about after the 
closing of the frontier now appeared to emerge full-blown and President Lyndon Baines 
Johnson and his “failed” philosophies, for many conservatives, independents, and 
liberals alike, were to blame. Cowboy Johnson not only botched his “two” wars he 
threatened a sacred feature of the national Frontier Myth: the belief that America was 
the favoured nation.342 
In an image-conscious political culture, political figures had become closely 
likened with icons—one of whom was Lyndon Johnson. Throughout the late 1960s and 
in the decades which followed, LBJ stood as the central figure against which 
conservatives, and even some Democrats, would define their own political beliefs. With 
forces spiraling out of control by 1967-1968, Johnson came to personify the perceived 
failures of cowboy liberalism in the 1960s. His inability to maintain control over his 
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image was painfully evident by the end of his presidency. Though the frontier myth, 
which transcended LBJ himself, would survive as a master explanation for the nation’s 
destiny and as a constant in American thinking—it could not endure in the same form 
that it had for much of the twentieth century. A new cycle of events set in motion by the 
Vietnam experience, in particular, would now redefine the myth’s parameters over the 
course of the 1970s decade.  
From the late 1960s through 1980, the perceived meanings of the Frontier Myth 
and of what it meant to be a liberal and a conservative changed. As political scientist 
Bruce Miroff contends in his recent study, The Liberals’ Moment, the political 
earthquake of 1968 “marked the fatal rupture that divided the Democratic coalition.” 
That year, Republican Richard Nixon would be elected and, though interrupted by 
Watergate, would carry the mantle of conservative ascendance that would take full hold 
under the Reagan Revolution and bring about a reconstructed Frontier Myth.343 
 
Frontier Myth in Remission 
Following one of the most remarkable comebacks in American political history, the 
“Republican Phoenix” Richard Milhous Nixon, took over the presidential office in 
January 1969 after defeating Hubert Humphrey at the ballot box in November. During 
his five years in office, RN rarely attempted to cash in on the now receded 
Frontier/Western Myth. Though he was from the Southern California, the Far West, 
Nixon promoted much more the persona of a generic national politician rather than one 
with Western attributes. Strangely though, his foreign relations advisor and later 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, did understand himself as a kind of cow man with 
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portfolio. Dr. Kissinger envisioned his own diplomatic technique as that of the heroic 
loner who comes to the rescue. In 1972, he boasted to Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci 
that: 
 
I’ve always acted alone. Americans like that immensely. Americans like 
the cowboy who leads the wagon train by riding ahead alone on his horse, 
the cowboy who rides all alone into the town, the village, with his horse 
and nothing else. Maybe even without a pistol, since he doesn’t shoot. He 
acts, that’s all, by being in the right place at the right time. In short, a 
Western.344 
 
 
Thankfully, Kissinger did not buy a ranch. 
Throughout the twentieth century, popular culture depicted Western heroes like 
Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, Wyatt Earp and Buffalo Bill as having achieved brave 
triumphs over their adversaries with tales of their amazing toughness and 
marksmanship. Henry Nash Smith had declared them all “fixtures of American 
mythology.” Johnson had proudly displayed the cowboy art of Frederic Remington and 
Charlie Russell in the White House; artists that the Goetzmanns compare to Walt 
Disney for “giving birth to such vital and unforgettable characters.” Americans used 
these myths to bolster and intensify their values as a people and a nation. In a press 
conference in 1970, Richard Nixon expressed his disdain for the new anti-hero types 
who “tend [to] glorify and to make heroes out of those who engage in criminal 
activities.” Rather, he thought that Charles Manson’s gruesome cult-murder case and 
the breakdown of law and order could be straightened out by taking the Duke’s 
performance in Chisum as a model.  But Westerns of any kind, including anti-Westerns, 
were becoming increasingly rare by 1971. The “heroic” Western myth and symbolism 
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which informed the politics of the Lyndon Johnson years took a hiatus from the end of 
his Administration until 1980—having been submerged by Vietnam, race riots, and a 
deepening recession. Stock in the old Western myth seemed to reach a low point with 
the release of Mel Brooks’ full-blown Western farce, Blazing Saddles in 1974: the same 
year that the lid was blown off of Nixon’s Watergate scandal. Apart from these comedic 
deviations, gunfighter skills and violence were now being portrayed through urban 
Western characters like Clint Eastwood’s Inspector “Dirty Harry” Callahan with his 
eight-inch barreled Smith & Wesson revolver. Star Wars (1977), meanwhile, took on 
several Western conventions, from the low-slung laser weapons holsters, to the black 
and white attire, to the shoot-out scene with individualist and maverick Han Solo in the 
intergalactic saloon. Luke Skywalker grows up on a ranch under a rim rock and the 
film’s characters live on the edge between civilization and wilderness.  Though it 
contained little about racial inclusiveness, the rescue narrative was quite clearly inspired 
by The Searchers. But George Lucas’ blockbuster deliberately disguised Western 
conventions in an outer space setting. Outland (1981) relocated the classic High Noon 
plot in outer space with none other than Sean “Mr. Bond” Connery replacing Gary 
Cooper as a space marshal who rode in from nowhere. Like Cooper, Connery ends up 
facing the bad guys alone as the miners he’s come to help cower on the sidelines. If the 
traditional Frontier/Western heroes and settings themselves had been tainted and were 
now out of fashion, audiences were at least reassured that its essential themes live on 
through these overlapping police-Western, science fiction-Western genres that such 
reincarnated frontiersmen provided a direct relationship between the past and the 
future. 345 
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Apart from comedies that mocked the Frontier Myth, overt Westerns of the post-
Johnson era were typically about failure and catastrophe. Film scholar Robin Wood 
identifies the two truly revisionist Westerns as McCabe and Mrs. Miller (1971) and 
Heaven’s Gate (1980)346, both of which in different ways represent utter rejections of 
the ‘progress’ of Americanism by completely reversing the conventions of the classic 
Western.347 Director Robert Altman, having just come off of directing the film version of 
M*A*S*H (1970), referred to his revisionist McCabe and Mrs. Miller as an “anti-
western film” because it subverted so many Western codes, including: male dominance, 
the heroic standoff, and John Ford’s rationale of domesticity and the Euro-family on the 
land. John McCabe (Warren Beatty) and Mrs. Miller (Julie Christie) are introduced to 
their audience in a ballad about drug dealers (McCabe), addicts (Miller), and disheveled 
prostitutes. At the film’s close, McCabe dies in a snowdrift after being wounded by the 
same corrupt and violent company that had wanted to buy him out. McCabe had been 
encouraged to build something of worth and promote the values of freedom and 
entrepreneurship in the wilderness but instead dies trying only after reaching the 
realization that the pious platitudes were fake. Here Altman directly overturns the idea 
of the “winning of the West” and its alleged basis in cultural superiority and the 
civilizing of the frontier. McCabe was neither a liberal nor a conservative application of 
the Frontier Myth: it was an outright rejection. 
Michael Cimino’s Heaven’s Gate, meanwhile, plays down the heroic role of the 
individual and any sense of hierarchy in society. The film features evil capitalists picking 
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on immigrants in Wyoming with a final massacre that is hideously effective in applying 
post-Vietnam War cruelty in a Western setting. Here when the U.S. cavalry rides to the 
rescue, it is on the wrong side. Like McCabe, Heaven’s Gate is a film of failure and 
catastrophe that Wood writes might have been aptly called “The Death of a Nation.”348 
Though a highly innovative Western, Heaven’s Gate is perhaps most famous for its 
extravagant costs and failure at the box office, which led to the collapse of United 
Artists. The film, arguably, might have done better with American audiences had it come 
out a few years earlier but by 1980 there was a movement in the U.S. toward 
conservatism and more “patriotic” films that would emerge during the Reagan years.  
Lyndon Johnson’s demise marked the end of an era of liberal, Democratic Party 
supremacy but it was presidential candidate George McGovern’s 1972 campaign that 
shifted power among Democrats from one that dominated urban, blue-collar voters to a 
party dominated by suburban, college-educated activists. The South Dakota Senator’s 
campaign also interested new cultural forces, including women’s and gay rights, 
dropped the Party’s Cold War past and oriented itself against the Vietnam War, 
American military buildups, and overseas interventions. Nixon first blasted the post-
Johnson Democrats (specifically his opponent George McGovern) for promoting “the 
three A’s—acid, amnesty and abortion.” And conservatives would continue to apply this 
label to liberal Democrats through the 1980s and beyond. As Bruce Miroff asserts in his 
close examination of the McGovern Campaign and its legacy, McGovern’s massive 
defeat at the hands of Nixon’s “Silent Majority” in 1972 placed a kind of stigma on the 
left wing of the Democratic Party that has become a rationale for the party’s drift to the 
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center ever since. Miroff also contends, correctly in my view, that while Democrats 
continued to champion “policies favorable to working class interests” they “fell short, 
most of the time, in touching working-class hearts.” In the realm of presidential politics 
this would have significant implications for the changing Frontier Myth. 349 
For a time during the 1970s—in its liberal, conservative and more radical forms— 
the myth seemed to just hang there in a state of limbo. In country music, the Statler 
Brothers’ song “Whatever Happened to Randolph Scott?” released in 1974, featured a 
chorus that both inquired into and lamented the disappearance of the white hat, code 
abiding heroes of Westerns past: 
 
Whatever happened to Randolph Scott, 
riding the trail alone? 
Whatever happened to Gene and Tex 
and Roy and Rex? The Durango Kid? 
Whatever happened to Randolph Scott,  
his horse plain as can be? 
Whatever happened to Randolph Scott, 
has happened to the rest of me.350 
 
The last line is apparently an indication of a direct connection between the frontier 
Western story and American society; here the suggestion appears to be that the absence 
of genuine cowboy heroes reflects a broader decline in society (reminiscent of Simon 
and Garfunkel’s baseball star lament in their 1968 hit, Mrs. Robinson: “Where have you 
gone, Joe DiMaggio? Our nation turns its lonely eyes to you”). The departure of Scott 
speaks of something having “happened” to everyone else as well. And nowhere did this 
appear more evident than at the level of the American presidency. 
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During the remainder of the 1970s, Americans’ ability to respond to major issues 
impacting the nation was undermined by what was perceived as a crisis in leadership as 
three successive presidents—Nixon, Ford and Carter—were rejected by the American 
public. Richard Nixon’s overwhelming victory in 1972 quickly went sour and, in less than 
two years, he was forced into resignation over the Watergate Scandal. Gerald Ford’s 
pardoning of Nixon, and his perceived failure to respond effectively to the OPEC oil 
boycott, bankruptcy in New York City, and in Vietnam, where Saigon fell in 1975, 
undermined his own presidential image and contributed to his defeat in 1976. Then a 
kind of aberration from the conservative trend occurred when Democratic candidate 
Jimmy Carter was elected to the presidency as an outsider in 1976. Unfortunately for the 
former Georgia Governor, he had inherited the ruined ideology of liberal progressivism 
which, if not dead, was at best in intensive care. 
 
The Trials of Jimmy Carter 
James Earl “Jimmy” Carter of Plains, Georgia was not a western cowboy but a 
Southern peanut farmer.  While a fellow Democrat, Carter did little to rehabilitate the 
reputation of Lyndon Johnson when he ran for President against Gerald Ford in 1976. 
In fact, Carter treated Johnson as an anathema and rarely even mentioned his name. 
One notable exception came in Carter’s highly publicized interview with Playboy 
Magazine published just days before the 1976 Presidential Election. The White House 
hopeful told interviewer Robert Scheer that, though he had encouraged his son, Jack 
Carter, to enter the US Navy and Jack saw action in Southeast Asia: “there was an 
accepted feeling by me…that we ought not to be there, that we should simply never have 
gotten involved, we ought to get out.” When asked who was responsible, Carter 
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conceded: “I guess if there was one President who made the most determined effort, 
conceivably, to end the war by massive force, it was certainly Johnson.” Conscious of the 
post-Vietnam, post-Watergate mood in the country, Carter then ramped up his 
criticism: ‘There was government secrecy, to exclude the American people, to mislead 
them with false statements and sometimes outright lies.” And in the highlighted last line 
of the article (located just a few ads before the magazine’s most popular feature, the 
centerfold of “Miss November”) Carter delivered the crushing blow: “I don’t think I 
would ever take on the same frame of mind that Nixon or Johnson did—lying, cheating, 
distorting the truth.”351 
Anti-government sentiment and folksy-charm worked to Jimmy Carter’s 
advantage in the 1976 general election campaign as he worked hard to portray himself 
as the honest Washington outsider. Carter’s team managed to avoid having its candidate 
labeled as either liberal or a conservative for, by the nation’s Bicentennial year, this was 
perceived to be a losing game. On November 2, 1976, Carter won a narrow victory over 
President Gerald Ford but the big election story was the poor voter turnout. “Neither 
Ford nor Carter won as many votes as Mr. Nobody,” one reporter observed in making a 
connection to the fact that almost half of the nation’s eligible voters did not show up at 
the polling booths.352  
If Carter was to improve the climate of American political culture, he had his work 
cut out for him. In the wake of defeat in Vietnam, the “credibility gap”, and Watergate—
and with the frontier myth paradigm now in hiatus—Jimmy Carter attempted to use 
television to de-mystify what he viewed as a bloated and self-important office of the 
                                                          
351 Scheer, “Playboy Interview: Jimmy Carter…,” 70, 86. 
352 George Brown Tindall and David A. Shi, America: A Narrative History, Volume 2 (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1999): 1595. 
 
 
288 
 
presidency. Carter abandoned Johnson’s heavy-handedness and Nixon’s imperial style. 
He conducted TV fireside chats in cardigan sweaters, carried his own luggage, made his 
own breakfast, and for a time even banned the playing of “Hail to the Chief.” While this 
approach seemed to play well at first in the end, when the economy continued to 
flounder, it was perceived as resulting in a “diminutive presidency.” Carter, in effect, 
created a milieu that undercut his own public image, seemed to undermine his own 
achievements, and reduced his own authority and legitimacy.353 
On the heels of the defeat in Vietnam, events and circumstances which had 
disempowered the frontier myth and sent it into temporary remission only seemed to 
accelerate during the years of the Carter Administration. In terms of presidential 
decisions and actions Carter, like Ford before him, had inherited an almost 
insurmountable set of domestic and international problems when he took office: high 
unemployment, growing trade deficits, “stagflation” of inflation and slow growth, 
record-high energy prices, and dropping productivity. Carter was expected to fix all of 
these problems and the national spirit through political institutions and progressive 
policies in which many Americans had lost faith. Despite a variety of efforts the 
economic and international situation only worsened. Before long White House 
journalists began reporting on a series of embarrassing incidents involving Bert Lance 
and Carter’s brother Billy (who had borrowed money from Colonel Khadafi of Libya to 
prop up the Carter peanut business) which served further to undercut his presidential 
image. The seizure of the American hostages in Iran, held for fourteen long months, 
seemed a metaphor for the Carter Administration and the nation’s impotence. 
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“Television,” writes William C. Spragens, “reinforced his image as a vacillating, weak, 
and confused leader.”354 
The can-do spirit of the now spent liberal version of the frontier myth reached a 
low point with the deflating events and circumstances of the late 1970s. In his 1980 
State of the Union address, President Carter asked Americans to make sacrifices and 
talked about the United States as a nation of limits. Carter told viewers to turn down 
their thermostats, said that the nation needed to lower some of its loftier goals, that it 
was in the best interests of peace to accommodate the Soviets where possible. He quoted 
from Walter Lippmann who had once stated: “You took the good things for granted. 
Now you must earn them again….There is nothing for nothing any longer.” Jimmy 
Carter had found so much confusion in the country that he scolded his fellow Americans 
for committing the crime of “malaise.” The President’s sentiments, though perhaps well 
founded, were especially demoralizing in a country which had long defined itself in 
terms of growth; and it roused a fear which dated back to the close of the frontier. The 
Census Bureau’s declaration of the close of the Frontier in 1890 was perceived in 
ominous terms by some Americans. Turner had told them that the frontier had shaped 
and defined Americans—without any frontiers the nation ran the risk of becoming, well, 
un-American. LBJ had spoken of metaphorical frontiers in education, in the macro-
frontier of space, and through the construction of hydroelectric projects. Now Carter—
who seemed to personify the passing of the confident, liberal frontier myth of the TR 
and Johnson administrations—was telling the country that these metaphors were drying 
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up too. None of this sat well with the American electorate and many preferred to blame 
Carter for this rather than themselves.355 
In popular culture, the Ford and early Carter years had seen Americans embrace 
averageness. On TV, Archie Bunker’s shabby living room, Taxi’s garage, Jim Rockford’s 
dilapidated trailer, and even the modest apartment of two childless working 
professionals Bob and Emily Hartley on The Bob Newhart Show all seemed to make 
class and status, and the pursuit of wealth, noticeably absent on many 1970s TV series. 
When their non-management colleagues hit the picket lines on The Mary Tyler Moore 
Show, Mary Richards and her boss Lou Grant felt a horrible discomfort in crossing the 
picket line. Wealth, status and “material success” received little attention on 1970s TV 
series. But then all this changed, and quickly.  
The premier of Dallas in 1978 would before long bring about the demise of the 
blue-collar-to-middle-class characters of the Ford and Carter years. Instead J.R. and the 
Ewings made being filthy rich attractive and sexy. Gerald Ford had gone out of his way 
to make it known he spent his first days as President at his modest home driving to work 
and making toast for breakfast, while Jimmy Carter packed out his own belongings from 
Plains, Georgia, to the White House, wore sweaters when addressing the nation, took 
phone calls from ordinary citizens, and created what Newsweek called “corn bread-and-
cardigan atmospherics.”356 All of this was to demonstrate that the in the post-LBJ and 
Nixon eras, these presidents were regular guys whose personas would bear no 
resemblance to an “Imperial Presidency.” Not without some irony, however, by the end 
of the decade both Ford and Carter would be overshadowed by well-to-do movie star 
                                                          
355 Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress," January 23, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
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Ronald Reagan of Beverly Hills, who seemed a lot more likely to be enjoying cocktails 
with the Ewings than visiting with Good Times’ “J.J.” Evans and his family at their 
inner-city apartment/housing project.  
Though set in urban Texas, Dallas, the TV show, would tap into the nostalgic 
potential of the West from a different angle than that of previous decades. As the only 
weekly “Western” of the 1980s, its stories were not about building better communities 
out West, battling greedy cattle barons, or haves versus have nots as in Heaven’s Gate— 
but focused instead on wealth and skullduggery at the Southfork Ranch. The show’s 
main character, scheming oil tycoon JR Ewing (Larry Hagman), became a kind of 
worldwide symbol of America and its allegedly conservative roots out West. Dallas’ 
smash success would set the stage for the glitz and excess of Dynasty and Robin Leach’s 
Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous. This change was a major departure from the past 
and seemed to parallel a major shift in the political culture of the nation and the 
Frontier Myth—one that intertwined with the declining image of President Jimmy 
Carter. 
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Figures 7.4 and 7.5: The devolution of the Presidential “Superhero” from LBJ (1966) to 
Jimmy Carter (1980). (Figure 7.4 by D.J. Arneson and Tony Tallerico, The Great Society Comic Book, 
Issue 1, New York, Parallax Comic Books, 1966. Figure 7.5 cartoon by Bert Whitman, Phoenix Gazette, 
1980. Both images reproduced under the Fair Dealing [educational purposes] provision of the Canadian 
Copyright Act)  
 
In 1980, Bert Whitman of the Phoenix Gazette drew an editorial cartoon of Jimmy 
Carter dressed in a Superman suit many times too big for him to fill (Figure 7.5). It was 
a far cry from the “can do” days of the Great Society (Figure 7.4). Michael DeSousa 
asserts that during the Iranian hostage crisis, President Carter was similarly portrayed 
by cartoonists and newspaper editors as just not up to the task of besting the Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The Wall Street Journal even pulled an old-LBJ stunt to denounce the 
Democratic President, belittling Carter for his “feminine spirit” and his unwillingness to 
“twist arms.” “[W]e watched how far this approach got him in the jungles of Washington 
and the world. So in a sense, we’ve already had a ‘woman president’: Jimmy Carter.” By 
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1980, Carter had for some become a kind of antithesis of the presidential image, a kind 
of anti-frontiersman/cowboy who just seemed incapable of getting the job done.357 
In the summer of 1980, Carter received the lowest approval rating for a president 
ever recorded up until that time—21 percent. One week before the presidential election 
in November, the sympathetic New York Times acknowledged that Carter had made 
some excellent appointments, showed courage on the Panama Canal, and had developed 
a successful energy program; but its editors also wrote that “President Wobble…seemed 
to be all sail and no boat.” A Harris poll taken in 1980, listed all presidents since FDR 
and asked “Which President was least able to get things done?” Carter finished first, 
Gerald Ford second. A year before polls revealed that what the electorate now wanted 
was “strong leadership” but not a return to what were perceived as the “failed” visions of 
the 1960s. The ruined ideology of liberal progressivism had resulted in a temporary 
hiatus of the Frontier Myth. Now a growing number of Americans who were “getting 
mad as hell and not going to take it anymore” envisioned a national hero who could 
restore national pride. Circumstances were ripe for a resurrection of the Frontier Myth 
with a substantively different agenda and emphasis. The Republicans saw their 
opportunity and quickly pounced.358 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
357 Michael A. DeSousa, “Symbolic Action and Pretended Insight: The Ayatollah Khomeini in U.S. 
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168. 
358 Leuchtenburg, A Troubled Feast, 280; NYT editorial quoted in Ibid; Harris poll results in 
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VIII. 
The Hinge: Ronald Reagan  
& the Conservative Resurgence of the Frontier Myth 
 
 
I’ve been looking forward to coming home to the Great 
American West. While Washington, as usual, seems 
paralyzed by handwringers, the people here are filled 
with…frontier spirit. You and your forebears tamed a wild 
frontier….So now load up the musket and help us conquer 
this wild growth and centralization of power which threatens 
all that we’ve created….We share the overriding philosophy 
that individual freedom, individual integrity, and individual 
ingenuity made us the greatest country the world has ever 
known.…Together we’ll make America great again.  
   —President Ronald Reagan, Cheyenne, Wyoming, 1982359 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sometimes mythical narrative and social structures become so battered by 
unforeseen historical events that they collapse.  Certainly this is what happened to the 
liberal frontier cowboy myth so prominent in LBJ’s early presidency.  Under the 
presidencies of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the frontier myth and 
associated ideology of liberal progressivism would together recede from the American 
mind and politics. But while the myth was out of sight it was not dead. Rather, it was 
simply too weakened by the events of the mid-to-late 60s to protect its own core 
features, and so became susceptible to being reformulated in a new shape at the hands 
of a new political collective who drew from it what suited their aims and in the process 
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gave it a new and conservative form. At the outset of the 1980s decade, many Americans 
longed for a mythic hero who could restore national pride. When the myth was 
resurrected in 1980, it would no longer be as a touchstone of liberal Presidents but 
instead as a key symbol of the conservative “Reagan Revolution.”  Over a period of a 
dozen years, the Frontier Myth’s structure would undergo a greater climatic shift than 
during any transition period since the late nineteenth Century. 
Walter R. Fisher has written that, in 1976, former actor and California Governor 
Reagan was defeated by Ford at the Republican Presidential Convention because he was 
perceived as “someone who ‘shoots from the hip’, a man of action”; but in 1980 Reagan 
was, arguably, victorious for the same reason.360 The former editor of the Texas 
Observer, Jim Hightower, referred to Reagan as a “disgruntled maverick”: an iconic 
figure of the heroic frontiersman who the little guy could depend on in the fight against 
big bureaucracy and big government. Reagan would do this by encouraging individual 
initiative, self-reliance, freedom and independence from government. The former 
Governor’s own political themes appeared like something from an earlier time as he 
pledged to lead Americans back to their traditional and exceptional values, and rightful 
position as leader of the “free” world: an omnipotent righteous cause would replace 
good intentions. Ronald Reagan would become the presidential leader and symbol of 
the nation’s conservative, nostalgic drive to restore an imaginary vanished past. 361 
Picking up on some of the same themes initialized by Richard Nixon, the 
Republicans sought to frame the public image of Democratic liberalism as a party of 
war, lawlessness and weak-kneed policies. Conversely, Reagan came to personify the 
                                                          
360 Walter R. Fisher, “Romantic Democracy, Ronald Reagan, and Presidential Heroes,” Western 
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perceived strengths of modern conservatism: a philosophy touted as having the right 
prescription for defeating economic stagflation at home and standing up to the Soviet 
menace and other international “outlaws” abroad. A man in Wichita Falls, Texas, LBJ’s 
home state, wrote to Reagan that he and others were “sick, sick, sick and disenchanted 
with the whole picture in Washington. We want someone up there with the guts to buck 
the establishment, clean house and make a really honest effort to reinstate an old-
fashioned honorable government for the people.”362 Another voter from Brownwood, 
who only identified himself in his letter to the editor as “old Cowboy,” described the 
Lone Star state’s political attitude as follows: “Hell, most everybody around here calls 
themselves a Democrat, but that don’t mean they’re a bunch of crazy liberals.” Then he 
went into attack mode on the incumbent President. “Carter’s ruined our defense 
position,” he wrote. “He’s let some dinky little country push us around and kidnap our 
people. He’s sacrificed our farmers with his wheat embargo and ruined our economy 
while he runs giveaway programs….Maybe Reagan can turn things around.”363 Views 
like these ones reflected a belief that Reagan was the antithesis of establishment politics. 
And cultural conservatives—including westerners, southerners and blue-collar 
workers—had increasingly come to view and denounce the national Democratic Party as 
a voice for special interests (an image once held by elite, “country club” Republicans), 
and racial and radical minorities. At the same time, the more that Jimmy Carter was 
associated with failure, the more failure was associated with liberalism, and liberalism 
associated with the Democratic Party: thus completing the circle. Reagan and his 
handlers were able to transform the vision of conservatism while at the same time 
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negatively redefining liberalism as a failed philosophy. The Republican strategists’ 
combined a variety of issues into one big, mass problem of alleged incompetence, big 
government and lack of moral leadership. In Theodore Roosevelt’s day, the Frontier 
Myth had been deployed to combat monopolistic power and greedy corporations (on the 
big screen this had been well established in John Ford’s classic Stagecoach)—the 
Federal Government was there to champion the rights of “regular” Americans. Now 
Reagan and company had seemingly turned this perception around, insisting that a 
bloated federal government and not corporate vested power was the biggest threat to the 
nation’s frontier values and Americans’ pioneering spirit. In so doing they managed to 
convince some swing voters who had never viewed the GOP as trustworthy and as only a 
friend of the rich that Reagan was on their side.364   
Remarkably, many of Reagan’s arguments would vary little if at all from those 
promoted by Barry Goldwater in 1964 but Reagan had a distinct advantage over his old 
mentor and friend that scholars that have not previously acknowledged: a revamped, 
conservative version of the Frontier Myth that he and his campaign staffers tapped into 
and perpetuated through its old-new platform and Reagan’s own image as a Western 
cowboy. Marshall Sahlins and others examining the dynamics between structure and 
event provide us with theoretical and interpretive tools which can assist us in 
interpreting this change. In the anxiety-ridden era spanning from the late LBJ to Carter 
periods, an avalanche of perceived national failures caused the entire Frontier Myth to 
shift sharply to the right and take on a new form from which Reagan and his supporters 
stood to benefit from the most. 
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Ronald Reagan had “the look” of a “Cowboy conservative.” Fisher observed that 
many Americans found their quest for a hero in the transplanted mid-westerner who 
now seemed even more the California-far westerner than folks who were born there 
(including Nixon): 
He aroused a consciousness not of the stevedore, the athlete, or the truck 
driver, but the quintessential hero of the West—the town marshal. 
Accenting this image were his origins, the West (California—the last 
frontier); his penchant for western garb, his ranch, his pastime of riding 
horses, and several of his film and television roles, and his physical 
appearance: tall, lank, and rugged. Like the savior of the West, he exuded 
honesty and sincerity, innocence, optimism, and certainty. 
 
The Reagan image was carefully crafted in accordance with many of the same frontier 
qualities espoused by Turner. Reagan had supreme confidence and self-reliance in his 
economic theories and (unlike the grim Goldwater of 1964) supreme optimism for the 
country, was resilient and virile, and constantly describes his proposed policies and 
“initiatives” in a kind of spirit of adventure. And Reagan was a kind of politician-
frontiersman who would directly challenge what was once again perceived as the 
corrupting and phony complexity of Eastern institutions. LBJ, the promoter of the 
public good, would be replaced by Ronald Reagan the deregulator and protector of 
capitalist freedom so sought after by big business. For Reaganites, promoting 
individualism did not involve protection of one’s rights and welfare within society but 
instead meant independence from government controls.365 
Middle class conservative Americans, in particular, welcomed Reagan’s self-
assurance, critique of the Washington establishment, and promise of rejuvenation. 
Americans were being told they could regain their youth by electing the oldest President 
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in their history.  As a symbolic embodiment of American values, Reagan would renew 
the nation’s past by resuming it. In John Wayne’s America, historian Garry Wills has 
described some of the parallels between Reagan’s appeal and that of his friend, the 
Duke. Like the movie version of Wayne, Reagan managed to capture on his political 
speaking circuit an aura of the Old American West. Reagan’s oratory was frequently 
nostalgic, harkening back to the founding fathers or pioneers who led the fight for 
“’maximum freedom for the individual.’”366 Further, Reagan positioned himself as a 
regular-folks candidate, angry about corruption and incompetence in government, 
longing for the good old days of the nostalgic frontier, “traditional” family values, the 
right to bear arms without government interference, free-market individualism, and the 
champion of strength in the face of vacillating liberals. Reagan’s illusionary vision of the 
past was not challenged to near the degree it could have been, arguably, because the 
public would rather not to come to terms with its real past, and instead preferred 
Reagan’s “happy” substitute. And Ronald Reagan’s visions seemed more believable 
because they fit a newly revised structure of the Frontier Myth which he believed in so 
much himself. 
As noted, the Democratic Party had dominated presidential politics for much of 
the twentieth century. While the GOP had been viewed as a party dominated by a rich 
and elitist establishment with its power base in the country clubs of the northeast, and 
some of the more reactionary regions of the Midwest, Democrats were thought to 
represent the interests of hard-working and patriotic regular folk.  But by the end of the 
Johnson Administration and through the 1970s many conservative Americans perceived 
a decline in family values, a weak and demoralized military, and a bungling and 
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dishonest federal government. Johnson and Carter were portrayed by Reagan’s team as 
having tarnished the American Dream by failing to live up to its alleged ideals. By 1980, 
the pendulum of the Frontier Myth had swung so far to the right that when asked the 
ambiguous question of which Party would make America “great once again” the majority 
now answered that it would be Reagan’s Republicans 367—the “Let’s make America great 
again” phrase even became a key Reagan campaign slogan. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: After three unsuccessful tries for the White House, Ronald Reagan finally 
made it in 1980 at the age of 69—taking all but six states and D.C. During the campaign, 
Cowboy Reagan hit hard at Carter’s economic policies, blaming him for “runaway” 
inflation and unemployment. (Dick Locher, Chicago Tribune, 1980. Permission of Dick Locher) 
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On the night before the election, Reagan went on national television to tell 
Americans that “Not so long ago, we emerged from a world war. Turning homeward at 
last, we built a grand prosperity and hoped—from our own success and plenty—to help 
others less fortunate….Then came the hard years: riots and assassinations, domestic 
strife over the Vietnam War and in the last four years, drift and disaster in Washington.” 
Reagan had been bashing Carter all year for letting America’s defense get soft by cutting 
the B-1 Bomber program, reducing the Navy, cutting special deals with the Soviets and 
appeasing the Reds, and for using his “big, liberal government” to threaten “the 
American way of life.” His use of words like “freedom,” “appeasement” and “weaken” 
deliberately provoked emotional responses and created a sense of urgency in the minds 
of Republicans and independents many of whom came to see liberals as extremists that 
were as dangerous to the well-being of their society as Goldwater had appeared to 
independents and Democrats in 1964. Significantly, Goldwater had hit on very similar 
arguments as Reagan during the former’s own frontier campaign of 1964— but the 
Arizona Senator was then feared as a “kooky” cowboy and, consequently, destroyed at 
the polling booths by LBJ.368 By 1980, events had transformed the structure of the 
Frontier Myth so radically from that of the mid-1960s that an ultra-conservative 
(Reagan) now appeared more “reasonable” to the national electorate than did an alleged 
“crazy liberal” (Carter).369 The Vietnam experience in particular, along with urban 
violence and decay, Watergate, Iran, and a lengthy economic recession had changed the 
nature and emphasis of the western myth and got a conservative frontier up and 
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running. Unable to sustain itself under the force of these powerful events, a new myth 
structure featuring a conservative philosophy and explanatory narrative for “right-
thinking” Americans was forming just as the Reagan ‘80 presidential campaign began 
hitting its stride. On Election Day, Ronald Reagan bushwhacked Jimmy Carter at the 
polling booth, capturing 44 states and defeating an incumbent president for the first 
time since FDR trounced Herbert Hoover in 1932. As historian Sean Cunningham has 
argued, Carter ultimately lost out in the image war with Reagan in large part because in 
the battle for public opinion, conservatism was pitched effectively as patriotic and 
practical while liberalism was now increasingly viewed as the anti-Frontier philosophy—
malaise-ridden, extreme and failed.370 
 
The Hinge 
Twelve years after Johnson left office, the elderly new President Ronald Reagan 
rode into the White House on the coat tails of a frontier explanation for American 
society that had been shaken to its core and was now looking backward in time—or at 
least back to an America as it “should have been.” The long-standing progressive 
Frontier Myth went sour for Democrats with Vietnam, race riots, and related economic 
troubles which many blamed on Johnson’s Administration. “Anti-Westerns” flourished 
in Hollywood during the final years of the Johnson presidency as a reaction against 
Vietnam and the Establishment. The Frontier Myth could no longer accommodate the 
numerous crises and realities of the late 1960s and Cowboy Johnson had to go. Then 
Western connections to the presidency (and the Western genre itself in popular culture) 
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faded during the Nixon, Ford and Carter years until conservative Ronald Reagan vied for 
the Presidency in 1980 on a campaign selling pure strength. Once in office, Reagan and 
his handlers tapped into powerful myths and symbols to promote policies but chose 
vastly different emphases on this imagery than LBJ. Reaganites were going to rely on so-
called American tradition, an alternative lifestyle to what was ailing the country based 
on the simple truths of the Old West: individualism, self-reliance, “know how” and 
higher values. Ronnie Reagan as a Western hero did not answer to regulators and 
bureaucratic red tape, he offered straight solutions. Reagan was going to shoot down all 
those impersonal forces at home, especially “big spending liberals” and government 
bureaucrats that were restricting, scheduling, supervising directing and frustrating their 
daily existence. He was going to put America “back on top” economically, and stand tall 
against menacing Communists and Iranian students who had embarrassed the United 
States and supposedly weakened America’s respect among other nations in the world. In 
1980 the California Cowboy’s most famous campaign slogan captured his return to the 
Frontier philosophy succinctly: “Reagan: Let’s Make America Great Again”. 
A shift took place, the hinge from Reagan to LBJ.  Two political practitioners who 
came down at diametrically opposite poles: one called for more government 
intervention, the other called for much less – both counted on the Frontier Myth to 
deliver. Turner had argued that the two American qualities of tolerance and 
individualism are in perpetual conflict. The two greatest achievements of the frontier—
the construction of a libertarian American individual and the creation of diverse, 
politically equal democratic communities—were frequently opposed to one another. 
Johnson chose to emphasize tolerance and a national agenda based on equality as 
opposed to regional policies and values; Reagan then moved the emphasis to the 
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opposite end of the scale—toward Goldwater-like libertarian individualism and states’ 
rights. LBJ projected frontier imagery forward in time and Reagan projected it 
backwards. A dichotomy developed here and with it the discourse shifted; the myth, or 
at very least its emphasis, adopted and changed. By 1980, the White House and popular 
culture versions of the Western were well on their way to becoming a narrower, less 
flexible, conservative voice. Johnson’s attempts to bring the full Frontier Myth forward 
collapsed and—after the myth initially receded into the background—a reactionary, 
nostalgic way of understanding America replaced the more forward thinking, 
progressive approach. The version that Reagan espoused is a reasserted structure that 
looked backward in time to the past to create an argument that the myth had been 
revitalized by returning to what it originally was, or was supposed to have been. The 
Reagan Presidency and emergence of Reagan as icon can best be understood not simply 
as a resurgence of American conservatism—the usual historic explanation—but in the 
context of a restructured and reoriented version of the Frontier Myth in the face of 
domestic and international events. 
 
 
Reagan’s Early Years in Politics 
 
To better understand Reagan’s presidential relationship to the myth, we need first 
explore this association over his life and career prior to arriving in the Oval Office. Like 
so many Californians of his generation, Ronald Reagan came from somewhere else. A 
transplant from Illinois, he went west to the Pacific Coast while in his twenties. Reagan 
became a born-again Westerner who later went back to the East as President to bring 
the mythic rejuvenating powers of the Western frontier to American political life. To 
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many believers in the rejuvenated and restructured myth, including Reagan himself, the 
East had become a kind of Europe incarnate: a decaying, stale and corrupt place.371 
Over the course of his political career, Ronald Reagan consistently deployed 
frontier symbolism and myth in accordance with his own needs and political 
objectives—making heavy use of it during his years in office as Governor of California 
and, in particular, as President of the United States. Reagan also had an angle on 
promoting western symbolism and myth that previous presidents did not. As a movie 
actor who signed with Warner Brothers in 1937—the same year that LBJ entered the 
Congress—Reagan was a professional at acting, memorizing movie script lines, following 
his directors, and conveying symbolism as the message. What is surprising to many 
today is that while all but one of Reagan’s fifty-three Hollywood movies showed him in a 
heroic role only six were Westerns.372 Reagan’s cowboy persona was fully launched by 
his two year, mid-sixties gig as host and occasional star on Death Valley Days: “Where 
the historical west comes alive.” Taken from a 1930s radio series, the TV version ran 
continuously from 1952 through the early 1970s, and in 1965-66 Reagan appeared every 
week to introduce episodes dressed, appropriately, in cowboy attire. But for Reagan the 
outfit was not just a costume. If he had been denied the opportunity to star in more 
Westerns during his movie career, he acted this out in both his private life, having 
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372 Reagan’s six movie-Westerns include: Law and Order (1932), Santa Fe Trail (1940), The Bad 
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chosen the lifestyle of a gentleman-rancher, and in politics. From that time forward 
Reagan methodically worked to personally and politically identify himself with those 
roles that he himself had wanted to star in most373 and later wished to project to the 
electorate: especially, that of the all-American cowboy, an archetype of the Old West. 
Naturally Reagan and his political handlers wanted his image to be linked to those 
positive values that the Western hero represented: virtuous manliness, individualism, 
patriotism and various other frontier and “small town values.” Today it is difficult to 
imagine Reagan in one of his other roles as an architect, concert pianist, college 
professor, social worker or an insurance adjustor.374 
During his presidential years, much was made by Reagan himself of his switch 
from the Democratic to the Republican Party during the mid-twentieth century. From 
the late 1930s, Reagan had been an active liberal and member of the Democratic Party. 
In Reagan’s America, historian Garry Wills asserts that “though Reagan did not change 
his party registration until 1962, his world and his views were conservative, business-
oriented and actively anti-Communist from 1947 on.”375 During the early Cold War era, 
Reagan was offended by the reluctance of many of his liberal allies to root out 
Communists more aggressively and came to view far leftists—who had threatened 
Reagan himself with physical harm after he became president of the Screen Actors Guild 
(from 1947-1952, and 1959 to 1960)—with contempt. According to his perceptive 
biographer Lou Cannon, however, above all else it was Reagan’s frustration over liberals’ 
belief in higher taxes for Americans that pushed him toward Republican conservatism. 
                                                          
373 During his Hollywood days, Reagan’s desire to star in more Western’s than he ultimately did is 
discussed in Murdoch, The American West, 111. 
374 Hedrick Smith, Adam Clymer, et al. Reagan the Man, the President (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing, 1980): 22-29. 
375 Gary Wills, Reagan’s America: Innocents at Home (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1987): 
257. 
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Reagan was the first actor to sign a million dollar contract with the Music Corporation of 
America (MCA) and, by mid-century, “the cause of lower income taxes became a lifelong 
obsession with Reagan.” Cannon asserts that this was not purely self-interest but that 
Reagan had come to the conclusion that high taxes would remove the incentive from 
Americans to put in the extra effort and hours of work necessary for a thriving 
economy.376 As an addendum to Reagan’s party-switching, Wills adds that an internal 
contradiction would remain a significant part of Reagan’s personae throughout both his 
acting and political career. Though Reagan greatly admired the armed forces and 
intelligence services within the government—“loyally spying on people for national 
security reasons”—and believed government powers should be directed against 
communism, he was just as staunchly anti-government when it came to the regulation of 
the movie industry or any other type of business and industry. 377 As we shall see, this 
kind of contradictory view of government as both a symbol of greatness and colossal 
hindrance to achieving it would be shared decades later by his frontier president 
descendent, George W. Bush. 
Along with the initial movie-cowboy angle discussed earlier, this study contends 
that Reagan’s successful political career was based in large part on a longing that many 
Americans had for the “good old days.” His ideas about pioneering individualism, 
mobility and personal autonomy struck a responsive chord with many Americans—even 
though they seemed hardly fitting in a highly industrialized and increasingly urbanized 
twentieth century society (other Americans, to Reagan’s benefit, contained 
contradictions too). Reagan was, in many respects, a nineteenth-century man who still 
                                                          
376 Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, r2000): 69. 
377 Ibid, 256. 
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preached the unlikely conservative combination of “rugged” individualism along with a 
constant haranguing for the establishment of “law and order.” In October 1964, 
Reagan’s political career received a huge boost when he appeared on national television 
in support of Barry Goldwater in a pre-recorded program entitled “A Time for 
Choosing.” Here Reagan told his audience: “The Founding Fathers knew a government 
can't control the economy without controlling people. And they knew when a 
government sets out to do that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. So 
we have come to a time for choosing." 378 His smoothly delivered message was from the 
same far right wing of pro-business, libertarianism that he had worked up in his years as 
a spokesman for GM and as a critic of Medicare—initially viewed by Reagan as a 
Communist plot. Despite Goldwater’s massive defeat at the polls a few days after the 
Choosing speech, his friend Reagan’s efforts had raised a million dollars for the faltering 
Republican campaign, put the actor on the map as a rising political star of the right, and 
offered a glimpse of a Reagan political philosophy which would remain largely intact 
throughout the rest of his political career. 
In November 1966, student protests at Berkeley and race rioting in Watts helped 
propel Reagan past Democratic incumbent Edmund G. (Pat) Brown by almost one 
million votes and into the office of Governor of California.379 Governor Reagan served 
from 1967-1975, and his early views on Vietnam were hawkish. Campaigning as a 
hardliner conservative he called, like Goldwater, for an end to appeasement of 
Communism, “the most evil enemy mankind has ever known,” stated that “the enemy 
                                                          
378 PBS-TV, The American Experience, “Reagan: A Time for Choosing,” Transcript: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/reagan-goldwater/  
(accessed 25 July 2013). 
379 David Murray, “The Rise of Ronald Reagan,” The Progressive, Vol. 23, Issue 2 (February 1968): 
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should go to sleep at night wondering whether we’re going to use nuclear weapons,” 
insisted that “you don’t negotiate with gangsters” like the National Liberation Front,380 
and boasted that “We could pave the whole country over for a parking lot and get the 
boys home by Christmas.”381 On domestic matters, Reagan represented conservatives 
and loudly opposed LBJ on almost every issue. His attacks on the federal bureaucracy 
typically included a line he had used in his days as a spokesman for GE and in his speech 
for Goldwater: “They say the world has become too complex for simple answers. They 
are wrong. There are no easy answers, but there are simple answers.” 382 As for 
conservation of the Redwood Forests, one of LBJ’s proudest initiatives, Reagan mused: 
“Seen one tree, seen ‘em all.”383 
  
                                                          
380 Reagan quoted in Ibid, 19. 
381 Reagan quoted in Herbert Gold, “Notes from the Land of Political Pop,” New York Times 
Magazine (cDecember 1967): 48, in the LBJ Library, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 113, Ronald 
Reagan—file. 
382Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” October 27, 1964, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/reagan-goldwater/   
(accessed September 17, 2014). 
383 Reagan quoted in Gold, “Notes from the Land of Political Pop,” 48. 
 
 
310 
 
 
Figures 8.2 & 8.3: “The Fascist Gun in the West”: This cowgirl’s poster of “kook-right” 
Governor Reagan in gunfighter stance from 1968 (left) was reprised by Reagan opponents 
during his 1980 presidential bid (right) but, by then, the newly transformed Frontier 
Myth was working more to his advantage (Left: Photo by Lou de la Torre, 1968, and reprinted 
here from the Foundsf website which has made this photo available under a Creative Commons license 
for educational purposes; Right: Vic Dinnerstein, The Fascist Gun in the West, Photograph: Universal 
Pictures, 1980, offset poster. Reprinted with permission of the Collection of the Center for the Study of 
Political Graphics; 9470). 
 
During his first term as Governor, however, Reagan took the advice of his handlers 
and worked hard to lighten up his emerging image as the “Fascist Gun in the West” (see 
Figure 8.2). The former celluloid cowboy began to stress neutralization more than 
nuclearization, toned down his war on trees, and worked hard at making himself more 
appealing to the general public —moving away from the label of an “extremist” or 
“showman.”384 Now, using more carefully crafted wording, Reagan declared: “We have 
the power to wind it up fast in Vietnam, and I think we should use it. The war must be 
fought through to victory, meaning first, an end to North Vietnam’s aggression, and 
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second, an honorable and safe peace for our South Vietnam neighbors.”385 After such 
efforts to sound more moderate and to identify himself with more mainstream 
institutions (through appearances such as his visit to Yale University as a Chubb 
Fellow), the Chicago Daily News observed that Reagan “has brought a large part of the 
Republican Party right back into the normal give and take process of American politics. 
He has been, as it were, a de-kooking agent.”386 
The news media took early notice of Reagan’s presidential prospects as well. In 
September 1966, before Reagan had even been elected Governor, Drew Pearson in his 
syndicated “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column was reporting that conservative 
Republican leaders were: 
 
carefully grooming a Hollywood actor to be President of the United 
States. For the moment they are not advertising that this is their long-
range goal….Under shrewd coaching by his right-wing handlers, who 
have hired the public relations firm Spencer & Roberts, he has 
succeeded in blurring [his] image [as a far-right winger]. This blurring 
of the Reagan image is a result of the decision by the Reagan brain trust 
that Barry Goldwater’s chief mistake was in being too honest.387 
 
Before long, with Reagan, the Republicans seemed to have a Goldwater who was a much 
more effective speaker, sounded more plausible, and at some point might actually win a 
national election. Arguably, in terms of substance, Reagan’s ideas and Goldwater’s were 
virtually identical but by the latter half of the 1960s observers recognized that Reagan’s 
much more suave and less threatening delivery could be a key element in his future 
success. As journalist Paul Scott reveals, one troubled “reaction report” sent directly to 
                                                          
385 Reagan quoted in Paul Scott, “L.B.J. Watches Gov. Reagan,” Greenville Herald Banner (January 
30, 1968) in LBJ Library, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 112, Ronald Reagan 1/68 file. 
386 Joseph Kraft, “Reagan De-Kooks the Republicans,” Chicago Daily News (December 11, 1967), in 
LBJ Library, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 113, Ronald Reagan file. 
387 Drew Pearson, “An Actor is Groomed to Be President,” Washington Post (September 19, 1966): 
B15, in the LBJ Library, Office Files of Bill Moyers, Ronald Reagan—file. 
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President Johnson read: “Reagan is a master of TV and if his local speaking appearances 
are any indication, he would in a very short time upstage other Republican 
[presidential] candidates with his simple and appealing solution for Vietnam.” The 
shape and nature of the Frontier Myth in the late 1960s was not a good match at the 
national level for Cowboy Reagan just yet but, as Johnson’s staffers apparently feared, 
his day was coming.388  
Ronald Reagan and his team’s skillful response to the changing structure of the 
Frontier Myth was a key ingredient to the rising Republican’s persona and a major 
foundation for his five presidential campaigns in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980 and 1984, and 
served to reinforce the change as well.  In all of his campaigns through 1980, Reagan as 
both Governor and Presidential candidate represented an anti-Johnson figure who 
opposed “big government” (except in the area of defense spending) and opposed or 
sought to cut back almost all that the Great Society entailed from school lunch programs 
to civil rights to conservation. Contrary to Johnson’s attempt to continue “the 
progressive, community spirit of the pioneers,” frontier cowboy Reagan would rely on 
so-called American “tradition” based on individualism and other simple truths of the 
Old West. This played much better to the national audience in 1980—still stinging from 
Vietnam, still reeling from the Iran hostage situation, and still struggling with post-
OPEC crisis high energy costs—than it had in Reagan’s previous campaigns. But it was 
not these crises that ostensibly caused the shift in American attitudes that Reagan 
necessarily highlighted and attacked, rather it was the old Republican chestnut of big 
                                                          
388 Quotation from LBJ staffers’ reaction report and general fears about Reagan within the LBJ 
White House are described in Scott, “LBJ Watches Gov. Reagan.” The thick files about Ronald Reagan on 
file at the LBJ Library (more voluminous than those held for any other potential Republican presidential 
candidate c1966-68, apart from Richard Nixon) are also indicative of the Johnson team’s concerns about 
the California Republican. 
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government and interfering bureaucracy. Reagan told TV viewers on election eve in 
1980 that “Americans, who have always known that bureaucracy is the enemy of 
excellence and compassion, want a change in public life—a change that makes 
government work for the people.”389 The reluctant gunman from the Far West who (like 
some modern day Cincinnatus) would willingly give up his tranquil retirement on the 
ranch, promised voters that, if elected, he would stand tall and defeat all those 
impersonal forces at home, especially “tax and spend liberals” and government 
bureaucrats who were restricting scheduling, supervising, directing and frustrating their 
daily existence. Economic stagflation and threats to America’s pre-eminence in the 
world were all the fault of those who had misunderstood the “lessons” of the frontier 
experience: especially Lyndon Johnson. “I am trying to undo the ‘Great Society’,” 
Reagan recorded in his diary. “It was L.B.J.’s war on poverty that led to our present 
mess.” 390 With regard to foreign policy, Reagan charged that LBJ and Carter had 
committed the sin of undermining the belief that America was a favoured nation by 
losing in Vietnam, allowing the Soviets to run rampant in Afghanistan and permitting 
Iranian students to embarrass the United States. All of this mayhem, he said, had 
weakened America’s respect and made it a pitiful giant in the eyes of other nations of the 
world. He summed up his own return-to-the-glories-of-the-frontier philosophy 
succinctly with his most famous two campaign slogans: the previously mentioned, 
“Reagan: Let’s Make America Great Again,” and later his triumphant, “It’s Morning 
Again in America” in 1984.” 
                                                          
389 Ronald Reagan, “A Vision for America,” speech delivered on national television, November 3, 
1980. The original draft is dated October 28, 1980 and appeared on display in the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Museum, Simi Valley, CA in August 2011. 
390 Reagan’s entry for January 28, 1982 in Ronald Reagan with Douglas Brinkley, ed. The Reagan 
Diaries (New York: Harper Collins, 2007): 65. 
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Reagan as a Cowboy Hero 
As the nation came to terms with the recent traumas of the war in Vietnam, 
economic woes, Watergate, and the Iran hostage crisis, the US, once again, appeared in 
search of itself and this arguably fed in to the nation’s increasing reattachment to the 
Frontier Myth—only now it was a conservative presidential candidate who stood to 
benefit most from its revised structure. Republican Party campaigners and handlers 
worked diligently to depict their candidate in the guise of a frontier cowboy during a 
period in American history when (ironically considering the demise of the western as a 
Hollywood staple in the late 70s and early 80s) the public yearned for a frontier-type 
who could pull the nation out of its perceived woeful malaise and Reagan embodied 
American Western mythology more than any other contenders for the White House 
since Johnson and Goldwater.  Symbolism was key to Reagan’s success. His iconic 
image as the conservative cowboy capable of meeting any challenge or defeating any 
foe, was summed up in a 1980 campaign poster, with Marlboro Country having been 
replaced by the slogan: “America: Reagan Country.” At the centre of the image is a 
smiling Ronald Reagan in a white Stetson with an open-necked denim shirt, while 
behind him in a haze are images of the flag, Statue of Liberty, a rustic church, the family 
farm, and Monument Valley. It was as though time had been turned back and the 
Hollywood directors of near forgotten 1930s B-westerns had been resurrected to design 
Reagan’s public relations campaign. Reagan used the revised Frontier Myth with a great 
deal of success because he was able to align his presidential image with that of the 
quintessentially American figure and hero—the cowboy—and, even more importantly, 
match up his own right wing ideology with the revised vision of America’s westering 
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experience. As Gary L. Gregg has asserted, “No presidency relied more upon visual 
images and symbolic moments than Reagan’s.”391 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: This iconic Reagan ‘80 campaign poster replaced 
Marlboro Country with the slogan: “America: Reagan 
Country.” (Image courtesy author’s collection) 
 
                                                          
391 Gary L. Gregg, “Ronald Reagan and the Rebuilding of the Symbolic Presidency,” in Paul Kengor 
and Peter Schweizer, eds., The Reagan Presidency: Assessing the Man and His Legacy (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005): 139. 
 
 
316 
 
Throughout his 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan projected an image that 
appealed to many American voters during a time when America’s military prowess was 
challenged by the USSR and its economic prowess by Japan. Reagan the cowboy was a 
strong, unapologetic and most of all heroic leader-type: an image that none of his 
political rivals, whether Republicans like George H.W. Bush or Democrats like Jimmy 
Carter, were able to project.392 America was falling behind, so went the perception, for 
the very reasons Frederick Jackson Turner had feared—because the country had become 
urban, intellectual and flabby. Some of the same fears and anxieties experienced in TR’s 
day resurfaced with a vengeance during the Reagan period and once again, the nation 
looked to the old virile and  “manly virtues” of the frontier for answers.  Only this time 
this toughness and virility was not needed to rid the nation of corporate corruption and 
excesses through a bolstering of federal government powers: instead the new, 
transformed Frontier Myth had become a reversal of this earlier accepted wisdom that 
had prevailed during TR’s and into LBJ’s time in office. On Inauguration Day 1981, a 
New York Times editorialist described how many Americans hoped that Reagan would 
fulfill the new demands of the myth: “The metaphor seems inevitable,” Robert Lindsey 
observed, “a cowboy in full regalia moves on Washington from out of the West, looking 
grim and ready for battle with the gang of looters that has taken over the town. He fights 
for individual liberty, the free enterprise system and a Federal Government that will get 
off the backs of the people.”393 
                                                          
392 Sarah Russell Hankins, “Archetypal Alloy: Reagan’s Rhetorical Image,” Communication Studies, 
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American audiences of the early Reagan period wanted tough, crusading, “red 
meat-eating” heroes394 who could avenge, at least symbolically, the humiliations of 
Vietnam, Watergate and the Iranian hostage crisis that they had to suffer through in the 
1970s.  America had lost a war, crime was seen as unravelling the social fabric, and a 
perceived breakdown in national discipline was leading to a sense of drift. These events 
literally shook the core of American society and how it saw itself. Tired of those serious, 
liberal character-driven movies such as All the President’s Men, ‘80s filmmakers could 
get away with the same simple-minded good versus evil mentality that had sustained the 
B-Westerns in the 1930s (through Hollywood’s new action heroes Sylvester “Rambo” 
Stallone, future California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Chuck Norris, and the 
like). These were not the tortured and complex western heroes dealing with complex 
societal issues that audiences had seen in Jimmy Stewart’s Broken Arrow, Gary 
Cooper’s High Noon, or even John Ford’s The Searchers or The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance. Rather, they were the simplistic characters finding simplistic answers as 
depicted by two dimensional heroes like Hopalong Cassidy, The Lone Ranger, and Roy 
Rogers. Reagan, in other words, was a B-western actor living in a B-Western world. As 
the editor of Reagan’s own presidential diaries has noted, the President “pined for the 
days of his Hollywood youth. There was good and evil and the world was black and 
white.”395 
Interestingly, though, Reagan himself had started out as a New Deal Democrat, it 
was his distaste for federal income tax (after he earned a salary of $1,000,000, multi-
                                                          
394 “Explosive Return of the Action Heroes,” Statesman [India] 30 April 2010. General Reference 
Center Gold. Web (accessed 31 March 2011). 
395 Douglas Brinkley quoted in Lisa Friedman, “Reagan, the Film Buff,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 
1997: 11, in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Newspaper Reference Files, “Reagan, Ronald W. – 
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year contract with Warner Brothers in the mid-40s) and for liberal leftists within the 
screen actors guild (which he headed) that apparently caused him to radically alter his 
political polarity during the 1950s to become a hard right libertarian.396 Now Hollywood 
symbols took on a kind of radical individualism that Reagan relished: not only were 
these heroes the old good versus evil types of his youth, character’s like Sylvester 
Stallone’s John Rambo also attempted to confront the receded myth of frontier-
masculinity by rehabilitating it and replaying the Vietnam War. As President, Reagan 
himself enjoyed taunting his domestic liberal enemies with Clint “Dirty Harry” 
Eastwood’s warning: “Go ahead, make my day” as he vowed to veto tax increases in 1985 
(which Reagan then asked for in the next budget).397 On screen, Detective Harry 
Callahan runs down punks who have made the city a crime-ridden jungle using tactics 
prohibited by an over-regulated and ineffective police force. His Smith and Wesson 
revolvers get bigger with each film as he fulfills a need to blow away entire structures of 
evil, not just individual bad guys. Reagan vowed to employ these alleged frontier values 
and tactics to rid America’s friends of Communists abroad, rid America’s streets of 
criminals at home, and rid the Federal government of vacillating liberalism. The Reagan 
era would come to represent the heyday of presidential “cowboy conservatism.”  
 
Reaganism and The Right Stuff 
Another significant film of the 1980s, The Right Stuff (1983), is likewise built 
around a conservative version of the Frontier Myth, with its emphasis on rugged 
                                                          
396 See Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, 246. 
397 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at a White House Meeting With Members of the American Business 
Conference," March 13, 1985. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38318. Reagan is quoting Dirty Harry Callaghan 
(Clint Eastwood) from Sudden Impact (1983), Warner Brothers, Dir: Clint Eastwood. 
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individualism, conquest and nostalgia. Sam Shephard plays test pilot extraordinaire 
Chuck Yeager, the man at the center of the film, and personifies him as a Western 
cowboy hero. Actor Shephard himself exhibited this persona, often wearing a cowboy 
hat and boots and exhibiting a grace under pressure manner. The director of The Right 
Stuff, Philip Kaufman (who wrote the screenplay for The Outlaw Josey Wales, 
Eastwood’s favourite, a few years earlier) recognized Yeagar/Shephard as the most 
appealing and marketable icon of the film.398  Our first sight of Yeager as the lone rider 
on his horse brings to mind the heroes of Wister and Ford. Yeager rides his horse up to a 
saloon, saunters in, and orders a whiskey with his buddies.  Then he promises to “put 
the spurs” to the X-1. Here director Kaufman is setting the stage for the rest of the film 
by superimposing the fantasy of space travel, America’s highest frontier, where lone 
space cowboys will bring security and even a sense of providential order to the empty 
skies.  
Another different kind of “right stuff” cowboy appears in the character of John 
Glenn (Ed Harris). Glenn much more resembles the clean cut cowboy of the Gene Autry 
era—or Reagan himself in his cowboy roles—a virtuous hero who abstains from alcohol 
and promotes the expansion of civilized values and morality into the western/space 
travel wilderness. Significantly, in a departure from earlier liberal heroes, Glenn 
becomes the Mercury Seven’s most vocal critic of government bureaucrats or 
functionaries, all of whom treat the astronauts as if they were little more than “spam in a 
can.” One of Ronald Reagan’s favourite lines, that government was not the solution but 
the problem, is a philosophy shared wholeheartedly by the heroes in The Right Stuff. 
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Nowhere is this more evident than in the scenes featuring a bombastic take on LBJ or 
the U.S. Space Agency’s parade of bureaucrats beset with heavy German accents. The 
Teutonic bumblers, and in some respects the celluloid LBJ himself, are the foils to the 
values that the astronaut heroes of the film represent. Movie-goers are shown how 
bloated central planning (propagated by crazy liberals like Johnson) threatened to turn 
the free and individually talented fly-boy heroes into canned meat, cogs in a mechanical 
and impersonal system. In face of these American apparatchiks, the entrepreneurial 
and self-reliant astronauts are determined to show what they’re made of. The Seven are 
convinced that it is their own personal stories and achievements that will ultimately 
attract funding to the Mercury program. John Glenn takes charge of the space cowboys’ 
efforts to make crucial changes to the spacecraft, then makes a spectacular landing after 
a shaky heat shield imperils his spacecraft as the hero hums the “Battle Hymn of the 
Republic” (apparently some poetic license was taken here399) all the way to parachute 
deployment. As James Scott has asserted: “By the early 1980s The Right Stuff [was a] 
technophilic hymn to the conquest of space…associated not only with the popular Space 
Shuttle but also with President Reagan’s space-based SDI initiative.”400 
 
Cowboy Reagan’s “Ranch in the Sky” 
During his presidential years, Reagan’s rugged, western image was most visible in 
the 50 trips that he and Nancy took to Rancho del Cielo (“Ranch in the Sky”), where he 
spent one year of his eight year presidency. The press delivered regular television 
footage of the President at his 688-acre “Western White House” near Santa Barbara. 
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While campaigning in 1980 and during his two terms in office, many of the activities 
and tasks that Reagan performed at the Ranch—riding horses in cowboy garb, clearing 
brush, mending fences, and signing legislation—were choreographed by his own press 
team and offered broad and simple metaphors for what he had pledged to do to restore 
order to his land as the Commander-in-Chief. Reagan was depicted as the rugged 
individualist on horseback or fence builder with chainsaw in hand who worked the land 
independent of outside help to build something worthwhile out of the scrub brush of the 
Santa Barbara hills. 401 
The Reagan and LBJ ranches, like their respective owners, are in many ways a 
study in contrasts. Both presidents went to their ranches frequently to recharge and 
rode horses but at that point the similarities end. Unlike the functioning LBJ Ranch, the 
only cattle at the Reagan’s Ranch during his presidency were two Longhorns kept as 
family pets: Duke and Duchess. In a reversal of LBJ’s comfortable, high-tech home at 
Stonewall, Rancho del Cielo had only the most basic of features: no furnace (staffers 
could be seen regularly stoking fireplaces in the living and family rooms), no bathtub, no 
dishwasher and a dated roof antenna for the TV. Reagan never wanted to modernize 
and deliberately avoided doing so. While the LBJ Ranch had reveled in presidential 
trappings and celebrated the executive office, Reagan’s Ranch was utterly void of them, 
save the white phone in the bedroom with a direct line to the Secret Service and the 
Reagan’s choice of address: 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. With a few exceptions (and 
most of them famous: George and Barbara Bush, Margaret Thatcher, Mikhail and Raisa 
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Gorbachev, Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip, and Brian and Mila Mulroney) the 
Reagans hosted very few guests, rarely inviting senior advisors or even their own 
children to stay there. The Ranch was, and remains to this day, filled with sketches of 
cowboys on horseback, often lone figures on the prairie. One observer has suggested 
that Reagan’s choice in ranch-art reflected his own state of mind when he placed them 
on the walls in the mid-1970s: that of a lone conservative rider wandering the plains. 402  
Johnson and Reagan’s adherence to vastly different versions of the Frontier Myth 
were so deep seated that these convictions were even evident in the choice of their 
physical surroundings. Where Johnson associated Western imagery with progress, 
ongoing improvements, and the exploration of the frontiers of the future403, Reagan’s 
vision of returning America to greatness reached backward in time to reinvigorate the 
present by returning it to what was still commonly perceived as his nation’s “traditional” 
and “ideal” way of life. More importantly, for the purposes of this study, the frontier 
message now interacted with a conservative political agenda as well.  
 
 The Myth and Nostalgic Conservatism 
On social issues from school prayer to sex education, Ronald Reagan was 
committed to turning back the clock to the values that he saw as governing America in 
the past. As discussed in previous chapters, LBJ too could be cavalier in the way he 
understood the history of the West and the pioneering/frontier experience. But the 
lessons which Johnson used them for were dramatically different than those of Reagan. 
                                                          
402 Steven Barrie-Anthony, “Home Is Where His Heart Was,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 2004, in 
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403 As noted earlier in this proposal, Lyndon Johnson’s vision of the frontier as an ongoing 
“molding force” in modern, urban, industrial America is described in his Foreword to the re-issued 1965 
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And, I would contend, even more so than his frontier-president predecessors Reagan 
seemed to have an open preference for myth over his consideration of events both in the 
present and the past. 
Reagan paid little attention to the historical West. His view and descriptions of the 
past were typically ahistorical and sometimes fictional, selective, and chosen for 
dramatic effect. Most of all they were driven by priorities of a conservative view of the 
Frontier Myth. In their study Personality, Character and Leadership in the White 
House, psychiatrists Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer working in 
conjunction with several presidential historians, characterize Reagan as the most 
fantasy driven of all the presidents. “Reagan,” their study contends, “tended to ‘accept as 
fact any opinion, story, or rumor that tended to support his own point of view.’”404 
While this is arguably true for most leaders, Reagan—possibly because of his past career 
of acting and pretending in movies and TV—appears to have been especially prone to 
this weakness. For example, Reagan was evaluated by Rubenzer, Faschingbauer and the 
presidential historians as the president most prone to daydream and as a man who 
reflects on major problems and issues “from the standpoint of what John Wayne would 
do.”405 Reagan would also discuss proposed initiatives—such as the extremely complex 
and expensive Strategic Defense Initiative—as if they were already up and running, and 
would demonize America’s enemies (in particular the Soviets), and, in retrospect, 
appears to have suffered bouts of forgetfulness from the early onset of Alzheimer’s 
disease. Wilbur Edel once demonstrated at length that the President possessed a 
remarkable “ignorance of history” and penchant for “acceptance of fantasy in place of 
                                                          
404 Steven J. Rubenzer and Thomas R. Faschingbauer. Personality, Character, and Leadership in 
the White House: Psychologists Assess the Presidents (Brassey’s: Dulles VA, 2004): 178. 
405 Ibid, 183. 
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fact.”406 Even more than LBJ (and, arguably, to a much greater degree than the learned 
President TR), Reagan seemed prone to allowing the structures of the Frontier Myth to 
accommodate and therefore interpret contemporary events themselves: with the 
conservative version of the myth remaining steadily paramount in his thinking and 
actions as President. Relatedly, for Reagan, what was most important about American 
history was not what might provide clues to solutions for the complex challenges of 
modern America—but what could be used to overcome these complexities. 
Contemporary problems, as Reagan saw them, were the result of the nation’s 
abandonment of the values that had made the country “great” in the past. He looked 
back with sincerity and faith to an America as “it should have been.” “If the legend 
becomes fact,” to quote from Ford’s self-reflexive The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, 
Reagan believed that America needed to “print the legend.” 
Interestingly, the influence of movies on Reagan’s thinking has been observed 
elsewhere by Lou Cannon and other biographers but it should be noted for the purposes 
of this study that Ronald and Nancy Reagan watched numerous Westerns at Camp 
David during their eight years in Washington including many featuring their friends 
“Duke” Wayne and Jimmy Stewart. Among the John Wayne Westerns viewed by the 
Reagans were Big Jake, Chisum, Red River, Rio Bravo, Rooster Cogburn and The 
Searchers; those starring Jimmy Stewart included Destry Rides Again, How the West 
Was Won, The Man from Laramie, and Winchester ’73 (twice). Sometimes, Reagan 
would work descriptions of the scenes or plots from Western movies into his speeches in 
the days and weeks after he viewed them: as he did during his 1988 visit to Moscow 
                                                          
406 Wilbur Edel, The Reagan Presidency: An Actor’s Finest Performance (New York: Hippocrene 
Books, 1992): 5, 65. 
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when he compared perestroika to the scene where Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid 
jump off a cliff. During the final year, 1988-1989, the Reagans watched eight Westerns 
at Camp David including two horse operas featuring Reagan himself that had served his 
political image so well: Santa Fe Trail, and the last film viewed before heading back to 
California, Cattle Queen of Montana (shown January 14, 1989).407 As David Murdoch 
keenly observed: “What is remarkable is that [Reagan’s] version of the myth is so 
inextricably entangled with movie images, so that one has replaced the other….For 
Reagan, films did not reflect history, history reflected movies.”408 
On TV, Reagan enjoyed episodes of the 1985 series Lonesome Dove: based on one 
of RR’s ten favourite books and authored by Larry McMurtry.409 The story revolves 
around a lengthy cattle drive of former Texas Rangers from Texas to Montana and 
parallels in many ways with the Don Quixote story of an old knight and his adventures. 
Eden awaited the stalwart. The series fit the Reagan “frontier” era perfectly with its 
power resting on the resilience of the older myth of the cowboy. As one Texas reviewer 
who bought into the Reagan era myth wrote, McMurtry “has distilled the westering 
experience to its essence.”410 
Reagan’s own preference for myth over actual events is also evident in his 
correspondence. In a letter which the President wrote to a young disabled man, Peter 
Aviles of Caldwell, Idaho on January 28, 1985, Reagan referred to himself as a “history 
                                                          
407 The complete list of films of the Reagans’ White House movie nights was posted online at: 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, “Films President and Mrs. Reagan Viewed,” National Archives and 
Records Administration, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/filmsviewed.html (accessed 3 
February 2011). 
408 Murdoch, The American West, 115. 
409 Larry McMurtry’s  Lonesome Dove (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985) was described by 
Reagan as one of his ten favourite books and for this reason appeared in a special display at the Reagan 
Ranch Center Museum, Santa Barbara CA, which I visited in August 2011. 
410 Leonard Sanders, Fort-Worth News Tribune, August 16, 1985 quoted in Ernestine P. Sewell, 
“McMurtry’s Cowboy-God in ‘Lonesome Dove,” Western American Literature, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 1986): 
225. 
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buff” with a “main interest in the American West.” He continued: “As some historian put 
it, it was the most unusual march of empire in world history. It wasn’t led by the military 
but by settlers who bet their lives and the lives of their families as they opened up the 
west in the face of hardship and hostile Indians.”411 The President acknowledged his 
own mythic understanding of the West and both promoted and defended this limited 
view by emphasizing its moral function. When Reagan opened “The American Cowboy” 
Exhibit” at the Library of Congress in 1983, he applauded the “ideals of courageous and 
self-reliant heroes, both men and women,” which “are the stuff of Western lore.” Then 
he explained through reference to a “noted historian” (Henry Steele Commager) that 
“Americans, in making their Western myths, were not put off by discrepancies with 
reality. Americans believed about the West not so much what was true, but what they 
thought ought to be true.” He continued: “Lacking the common heritage that bound 
other nations together, they were forced to look elsewhere for the basis of their national 
existence. And they found it,” thankfully, in Reagan’s view, “in the West.”412  
Whether fully conscious of it or not, Reagan and his Administration were offering a 
counter thrust against the “New Western History” and now reclaimed the frontier, even 
a less than “real” one, as good, right and proper. When the optimistic conservative 
Reagan told Americans that “our best days are ahead of us” what he meant was that the 
future would be better because under his leadership the spirit of enterprise and 
                                                          
411 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Presidential Handwriting File Series II: Presidential 
Records, Box 11, Folder 162 (January 26, 1985 to January 28, 1985), PR007 287180, Reagan response 
letter to Peter Aviles (January 28, 1985). 
412 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Opening of ‘The American Cowboy’ Exhibit at the Library of 
Congress,” March 24, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41095 (accessed March 13, 2012). 
 
 
327 
 
adventure would be imported from the past.413 As Reagan wrote in his auto-biography: 
“I thought then, and I think now, that the brief post-Civil War era when our blue-clad 
cavalry stayed on a war-time footing against the plains and desert Indians was a phase 
of Americana rivalling the Kipling era of color and romance.”414 The former actor did 
not only wish to revive the spirit of the nation he wanted to “resurrect” his idealized and 
sentimental vision of the past as well.415 In the aftermath of the tumultuous late 1960s 
and 1970s, Reagan’s comfort level with historical neglect and adherence to a new right-
wing revision of the Frontier Myth met with a generally receptive American audience. As 
historian Ray Allen Billington told the New York Times in 1981, a popular myth 
emerged that “the frontier was a land of unrestrained liberty, where the individual was 
supreme and law was dispensed out a holster instead of a law book. It really wasn’t like 
that,” Billington explained. “But people believe the myth that was created…and Reagan 
has come to personify those things: they aren’t true but it doesn’t matter because people 
think they are.”416 Reagan the candidate and president communicated in simple terms, 
through patriotic, uplifting and often imaginary Western stories, metaphors, films and 
anecdotes to promote a vastly different agenda from that of LBJ, including: law and 
order, family values, tough talk in dealing with the Soviet Union, a guns over butter 
approach to government spending, libertarianism and individualism over Civil Rights 
and inclusion, and (at least rhetorically) a reduction of size and role of the federal 
government in American life.  
                                                          
413 Ronald Reagan: "Inaugural Address," January 21, 1985. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38688>   
(accessed February 23, 2012). 
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In Discovered Lands: Invented Pasts: Transforming Visions of the American 
West (1992), Martha Sandweiss observes that the myths of the West—of discovery, the 
adventuring spirit of the pioneers, of tough individualism and self-reliance—are rooted 
too deeply in the American psyche to be eliminated by historical “fact.” And as Brian 
Dippie demonstrated through his study of the “Vanishing American,” myths have 
consequences. The dominance of myth over fact and the influence of myth-based beliefs 
in shaping the actions of the Chief Executive would prove as evident during the Reagan 
Years as it had during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson: 
only this time, events of the previous decade had caused changes to the mythic structure 
that would result in a right-wing reorientation of federal policies and programs. As will 
be asserted in Chapter IX, the conservative Frontier Myth of the 1980s and the politics, 
policies and nature of the “Reagan Revolution” were inexorably linked.417 
 
Conclusion: Reagan as the Right Wing’s Frontier Antidote to LBJ 
In earlier chapters this dissertation explored how Lyndon Johnson and his 1964 
campaign team had characterized Barry Goldwater as a reckless, selfish and 
irresponsible cowboy who did not live up to the frontier values of the postwar 
generation. Given Ronald Reagan’s similar, if much smoother, platform on the issues 
one might assume that had he ever run against Reagan, LBJ would have taken a similar 
tack. 
But during the late 1960s and afterwards, then California Governor Reagan had 
plenty to say about Democratic President Johnson: in fact he soon became arguably the 
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most effective of the Republican LBJ-bashers in the Southwest. On speaking tours in his 
state of California, Johnson’s home state of Texas, and other “frontier” states, Reagan 
then portrayed himself as being on a “Crusade for the people.” In contrast to the Liberal 
Establishment, he attacked LBJ’s Great Society as “having been set up in opposition to 
the vast majority of American interests, linked this to Johnson’s widening credibility 
gap…blamed LBJ’s social policies for the formation of radical left splinter groups” and 
called “upon LBJ to do more, not less, to win the war in Vietnam.”418 Two decades later 
this same line of attack was used by Reagan on the Democratic Party’s vision. In 1988, at 
a fundraising dinner in Houston, now President Reagan used cowboy talk to chide “the 
Democrats…once proud-party which used to stand for economic growth at home and 
expanding the frontiers abroad—a proud bull with a passion for justice and liberty.” 
Now, Reagan insisted, after years of weak, liberal leadership the party he had once 
belonged to had allegedly been reduced to “a stampeded steer, cowed by special 
interests at home and enemies of freedom abroad.”419 In an article published in The 
Nation, “The Age of Reaganism,” liberal journalist Andrew Kopkind described the 
overall values of Reagan’s Cowboy Code as one that valued private and not public 
institutions—apart from the masculine element, the very antithesis of most of the values 
promoted by LBJ: “competitive enterprise over collective endeavor, the family unit over 
the heterogeneous community… patriotism over internationalism, selfishness over 
altruism, having over sharing.”420 For Reagan, the implications for the Frontier Myth 
were clear: LBJ had not “cowboyed up” to the traditional values of individualism, self-
                                                          
418 Cunningham, Cowboy Conservatism, 91. 
419 Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a Republican Party Fundraising Dinner in Houston, Texas," 
September 22, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
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reliance and America’s duty to face down and defeat the bad guys from behind the barrel 
of a Smith and Wesson. LBJ had failed the myth. Reagan had taken advantage of and 
would reinforce the new rightest structure through programs that changed and even 
reversed the liberal trajectory that had shaped the administrations of the earlier frontier 
presidents.  
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IX. 
 
Reagan’s Policy Frontiers at Home and Abroad 
 
Yes, the choice before the American people this year is just as 
clear as it was in 1980 and 1984: a choice between, on the 
one hand, liberal policies of tax and spend; gun control; 
economic stagnation; international weakness; and always, 
always ‘blame America first’; and on the other hand, what we 
believe—the policies of limited government, economic 
growth, individual opportunity, a strong defense, firmness 
with the Soviets, and always, always, ‘I pledge allegiance to 
the flag of the United States of America’. 
America has saddled up….We’re keeping a promise that is as 
old as this land we love and as big as the sky. We need you to 
put on your spurs and ride with us.  
     —President Ronald Reagan campaigning on behalf of VP 
George HW Bush (1988) 421 
 
 
The conservative contours of the transformed Frontier Myth were both deliberately 
and subconsciously mirrored in the policies, programs and ideology of the Reagan 
Administration. Events of the late 1960s and 1970s had caused a shift in the myth’s 
emphasis that appeared a near eclipsing of those national priorities that had allowed 
LBJ to soundly defeat Barry Goldwater in the presidential contest of 1964. When Ronald 
Reagan ran for President in 1980 it was as the “great emancipator.” But Reagan was not 
campaigning in support of civil rights or anti-poverty legislation; instead he was selling 
his right wing pledge to free Americans from economic stagflation, the legacy of 
Vietnam and the Iranian hostage crisis, and most of all, from the restraining hands of 
liberals.  
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Events of the previous decade-and-a-half had overturned the liberal Frontier Myth 
and replaced it with a conservative one as events not only affected structure, but the 
structure would shape events. As Marshall Sahlins contends, the two were mutually 
informing. With “Reaganomics,” new capital released through tax cuts and deregulation, 
promised to bring back to the American economy the rapid expansion and high growth 
rates of the past that Turner’s Frontier thesis had once said were made possible through 
the continual expansion of the frontier into regions rich in natural resources. Reagan 
would also initiate the largest peacetime military buildup in US history and a Strategic 
Defense Initiative program both as a “big stick” to use against the allegedly expansionist 
Soviets and to restore America’s position as the world’s undisputed number one 
Superpower. Reagan’s Eighties was a decade of national renewal and national excess. 
The decade was also characterized by restorative nostalgia: the desire to “return to the 
good old days” (which the frontier was now understood as representing), a rebirth in 
national pride, and, in its darker manifestations, a search for ‘black hats’ to be defeated 
so that the promise of the imagined homeland of the past could be restored. It is no 
coincidence that the president’s policy actions paralleled so closely the values and 
symbolism of the resurgent myth of the frontier, a vision which, having recently been 
transformed, came once again to be perceived as offering an explanation for the entire 
American experience. 
This said, adherence to the revised Frontier Myth created challenges and problems 
for Reagan and his team as well when events challenged the structure they had rode to 
the White House. As will be explored, the “Sagebrush Rebellion” over the control of 
public lands at first seemed to tie Reagan’s stance most closely to the idea of the 
American frontier as a focal point of the nation’s libertarianism and democracy; it 
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ultimately failed, however, when most of its advocates concluded that the risks of 
individual state over federal control outweighed the potential benefits. In 1983, the 
airing of a TV-movie about nuclear annihilation—and a series of real world events both 
preceding and following its release—caused Reagan and the American public to re-
examine some of their assumptions about the Cold War and the US-Soviet relationship. 
The bombing of the Marines barracks that same year and Iran-Contra scandal in the 
latter half of the decade, meanwhile, would confound and frustrate Reagan. And, as with 
LBJ, the President’s adherence to the tough, “manly” principles of the myth severely 
limited his options and brought disastrous results. Ideas, as Brian Dippie contends, had 
direct consequences for policy formation during the Reagan Administration but that did 
not mean that ideas could predict the future. Rather, the influence of ideas on policy 
brought sometimes unpredictable outcomes and ultimately, adjustments to and the 
dominant contours of the Frontier Myth and, consequently, to aspects of Reaganism 
itself. 
 
Morning in America 
Ray Allen Billington had identified the frontier thesis’ most outstanding feature as 
optimism: one earned through Americans’ triumphant taming of the West. Ronald 
Reagan tapped heavily into this aspect of the myth by breaking the mould of older 
generations of conservatives and employing the same spirit of optimism and hope that 
liberals had projected—only this time in the name of policies that were conservative. 
And Reagan did this in ways that no Oval Office predecessor had done. Contrary to 
others in the Republican Party, including Goldwater, Reagan perceived that he could not 
govern the country as a pessimist. Previously, most conservatives had always promoted 
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a strand that was pessimistic and negative about human nature but Reagan thought that 
raising spirits in the country was a practical way to make good things happen, including: 
investments, confidence in the military, and having children.422 
 
Figure 9.1: Barry Goldwater was out-cowboyed by LBJ in 1964 but 
Reagan learned from his old friend’s mistakes, benefitted politically 
from later events which had unravelled the nation, and would ride his 
own conservative version of the Frontier Myth all the way to the White 
House in 1980. Here they meet in the Oval Office to admire an apt gift 
just one month after RR’s first inauguration. (Courtesy Ronald Reagan 
Library, White House Photograph Collection, Photo #795-2, Frame 4A, February 
23, 1981) 
 
As President, Ronald Reagan spoke optimistically of returning and restoring 
America to an idyllic time of days past. Likewise, Reagan constantly invoked the past in 
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Hero in Politics,” 29-30. 
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ideal, reassuring terms, and thought he lived through much of it. In Reagan’s depiction 
of the frontier past, American imperialism out West was all for the good and in the 
present social problems and disagreeable social groups (minorities, the poor, and 
intellectuals) were either ignored or obstacles to be pushed out of the way as part of the 
president’s attempt to control the future by making it into the past. Reagan’s version of 
the myth itself had remained an optimistic vision for real bona fide Americans but, it 
was a narrower, less flexible and more exclusionary one than had been the case in 
previous decades. 
Nowhere were Reagan’s brand of and connections to a conservative, return to the 
past, and optimistic Frontier Myth made more explicit than in his Presidential ad 
campaigns. At the 1984 Republican National Convention, and on paid TV airtime 
afterwards, the Reagan Campaign ran an 18 minute commercial created by ad-man 
extraordinaire Hal Riney and formally entitled Prouder, Better, Stronger—but now 
more widely known as Morning in America. At the beginning of the polished film the 
impression is created that America, like Rip Van Winkle, has long been asleep (in this 
case economically and politically) and only awakens with the 1981 inaugural ceremony 
depicting Reagan with his hand on the Bible taking the oath of office. The scenes which 
directly follow depict morning imagery from across the country. Reagan tells us: “Yes, it 
was quite a day, a new beginning.” As we witness the “birth” of Reagan’s Presidency and 
are told: “It’s morning in America.” Soon ordinary Americans and VP Bush explain to 
viewers that there’s been “a renewed sense of pride and patriotism” in the country and 
that “the country’s moving again.” In choreographed footage of the President and First 
Lady’s trip through the Far East, Reagan tells us in a voice-over: “Our trip to Japan, 
Korea, and later the People’s Republic of China, makes you realize that the old line ‘Go 
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West, young man, go West,’ still fits. There’s a new frontier out there, there’s a future 
and the United States is going to be very much a part of that future.” Here the Frontier 
Myth and Reagan’s cowboy status is plainly evoked as is America’s expanding role on an 
“international” frontier. On the South Korean edge of the DMZ, Reagan exalts American 
troops stationed there as everyday heroes. He appears in an army mess hall, dressed in 
battle fatigues. The President tells us: “I’ve never seen such morale, such esprit de corps, 
such pride in their work. All of us here at home should remember all of those young men 
and women on the frontiers of freedom.” For Reagan and his filmmakers, the “frontiers 
of freedom” phrase (also a favourite of LBJ’s) represents the outermost edge of 
American influence: everything within her sphere is safe, good and civilized but outside 
is unknown and potentially uncivilized. The mythic pioneer and American heroes on the 
frontier likewise had to fight and guard to protect the advancing civilization and also to 
push the frontier further as he brought new land into America’s domain. Cattle boss 
Reagan and his boys on the Korean Peninsula are portrayed as paladins of the American 
way, fighting on “the “frontiers of freedom” to defend democracy from all that is lying 
beyond the frontier with the evils of communism. 423 
As the leading man in the story of his Presidency, Reagan was packaged as the 
political embodiment of the frontier/cowboy hero in the white hat, an active force who 
has arrived from outside to help right the prevailing wrongs and get the country moving 
again. His manliness is perceived in his tough stands on military posture, his seemingly 
decisive views on domestic policy, and his tall, “rugged” appearance. Here the 
president’s handlers tapped directly into the simple truths of the Old Frontier: 
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individualism, self-reliance, higher values, and the bristling “know how” of America’s 
advanced and potent military technology. Reagan’s Democratic opponents, meanwhile, 
were pushed into contrasting imagery and portrayed by those on the right as 
“impractical, ineffectual and effete.”424 Ultimately, Morning in America’s Reagan is 
portrayed as the sanctifier of community: he is the “natural” inheritor of the presidential 
office and if Americans want the final chapter of this heroic tale to be written, then they 
will need to cast their vote in November to re-elect Ronald Reagan as their President. 
His success at the polls in 1984, with Reagan/Bush winning every state except 
Minnesota and the District of Columbia, is a reflection of the importance of imagery in 
political campaigns. Frontier symbolism and myth would play a crucial role in Reagan’s 
presidential policy-making as well. 
 
Reaganism at Home: The Frontier “Principles” of Freedom & Individualism 
Of all the principles that Reagan emphasized in his frontier rhetoric, freedom and 
individualism were perhaps the most pronounced. The President told Americans that 
they were a community unique in history because “we unleashed the energy and 
individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before.”425 As a 
result, Reagan would say, “Freedom and dignity of the individual have been more 
available and assured here than in any other place on Earth.”426 Here Reagan is drawing 
on a selective rightest version of the Frontier Myth emphasizing Turner’s “masterful 
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grasp of material things,” and American exceptionalism—two features which would 
become ideological pillars of both his domestic and foreign policies. 
A radical conservative, Ronald Reagan portrayed American history as a struggle to 
preserve America’s freedom, greatness and values against major obstacles imposed by 
economic adversity, Big Government, and sinister enemies (especially Communists and 
terrorists). Reagan believed that Americans had always had the opportunity to achieve 
greatness and were better off going it alone without outside help. The domestic evils of 
government regulation and taxation, and the need to maintain the nation’s military 
strength, always remained paramount in stories that Reagan told and heavily influenced 
his policies at home and abroad. He also repeatedly told Americans that if they chose to 
participate in the story—that is, the conservative myth structure of their era— then they 
would become part of their nation’s greatness.  
President Reagan hailed the decentralization of government and portrayed this as 
harkening back to an era of unregulated individualism. His cowboy-politician image of 
the ‘80s emphasized the handling of adversity through independence and isolated self-
reliance. To bolster these attributes Reagan took the opposite approach to TR and 
Lyndon Johnson: instead of investing in community welfare and giving impoverished 
people the support that liberals believe are needed to increase the level of freedom and 
independence, Reagan cut public assistance programs, deregulated banking, business 
and environmental codes, and decentralized the federal government: all for what he told 
Americans was a harkening back to the old days of rugged individualism. Reagan 
claimed that Jimmy Carter had blamed ordinary Americans for the nation’s ills (actually 
Carter had asked Americans to work together to improve the situation); supposedly 
reversing Carter’s stance, Reagan then identified the little folks with the essential 
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goodness of the nation.  The real culprit was not the average American, Reagan insisted. 
"In this present crises,” he told the nation in his first inaugural address (written entirely 
by himself), “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the 
problem.”427 Reagan poured his conservative critique on even thicker in his address of 
election eve, 1984, when—again sounding much like Goldwater two decades earlier—he 
told voters that professional politicians (or what he usually referred to as “the liberal 
establishment”) had poisoned the nation’s well-being: 
 
As you worked harder to keep up with inflation, they raised your taxes. 
When our industries staggered, they piled on more regulations. When 
educational equality slumped, they piled on more bureaucratic controls. 
They watched crime terrorize our citizens and responded with more 
lenient judges, sentencing, and parole. When the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan, they punished our farmers with a grain embargo and 
neglected to build our defenses.428 
 
 
Cowboy Reagan warned Americans that they faced two specific adversaries: their own 
government at home and the Soviet Union abroad. At home if problems arose from 
earlier decisions, those were the government’s decisions—not the peoples. But, through 
their renewed faith in their frontier heritage, Americans could “stand tall” to overcome 
impending dangers and accomplish anything.  
Reagan’s frontier prescription, rooted in a construct of the imagination, was 
problematic in terms of late twentieth century realities. One of the great ironies of the 
Reagan Administration’s push for decentralization—the “New Federalism” which was 
characterized as harkening back to the days of “rugged individualism”—was that it 
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simultaneously drove hard toward bolstering both ideological centralization and 
conformity. Diversity no longer had a home in the Frontier Myth of the Reagan years.429 
 
Reagan as a “Sagebrush Rebel” 
For more than three decades, the Sagebrush Rebellion has been associated in 
popular memory with Ronald Reagan and his controversial Secretary of the Interior, 
James Watt. The “rebellion” pitted ranchers, loggers, miners and others against 
Washington bureaucrats in a conflict over the West’s land, water, and natural resources. 
Here the two frontier ideals of the construction of a libertarian American individual and 
its creation of democratic equality for all Americans (with support of a federal 
government ‘equalizer’) appeared to come into direct opposition to one another. The 
biggest spark igniting the rebellion was the 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act, which legislates that public land must be kept in perpetual trust by the government 
in Washington DC. Western-Federal relations soured further when the Carter 
Administration brought in staffers from environmental groups to help shape key 
Interior Department policy decisions. Though somewhat disjointed, Westerners of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s “rebellion” agreed on one thing, that the region’s destiny was 
being dictated by outsiders who did not understand the West and were exploiting it and 
them. During the initial scuffles, angry Alaskan ‘Rebs’ burned an aircraft belonging to 
the National Park Service; that same state’s voters also approved a proposal setting up a 
special statehood commission to “reconsider and recommend appropriate changes”—a 
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kind of symbolic attempt to secede from the Union. Other Western states passed 
legislation that laid claim to parts of the 700 million acres of land under federal control.  
By 1979, a New York Times headline declared: “West Taking South’s Place as Most 
Alienated Area.”430 Carter officials were baffled by the depth of resulting western 
antagonism since, from their own standpoint, they were simply asserting the broader 
national and western interests against more parochial western interests. A few months 
later, Washington outsider Ronald Reagan was going out of his way to identify himself 
as “a Sagebrush rebel” bent on crushing the alleged corruption and tyranny of the East 
while defending the pioneering values of the West. While campaigning in Idaho Falls in 
1980, the Republican presidential candidate pledged: “The next administration won’t 
treat the West as if it were not worthy of attention. The next administration will reflect 
the values and goals of the Sagebrush Rebellion.”431 The myth of the West as most 
representative of the independent and “free” Americans (as opposed those corrupt, 
meddling Easterners) and Reagan’s vague pronouncements supporting the “Rebs” had 
emerged just in time for the 1980 presidential election campaign. But as Richard White 
has characterized it, the Rebellion was “a very old play staged under a new title…yet 
another attempt to get the federal government to cede public lands to the states.” White 
pointed out that one of the great paradoxes of the West was its image of a land of rugged 
individualism while, in reality, it was also the region of the country (excluding the Pacific 
Coast) most dependent on the federal government.432  
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In the end, while the Sagebrush Rebellion had support of a number of interest-
groups, it never had a carefully developed or consistent ideology that could explain why 
state ownership would make the West more well-off or better serve the nation’s interest 
in terms of fairness. Under the existing system, many ranchers, miners and 
recreationists (the latter of which had opposed state ownership to begin with) came to 
the realization that all had free access to federal lands under the existing system but that 
this might end once placed under a state jurisdiction.433 When he became President, 
Reagan’s Secretary of the Interior James Watt’s own thoughtless, pro-development 
statements helped further galvanize opposition from environmentalists and rebels alike 
and kill the remnants of the rebel support. And once the lines of controversy became 
clearer the Reagan Administration withdrew its initial support. This was one battle that 
“The Gipper” did not win; it also provides us with an early case of where the conservative 
myth’s power to persuade, while initially potent, had limits when contemporary realities 
and events did not fit comfortably within its parameters.434 
 
Race Relations 
Both Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson’s ideas about race relations on the 
frontier and in modern America evolved and acquired more depth over time but this 
issue would always remain a blind spot for Ronald Reagan. Here political expediency 
and Reagan’s own adherence to the conservative brand of the myth appear to have been 
in back of his myopia. During the 1960s, Reagan usually avoided anything to do with the 
Civil Rights movement and the politics of racial justice. Reagan’s Deputy Chief of Staff, 
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Michael Deaver, would later state that “’Reagan never got beyond the Jackie Robinson 
story.’”435 Lou Cannon concurs that while Reagan was no racist, he also “described racial 
prejudice like it was all in the past….He never got to the next level on the issue.”436 
Cannon points out that throughout his career there was never anyone trying politically 
to get him there since African-Americans did not support RR anyway. Perhaps as a 
result, so the argument runs, Reagan never openly advocated racist practices and did 
not condemn them either. For example, in 1964, when he delivered the biggest speech of 
his career up until that time, “A Time for Choosing”—at the very height of changes in 
Civil Rights—Reagan incredibly made no reference to these historic issues.437 When 
pressed, Reagan would say that he opposed the Civil Rights legislation of the Johnson 
Administration arguing that such social change, even if desirable, should not be 
spearheaded by the national government. If one can judge from his actions and words 
(or lack of them), it appears that the questions of racial justice did not interest him as he 
gave little thought to what it meant to be a minority in America, “the land of the free.” 
For Reagan, “traditional” individualism always trumped social engineering and state-
sponsored inclusion.  
Politically, during his presidential years, Ronald Reagan appears to have found it 
difficult to express his distaste for racism primarily because of the support that he 
sought and received from Southern conservatives (both Republicans and “boll weevil” 
Democrats); as a result, African-Americans are probably the minority group most 
disillusioned with the Reagan White House years.  
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In addition to the pragmatic (or opportunistic) political incentives, though, part of 
Reagan’s disinterest and at times seeming indifference to racial issues may also stem 
from the fact that he was largely unable to incorporate history into his own mythic 
understanding of America’s past. In his debate with Jimmy Carter, Reagan responded as 
follows to a question about America’s future as a multi-racial society: “I believe in it. I 
am eternally optimistic, and I’m happy to believe that we’ve made great progress from 
the days when I was young and when this country didn’t even know it had a race 
problem.” Carter then challenged his opponent’s confusion and ignorance by pointing 
out that minorities were well aware of a race problem in the early twentieth century. 
Carter suggested Reagan’s evasion of the question seemed to suggest that, for him, “this 
country” meant white America. The root of the trouble for Reagan was that he never 
came to terms with the serious inconsistencies in his mythic narratives about unity and 
coherence in the American Western and national experience.438 Reagan’s belief in and 
preaching of frontier “optimism,” as identified by Billington, seemed to create blinders 
for Reagan in terms of the reality for those Americans—minorities and the poor—who 
lived on the margins or were excluded from the kind of society that the Reaganites 
envisioned. As with the mythic frontier of Reagan’s imagination, his vision was that of a 
mainstream, masculine America where the nation’s historic ethnic and racial variety, 
women and the impoverished were missing. It was this same nostalgic drive to restore a 
vanished past that had shifted the Frontier Myth from one of liberalism and inclusion to 
one of conservatism and exclusion. 
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One group of peoples that Reagan did not want projected into the past to allow a 
history were Native Americans: the old “savage” enemy (replaced in the twentieth 
century by Communists) and obstruction to Turner’s “superior” American civilization. 
In 1988 when a university student in Moscow, USSR asked Reagan to explain the 
disastrous economic and social conditions of the nation’s Native American population, 
the President responded: “We have provided millions of acres of land for what are called 
preservations—or reservations, I should say. They [American Indians], from the 
beginning, announced that they wanted to maintain their way of life, as they had always 
lived there in the desert and the plains and so forth.” Then the President mused, but 
“maybe we made a mistake. Maybe we should not have humored them in that, wanting 
to stay in that kind of primitive life style. Maybe we should have said, no, come join us. 
Be citizens along with the rest of us.”439 
Reagan’s talk of “humoring” Native Americans on “preservations” was revealing.  
It was Reagan, after all, who first vetoed major Indian health-care legislation, then cut 
the existing services by 13%. Even during the years of economic growth, his appointees 
reduced federal appropriations for housing, education and legal aid with overall 
expenditures—dropping 18% between 1982 and 1984 alone. The smiling President also 
appeared unaware of the fact that Native Americans had been citizens of the United 
States since 1924. 440 
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Reagan’s ignorance of the past, frontier imaginings, and, more broadly, his anti-
intellectual streak on a wide range of issues extending beyond race relations was picked 
up on by numerous editorial cartoonists. During the 1980s, dozens of political cartoons 
portray Reagan as clueless but, interestingly, a majority of the public—minorities and 
liberals being two notable exceptions—did not seem to care, they liked him anyway. 
Early depictions of the Reagan Library feature books opened to empty pages and 
another showing Reagan himself at the Presidential Library’s reference desk with just 
his own memoirs and a Zane Grey novel in the spacious otherwise empty shelves behind 
him.441 A 1988 Bruce Beattie cartoon portrays a befuddled but still mounted Cowboy 
Reagan riding off into the sunset in the wrong direction (“Uh, Ron, the sunset you’re 
supposed to ride off into is THAT way…”).442 
But though RR may have been short on smarts he is still typically envisioned as tall 
in the saddle. For most Commanders in Chief, Reagan’s perceived “reality gap” would 
have caused serious harm but as former Johnson aide turned journalist Bill Moyers 
wryly observed: “We didn’t elect this guy because he knows how many barrels of oil 
there are in Alaska. We elected him because he makes us feel good.”443 
 
“Bonanza” Economics, Taxes and Deficits 
The conservative revision of the Frontier Myth also provided fuel for the 
Republican President’s references to “bonanza economics”—not through the tapping of 
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abundant resources on a new physical frontier but rather through the magic of supply-
side Reaganomics combined with the call for a revival of the nation’s spirit. Reagan’s 
campaign praised the bonanzas of previous “boom” eras and now it was his intention to 
revive a “cowboy economy” in a post-industrial age. The Reaganites hoped to use the 
manipulation of capital as a replacement for agricultural and industrial production to 
drive the nation’s economic recovery. Through deregulation and tax cuts, especially for 
the wealthy, Reagan claimed that a “bonanza” of new capital would guarantee a constant 
and painless economic growth—that “with a rising tide” all boats would float (just as the 
Frontier Myth alleged that even “the little guy” benefitted from wealth creation).444 This, 
the supply-side President explained, would work in the same way that opening up 
“vast…untapped wealth” out West—including agricultural lands, oil and gold—had 
driven the economy in the past.445 As Reagan phrased it, when signing the 1982 St. 
Germain/Garn bill which deregulated the savings and loan industry: “All in all, I think 
we’ve hit the jackpot.”446 Reagan offered further reassurances in his second Inaugural 
address in 1985. Once again, as in their glorious past, Americans were told that they 
were living in a world without limits: “We believed then and now: There are no limits to 
growth and human progress when men and women are free to follow their dreams.”447 
Here Reagan delivered the optimistic old frontier “bonanza” idea all over again which 
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was received to cheering ovations as he, like Turner, gave expression to the intense 
wishes of the nation. The Frontier Myth of the Reagan years inspired deregulation in 
banking and industry in a big way: a change that would come back to haunt Reagan’s 
heir George H.W. Bush a few years down the road. 
In the popular mind, Americans had conquered the untamed West and with the 
same adventurous spirit Reaganites believed they would emerge triumphant in the face 
of contemporary challenges as well. As Reagan closed the Inaugural speech, facing 
westward from the Capitol Building for the first time in history (in a deliberate symbolic 
gesture), he told Americans that “at the steps of this symbol of democracy…we see and 
hear again the echoes of our past: the men of the Alamo call out encouragement to each 
other; a settler pushes west and sings a song, and the song echoes out forever and fills 
the unknowing air. It is the American sound. We sing it still….we are together as of 
old.”448 Reagan thus tied together the past, present and the future as he called upon 
Americans to dedicate themselves to living out this story. For the President, the 
attributes of the past could help Americans triumph economically, socially and 
politically over their challenges in the present. Reagan’s nostalgia promoted a 
comfortable, mythic referent to a past place and time that no longer existed—if it ever 
had.  And unlike Lyndon Johnson and in many respects TR, who viewed history with a 
sense of continuity and progression, Reagan’s backward thinking of the Frontier West 
“as it ought to have been” discouraged this continuity.  
In keeping with the line of his fellow conservatives and the new conventional 
“frontier” wisdom, Reagan also believed that the Federal Government tried to do too 
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many things, spent too much money, and over-regulated. His champion, Calvin 
Coolidge, might have found many places to cut spending but Reagan had a tougher time 
since by the late twentieth century various New Deal and Great Society programs, such 
as Social Security and Medicare, remained popular. His biggest cuts to social programs 
were in the areas of Medicaid, food stamps, aid to families with dependent children and 
other programs which were especially vital to lower-income families.449  
Tax cuts were the most touted feature of the Reaganomics program. During the 
hyper-inflation of the 1970s, millions of Americans saw their incomes rise but their 
purchasing power stay the same; meanwhile, their taxes kept increasing. Much of the 
public was angry as dozens of states began slashing property and state income taxes. 
Reagan’s 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act—signed at a heavily hyped event for the 
press at Rancho del Cielo—offered a broad array of tax concessions, including a 25 
percent across the board tax cut and a lowering of the maximum rate from 70 to 50 
percent for 1982. Before long, however, Reagan discovered that there was not enough 
waste and fraud to make the substantial budget cuts that he had promised so easily 
during the campaign.450  Tax cuts were followed with tax increases, which the President 
slickly referred to as “revenue enhancers,”451 and his frequently repeated promise to 
shrink government did not occur. The tripling of the national debt from 1980 to 1989 
was primarily the result of Reagan keeping his word on defense spending as he 
demanded and got Congressional approval for more than $2 trillion dollars in defense 
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spending.452  In 1983, even when unemployment reached more than 10 percent and the 
economy looked as if it were about to plunge over a cliff, Reagan insisted that the 
country stay the course. “Our government is too big and it spends too much,”453 he 
would continue to say as if defense expenditures did not count. Then in late 1983 and 
1984, a dramatic economic recovery arrived as inflation plunged from 11 percent down 
to 2 percent, unemployment dropped to 7.5 percent, and annual growth accelerated to 
7.2 percent 454—enabling a president who once appeared to be in “phaseout” mode to 
win with the largest popular majority of the vote since LBJ in 1964. “The sour economy 
is the fault of Jimmy Carter,” Reagan said repeatedly;455 by employing these phrases 
consistently over time he effectively etched blame on the Democrats in the public mind 
and had set himself up for the credit when things turned around. Reagan was able to 
pursue his feeling good Morning in America campaign in 1984—projecting a return to 
glory years past— and winning a landslide re-election victory in the process. By the end 
of his administration, Reagan had in reality expanded the federal payroll and created a 
huge debt which would trip up his successor George H.W. Bush. But none of this 
mattered at the time: the perception of much of the American public was that Reagan 
was promoting greater individualism, independence and self-reliance through tax cuts 
and alleged reductions in federal spending and this served to tie his image even more 
closely to the neo-conservative “frontiers” of the 1980s. 
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Figure 9.2: President Reagan and a Buffalo Bill Cody look-alike link the Republicans’ 
promotion of conservative “Budget Reform” with the Frontier Myth. (Courtesy Ronald Reagan 
Library, White House Photograph Collection, North Platte, Nebraska, August 13, 1987, Roll C42192, 
Frame 6)  
 
Reagan’s constant talk of less government, reduced spending and less intrusion 
was also a case of perception over reality in relation to a favourite old theme of Ronald 
Reagan’s, “law and order,” which was spun with much effectiveness by his handlers in 
1980 and throughout his presidency. After “Sheriff” Reagan took office and started 
appointing conservative judges who emphasized punishment over rehabilitation, the 
length of prison sentences increased substantially. In part as a result of these initiatives 
against domestic outlaws, the number of prisoners in the US prison system has risen 
dramatically ever since from 500,000 in 1980 to 1.5 million in 1994456 to 2.3 million 
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today—the highest rate of incarceration in the developed world.457 “We put criminals on 
notice,” Reagan told Americans. “We said: make one false move, and the next sound you 
hear is the clang of a jail cell door slamming shut.”458 In the words of Dirty Harry, the 
President often liked to tell criminals: “You’re out of luck.”459 Another ironic twist of the 
Eighties frontier vision, however, is that in combining the “rugged individualism” theme 
that Reagan accepted as a key defining characteristic of the nation with his unwavering 
insistence on stability and order, Reagan stirred up a strange brew which could only be 
realized through the costly expansion of the US Federal prison system. Defense 
spending and issues such as incarceration served to send the nation’s debt through the 
roof. 
Many conservatives tipped their hats to bureaucrat bashing Ronnie R., their 
Western frontier hero. But the former B-movie actor’s opponents used the 
cowboy/frontier image frequently as well, attacking Reagan’s “cowboy capitalism” of 
cutting taxes; firing and deregulating air traffic controllers, banking, and environmental 
codes; cutting public assistance programs and Head Start; dramatically increasing 
military spending; expanding the prison system; and pushing budget proposals that 
appeared regionally biased in favour of the West.  
Reagan had long characterized “tax and spend” Democrats as outlaws who had 
looted America of its wealth and vitality. In the context of the 1980s, many Americans 
had come to accept this explanation. But, in the end, opponents charged that his wild 
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“borrow and spend” Republican bunch with its gigantic military buildup would create 
the largest peacetime deficits in history and a huge national debt that would take 
generations of Americans to pay off.460  The legacy of Reagan’s decision to deregulate 
also received a rough ride, especially in the years directly following his final term office. 
While in the short run deregulation may have worked to promote economic growth in 
some areas of the US economy, these gains were likely more than offset by the Savings 
and Loans bailout of 1989-1995.  
Scholarship has shown that the Savings and Loan Crisis, a direct result of the 
Reagan Administration’s deregulation campaign, created what one observer has 
described as “the single greatest regulatory lapse of this century”—causing the federal 
government to spend $250 billion to cover losses, an amount approaching the total cost 
of the Vietnam War.461  As Professor Michael Mendelbaum described him in the journal 
Foreign Affairs, Reagan was viewed by opponents as “ill equipped for the responsibility 
that he bears, a kind of cowboy figure, bellicose, ignorant, with a simplistic view of the 
world pieced together from the journals of right-wing opinion and old Hollywood 
movies.”462 For Reagan and his supporters, the President’s connection with the Frontier 
Myth and the cowboy was a political statement and a powerful symbol that could be 
used to disarm his detractors by suggesting, if not stating directly, that opposition to 
Reaganism was somehow less “American.” For liberals on the other hand—and in a sad 
turn for proponents of a liberal take on the Frontier Myth—Reagan’s close association 
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with black hat villains (as opposed to heroes), conservative ideology, and the frontier 
would further weaken their own positive associations with the Frontier Myth, and cause 
them to turn increasingly away from and even against the myth and symbolism of the 
frontier as a way of representing their own liberal causes. A point we shall return to in 
Chapter X. 
 
Reagan on the International Stage 
During the 1980 campaign, many Europeans and some Americans as well, 
expressed fears that “nuclear cowboy” Ronald Reagan would make at least as trigger 
happy a Commander in Chief of America’s nuclear arsenal as Barry Goldwater would 
have. In London, an updated version of political satirist Tom Lehrer’s 1965 classic 
recording Who’s Next?, Lehrer nervously asserted: “We’ll try to stay serene and calm/ 
When Ronald Reagan gets the Bomb.” Cartoons in France, meanwhile, depicted “Ronnie 
le Cowboy” as Major Kong from the 1964 Stanley Kubrick film Dr. Strangelove or: How 
I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,  cheerfully riding a nuke (as opposed 
to the mad LBJ cartoon) while wildly waving his Stetson.463  
Reagan’s handlers responded. In a confidential memo from 1980 campaign 
strategist Richard Wirthlin to Reagan, Bush and their senior campaign directors, a 
strategy was proposed in response to the Reagan as “too quick to push the nuclear 
button” issue that he hoped would at least allay fears of the American voter (the memory 
of the Goldwater disaster in 1964 explains the urgency here). Wirthlin’s 
recommendations were followed to the letter.464 In his two TV ads on the topic of 
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“Peace,” Reagan puts on the hat of the responsible cowboy, reminiscent of LBJ in 1964, 
but also reminds Americans that “History has taught us only too well that tyrants are 
tempted only when the forces of freedom are weak, not when they are strong,” uses the 
exact “gentle” phrasing found in his strategist’s memo (replacing common Reagan-Bush 
phrases such as “defense posture” with “peace posture”), and concludes the lengthier of 
the two spots with: “Peace is our dream…and I pledge to you that, as your President, of 
all the objectives we seek, first and foremost will be the establishment of world 
peace.”465 While preserving Reagan’s hawkish “tough on tyrants” image, it appears clear 
that his team was determined not to make the same miscalculations that the 
Goldwaterites had 16 years earlier.  
Throughout his two terms in the White House, Reagan offered a “peace through 
strength” philosophy and massive military build-up reminiscent of TR’s “big stick” 
philosophy that a majority of Americans of the 1980s era apparently longed for. As the 
arch-enemy of communism and champion of American supremacy, Reagan used words 
and symbolism which “evoked a powerful belief that the past that never was could not 
only be restored but would secure America’s role as ‘number one’ in the world.”466 The 
powerful idea of American exceptionalism, superiority as a civilization, and unlimited 
potential was alive and well in the Reagan years—only this time it was big business and 
not the federal government that promised to fulfill the nation’s frontier destinies. 
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In 1983, Reagan sent the American military in like the gun toting heroes of the 
Magnificent Seven to liberate Grenada—the smallest independent country in the 
Western hemisphere—on the justification of rooting out communist Cubans held up in 
government offices and schools. According to White House sources, the Marines aided 
defenseless settlers against “a brutal gang of thugs.”467  Reagan told Americans that the 
tiny island nation “was a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion 
to export terror and undermine democracy. We got there just in time.”468 While a secret 
CIA report later concluded that Reagan’s assessment was grossly inaccurate and that 
little may have been accomplished in real terms, the Americans were at long last 
victorious. The shame of the Vietnam debacle could be erased, Reaganites seem to have 
believed, through their own President’s “splendid little war.”469 Grenada, though tiny, 
was a frontier that was conquered quickly and decisively thereby feeding Reagan’s 
message of reassurance and bringing back the frontier mythic America that regarded 
itself as a nation of winners. 
 
Soviet Outlaws 
Cowboy Reagan faced several non-Communist “troublemakers” during his White 
House years, including that “mad dog of the Middle East” Libya’s Colonel Muammar 
Khadafi, but no enemy was nearly as lethal or troubling to Reagan or most other 
Americans as the Soviet Union. Having been strongly influenced by his own frontier 
                                                          
467 Reagan “thugs” quotation in Michael Schaller, Ronald Reagan (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011): 68. 
468 Ronald Reagan: "Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada," October 27, 1983. 
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
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vision, including his belief in the necessity of individual liberty in a free society, Reagan 
not only railed about Soviet power but abhorred what he envisioned as the entire ‘cradle 
to grave’ Soviet way of life. Holding on to his frontier visions of an earlier age, the 
President repeatedly counterpoised his idealized images of an older America—with its 
alleged simple truths of individualism, self-reliance, know-how and higher values—
against the negative images of modern life in Soviet Russia. In fact, up until the thaw 
with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid to late 1980s, virtually all of the 
public descriptions that Reagan offered of the Soviets were negative and nasty. 
According to Robert Ivie, “The Soviet Union is depicted [by Reagan] as a ‘Natural 
Menace,’ as animals, primitives, machines, criminals, mentally disturbed, as fanatics 
and ideologues, and as satanic and profane.”470 Globally, the Soviets’ skulduggery and 
America’s own weakness (due to Carter’s administration) was said to be responsible for 
every unfortunate turn of events—from Grenada to the attack on the Beirut Marine 
barracks in Lebanon and, in particular, the “Korean Airlines Massacre.” Dating back to 
the 1960s, Reagan had never equated “grim” liberals471 with Communists but his 
depiction of an increasingly government controlled nation would supposedly leave the 
differences between the US and USSR so marginal that foolish appeasement and 
accommodation with the Reds would be the only course.  
As the champion of conservative frontier values and the enemy of Communism—
and its postwar association with enormous concentrations of state power—the white hat 
Reagan (initially) hated the idea of détente with the duplicitous, black-hatted Soviets. 
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“Detente,” he would say, “isn’t that what a farmer has with his turkey, until 
Thanksgiving Day?”472 Reagan did not trust the Soviets, thought that his predecessor 
presidents had enabled Red power and global reach to increase, and was determined to 
counter it with a massive military buildup and a war of words. In his often quoted 
speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983, Reagan warned of the Soviet 
enemy: “Let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its 
omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on 
the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.” Reagan continued: “I urge you 
to beware the temptation…to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of 
any evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby 
remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong, good and evil.”473 
During his first few years in office, Reagan pulled no punches—listing alleged 
Soviet crimes against humanity at every opportunity.474  The era of gentler diplomacy 
was over and a period of intense anti-communist rhetoric, military buildups and 
“freedom fighter” activities in the third world was in as Gunfighter Reagan and his 
followers hoped that one day, as in the Hollywood world of the Old West, Brezhnev and 
his gang would get the drubbing they deserved (Figure 9.3). 
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473 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals 
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Figure 9.3: Bedtime for Brezhnev: An early achievement of the Reagan presidency this 
widely viewed poster helped transform Reagan’s alleged “cowboy” credentials from a 
humorous popular culture concoction of “B” westerns and chimp-comedies into a persona 
that perfectly matched the renewed and revised version of the American Frontier Myth. 
(2010.54.19402. Unknown Artist. Bedtime for Brezhnev, 1981. Poster, 18 x 27 in. Collection of the 
Oakland Museum of California. All Of Us Or None Archive. Gift of the Rossman Family) 
 
Reagan metaphorically confronted the evil Reds in a 1984 re-election campaign TV 
ad portraying the Soviet threat as “a bear in the woods”: a piece that members of the 
Boone and Crockett Club might have admired. Here a grizzly bear is seen moving, 
slowly, ominously through the underbrush and across a stream. A friendly voiceover 
favoring Reagan’s candidacy asks: “There’s a bear in the woods….Isn’t it smart to be as 
strong as the bear?” At the end of the ad, a faceless, rifle toting hunter in the same 
woods stands tall on a hill as the bear approaches; the beast stops, hesitates and timidly 
steps backwards. The fantasy imagery is clear: Ronald Reagan is the armed and ready 
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guardian gunslinger or pioneer who, on the international frontier, will confront the 
Soviet bear and keep the American nation safe.475 
  
A Silver Bullet 
Ronald Reagan’s whole hearted acceptance of a particular expression of the 
Frontier Myth and his calls for a restoration of the simple truths of the past also 
informed national policies such as the highly ambitious, and expensive, Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars” program. Having been proposed just two weeks 
after the President would deliver his famous “Evil Empire” speech about the Soviet 
Union in 1982, the project would fulfill his image requirement that a single hero, or in 
this case a hero nation, would save the day by raising a “space shield” which enemy 
missiles could not penetrate. Here the Reagan Administration shifted the frontier scene 
from finite land to infinite space. As Garry Wills points out in Reagan’s America: 
Innocents at Home, to Reagan and a large segment of the American public SDI was 
“much like the Lone Ranger’s silver bullet which he used only to knock guns out of the 
bad guy’s hands.”476 And unlike Jimmy Carter, who had allegedly allowed American 
frontiers to diminish and shrank the sphere of American influence by ceding the 
Panama Canal without even unbuckling his holster, Reagan’s “Star Wars” program (like 
JFK and LBJ’s Apollo missions) promised the nation that a “New Frontier” was out 
there for Americans to master…in space. The President saw the possibility of using a 
scientific future to return America to its Edenic past: a time before nuclear weapons 
threatened the existence of the planet. 
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Thus, the Reagan vision was once again restorative. In his SDI speech, his 
challenge to science even contained a kind of sacred element: “I call upon the scientific 
community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great 
talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us a means of rendering 
these weapons impotent and obsolete.”477 Scientists were, in effect, being given a chance 
to atone for their Original Sin by conquering a new challenge. As the New Republic put 
it: “In classic Reagan style, he offered a simple, clear and hopeful vision: a shining city 
on a hill—with a moat.”478 In doing so, Reagan was also marshalling support for the 
project through the same kind of can-do optimism that Billington has identified as part 
and parcel of the Frontier Myth.479 
Just as Turner had described the American frontier as a “safety valve” for the 
exhaustion and pollution of the old world in the East, now unexplored spaces in the 
universe needed to be found for Americans to maintain their unique identity as a nation 
of pioneers. The idea of a mystique and lure of unknown frontiers and myth of an 
exceptional American pioneering spirit was laid on thick in an advertisement sponsored 
by the Coalition for the Strategic Defense Initiative which appeared in USA Today. The 
commercial was formatted as a giant thank you letter addressed to “Mr. President” and 
stated, among other things, that: 
 
You have unleashed a surge of technological advance in the U.S. and in the 
rest of the Free World which will not only solve the problems of strategic 
defense, but will also open up space to tap its unlimited resources and 
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New Republic, Vol. 190 (May 14, 1984): 13. 
479 Ray Allen Billington and Martin Ridge, Westward Expansion: A History of the American 
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energy and its unique manufacturing environment for the good of 
mankind. 
 
You have made it possible that in the year 1992, 500 years after Columbus 
opened up the frontiers of the New World, the U.S. and its Free World 
allies will open up the high frontier of space for our security and our 
prosperity as spacefaring nations. Free enterprise investment in space 
systems demands long term security be provided, and SDI is an essential 
first step in that direction. 
 
Get our children out from under the nuclear Sword of Damocles. Free men 
for centuries will never forget your role in delivering them from the 
nuclear balance of terror.480 
 
 
Here we see Reaganites’ rhetorical removal of what had been a technological horror, or 
the “the nuclear Sword of Damocles,” so that Americans might once again take up their 
frontiering odyssey for centuries to come. It is essentially an expansion of the revised 
Frontier Myth structure replete, though not stated explicitly here, with bad guys (or 
more specifically, the weapons of the non-“free” powers) for the heroic and exceptional 
frontier nation to subdue and destroy. Reagan’s solution, once again, implies a return to 
the “good old days” only this time it was through an ideal projected future based on the 
lessons and values of the past.  
Both Reagan and Lyndon Johnson had employed frontier symbolism in their 
equating of leadership in space with security interests. But while Johnson had 
emphasized this outer space extension of the “frontiers of freedom” as one that would 
facilitate adoption and change—enabling American society to become freer, fairer, more 
inclusive and more democratic—Reagan’s supporters characteristically linked the 
proposed SDI adventure with “free enterprise investment” that could tap into the 
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cosmos’ “unlimited resources and energy and unique manufacturing environment.”481  
The Final Frontier had taken a hard turn to the right since the days of JFK and LBJ and 
was now being viewed less as a venture in change and growth politically and socially, 
than as a cause for investment optimism. 
Not everyone was excited about the plans for “Star Wars.” Critics charged that the 
$26(+) billion dollar project was unfeasible (it never did make it out of the research 
stages) and that the Soviets would have the last laugh when America went broke trying 
to build the elaborate contraption.482 Reagan’s Frontier connections and heroic cowboy 
persona, however, appeared to offer further grist in support of SDI. A 1986 cartoon 
portrayal of the President by Jerry Robinson depicts the Star Wars initiative as a 
constellation in the shape of Reagan as a cowboy with his cocked pistol drawn—the 
frontier sheriff facing down the villains (Figure 9.4). Two Russian astronomers with a 
huge telescope look tiny compared to the gun-toting and fearless Reagan. One of the 
Soviet scientists says to the other, “I Think We Better Call Comrade Gorbachev.” This 
six-gun Reagan has compelled the Reds to understand that they no longer face a 
wobbly-legged adversary. Even in cartoon form, we observe that Reagan the space-
gunfighter is self-reliant, aggressive, and a true believer in manifest destiny. Robinson’s 
work is a kind of comical fulfillment of one of the Reagan campaign’s feature rallying 
cries: “America is back!” 483 
 
                                                          
481 Ibid. 
482 In a counter thrust to Jerry Robinson’s work (below), Lambert Der later published a cartoon 
with Gorbachev appearing as Darth Vader and Reagan as Luke Skywalker: their arms embraced around 
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Figure 9.4:  (Cartoon by Jerry Robinson, 1985. Permission granted by Janice Robinson, Cartoonists and 
Writers Syndicate) 
  
In the meantime, NASA would continue to play off the popular connection of the 
past with the future and the idea that technology itself was a kind of frontier through its 
familiar naming of extraterrestrial exploration craft: Mariner, Voyager, Pioneer, and 
Viking. All employed the Frontier Myth to resonate with the public and to add appeal to 
its budget requests. During the Reagan period, though, much of the emphasis was on 
space as an arena for commercial enterprises. 
 
The “Reasonable” Cowboy Conservative  
A number of events appear to have come together in the late summer and early fall 
of 1983 which forced Ronald Reagan to rethink and reshape his own ideas about the 
Frontier Myth, specifically in the context of America’s Cold War confrontation with the 
USSR. The shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviets on September 1, 
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1983, was the first of these and, as historian Beth Fisher has asserted,484 hit home to 
Reagan the possibility that a human error could bring about nuclear annihilation. 
Reagan later wrote in his memoirs that “If mistakes could be made by a fighter pilot, 
what about a similar miscalculation by the commander of a missile launch crew?”485 
Reagan became even more deeply affected after watching the ABC made-for-TV movie 
The Day After in October. The story, depicting what would happen if there were a 
nuclear attack on Lawrence, Kansas, stunned Reagan—he wrote in his diary that: “It’s 
very effective & left me greatly depressed….My own reaction was…to see there is never a 
nuclear war.”486 The movie had demonstrated to Reagan (through the medium which 
appears to have most influenced him)487 that nuclear war could never be won by either 
side. And it had done so in a visual story about ordinary Americans which, like the tales 
of the Frontier Myth, was “especially well-suited to Reagan’s intellect.”488 At what 
Reagan described as a “sobering” Pentagon briefing just days after viewing The Day 
After, he was told that nuclear war was winnable. “I thought they were crazy,” the 
President wrote. “Worse, it appeared there were also Soviet generals who thought in 
terms of winning a nuclear war.” 489  With scenes of nuclear annihilation fresh in his 
mind, Reagan likened the Pentagon briefing to the movie, The Day After.490 Adding 
further to Reagan’s anxieties, in November he learned that the Soviets had become 
unglued during a NATO war game, thinking it was a real attack, and had seriously 
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considered ordering a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the U.S.491  Reagan expressed his 
shock that Soviet leaders genuinely feared an American nuclear attack and pondered 
whether his own rhetoric might have contributed to this dangerous perception.492  
The Day After movie, and all of the surrounding events of this period, were pivotal 
in Reagan’s life and political career and apparently caused him to reassess his policy 
approach to the Soviets. With the threat of nuclear annihilation now at or near the top of 
his agenda, the former “nuclear cowboy” (who, as Governor, once boasted that an 
atomized North Vietnam could be paved over as a parking lot)493 now became an 
advocate not only of reductions but of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Reagan 
wrote seven years after these events: “As long as nuclear weapons were in existence, 
there would always be risks they would be used, and once the first weapon was 
unleashed, who knew where it would end? My dream, then, became a world free of 
nuclear weapons.”494 Though he wrote these words in hindsight, his actions at the time 
are also demonstrative of a shift away from his adherence to a gunslinger stance against 
the USSR toward a reasonable and more conciliatory “trust but verify” cowboy. A 
reoriented Cowboy Reagan would attempt to make peace with his enemies for the 
common good rather than the hardliner, hawkish approach of attempting to stare them 
down on a dusty, deserted street. Indeed, for Reagan, the postwar doctrine of mutually 
assured destruction (MAD) was now identified with “madness.” In terms that adherents 
to the Frontier Myth could well understand, Reagan likened MAD to “two westerners 
                                                          
491 Farber, The Rise and Fall of American Conservatism, 204. 
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standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head—permanently.”495 Reagan, 
then, was rethinking and to some degree redesigning the structures of the Frontier 
Myth. And he was not alone. Stanley Feldman and Lee Sigelman’s research has 
demonstrated that after watching, The Day After, the issue of nuclear war came much 
more to the forefront in the minds of millions of other Americans as well who sought 
additional information on the issue from the print media in particular. Feldman and 
Sigelman also found that “The more news stories about nuclear war one watched or 
read, the more likely one was to move toward a more conciliatory approach to U.S.-
Soviet relations. This is a powerful effect.”496 Events, the popular media and two 
powerful world leaders would collectively cause precisely the kind shifts in the Frontier 
Myth’s Cold War mentality that Marshall Sahlins challenges us to look for. 
A shift in Reagan’s public tone towards the Soviets was noticeable and would 
intensify with time. At a press conference prior to his September 1984 meeting with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Reagan was asked: “Do you think this meeting 
will help people come to your way of thinking; that you’re not the trigger-happy cowboy 
you say people like to portray you as?” The President responded, “Well, the most 
important thing is what understanding I can reach with Foreign Minister Gromyko to 
maybe convince him that the United States means no harm.”497 But the real change 
came after Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the USSR. In 1987, Premier 
Gorbachev told Reagan he was willing to make a deal on a medium-range missile treaty 
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and, to the horror of many of his conservative advisors (but encouraged by Nancy and 
Secretary of State George Schultz), Reagan reached back.498 In Washington on 
December 9th Reagan and Gorbachev signed a treaty to eliminate intermediate range 
nuclear forces. It was an epochal event that led to the eventual end of the arms race 
altogether. Hard-line conservative hawks were convinced, however, that their President 
had been royally duped and that only the fall of the USSR could genuinely turn things 
around. 499 But Reagan could no longer abide by the “showdown” mentality; instead he 
took on the persona of the tough but reasonable cowboy whose foreign policy now 
placed the prevention of a catastrophic war at or near the top of the agenda. 
Toward the end of Reagan’s time in office, in New Years of 1988, the Washington 
Post pondered: “What a strange nuclear place Ronald Reagan has brought himself and 
the rest of us to” as “the mad bomber of the West” of just a few years before had been 
replaced with a President who accepted nuclear disarmament as a worthy goal.  In an 
editorial reminiscent of those defending “that crazy cowboy” Theodore Roosevelt a few 
years after he too had entered the office, Stephen J. Rosenfeld conceded that Reagan 
“did not do crazy things after all” and was “never as monstrous as people said.” 
Rosenfeld’s column was aptly titled, “Myth of the Nuclear Cowboy.”500 Today, at the 
Reagan Ranch Centre Museum in Santa Barbara, the image of Reagan as a warmonger 
continues to be combated with a display of the Reagans’ highly publicized ranch-invite 
to former Soviet Premier Gorbachev, who arrived in Santa Barbara on a private jet 
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named the “Capitalist Tool” and then unwittingly wore his ten-gallon cowboy hat 
backwards during his entire visit.501 
 
Constraints of the Conservative Frontier Myth 
Ronald Reagan’s initial deployment of the Frontier Myth and pre-1984 shoot-
from-the-hip story-telling had not been without awkward moments and major setbacks 
for his Administration. During his first term, Reagan’s good versus evil “showdown” 
mentality between an American West and a Soviet East caused some serious difficulties 
for his associates. Reagan’s strongest ally in the Senate, Paul Laxalt of Nevada, told an 
interviewer in 2001 that for a time it was his responsibility to meet, on behalf of Reagan, 
with the Soviet Ambassador. He got to know the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, 
well and seemed to be building a more trustful relationship. “That all went fine until 
Reagan called the Soviets an Evil Empire,” said Laxalt. “I could have just died, because 
that just reinforced the Kremlin view that he was just a wild-assed cowboy.”502  
But it was the Iran-Contra scandal of 1985 to 1987, in which arms were secretly 
traded to Iran to gain the release of Americans being held hostage in Lebanon, that 
became the most damaging of Reagan’s mistakes while in office and stemmed directly 
from the President’s own desire to project himself as a tough and respected leader who 
exemplified the “manly” values of the Frontier Myth. The deal was viewed by most 
Americans—including some of Reagan’s most senior cabinet members—as clearly 
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inconsistent with the policy of standing up to terrorism. Iran, after all, was considered 
one of America’s enemies and the public vividly remembered the 1979 takeover of the 
US Embassy in Teheran. Personal notes from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
describe conversations with Reagan where the President was determined to trade arms 
for hostages. Weinberger recorded: “President sd. he could answer charges of illegality 
but he couldn’t answer charges that ‘big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to 
free hostages.’”503 Weinberger’s notes, taken on the day of the conversations, record that 
he and Secretary of State George Shultz vehemently objected to the President’s position 
and, along with White House Chief of Staff Don Regan, attempted unsuccessfully to 
sway Reagan away from his course. Later, an independent investigation reached the 
conclusion that the arms sales to Iran “were carried out with the knowledge of, among 
others, President Ronald Reagan [and] Vice President George Bush” and also that “large 
volumes of highly relevant, contemporaneously created documents were systematically 
and wilfully withheld from investigators by several Reagan Administration officials.”504 
Though eleven of fourteen officials charged were convicted of criminal charges, many 
were later pardoned by President George H. W. Bush. Cowboy Reagan’s flawed policy 
arguably stemmed from his understanding of the demands of the frontier hero 
fascination with films like the Rambo and Missing in Action series (featuring their 
“captivity formula” which Richard Slotkin contends, “links them to the most basic story-
form of the Frontier myth”505), determination to avoid the kind of recent humiliation 
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experienced by Jimmy Carter during the Iranian hostage crisis, and his apparent 
obsession with freeing the Beirut hostages. Together these factors persuaded Reagan 
and some of his underlings to pursue a series of illegal covert actions that tainted the 
second term of the Reagan Presidency. 
“Irangate” is the event that most challenged the structures of frontier philosophy 
that Reagan had developed. The structures as Sahlins has explained, simply could not 
sustain themselves in the face of the events surrounding Irangate. The images of the 
frontier that Reagan had cultivated required him to project a tough, masculine persona 
and these in turn contributed to serious policy inconsistencies that backfired on the 
President, and likewise demonstrated a disregard for the democratic system, and 
exposed Reagan’s disconnect from the American people. More broadly, Reagan’s 
adherence to the his conservative incarnation of the Frontier Myth and American 
exceptionalism not only narrowed his field of judgement but promoted an exclusively 
American view on international problems.  
This same mindset may have also led to Reagan’s earlier failures in Lebanon. 
According to biographer Lou Cannon, Reagan ignored the advice of his Secretary of 
Defense and military advisors in 1983 who strongly urged that U.S. forces stationed in 
Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War be pulled out of that city due to their serious 
vulnerability (Figure 9.5). On October 23, 1983, hundreds of Marines died when a 
suicide bomber detonated his vehicle after crashing into their four story barracks.506 
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Figure 9.5: A misguided President drops by at his own “Alamo” in Beirut, 
Lebanon, where 241 American military personnel were killed when truck 
bombs exploded at their highly vulnerable barracks. (Cartoon by Bob Gorrell, 
Richmond News Leader, 1983, and is reprinted here with permission of the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch) 
 
 
 
Such tragic turns of events as the Beirut bombing and “credibility gaps” as Iran-
Contra may have destroyed most of Reagan’s predecessors. However, the “Teflon” 
president’s personal popularity helped him to survive these major setbacks in the long 
run, the future of the conservative frontier myth was not so obviously secured. In sharp 
contrast to Jimmy Carter and 1984 Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale, 
Reagan continually projected themes of limitless frontiers and optimism and this paid 
off at the polls.507 
                                                          
507 Polling data discussed in Spragens, Popular Images of American Presidents, 605. 
 
 
373 
 
Reagan’s perception of the frontier past, with its broad nationalist themes, was 
shaped heavily by his own conservative philosophy and by its application to 
contemporary political issues. As was the case with his ideological opponent, Lyndon 
Johnson, this connection came at the expense of integrity with the complexity of history 
having been replaced with a narrative of overall American destiny. But, as noted earlier, 
while the disconnect of myth and metaphor with reality eventually destroyed Johnson, 
Reagan’s reputation, though tarnished, weathered these blows. For Reagan, it seemed, 
“the buck never stopped because the blame never stuck.”508 Middle class Americans, it 
seems, wanted to believe in Reagan and the revised frontier values which were accepted 
as a given and which he came, for many, to represent, including: optimism, manliness 
(as opposed to the softer, more feminine Carter), individualism (freedom from 
government controls), self-reliance, resilience (as demonstrated after being shot early in 
his presidency), confidence (in his own economic theories and in Americans ability to 
conquer all challenges), calmness of purpose, and a spirit of adventure (“Star Wars”) 
that looked to restore the “traditional” past and accept its “lessons” as the nation’s 
polestar for the future. 
 
Reagan’s Mixed Legacy  
President Reagan painted a portrait of America that was not unlike those created 
by the artists Frederic Remington and Norman Rockwell, one of the “good old days” 
much of which never existed except in peoples’ happy memories. His Morning in 
America preached small government, insisting that “Government does not solve 
                                                          
508 Quotation from Tindall and Shi, America: A Narrative History, 1615. 
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problems…instead, it subsidizes them.”509 In terms of actual results, however, the size of 
the federal government grew under Reagan’s presidency due primarily to a massive 
increase in military spending. Reagan is portrayed as a champion of the tax cutters, but 
he also raised taxes. His support base was made up of social conservatives but Ron and 
Nancy rarely attended church.510 Meanwhile, his cuts to social programs such as 
Medicare and aid to the poor, cuts to school lunch programs (including an unsuccessful 
attempt to redefine ketchup and relish as vegetables), anti-union tactics (most notably, 
the firing of 13,000 federal air traffic controllers), avoidance of civil rights, near 
complete lack of support for conservation concerns, the Iran-gate controversy, along 
with tax cuts for the wealthy left many liberal, minority, and underclass Americans 
bitter.511 
In 2004, the chair of the NAACP Julian Bond told the Washington Post: “For 
many Americans, this was a time best forgotten….He [Reagan] was a polarizing figure in 
black America. He was hostile to the generally accepted remedies for discrimination. His 
appointments were of people as equally hostile. I can’t think of any Reagan policy that 
African Americans would embrace.”512 Women’s rights groups, the growing number of 
urban homeless people, and AIDS victims, also received little support or comfort from 
the President and his rightist programs. In the frontier version of America that Reagan 
bought into and perpetuated (both consciously and unconsciously), only conservative-
leaning Cowboys seemed welcome. Today it would be difficult to challenge the argument 
that Reagan’s own heavy emphasis on the individualism strains of the myth over its calls 
                                                          
509 Reagan made this statement numerous times throughout his political career. This version is 
quoted from: Ronald Reagan, Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1989): 419 – it was taken from a Reagan speech delivered on December 11, 1972).  
510 Pianin and Edsall, “Schisms from the Administration…,” A01. 
511 Ibid. 
512 Ibid. 
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for community and inclusiveness has contributed to a long-term, increasing inequality 
in American society and a polarization of American politics. 
Yet despite these substantive problems Reagan to a greater degree than any other 
President, apart from TR, appears to have benefitted in the long-run from his 
deployment of (a particular conservative brand of) the Frontier Myth. So quickly had the 
structures of this myth shifted in the wake of LBJ’s term in office, and so effectively were 
they deployed by Reagan, he could use the myth to reshape the national political 
agenda. Conservatives and many centrists saw his greatest successes in renewing the 
public’s sense of optimism, lowering inflation, improving the standard of living for 
middle and upper class Americans, and negotiating an arms treaty which helped hasten 
dramatic political change in Eastern Europe. Even his 1981 tax cuts were for more than 
just the wealthy as the President insisted on initiating these across the board against the 
advice of his zealous budget-slasher David Stockman.513  For a large segment of the 
American population growing up in the 1970s and 80s, Gerald Ford was perceived as a 
place-holder, Jimmy Carter as a failure, and Ronald Reagan as a frontier hero—someone 
bigger than the presidency who, unlike Carter, did not let the office beat him down.514 
 
Conclusion 
Ronald Reagan was the first of the radical conservatives—brandishing a revised 
Frontier Myth that emphasized individualism, liberty, reduction in the size of 
government, and vast expansion of the military—to reach the presidency. The archetypal 
fantasy figure, a cowboy with a cause, Reagan left office with an impressive rating of 
                                                          
513 Paul Craig Roberts, The Supply-Side Revolution: An Insider’s Account of Policymaking in 
Washington (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984): 186-187, 191-192. 
514 Cunningham, Cowboy Conservatism, xiii, 235. 
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63% approval/ 29% disapproval.515 Even many Americans who did not agree with his 
policies greatly admired him as a person and it is his direct connections with the post-
1970s expression of the conservative Frontier Myth that, perhaps more than any other 
factor, has forged a popular notion today that “cowboy” presidents and politicians are 
tied to Republicans and conservative ideals.  As he prepared to ride off into the sunset in 
1988, Reagan told his cowhands at the Republican National Convention: “We lit a 
prairie fire a few years back….But we can never let the fire go out…There’s still a lot of 
brush to clear out at the ranch, fences that need repair and horses to ride.”516 Reagan 
continued to claim that, as in Western novels and movies, the answers to America’s 
problems were hard-earned, but simple. Quoting from John Wayne’s character in The 
Alamo, Reagan claimed: “there’s right and wrong. You gotta do one or the other.”517 At 
the end of Reagan’s second term, for the first time since poll-taking had begun in the 
United States, more Americans self-identified as conservatives than as liberals.518 
Benefitting from the events prior to and during much of his time in office Reagan not 
only fit the requirements of the conservative Frontier Myth, his persona and policies 
reinforced and popularized it.519 Concurrently, this shift in frontier and Western 
symbolism caused more Americans to self-identify with the right than the left—a 
perception which continues to this day. 
                                                          
515 Gerhard Peters. "Final Presidential Job Approval Ratings." The American Presidency Project. 
Ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California. 1999-2009. Access:   
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/final_approval.php > (February 16, 2012). 
516 Reagan, Ronald. “President Ronald Reagan’s Remarks to the 1988 Republican National 
Convention.” New Orleans, August 15, 1988.  Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36273 (accessed 13 March 
2012). 
517 Ronald Reagan, “Unforgettable John Wayne,” Reader’s Digest (October 1979): 118. 
518 Farber. The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 163. 
519 See Jeff Roche, ed., The Political Culture of the New West (Lawrence KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 2008): 3. 
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Through the deployment of conservative expressions of the Frontier Myth, Reagan 
built a conservative counter-establishment in Washington DC that had been originally 
established to counterbalance liberals but over time became an establishment in its own 
right. The political successes of the Reagan Administration were a direct benefactor of 
the resurgence and transformation of ideological structures of the Frontier Myth. The 
widely held perceptions of events from 1965 to 1979 worked to break up the consensus 
of a progressive, liberal frontier myth and ultimately resulted in a new conservative 
Cowboy consensus built on a combination of nostalgia for the past, a renewed sense of 
“frontier” optimism and national exceptionalism and, in some respects, resentment. 
Along with the broader crises and realities of the late 1960s, Lyndon Johnson’s own lack 
of popularity upon leaving Washington, his association with “not winning” in Vietnam, 
and a faltering economy, also set the stage for shifting the dominant Western structure 
and “ownership” of the Frontier Myth from the Democrats to the Republicans. The 
liberal Frontier Myth no longer matched historic experience (Sahlins) and the structure 
was transformed: veering hard right. In some respects, the state of Texas provides a 
kind of microcosm for understanding how historic events and personalities have 
brought dramatic reversals in the myth’s emphases. The change there from a 
Democratic stronghold to a Republican one was so marked from LBJ’s presidency 
through Reagan’s that the latter President could joke to a crowd at a rodeo in Mesquite 
in 1988 that “its’ hard to believe that once upon a time to be a Republican around here 
felt a little like being Gary Cooper in “High Noon—outnumbered in a big way.”520 By the 
late 1980s, those days were over. Now Reagan was even invoking symbolism which had 
                                                          
520 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Mesquite, Texas,” Public Papers 
of the Presidents, The American Presidency Project, 
<http://www.Reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/110588c.htm> (accessed July 13, 2011). 
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previously been part and parcel of LBJ’s repertoire: “I keep a special place in my heart 
for Texas—for every cowpoke or wildcatter, astronaut or rancher, and every man, 
woman and child who remembers the Alamo and knows the story of the battle of San 
Jacinto.”521 Myths will always be with the world and Americans’ Frontier Myth structure 
during the late 1960s through 1980s era was revised to adjust its core features to 
changing perceptions of reality, some of which were large international events (the 
Vietnam War) while others were smaller and personal (including Reagan’s viewing of 
the made-for-TV movie The Day After) but also influenced, if in a less dramatic and 
comprehensive way, the nature of the myth. The changing historical events and 
circumstances of the 1990s and 2000s, in particular during the fourth cowboy 
presidency of George W. Bush, would usher in additional adjustments to the emphases 
and influence of the Frontier Myth. As Marshall Sahlins noted in another context, events 
sometimes cause the structures to change. And once again over the two most recent 
decades, the power of the myth would work to confirm the supposition advanced by 
Brian Dippie’s that such deeply entrenched visions communicated messages that did not 
require explanation and have had ongoing consequences for the development of 
American society and politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
521 Ibid. 
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X. 
 
George W. Bush:  
The War on Terror and the Frontier Myth  
 
     
Question: “Do you want [Osama] Bin Laden dead?” 
The President: “I want justice. There’s an old poster out 
West, as I recall, that said, ‘Wanted: Dead or Alive’….” 
Question: “Are you saying you want him dead or alive, sir? 
Can I interpret—” 
The President: “I just remember—all I’m doing is 
remembering—when I was a kid, I remember that they used 
to put out there, in the Old West, a wanted poster. It said, 
‘Wanted: Dead or Alive.’ All I want—and America wants him 
brought to justice. That’s what we want.” 
 —President George W. Bush in an exchange with reporters 
about American mobilization for the “War on Terror” in 
Arlington, Virginia (September 17, 2001) 522 
 
 
 
 
Hollywood, Frontier Justice and 9/11 
 
In Stephen McVeigh’s recent study, The American Western (2007), the author 
asserts that during the postmodern Clinton years of the 1990s which looked toward 
“building bridges to the future,” the Western “ebbed far away from the center of the 
American imagination.” But in the 2000s the conservative manifestation of the Frontier 
Myth which had established itself in the Reagan era emerged quickly again in American 
presidential politics through the context of the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001. As McVeigh contends, Republican President George 
W. Bush’s repeated use of the word “remember” in the above quotation is steeped in 
                                                          
522 George W. Bush: "Remarks to Employees in the Pentagon and an Exchange with Reporters in 
Arlington, Virginia", September 17, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65079 (accessed 8 April 2014). 
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frontier myth and suggests tradition, nostalgia, and the previous triumph of American 
civilization over savagery.523  Popular culture during the formative years of George W. 
Bush’s political career and later on in the years of his presidency offer insights into the 
relationship between the event of 9/11 and the Frontier Myth within his presidential 
administration. The series of movies featuring Dirty Harry (Clint Eastwood) and 
spanning 1971 to 1988, along with Open Range (2003) and Hidalgo (2004) are 
especially relevant. 
Though not created in a temporal Western setting, the release of what is arguably 
the most influential, modern cop film, Dirty Harry (1971), was part of a wider 
conservative retrenchment in American society after the liberal dominance of the 1960s 
that saw the Western repositioned in the western geography of San Francisco and the 
west of the American conservative imagination. The central character, Clint Eastwood’s 
Detective Harry Callahan, is a man alone and though a ‘maverick’ or ‘rogue’ is also a cop 
who embodies ‘straight’ as opposed to ‘hip’ values. Dirty Harry’s run would span until 
1988 (Ronald Reagan’s final full year in office) but its influence on American identity, 
especially among conservatives, has been much longer.524 Harry is a modern-day 
Western sheriff who becomes the dispenser of tough, frontier justice. He operates in a 
new moral arena in the present day where the same questions of the Frontier Myth: 
                                                          
523 Stephen McVeigh, The American Western (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007): viii; 
Ibid, vii. 
524 How influential was Eastwood’s run on cop films themselves? As Dirty Harry might have said: 
“You’ve got to ask yourself one question.” How many films over the past four decades have been about 
happy and well-adjusted cops who got along well with their superiors, followed the rules, and caught the 
evil-doers by operating by the book? Apart from Frances McDormand’s character of Marge Gunderson in 
Fargo it would be difficult to think of one.  
For the purposes of this study it is worth noting that 2008 Republican Presidential candidates 
“maverick” John McCain and “rogue” Sarah Palin appeared to possess Dirty Harry qualities as well. 
Dirty Harry, Director: Don Siegel, 1971. The other films in the Dirty Harry series include: Magnum 
Force, Director Ted Post, 1973; The Enforcer, Director: James Fargo, 1976; Sudden Impact, Director: 
Clint Eastwood, 1983; and The Dead Pool, Director: Buddy Van Horn, 1988. The films also inspired a 
dozen Dirty Harry novels from Warner Books in the early 1980s and a video game in 1990. 
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right versus wrong, savagery versus civilization, and justice versus injustice play 
themselves out. But Harry Callahan is no Gene Autry, no B-Western cowboy. Nor does 
his manifestation of the myth contain any remnants of the liberal myth identified in 
TR’s and LBJ’s use of the symbolism. Rather, Harry must resort to extra-legal force to 
defeat his psychotic antagonists, along the way exposing as ineffective any legal means 
of pursuing criminals and providing movie-goers with a rationale for his one-man, 
vigilante-style of ‘justice’. Detective Callahan uses excessive violence to overcome 
sadistic opponents; and audiences cheer the hot dog chewing, 44 magnum toting 
protagonist as he taunts “punks” foolish enough to try and outdraw him to “Go ahead, 
make my day!”   
As literature and film scholar Brian Baker observes about the first film, Harry 
would deny the insane villain, Scorpio, his rights “or perhaps more properly not 
consider that Scorpio had recourse to ‘rights’ because his behavior meant he had not 
earned them. In essence, the film provides a rationale for police (or, more broadly, 
American) torture when faced with the unmanageable psychosis of the contemporary 
criminal.”525 In a similar mode of thinking to those in the Bush Administration of the 
2000s, the (un-American) “evil-doers” they would encounter on September 11, 2001 
likewise had relinquished their rights to those enjoyed by “civilized” peoples. Baker 
concludes that “Eastwood’s identification with the Western furthers a reactionary 
undercurrent in Dirty Harry: to reconstitute masculinity in a less-troubled form, one 
which is identical with the Western figure of the lone male frontiersman.”526 Judging 
from his actions and words as President, George Bush hoped to play a Dirty-Harry like 
                                                          
525 Brian Baker, Masculinity in Fiction and Film: Representing Men in Popular Genres 1945-2000 
(Continuum: New York, 2006): 97. 
526 Ibid, 100. 
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gunslinger role with an ends justifies the means approach to dealing with international 
outlaws who seemingly threatened Americans “civilized” way of life. 
Open Range, possibly the most critically acclaimed Western so far of the 21st 
century (making Time Out London’s “The 50 greatest Westerns” list), appeared in 
theaters in August 2003 just a few months after the commencement of the Iraq War.527 
The mature Robert Duvall received top billing as Boss Spearman, Kevin Costner (who 
also produced and directed the film) was the psychologically and emotionally scarred 
Charley Waite, and Annette Bening played Sue Barlow, the smart, feminist heroine and 
Charley’s love interest. In most respects, the film is an anti-revisionist return to the 
postwar era Western with its Cold War belief in domesticity, good versus evil, and the 
idea of land being used to raise a family—where the villain is a rich, corrupt cattleman 
and businessman. 
In the post 9/11 milieu we witness the Western’s return to the old tale of morally 
good men who defend the social order from those who would threaten and destroy it; 
these heroes also defend and maintain traditional family values. At the end of My 
Darling Clementine (1946), Wyatt Earp (Henry Fonda) pledged to return to Clementine 
(Cathy Downs) after dealing out six-gun justice to the vicious Clanton gang. Open Range 
ends exactly the same way, with Charley staying true to his value system and settling 
down with Sue once he has fulfilled his manly duty of taking down the black hats. Open 
Range is a return to the depiction of violence as a means to a happy ending, a return to 
the traditional values of the classic Hollywood western. It shows a world where “Old 
America,” scarred by violence, can imagine a new future where domestic tea cups 
become more important than bought gunmen or corruption. 
                                                          
527 Open Range (2000), TIG Productions, Dir: Kevin Costner. 
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The characters in this early Bush-era Western are remarkably familiar. Charley 
does not talk much because he is a real man who prefers action to words. Duvall receives 
iconic treatment with plenty of shots of him on his horse as stunning scenic images of 
the Rockies at dawn outline his silhouette. “Boss” is the last of the cowboy type—heroic, 
loyal, respectful and tolerant. Facing a tyrannical landowner named Denton Baxter and 
a corrupt and impotent sheriff, Boss, Charley and their small band of “free-grazers” have 
become victims of the cattle baron’s unprovoked and vicious attack. Boss forcefully 
makes the cowboys’ case in a crowded and potentially unfriendly saloon: a speech that 
later pays off when townsfolk slowly but surely come to the free-grazers aid (as opposed 
to the cowardly townsfolk in 1952’s High Noon). As President, George Bush likewise 
hoped to win international support for his “War on Terror” in response to 9/11 for an 
invasion of Iraq: though ultimately the response he received for the first proved much 
more successful than the latter. In the climactic gun battle of Open Range we see a clear 
distinction made between justice and revenge as Boss steps in and stops Charley from 
killing one of the wounded men. Like Bush’s justification for pursuing Al Qaeda, you kill 
those who would do the same to you, not those who pose no threat—collateral damage 
aside. Most significant of all, as historian Walter Metz writes, Open Range represents 
“the resurgence of a resolutely anti-revisionist western, one which truly believes that 
Hollywood had it right all along, seems to be the special provenance of 2003 when [the 
film] promised to hop across the preceding thirty revisionist years of the western and 
return us to representations of the simpler America of the postwar years.”528 Open 
Range moved the structure of American westerns of the first Bush term even further 
                                                          
528 Walter Metz, “‘Mother Needs You’: Kevin Costner’s Open Range and the Melodramatics of the 
American Western.” Chapter 4 in Murray Pomerance, ed., A Family Affair: Cinema Calls Home (New 
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away from the revisionism of what Elliot West described as a “longer, grimmer but more 
interesting story”529 of the West. Of greater significance for the purposes of this study, 
though, instead of riding into the sunset alone (the conservative myth), Charley settles 
down with the woman to start a domestic, settled, civilized life (the liberal myth) just as 
Chico did with Petra in The Magnificent Seven, four decades before. 
In 2004 Disney released Hidalgo: one year after Open Range and the American 
invasion of Iraq—at a time when the “War on Terror” had seemingly reached its most 
intense period. This supposedly fact based Western was set in the Middle East and 
replaced hostile Indians with stereotyped, generic Arabs as the potential threat to the 
frontier hero.  The main character, Frank T. Hopkins (Viggo Mortensen), enters a race 
with these celluloid Arabs in a kind of allegory of Americans attempts to make sense of 
their nation’s new mission in the world. The savagery versus civilization theme is 
paramount throughout and even the title of the film, named for the hero’s horse, 
provides viewers with a constant reminder of one of the key icons of the American West. 
Other strong associations with Americans in their post 9/11 circumstances included the 
main female character, Jazira’s (Zuleikha Robinson) name resonating with Al Jazeera 
(the TV network); her name given her father “Sheikh Riyadh” (played by Egyptian born 
Omar Sharif) with its direct association to the capital of Saudi Arabia (a key ally for the 
US in the Arab world); and the hero Hopkins earning of respect from the Sheikh when 
he brandishes his Colt pistol – “a symbol of both the hero’s strength on the American 
                                                          
529 Elliot West, “A Longer, Grimmer, but More Interesting Story,” in Patricia Nelson Limerick, 
Clyde A. Milner II, and Charles E. Rankin, eds., Trails: Toward a New Western History (Lawrence KS: 
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frontier and the U.S. global power past and present.”530 An important message of the 
film is that Arabs, like rebellious and backward Indians of the Old West or the Viet Cong 
of Southeast Asia, have “’no future’” in the world unless they possess the good sense to 
“’work hand in hand with the West, America.’”531 
Related to this message, the love story between Hopkins and Jazira includes their 
grappling with a Muslim practice that US President Bush alluded to several times in his 
post 9/11 speeches: the “women of cover.” Bush was referring to the Muslim women who 
wear head scarves or cover their face.  As he explained at one town hall meeting in 
California in early 2002:  
 
I love the story that came out about the women of cover, of Muslim faith, 
who didn’t feel comfortable about going [out of] their home. And so Jewish 
and Christian groups…said, “We’ll walk you to the store,” because the 
America we know is not one that castigates an individual based on their 
religion. The American we know is a society that’s open and free and a 
society that says, if you dream the big dream, you can realize it if you work 
hard….That’s the spirit of America that I know.532 
 
In Hidalgo, the female Muslim woman gains empowerment and independence from 
patriarchy and Islam through her own uncovering. Jazira is fulfilling the role of the 
prisoner/victim in the frontier captivity narrative, with an Arab woman replacing a 
white American female, as Hopkins does all he can to free her from her restrictive 
community, family and clothing. In the end Jazira uncovers in front of the western hero 
in defiance of her powerful father and in rejection of her perceived role as an oppressed 
                                                          
530 Quotation from film critic quoted in Susan Kollin, “‘Remember, you’re the good guy,’ Hidalgo, 
American Identity, and Histories of the Western,” American Studies, Vol. 51, No. 1/2 (Spring/Summer 
2010): 20. 
531 Quotations from film critic Emad El-Din Aysha appear in Ibid. 
532 George W. Bush, “Remarks at a Townhall Meeting in Ontario, California,” January 5, 2002. 
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“woman of cover.” Through uncovering the audience is presented with a woman who 
has moved toward liberation and freedom or what the president of the United States 
himself might have called, the “American spirit.” Several staples of the conservative 
Frontier Myth, including the superiority of Americanism over inferior and  less-
“civilized” cultures, exclusion of un-American ways of doing, and the dream that anyone 
can make it “big” if they work hard and embrace American-style freedom and liberty—
were all present in the Disney creation. 
The dominant plotline of Hidalgo too is remarkably familiar as a down and out 
American cowboy whose glory days are supposedly long past takes his mustang to the 
Middle East, faces down Arab treachery, and, in the end, is victorious in the 3,000 mile 
“Ocean of Fire” horse race across the Arabian Desert. Hopkins’ character thus wins the 
girl’s heart, and reaffirms American virtues and greatness across the globe. In besting 
the backward Arabs the American hero also demonstrates his supremacy over what 
turns out to be an anachronistic “Old World” British presence so that the USA can take 
its rightful place as the last, best hope of liberty in the troubled region. 
In the high security-culture following September 11, then, conservative Westerns 
could serve the same kind of purpose of those that predominated the post-World War II 
period—also a time when the United States worked toward securing its place as a world 
superpower and making commitments abroad that caused considerable anxieties 
domestically. Stanley Corkin contended in Cowboys as Cold Warriors that Westerns 
served to help “mediate national problems ‘by grafting the historical onto the mythic’ in 
an effort to help viewers ‘adjust to new concepts of national definition.’”533 New, old-
                                                          
533 Stanley Corkin, Cowboys as Cold Warriors quoted in Kollin, “’Remember, you’re the good guy,’” 
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style Western films such as Open Range and Hidalgo arguably performed the same kind 
of function in the anxious and paranoid first decade of the 21st century. The Western was 
not dead, after all, as so many had claimed: rather, it had reinvented itself by taking on a 
structure that bore some striking similarities to that which dominated the genre more 
than three decades earlier. The event of 9/11 is outside of the realm of other narrative 
structures; as a result, President Bush II and many Americans turned to the Frontier 
Myth as a way of explaining what had happened and of providing an answer to the 
question of what to do next. A happy ending was still within reach, so long as Americans 
like Charley Waite and Frank Hopkins remained true to their value system. This, so the 
message went, was once again the mission of Americans throughout the globe in its 
efforts to deal with its latest enemy: Al Qaeda and its alleged enablers.  
 
How Bush Compares with His Frontier President Predecessors 
A full century after the quintessential frontier president Theodore Roosevelt sat in 
the presidential saddle, conservative “Bush 43” likewise attempted to deploy Western 
symbolism in the aftermath of 9/11 and, in particular, his prosecution of the Iraq War. 
The conservative structure of the myth had changed little in the intervening years 
between Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. There was never a resurgence of liberal 
cowboyism under Clinton, instead the myth lay largely dormant during the 1990s and 
was reactivated by the event of 9-11. George W. Bush’s cowboy-speak sat well with many 
Americans at the early stages of the “War on Terror” as the buckskinned-President 
attempted to use “Western” rhetoric and lessons from popular culture to reaffirm the 
United States’ sense of identity and purpose on the international stage. With America as 
the heroic cowboy and literally Edward Said’s Oriental “other” as the enemy, Bush 
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attempted to project many of the same values of Western convention: a view of the 
world as an arena for the battle of light versus darkness where “evil-doers” needed to be 
tracked down and punished along with its depictions of the heroic and special virtues of 
the United States. President Bush’s plain spoken, frontier “dead or alive,” “smoke ‘em 
out” talk was a direct style that, at least initially, was well received by many Americans, 
if not by most living outside of the United States. But while “going Western” would work 
as a boon for Bush’s assertive policies in the early stages and even helped his re-election 
in 2004, by his second term this reliance on the Frontier Myth fell as flat as it had for 
the liberal LBJ. In other words, the myth could only sustain policy so far before it 
collapsed under its own weight when events proved it incapable of doing what its 
proponents advocated. The myth’s eventual inapplicability to Johnson and Bush 
(though retaining some of the same language) was in part a product of American 
presidential discourse and policy but more generally it was a victim of changing 
historical events and circumstances.  
As Marshall Sahlins articulated in Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, 
sometimes a combination of crises or series of events can prove so disruptive that they 
can no longer be fully explained by invoking or relying on the wisdom embodied in the 
myth. This development would ultimately bring about the demise in stature and 
influence of both LBJ and Bush 43. Brian Dippie’s numerous “Vanishing American” 
examples demonstrated the power of myth to influence policy. When the War in Iraq, 
the economy, and events (such as Hurricane Katrina) went south for the Bush 
Administration in its second term the symbolism of the conservative Frontier Myth lost 
its power and influence over much of the American public and policy makers. The 
transformative events of the first decade and a half of the twenty first century have 
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continued to impact on American society and to extend the value of the Frontier Myth as 
a way of explaining and understanding America.  
Of the four presidents most closely associated with the Frontier Myth, George W. 
Bush was arguably the most contrived and self-conscious of the group. Bush and his 
team were anxious to move away from the apparently unsuccessful “Ivy League and 
Pork Rinds” mix of his one-term president father, George H. W. Bush (Bush 41).534 In 
particular, the younger Bush wanted to show no signs of being “in part a member of that 
Eastern Establishment that caused Barry Goldwater to propose sawing off the Atlantic 
seaboard and setting it adrift.”535 Bush Jr. had learned this lesson the hard way. In his 
late 1970s bid for a seat in Congress, he was portrayed by his Democratic opponent as a 
“Daddy’s boy, not from around heah…”536 Having spent too many years away from the 
frontier, Bush lost the contest. According to his biographer, Bill Minutaglio, Bush Jr. 
believes he was later successful in his gubernatorial race against Democrat Ann 
Richards because of his team’s strategy to make “Dubya” even “more Texan” than his 
opponent.537 Arguably then, George W. Bush’s cowboy persona was perceived as vital for 
his own political survival as he needed a different kind of identity than that of the rest of 
his family.  
In October 2008, at an event celebrating what would have been TR’s 150th 
Birthday, George Bush compared himself to that first modern Frontier President, telling 
Americans that Roosevelt “was a man who felt at home on a sprawling ranch in the 
                                                          
534 R.W. Apple, Jr. “Bush Offering a Special Mix: Ivy League and Pork Rinds,” New York Times, 
January 19, 1989, A1. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Quotation appears in Karen S Hoffman, “Visual Persuasion in George W. Bush’s Presidency: 
Cowboy Imagery in Public Discourse,” Congress & the Presidency, Vol. 38 (2011): 336. Also see: Karen 
Olsson, “A Shrub Grows in Midland,” Texas Observer, June 25, 1999, 
http://www.texasobserver.org/1175-a-shrub-grows-in-midland/ (accessed 27 February 2014). 
537 Minutaglio, Bill. First Son: George W. Bush and the Bush Family Dynasty. New York, NY: 
Three Rivers Press, 1999): 8. 
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West. He believed in the importance of a strenuous life of exercise. I can relate to 
that.”538 Bush then described the Rough Rider portrait of Roosevelt on horseback that 
hung above the fireplace in what was TR’s former office, claiming that it had been a 
reminder to him as the occupant of the White House. “When I look at it I think about 
the character and courage that is necessary for any President.” Having excised TR’s 
liberal elements, Bush then proudly declared: “For the past 8 years, his legacy has been 
an inspiration to me….”539 
In many respects, though, TR and Bush appear to have had little in common. 
While Roosevelt was a Renaissance man, intellectual curiosity was viewed suspiciously 
in George W. Bush’s White House. The Rough Rider was distrustful of Big Business 
while Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney thrived in the halls of corporate power. 
Biographer Edmund Morris compared the disastrous Enron Corporation, a company 
that had been closer to the Bush Administration than any other, as “a very good parallel” 
to the corporate trusts that Roosevelt had very publicly assailed as “malefactors of great 
wealth.”540  Bush’s own “ranching” comparisons, meanwhile, seemed shaky at best given 
the twenty first century president’s apparent fear of horses.541 These substantive 
differences leave the impression that President Bush’s admiration for the first Frontier 
President was either misplaced or was contrived and did not run much deeper than the 
surface.  
                                                          
538 George W. Bush: “Remarks Honoring President Theodore Roosevelt’s 150th Birthday,” October 
27, 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84767 (accessed 26 June 2012). 
539 Ibid. 
540 Edmund Morris quoted in Burt Solomon, 2002. "The Cult of TR. (Cover story)." National 
Journal 34, No. 7: 452. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed June 19, 2014). 
541 Alex Spillius, “George Bush the Texan is ‘Scared of Horses’,” The Telegraph, 21 September 2007. 
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But if Roosevelt’s liberal cowboy record could never be absorbed deeply into the 
conservative frontier mythology of the early twenty-first century, the Bush team had a 
more suitable frontier predecessor in mind: Ronald Reagan. Based on the actions of 
Bush and his team it would appear that they attempted to deploy the Cowboy Reagan 
model, in terms of both style and substance, every time it had an opportunity. Just prior 
to his run for the presidency Bush purchased a sprawling ranch in the Texas Midlands 
near the town of Crawford. The ranch conjured up images of Reagan on horseback at 
Rancho del Cielo. Reagan used to disappear to his ranch and called it a vacation. But the 
more self-conscious Bush made it a blatant showcase of his authenticity. Ironically, like 
Reagan, Bush went to great lengths to run his ranch on ecologically sound principles 
while at the same time eliminating environmental regulation across the country.542 For 
Bush this pure Old West scene replaced the connections to his ancestral estate at 
Kennebunkport, Maine, which had been the home of the Bush family since the turn of 
the nineteenth century. The ranch would serve as the backdrop for the rest of the 
mythology tapped into by Bush and Cheney and as a counter to the bureaucratic, 
Washington establishment. Bush, as with the Californian Reagan, would play the role of 
the “outsider.” And, as LBJ had fully understood, doing business at the ranch gave a 
President the opportunity to play up the Frontier narrative in place of the office’s 
associations with the urban capital. Cowboys and Indians magazine recognized the 
                                                          
542 As David Farber has assessed, during the Bush presidency big oil and other major extractive 
industries “were in the catbird seat” while those seeking government regulation “had no place at the 
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Oil, Teddy Roosevelt Found Immortality and Mystery,” Sierra, Vol. 87, No. 2, (March/April 2002): 34-43. 
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dichotomy right away: “The town of Crawford is about as far from Washington D.C. as a 
man could hope to get.”543 
In terms of his own persona, George W. Bush may have gone to an elite prep 
school and then Yale, but despite the blue blood schooling and family name he had the 
common touch and showed no evidence of snobbery. Many Americans liked that. 544 
Sounding much like Reagan, he insisted that he believed strongly in a few core 
conservative beliefs including less government, lower taxes and a greater reliance on the 
private sector and individual frontier-like initiative. And Bush had the advantage of not 
being the kind of scary, extremist, Goldwater-type of conservative who pushed away too 
many middle-of-the-road voters. When he ran for President in 2000 he did not want 
people to be afraid of him or of his presidency and tried to soften some of the harsh and 
exclusionary language used by some in the neo-conservative movement. For example, 
George Bush spoke of compassion for the poor and disadvantaged but paradoxically 
claimed he could do this by reducing government: he never clearly articulated how this 
would work. As a presidential candidate, he was not willing to change his policies to win 
minority votes but was also not a racist and wanted to get passed the kind of race-
baiting and code words that his party had been employing since the early 1960s.  
On foreign policy, Bush insisted at the presidential debates that Americans should 
avoid nation building, avoid overcommitting the US military around the world, and not 
tell other nations the way they should run their own affairs. He ran hard on the 
character and morality issue and insisted that the country needed a change from the “X-
                                                          
543 Cowboys and Indians quoted from in Mark West and Chris Carey. “Re (Enacting) Frontier 
Justice: The Bush Administration’s Tactical Narration of the Old West Fantasy after September 11.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 92, No. 4 (November 2006): 393. 
544 For an excellent examination of Bush’s pre-presidential persona see Farber, The Rise and Fall of 
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rated” days of President Bill Clinton. In this vein, Bush tried to portray himself as a 
straight-shooter, a man of the regular people, one who used direct language and called 
things the way he saw them. Early on in the Bush presidency, Los Angeles Times 
editorialist Ronald Brownstein apparently bought into the image in his own comparison 
of Bush with Bill Clinton: “The White House seems to be telling voters that Bush may be 
a man of fewer words than his predecessor, but at least you can trust his words. In 
White House iconography, Bush is Gary Cooper to Clinton’s Elmer Gantry.”545 
Bush could not attack Clinton (and by association, his Vice President Al Gore) as a 
“tax and spend” liberal since during his tenure the Democratic President had not only 
balanced the budget but had actually achieved government surpluses through very 
careful federal spending programs. But even this outstanding accomplishment was, 
remarkably, attacked as a major failure when Bush told Americans that: “’The surplus is 
not the government’s money; the surplus is the people’s money.’” In Reaganesque style 
Bush pledged that if he were elected he would give the surplus back by cutting taxes.546 
For many Americans living in Red States, small-town and rural America, Bush’s frontier 
atmospherics, laid back manner, and promise of tax cuts seemed to help galvanize his 
Republican half of the electorate against his 2000 Democratic Party opponent, Al Gore. 
One sign hoisted during the 2000 Campaign seemed to sum up the red state Republican 
sentiments: “This Country Needs Cowboys, Not Smarty Pants.”547 The conservative 
Frontier Myth like the liberal one of LBJ’s day, informed Americans that the rural state 
                                                          
545 “George W. Bush Against Telling Other Nations What To Do – 2000 Presidential Debate,” 
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regions best represented the “real” America—though the simpler vision of what that 
meant now represented the values of individualism and freedom over that of community 
and mutual help. This self-flattery played especially well in the fly-over states and 
smaller, cities, towns and rural areas of the Southern states (which George Bush swept 
in 2004 and 2008) and, apart from the Pacific states, in the West. 
 
Figures 10.1 and 10.2: In this 2004 campaign bumper sticker (left) the Bush team attempts 
to transfer the iconic affection of American voters for the white Stetsoned Ronald Reagan 
to George W. Bush. Democratic non-believers countered with a campaign button of their 
own (right) featuring “fake” cowboys of the GOP. (From the author’s collection).  
 
Republican Party faithful had been longing for a new Reagan since Reagan. As Bill 
Keller of the New York Times put it in 2003, for George W. Bush “the analogy has the 
added virtue of providing an alternative political lineage; he’s not Daddy’s Boy, he’s 
Reagan Jr.” Writing two months prior to the commencement of the Iraq War he added: 
“Some Republicans speak of the current era, with the culmination of Reagan’s ballistic 
missile defense and the continuing assault on marginal tax rates and, especially, the 
standing tall against global evil as the recommencing of the Reagan ‘revolution’.”548 
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Britain’s The Economist agreed when it offered this response to its own question, “To 
what extent is George Bush Mr. Reagan’s heir?” in 2004: 
 
The similarities between the two men’s administrations are striking. Like 
Mr. Reagan, Mr. Bush prefers simplicity to nuance; like Mr. Reagan, he 
has made tax cuts and a huge defence build-up the signature tunes of his 
administration; like Mr. Reagan, he sees himself as engaged in a struggle 
with evil (this time an “axis” not an “empire”); and like Mr. Reagan, he is 
widely regarded outside the United States as a dangerous cowboy. 
 
 
The Economist piece noted that the parallels were “deliberate” as Bush attempted to 
model himself on Reagan rather than his own father.549 Along with the “dangerous” 
cowboy comparisons, the propensity for large deficits (that dwarfed Reagan’s), and a 
perceived lack of smarts also loomed big in liberal journalists and scholars’ comparisons 
of the frontier politicians. Most Republicans and some moderates, however, were elated 
by the comparisons.550 In a July 7, 2003 article entitled “Bring it on, Mr. President,” 
appearing on gopusa.com, Doug Patton declared: “We know exactly where he [President 
Bush] stands, and so do our enemies, just as they did with Reagan.”551 
Mark West and Chris Carey argue, convincingly, that after 9/11 in particular Bush 
and Cheney’s decision to go full bore in resurrecting Frontier Reagan was part of a 
focused and deliberate effort to protect the Republican base and to challenge the 
majority of those remaining “Reagan Democrats” to stay on side with them during 
wartime. Both major world events (Sahlins) and political realities (West and Carey) 
drove these comparisons. With the divide between the political parties widening, the 
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targeted audience increasingly became their supporters in the winning Red States.552 In 
2000 virtually every county with a cow in it went for Bush while large cities were just as 
enthusiastic for Gore. As The Economist observed in 2004: “At home, Mr. Reagan had 
no choice but to reach out to Democrats, because in 1980, registered Democrats 
outnumbered registered Republicans by 17 percentage points. In today’s 50-50 America, 
Mr. Bush’s main priority is to galvanise his half of the electorate.” 553 There can be no 
doubt that Bush’s deployment of the frontier imagery and symbolism, at least initially, 
helped secure his half for 2004. 
 
The Events: 9/11 and Iraq 
The policy issue most informed by the Frontier Myth was the response to the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. On that Tuesday morning the architectural symbols of 
American power, business in New York, the military headquarters of the Pentagon, and 
Federal Government institutions were either destroyed, damaged, or under intense 
threat.  Prior to the events of that day, Bush had numerous ambitions for domestic 
policy and only a few major ones related to foreign policy. But after the attacks all other 
“competing priorities were reframed through a policy lens of a singular focus: ridding 
the world, but most specifically the United States, of the scourge of catastrophic 
terrorism.”554 Here the shattering events of one day would bring about a change in the 
emphasis and, in some respects, structure of the Frontier Myth so that it would now 
attempt to accommodate policies of pre-emption and unilateralism in world affairs on 
                                                          
552 The Republicans’ target audience discussed in West and Carey, “(Re) Enacting Frontier Justice,” 
402. 
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an unprecedented scale. From September 11th onward Bush had found his mission, his 
message and, as political scientist Stanley A. Renshon has contended, “his life’s 
purpose.”555 
George W. Bush quickly placed his American crusade against terrorism within the 
context of the Frontier Myth by emphasizing some of its specific features. Almost 
immediately, the President’s language in speeches and news conferences began making 
references to the Old West: in particular those popular images emphasizing savage 
enemies, justice, cowboys, hunters and the wild frontier. Readying his troops like 
frontiersmen or a vigilante posse, Bush told Americans that he was sending their sons 
and daughters out into a wilderness that “knows no borders.”556 The world was depicted 
once again as a new frontier and the President and his nation as the gunslingers who 
would bring to justice those forces of evil threatening freedom and civilization: “This is a 
fight to say to the freedom-loving people of the world: we will not allow ourselves to be 
terrorized by somebody who thinks they can hit and hide in a cave somewhere.”557 The 
“Wanted” poster that Bush had first alluded to in 2001 strongly resonated with the 
American public and the media. The New York Post was one of three Big Apple 
newspapers to publish posters featuring Osama Bin Laden: its double page “Wanted 
Dead or Alive” pull out was pasted up all over the city in store and residence windows 
and vehicles, sometimes with the “Alive” heavily scratched out.558  Similarly, when Bush 
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addressed the nation on the impending invasion of Iraq on March 17, 2003, he issued an 
ultimatum: “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours.  Their 
refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.”559 
A plethora of media articles and editorials around the world made connections between 
this announcement and George W. Bush acting like a sheriff who told the outlaws to get 
out of town or else. As one journal reported: “it sounded like Wyatt Earp telling the bad 
guy he had 48 hours to get out of Dodge.”560 Bush, remembering that “old poster out 
West” from his days watching cowboy movies and TV as a kid, was now acting upon 
these ideas in the same manner that his old celluloid heroes would have dispensed with 
a snake-eyed villain. 
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Figure 10.3: “American Cowboy”: artist’s depiction of Marshal 
Bush bringing frontier justice to a plethora of WANTED “evil-
doers.” (“All American Cowboy,” 2005. © Artist: Philip H. Ward, Tucson, 
AZ. Reproduced under the Fair Dealing [educational purposes] provision of 
the Canadian Copyright Act) 
 
LBJ’s Vietnam, explored in Chapter 6, has been widely understood in terms of the 
Myth of the Frontier. Similarly, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were cast as the most 
recent in a long line of battles “between savagery and civilization.” Symbolically, Iraq in 
particular became the newest frontier, the latest “Indian Country.” When Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Fort [Kit] Carson in October 2003, he told the 
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members of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Guard which served in Iraq that: “In the global war 
on terror, U.S. forces, including thousands from this base, have lived up to the legend of 
Kit Carson, fighting terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan, hunting the remnants of 
the deadly regime in Iraq, working with local populations to help secure victory….Few 
men have been chosen by destiny to serve their country as Kit Carson served, and fewer 
still have risen to the challenge.” Rumsfeld’s speech and performance of the historic 3rd 
Cavalry Color Guard in their nineteenth century garb—steeped in nostalgia for a mythic 
past—was carefully choreographed to provide legitimacy to the invasion of Iraq with 
numerous references to settling the West. The implication was clear: just as the 3rd 
Cavalry had defeated a savage foe in the Indian Wars, the contemporary 3rd had led the 
charge into Iraq to root out current day “insurgents.” 561  
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Figure 10.4: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld thanks troops for “following in the 
footsteps of Christopher ‘Kit’ Carson.” October 7, 2003 (Unknown Photographer. US 
Department of Defense) 562 
 
 
In his September 17, 2001 remarks to employees at the Pentagon, President Bush 
had characterized his coalition as the gathering of a posse preparing to ride out and 
capture the enemy. “We are putting together a coalition that is a coalition dedicated to 
declaring to the world we will do what it takes to find the terrorists, to rout them out and 
                                                          
562 Quotation and image appear in Donna Miles, “Rumsfeld Thanks Troops, Likens Them to 
American Western Legend,” U.S. Department of Defense website, DoD News, 7 October 2003, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28364 (accessed 27 October 2014). Photo URL: 
http://www.defense.gov/DODCMSShare/NewsStoryPhoto/2003-10/200310075a_hr.jpg (accessed 27 
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to hold them accountable.”563 Sounding again much like LBJ’s depictions of the Viet 
Cong, the enemy were depicted by the President as both savage and cowardly. Al Qaeda 
and their operatives are “an enemy that likes to hide and burrow in…There’s no rules. 
It’s barbaric behavior. They slit throats of women on airplanes in order to achieve an 
objective that is beyond comprehension and they like to hit and, then they like to hide 
out.”564  No longer are these the heroic guerilla fighters, the Mujahideen who fought the 
Soviets in the 1980s and were praised as “freedom fighters” by the Reagan 
Administration. Instead, like mythic Native Americans once portrayed as attacking 
towns and killing innocent settlers to satisfy their bloodthirsty cravings, the Islamic 
terrorists and their Taliban hosts in Afghanistan seem more animal-like than human. 
John Cawelti reminds us that an important formula of the classic Western was that the 
villains were so evil and repulsive “the hero is both intellectually and emotionally 
justified in destroying them.”565 Violence via Judge Colt was necessary in order to 
protect those higher values of law, peace, and domestic harmony.566 
The shattering events of 9/11 would result in President’s Bush’s emphasis on one 
feature of the myth’s structure in particular: employing frontier ethics, the world was 
repeatedly divided up by his Administration in terms of good versus evil. In Peter 
Singer’s The President of Good and Evil (2004) the author claims that George W. had 
employed the word “evil,” almost always as a noun, approximately 1,000 times and in 
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319 speeches during the first year and a half of his presidency.567 Rejecting moral 
relativism, Bush declared at the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association Meeting: “I view 
this current conflict as either us versus them [or] evil versus good. And there is no in 
between.” The War on Terror was, in Bush’s own words, a showdown or “monumental 
struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail.” Bush believed in “self-reliant” 
unilateralism and that nations perceived as evil must be strongly opposed by a tough 
and uncompromising America.568 Further, the president made it clear on numerous 
occasions that the people of the world were either “with us or against us.” For Bush, 
there was no room for middle ground.569 As in classic Western stories beginning with 
The Virginian, the President neither accommodated nor would he negotiate with the 
bad guys. And like John Wayne, or for that matter the celluloid Frank Hopkins, he 
wished to portray himself as a person of steadfast moral superiority who was acting on a 
“higher calling.”570 American power under the guiding principles of the Bush Doctrine 
was said to be a force in the world for goodness and light: “There is no doubt in my mind 
we’re doing the right thing. Not one doubt,” Bush declared in one interview.571 And the 
President went further than any of his war time predecessors, when he claimed not only 
that America and the forces of good would defeat its enemies but that Bush and his 
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outriders of freedom would “rid the world of evil.”572 Here Marshall Sahlins contention 
that major events can cause characteristics of a social/cultural structure to modify and 
transform is demonstrated once again. And now it was not only America’s enemies in 
specific nations which needed to be vanquished before the homeland of old could be 
restored, but all enemies around the globe (LBJ by contrast had, at one point, held 
global ambitions for his “Great Society”). 
Part of President Bush’s tough-guy strategy would be to throw aside those cultural 
and legal norms which he believed had prevented Americans from achieving an even 
playing field in its battle with the forces of darkness. For Bush, America could justify the 
use of extreme measures against enemies or possible enemies since it was not the same 
as when other nations used torture or other such methods. The United States, so the 
Administration’s logic appeared to go, was by nature a moral nation that only tried to 
protect its people and principles against evil. As a result, its use of extreme measures 
was moral, because a nation of high principle had used them only under threat from evil 
people. Like Dirty Harry Callahan, Bush was disgusted with procedural safeguards and 
international protocols which protected clever and sinister criminals from the severe 
punishments and harsh disciplinary treatment required to safeguard American society 
and to bring to justice those who would threaten innocent folks. In this view, torture and 
abuse of prisoners, denial of legal rights, extensive electronic surveillance, and in some 
instances even collateral damage were all justified and supported by the Administration. 
While most liberals were opposed to these measures—arguing that breaking treaties, 
international laws, and the code of simple human decency made the United States a 
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broken and dishonoured nation—conservatives and, at least initially, the majority of the 
public agreed that they had to fight fire with fire and appeared inspired by Bush’s moral 
absolutes and blazing certainties.  
 
Prairie Chapel Ranch and Frontier Imagery 
Bush 43 deliberately associated, visually, with popular imagery of the Frontier 
West in several ways. Most significantly in 1999, just as he was about to embark on his 
2000 presidential campaign, he purchased a 1,600 acre ranch at “Prairie Chapel” on the 
plains of central Texas. The ranch created the opportunity for the visual cowboy Bush to 
be seen wearing his Stetson, jeans and boots while clearing brush on his ranch and 
driving around in his pickup truck (a working vehicle): this activity was intended to 
reinforce the message that Bush was a real frontiersman of the ranch. The new Western 
“digs” also helped him to replace his ancestral connections to the Bush Estate at 
Kennebunkport, Maine.  
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Figure 10.5: Bush’s white Stetson appears on his Oval Office desk as 
he prepares for a radio address. Unlike TR, LBJ and Reagan, Bush 
often wore the cowboy attire in Washington: sending the message 
that whether home on the range in Texas or in Washington, cowboy 
characteristics were an important part of his persona and identity. 
(Photographer: Eric Draper, January 27, 2001. George W. Bush Presidential 
Library) 
 
 
 
Bush spent 490 days of his presidency at the Ranch near Crawford, Texas, 
considerably more time than the year Reagan spent at Rancho del Cielo. He entertained 
dignitaries much more than Reagan as well. According to The Washington Post, 18 
foreign leaders met with Bush at his Crawford ranch, including Russian President 
 
 
407 
 
Vladimir Putin, Saudi leader Abdullah, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 
and Bush’s “truest friend,” British Prime Minister Tony Blair.573 Close allies were 
awarded with visits to the Bush “frontier” homestead while those who balked at the 
President’s views would have to meet up with him in the urban environment of DC or 
elsewhere. Amidst a flurry of visits in the Spring and Summer of 2003, The Daily 
Show’s Jon Stewart wryly observed of highly skeptical French President Jacques Chirac: 
“I doubt he’ll be coming to the ranch anytime soon.”574 
Interestingly, world leaders sometimes applied even more frontier credentials to 
Bush than did Bush himself. Vladimir Putin reportedly took horseback riding lessons in 
preparation for his visit to the President’s Cowboy ranch; but upon arriving realized that 
the President was a self-described “windshield rancher” who rode a pickup truck.575  
Liberal journalists mocked the fact that Bush could not ride a horse, that the 200 head 
of cattle living on his ranch were owned by other ranchers who leased the property, and 
that his handlers knew well enough to keep him away from guns (Dick Cheney’s ill-fated 
hunting trip aside) and even firewood. With these “typical cowboyesque skills” all out, 
one observer wrote: “Ultimately someone came up with the image of George W. Bush 
using a chain saw—a relatively easy to operate tool—which would provide some kind of 
action video for the president and the media.”576 But even here Bush’s acumen came 
into question by skeptics. While Ronald Reagan actually did have a practical (along with 
his political) purpose clearing miles of trails for riding on and also needed firewood, the 
                                                          
573 Days at the ranches and visiting leaders as reported by the Washington Post in Karen S. 
Hoffman, “Visual Persuasion in George W. Bush’s Presidency,” 327. 
574 From The Daily Show, Comedy Central Network, May 14, 2003 quoted in West and Carey, 
“(Re)Enacting Frontier Justice…,” 394. 
575 President Bush’s “I’m a windshield rancher” self-description is quoted in Gregg Moss and Emily 
Narvaes, “There Ain’t No ‘W’ in Cattle Ranchin’,” Denver Post, February 2, 2002: K-02. 
576 Santina, Don. “Cowboy Imagery and the American Presidency: Ride ’Em Brush Cutter!” 
CounterPunch, December 19, 2005, at http://www.counterpunch.org/2005/12/19/ride-em-brush-cutter/  
(accessed June 18, 2012). 
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New York Times could see little point to Bush’s efforts “to clear brush and dead trees 
out of a shadowy hollow…a place he calls ‘the amphitheater.’”577 
After 9/11 the frontier visuals became a much more visible part of President Bush’s 
wardrobe. With the Ranch as Bush’s backdrop and bedecked in his Stetson, buckskin 
jacket, and eel skin cowboy boots embossed with the seal of his office, once again a 
president called upon the Frontier Myth visuals to communicate substantive 
information about his leadership style. Only in this case it was a Chief Executive’s 
uniform for fighting terrorism. Bush had invoked those familiar images which invited 
Americans to think about his hawkish policy and leadership in terms of the Frontier 
Myth. Likewise, in both speeches and press conferences, what one journalist described 
as his “John Wayne rhetoric”578 became much more pronounced among Bush and his 
inner circle as a means of expressing their determination to bring those behind the 
attacks and their allies to justice. 
Meanwhile at the White House itself, trusted visitors frequently encountered 
several frontier paintings and statues; Bush’s own special attention was focussed on “A 
Charge to Keep,” a painting that he had acquired from W.H.D. Koerner. The President 
was so taken by it, in fact, that he took the painting’s name for his own autobiography.579 
Bush believes that the image depicts circuit-riders who spread Methodism across the 
Alleghenies during the nineteenth century: that it is the portrayal of a cowboy—who 
looked a lot like Bush himself—and also of a missionary of his own denomination. But in 
a case of unwanted irony, the President was incorrect about the title of the painting and 
                                                          
577 Steven R. Weisman, “Meanwhile, Back at the Ranch…and Other Vacation Tales: The Presidential 
Search for the Inner Cowboy,” New York Times, January 2, 2002: A14, A24. 
578 Liz Marlantes, “More John Wayne Rhetoric Infuses Politics,” Christian Science Monitor, July 18, 
2003, online: http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0718/p02s02-usfp.html (accessed 27 October, 2014). 
579 George W. Bush, A Charge to Keep (New York: Morrow, 1999). 
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its meaning. W.H.D. Koerner created the illustration for a Western short story entitled 
“The Slipper Tongue,” which was published in the Saturday Evening Post in 1916. Scott 
Horton of Harper’s explains that the story was about “a smooth-talking horse thief who 
is caught, and then escapes a lynch mob in the Sand Hills of Nebraska.” The painting 
actually depicts the thief attempting to flee from his captors and the Post’s caption read: 
“Had His Start Been Fifteen Minutes Longer He Would Not Have Been Caught.” Rather 
than an inspiring evangelical Methodist, then, the man in the painting is actually a horse 
thief fleeing from a mob who wants him strung up. “The president of the United States,” 
Horton concludes, “has identified closely with a man he sees as a mythic, heroic figure. 
In fact that man is a wily criminal one step out in front of justice.”580 
                                                          
580 Quotations in Scott Horton, “The Illustrated President,” Harper’s (January 24, 2008), online 
article, http://harpers.org/archive/2008/01/hbc-90002237 (accessed May 31, 2012).   
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Figure 10.6: George W. Bush’s official White House Portrait by artist John Howard 
Sanden. “A Charge to Keep” appears over the President’s right shoulder. (White House 
Collection/ White House Historical Association) 
 
 
 
In the real world, trouble came for President Bush with his equally erroneous and 
premature bragging of “Mission Accomplished” in Iraq—just two months into the 
invasion. Ray Allen Billington reminded us that “optimism” had always been an 
“outstanding feature” of the frontier experience but when no weapons of mass 
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destruction were found, casualties continued to mount, and only a few joined in the 
“Coalition of the Willing,” skeptics in America toward both the mission and the Bush 
version of the myth began to multiply. By the end of June 2003 the President’s once 
firm footing at home had become noticeably shaky.  
It was at this point that VP Dick Cheney stepped in to control the damage by 
deploying the imagery of Cowboy Reagan. Cheney insisted in interviews and meetings 
with the press that President Bush was doing exactly what Ronald Reagan would have 
done in Iraq. His repeated key phrase was: “I saw the conviction and moral courage of 
Ronald Reagan.” Indeed the Reagan comparisons cropped up 21 times in Cheney’s 
interviews and speechmaking in the latter half of 2003 and this was typically 
accompanied by the use of Western symbolism.581 The cowboy talk, Mark West and 
Chris Carey point out, was hardly coincidental. The coordinated efforts of the two 
revealed part of a deliberate strategy to deploy the Frontier Myth to the party faithful in 
stump speeches occurring at vital moments—first early in the war in Afghanistan and 
now throughout the war in Iraq.  
 
The Bush Doctrine and American Exceptionalism 
In a dramatic shift in American foreign policy, President Bush announced in June 
2002 a fundamental change from the strategy of containment of America’s enemies (the 
previous Cold War strategy) to one of pre-emption. The president declared: “Our 
security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for 
pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”582 
                                                          
581 Cheney quoted in West and Carey, (Re)Enacting Frontier Justice,” 392; Ibid.  
582 Bush quotation from June 2002 appears on PBS Online, “Frontline: The Evolution of the Bush 
Doctrine,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html (accessed March 25, 
2014). 
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Bush, Cheney and Company’s ideas about pre-emptive military action fit with the view 
that problems on the frontier required a quick and decisive response to be resolved. Like 
the pioneers, frontiersman and cowboy of popular myth, Bush claims the right to self-
defense, only here he extends it to authorizing the pre-emptive attacks against potential 
aggressors and the goal of cutting them off before they are able to attack the United 
States. The Frontier Myth structure—throttled by the events of 9/11—would now be 
pushed to the edge with respect to promoting action prior rather than in response to 
specific perceived crises. American forces in Afghanistan and later Iraq would not be an 
invasion but an act of self-defense. To defend the United States, Bush had to show his 
steely cowboy determination: that he meant what he said and that he meant business. 
And Bush was not willing to wait for others to help. He would dispense with geopolitics 
and go with his “instincts” to act first and think later. “The Bush Doctrine is actually 
being defined by action, as opposed to by words,” Bush told NBC’s Tom Brokaw in a 
2003 interview on board Air Force One.583 
Rejecting the collective security approach embraced by liberals for most of the 
twentieth century, Bush insisted on the right of the United States to go it alone 
decisively in the face of a perceived threat against itself. His belief in “self-reliant” 
unilateralism supposedly reflected the frontiersman’s tough mindedness and 
independence and meant there would be little compromise with allies. When the Bush 
Administration lost the UN Security Council vote in 2003 and was denied authorization 
to launch a war against Iraq, it rejected the international rules and rustled up a small 
“coalition”—a posse that would go it alone. Britain under Prime Minister Tony Blair was 
                                                          
583 Bush quoted from interview with Tom Brokaw in Mike Allen and Romesh Ratnesar, “The End of 
Cowboy Diplomacy,” Time [cover story, Canadian Edition], Vol. 168, Issue 3, July 17, 2006: 14. 
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the United States one major stalwart ally during the Iraq War. The Guardian described 
Britain’s involvement in a discussion of the grounds for war as follows: “The truth is that 
Tony Blair is going into this inquiry the way he went into the war itself: as Tonto to the 
American Lone Ranger.”584  
The Bush Doctrine of pre-emption also emphasized its willingness to act 
individually without allies when necessary. Bush’s unilateral implementation of action 
at the UN prompted Jack Kelly of the Pittsburgh-Post Gazette to compare the President 
to Will Kane—the brave but isolated sheriff of High Noon.585 Kelly writes that “Bush’s 
U.N. speech on Saddam Hussein eerily resembled the script of the greatest Western of 
all time, High Noon.” Kelly misread the anti-McCarthyism message of the film-makers 
themselves; instead he and many others on the right, including Bush himself, saw this 
go-it-alone foreign policy as representing the “individualism” strand of the Frontier 
Myth. Ron Grossman of the Chicago Tribune agreed with this popular perception: “His 
[Bush’s] is a vision of pioneer America, where sturdy frontiersmen didn’t wait for the 
government. They went out and tamed the wilderness with their own two hands.”586 
Related to this, the President claimed morality was at stake.  “At some point,” Bush said, 
“we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me.”587 In practice, Bush’s unilateralist 
approach to the international community was not only demonstrated in Iraq, but also in 
his decisions to abandon the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia (originally 
signed with the Soviet Union), against widespread objections; refusal to offer any 
                                                          
584 Freedland, Jonathon. “Don’t Be Fooled Again.” The Guardian, February 4, 2004, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0204-07.htm (accessed 25 February 2014). 
585 Jack Kelly, “Bush Re-enacts ‘High Noon’ at the United Nations,” Pittsburgh-Post Gazette, 
September 18, 2002: B3. 
586 Ron Grossman, “Taking Apart the New Deal,” Chicago Tribune, April 13, 2003, Section 2.1, p. 5 
quoted in Dmitri, “Frontier Justice,” 24. 
587 Bob Woodward, Bush at War, p.81, quoted in Dmitri, “Frontier Justice,” 24. 
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endorsement of the Kyoto accord on global warming; and his insistence that the United 
States would not be participating in the International Criminal Court. To an even greater 
degree than Ronald Reagan, Bush saw the demands of an individual nation (America) 
on the international stage as trumping those of cooperation in the global community. 
With Bush we have another example of a President attempting to push the parameters 
of the myth to new limits in response to broader events. 
George W. Bush’s Administration also hoped to promote itself as representing the 
kinds of values associated with The Magnificent Seven or Shane:588 with the United 
States in the role as the mythic protector of innocents in the global community against 
the bad guy terrorists. The gifted individuals featured in these two movies have both the 
power and the responsibility to act—sometimes in the name of the community—but 
even against the will of the community if for their own good. The President knew what 
was best for the world and his bellicose doctrine allegedly included a sense of 
responsibility to help weaker nations that were unable to defend themselves.  In his 
speech of September 20, 2001, he described his vision for American leadership. “The 
advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time and the great hope of 
every time—now depends on us.”589 As LBJ had once said in relation to his “little 
booger” allies, the South Vietnamese, Bush said of the Afghanistan mission that “I 
wanted us to be viewed as the liberator.”590 In Iraq, meanwhile, he would take down the 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to help the weak and relieve a nation where “there is 
                                                          
588 Shane (1953) Paramount Pictures, Director: George Stevens, Starring: Alan Ladd, Jean Arthur, 
Van Heflin, Brandon de Wilde, Jack Palance; The Magnificent Seven (1960) MGM,  Director: John 
Sturges, Starring: Yul Brynner, Steve McQueen, Eli Wallach, Charles Bronson, James Coburn. 
589 Bush quotation from September 20, 2001 on PBS Online, “Frontline: The Evolution of the Bush 
Doctrine,” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/cron.html (accessed March 25, 
2014). 
590 Bush quotation from Woodward, Bush at War appears in Dmitri, “Frontier Justice,” 27. 
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immense suffering.” 591 Like Shane and other gunslinger heroes, the President was there 
to dispense justice in a hostile and highly dangerous post-Cold War world. Unlike some 
of his more thoughtful cowboy “counterparts,” though, Bush seemed less concerned 
with thinking actions and their consequences through first and more concerned with 
doing. And by deploying the Frontier Myth in ways that raised expectations so 
incredibly high—Bush, Cheney and others were setting themselves and their 
associations with the myth up for potential disappointment and failure later on. 
Significantly, both the Bush Doctrine’s supporters and some of its harshest critics 
subscribed to the exceptionalist tenets of the Frontier Myth. In The Folly of Empire, 
Bush-basher John B. Judis argues that the President’s pursuit of an American empire in 
the Middle East was an extreme departure from what the author believed was the 
nation’s essential tradition of anti-imperialism. Like Turner, Judis asserts that 
Americans had shunned colonialism, making its experience very different from Old 
Europe’s. Except for the temporary aberration after the Spanish-American War, Judis’ 
claims that Americans had adhered to anti-imperial traditions that allowed their 
westward expansion into a virtually empty continent. For decades, this self-serving and 
flattering version of history has been challenged by many historians including Norman 
Graebner and Richard Van Alsytne; and more recently by the New West historians 
including Richard White and Patricia Limerick. 592  But for many Americans these 
features of the myth have been too powerful to be displaced by scholars.  
                                                          
591 Woodward, Bush at War, 339. 
592 John B. Judis, The Folly of Empire: What George W. Bush Could Learn from Theodore 
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; See Norman A. Graebner, 
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416 
 
Recently, Dutch historian Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt’s analysis of American 
exceptionalism, The Myth of the West (1995), revealed that according to the Frontier 
Myth, America was the “last empire” but, at the same time, distinct from those previous 
empires of the European great powers. While these others had risen and fallen, the 
Frontier Myth ensured their own nation’s bright future. The right conditions of time and 
space had come together, making America—that “city on a hill”—the “last frontier,” even 
the “end of history.”593 
As the conflict in Iraq wore on, the Administration and nation’s adherence to the 
Myth of the West created similar problems for Bush to those that had sunk LBJ. Like 
Johnson, President Bush kept insisting that the old American hope of “freedom just 
around the corner” was out there to grasp on these far off frontiers and that democracy 
and freedom would be the foundation for international peace. Assigning a redemptive 
role to the United States, he raised great hopes for a brighter future, committed 
substantial American forces to spread democracy and attain peace but once again 
miscalculated the outcome in terms of underestimated costs and unanticipated 
consequences. LBJ biographer Robert A. Divine has written of the Bush Doctrine: “for 
the United States at least, war is a messy and unpredictable way to deal with 
international problems. Americans enter into conflicts convinced that they can create a 
better and more stable world once their enemies are defeated, only to meet with 
unexpected outcomes and a new set of challenges.”594 It is precisely these unexpected 
outcomes and challenges which would overwhelm Bush’s Administration during its 
                                                          
593 Nordholt’s analysis is discussed in Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: 
Historical Comparisons of Ends and Means in Their Foreign Policies,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 30, No. 3 
(June 2006): 517. 
594 Robert A. Divine, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, quoted in Ambrosius, 536. 
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second term and cause the myth itself to be viewed increasingly as out of touch with the 
realities of the twenty-first century. 
 
George W. Bush: Genuine or Fake Frontier President?   
Americans, and traditional allies overseas, had strong reactions to George W. Bush 
and his frontier persona. And those Bush Administration policies with the closest ties to 
the Frontier Myth were also the most hotly contested. Almost immediately after 9/11, 
Bush enjoyed a dramatic and seemingly united surge in popularity; but as time passed a 
growing wave of criticism and distrust emerged. Overall, within the United States itself, 
Bush’s frontier persona was initially viewed in a more positive than negative light. But in 
the post-Reagan era, it produced decidedly more affirmative responses from 
conservative members of the public and more critical ones from those holding liberal 
viewpoints.595 
For supporters of President Bush, his character was one of the qualities that they 
admired most. At first even those who did not agree with his policies appeared to admire 
those aspects of Bush’s character associated with cowboys. “They might break with 
President Bush on the war in Iraq or on illegal immigration,” observed Timothy Egan of 
the New York Times, “but not with the man himself.”596 
MSNBC’s Hardball host Chris Matthews, who would later turn vehemently against 
President Bush, hailed him in May 2003 as epitomizing the national character: “Here’s a 
president who’s really nonverbal….He looks great in that cowboy costume he wears 
when he goes West….We’re proud of our President.” At the outset of the Iraq War at 
                                                          
595 Certainly the interest in “Bush cowboy” has persisted for years; even after he left office a search 
on YouTube yielded 620 results. See Hoffman, Visual Persuasion in George W. Bush’s Presidency, 329. 
596 Timothy Egan quoted in Hoffman, Visual Persuasion in George W. Bush’s Presidency, 332. 
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least, Matthews saw Bush as an uncomplicated man of few words, a Marlboro Man type 
and “can-do,” self-reliant “type of guy” with a dislike for the “indoors.”597 Conservative 
online articles, such as Andrew Bernstein’s “In Defense of the Cowboy,” similarly lauded 
Bush’s supposed courage, self-reliance and straight-shooting talk.  “What we honor 
about the cowboy of the Old West,” writes Bernstein, “is his willingness to stand up to 
evil and to do it alone, if necessary. The cowboy is a symbol of the crucial virtues of 
courage and independence.” Conversely, Europeans who criticized the United States 
were described by Bernstein as “worse than the timid shopkeeper in an old Hollywood 
Western. They don’t merely want to avoid confronting evil–they seek to prevent anyone 
else from recognizing evil and standing up to it.” Indeed Bernstein argued that the only 
possible legitimate criticism of the President was that he was not cowboy enough.598  
In the days following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
American observers enthusiastically embraced frontier exceptionalism by identifying 
the differences between the United States and “Old Europe.” In a line seemingly drawn 
right out of the Turner thesis, freelance journalist Wayne Lutz claimed that, as opposed 
to Europe, America was built by rugged individuals possessing the moral clarity of the 
frontier folk: men and women who were willing to take risks to carve out a better world 
for themselves. Writing for the Sun News, Kathleen Parker declared that: “The world 
has become a global Dodge City. Lucky for us, a Wild West sheriff is in charge.” The 
National Review’s William F. Buckley concurred and insisted that Saddam Hussein 
needed to be ousted from power in Iraq. To do this would take the kind of cowboy 
thinking where men of action and courage would leave ambiguity behind in favour of 
                                                          
597 Chris Matthews quoted in Barry Stephenson, “Swaggering Savagery,” 12. 
598 Andrew Bernstein, “In Defense of the Cowboy,” Andrew Bernstein website, 
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taking down the evil-doer, as opposed to the kind of cowardice demonstrated by the 
French and the Germans.599  Jack Kelly of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, claimed that 
Bush’s 2002 speech to the UN on Hussein resembled the storyline of the film High 
Noon. “If other U.N. members were willing to join the posse,” Kelly wrote of the 
President, “he will be happy to discuss with them how best to enforce the law. But he 
made clear that he is going to face the man who hates us, even if they will not.” Then 
Kelly added his own assessment of Bush’s “Hadleyville on the Hudson” speech: 
“European sophisticates pride themselves on seeing the world in shades of gray. But 
when people look at them, all they see are shades of yellow.”600 Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld likewise dismissed the mounting opposition in Germany and France 
by describing them in mythic terms as “Old Europe,” and saying in so many words that, 
in the Bush White House, the views of these nations no longer mattered. 601 These two 
tenets of the Frontier Myth—American exceptionalism and its accompanying sense of 
mission—were very much alive and well among conservative ideologues and others 
during the early Bush years. 
Outside of the United States, George Bush’s one major supporter in the Iraq War, 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, was described by the President as the United States’ 
“truest friend” and by many in the media as his faithful deputy. In the case of one 
cartoon, Blair was “faithful Indian companion” Tonto to the Bush’s Lone Ranger (as also 
                                                          
599 Media quotations appear in Dodwell, “From the Center.” 
600 Kelly, “Bush Re-enacts ‘High Noon’ at the United Nations,” B3. 
601 Rumsfeld quoted in David E. Sanger, “To Some in Europe, The Major Problem is Bush the 
Cowboy,” New York Times (24 January 2003). Access: 
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described in The Guardian).602 Curiously though, it was Bush’s relationship with 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that was the collaboration most obviously 
tied to the Frontier Myth. Over a four year period the two men proudly nurtured a 
common identity as dual inheritors of the legacy of Marshal Kane (Gary Cooper) of the 
1952 film, High Noon. Their first visit at Camp David had resulted in mutual 
pronouncements of a new and very positive relationship based on “’comparing 
themselves to the lone, stoic and honor-bound marshal played by [Gary] Cooper.’”603 
Just two weeks after the terrorist attacks, on September 25, Koizumi visited the White 
House and left with a framed copy of the film poster for the movie—a gift that the PM 
said he “treasures.” Bush, according to the Christian Science Monitor, had “dubbed 
Koizumi ‘Gary Cooper,’ after the sheriff of High Noon.”604 A few months later, when 
Bush visited Tokyo in February, Koizumi had two special surprises waiting for him: first 
a performance of “yabusame,” traditional Japanese mounted archery, and then a gift to 
the American President a drawing of Bush himself performing yabusame on horseback. 
Prime Minister Koizumi declared that the print was symbolic of “the U.S.–led fight 
against the evil of terrorism.” 605  As one correspondent for a Japanese daily noted, 
“Koizumi’s overnight visit at ‘Prairie Chapel’ ranch puts him among only a handful of 
world leaders to meet Bush here, seen as a gesture of thanks for Japanese support for 
the United States in the Iraq war.”606 Far Eastern Sheriff Koizumi publicly assured the 
                                                          
602 Tonto cartoon which appeared in The Observer [London] on January 19, 2003 is described in 
Sanger, “To Some In Europe….” 
603 Quotation from Japan’s Kyodo News Agency appears in J. Hoberman, “It’s Always ‘High Noon’ 
at the White House,” New York Times, April 25, 2004: AR11. 
604 Christian Science Monitor quoted in West and Carey, “(Re)Enacting Frontier Justice,” 395. 
605 Ibid. 
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President that “Gary Cooper fought a lonely battle against a gang, but this time the 
whole world stands with the United States.”607 
For President Bush, it was especially important to be able to disseminate his 
administration’s plans quickly and widely without the added complication of having to 
explain and rationalize the specifics: the Frontier Myth appeared the ideal vehicle for 
this. It offered him a tactical tool for articulating his message to a diverse audience that 
played upon powerful ideas that were already heavily entrenched in American culture.  
At first, as we have seen, this approach was widely accepted at home and by a small 
number of leaders abroad. But unlike “Cooper-san,” few national leaders outside the 
United States and a steadily growing number of Americans viewed George Bush’s 
frontier persona and “mission,” particularly in Iraq, as authentic or noble. Significantly, 
like most European citizens, the Japanese public had strongly opposed the Iraq invasion 
right from the outset. 608  The Frontier Myth was an American myth that never held a 
grip on foreign leaders and the public in other nations as it did at home in the USA. And 
as the immediate urgency of September 11 faded over time and the Iraq War dragged on, 
the criticism of Bush grew more and more intense on his home turf as well as the 
Frontier Myth lost its ability to either explain or motivate. 
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These fissures were clearly in evidence during Bush’s second term. Liberals and, as 
time passed, moderates as well pointed to serious inconsistences in Bush’s handling of 
foreign affairs. For these folks Will Kane was a more thoughtful, reluctant hero who did 
a job that needed to be done out of a sense of obligation rather than John Wayne style 
guns blazing, bravado. To critics, Bush (along with Cheney and Rumsfeld) seemed 
increasingly intent on forcing his will on others, even when most of the world wanted no 
part of his invasion of Iraq. Just as galling to those holding on to the older liberal 
version of the myth: Bush appeared to be using faux cowboy credentials and methods to 
conjure up public support. Some liberal American critics at home challenged the idea 
directly that Bush genuinely adhered to frontier values and found his cowboy 
atmospherics so artificial that it undermined his overall legitimacy. Eric Baard of the 
Village Voice pulled no punches in 2004: “George Bush is a fake cowboy. From media 
accounts, you’d reckon that the president was a buckaroo to the bones. He plays up the 
image, big-time, with $300 designer cowboy boots, a $1,000 cowboy hat….”609 His 
purchase of a ranch just before his presidential campaign only reinforced Baard and 
others’ belief that it was all for the sake of Bush manipulating the Frontier Myth in order 
to also manipulate his own imagery.  Buying a ranch, clearing brush and wearing 
cowboy attire did not make him a Western hero. Deana Duke Arbuckle also insisted in 
her 2003 column in The Oregonian that “’this president is no cowboy.’” Arbuckle, 
herself married to a retired cowman, explained that a genuine cowboy “tends to his own 
herd and his own land. He mends his own fences. He never intrudes on his neighbor 
                                                          
609 Baard, Erik. “George Bush Ain’t No Cowboy,” Village Voice (September 28, 2004). 
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without an invitation. He makes a good neighbor…he minds his own business and 
wouldn’t tell the people next door how to live.’”610  
Some of those Americans most critical of Bush also invoked popular culture 
manifestations of the Frontier Myth. In two editorials which analyzed how Bush fit or 
should fit into the Western hero’s image, the President fared poorly. In the All-
American Post, published by the Vietnam Veterans and Airborne Press, the editor 
asserted that George W. Bush should “‘examine his cowboy image’” and gain support 
through his much more deliberate approach immediately after 9/11 rather than 
emulating Clint Eastwood in Unforgiven as he was doing in the days leading up to the 
Iraq War. The latter Bush was compared to a surly Eastwood announcing cruel threats 
as he left town. The publisher of the Anniston Star wrote in a similar vein that the Bush 
administration had “‘blurred the quiet cowboy as a self-defining allegory’” by being 
more like a “‘bad-humored 20-foot American cowboy [who] tells the whole saloon he’s 
going to drill the 3-foot bad guy, who doesn’t stand a chance.’” Like Gary Cooper, the 
Anniston Star contended, Americans looked up to the image fulfilled by Sheriff Kane in 
High Noon: the thoughtful, quiet cowboy who fought only when an outlaw forced him to 
take action to defend what was right. The frontier cowboy of The Virginian or High 
Noon had been one who demonstrated self-restraint and quiet confidence. He did not 
swagger or exude arrogance but recognized his own vulnerability. But these critics and 
others noted that this was not the image that Bush, VP Cheney and Defense Secretary 
Rumsfeld were conveying at all. Susan Faludi of the New York Times called Bush out 
directly: “The president’s actions have violated the basic terms of the American Western 
                                                          
610 Arbuckle quoted in Donald C. & Elizabeth M. Dickinson Research Center, National Cowboy and 
Western Heritage Museum, “Like a Cowboy: Imagery in Politics, Prose and Reality,” 
http://www.nationalcowboymuseum.org/research/cms/Exhibits/LikeaCowboy/tabid/142/Default.aspx 
(accessed 8 August 2009).  
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romance and, thereby, the terms by which we call ourselves Americans. He’s declared 
war on a foundational national myth.” Here was perhaps the most forthright example of 
a journalist apparently attempting to reassert the liberal Frontier Myth by insisting that 
the Republican President and those on the right were acting in direct opposition the 
myth’s ideals. If many conservatives had supported forceful, unilateral action, liberals 
increasingly saw this as a mistake by an unchecked President who had taken the myth to 
extremes and by association inflicted severe damage on the myth’s viability and 
persuasiveness.611 
Over the first two years of Bush’s second term, HBO ran the highly acclaimed 
Western, Deadwood, created and produced by David Milch – a former Yale fraternity 
brother of the President himself. In many ways the series reflected the milieu of Bush’s 
second term, the War in Iraq and the intrusions of the Office of Homeland Security with 
its frequent scenes of violence being employed at levels and disproportionate to the 
incidents that provoked it, an emphasis on property rights even in the absence of law, 
and a skeptical view of government as predatory at all levels. Significantly, in contrast to 
Open Range and Hidalgo of Bush’s first term, Milch intended Deadwood as a corrective 
to what he considered to be the varnished mythologies of the West created by 
Hollywood. As one interviewer put it: “As you watch ‘Deadwood’, you find yourself 
believing in this moral relativism.”612 By his second term, the varnish was wearing off of 
Cowboy Bush’s Administration to a growing degree in the minds of academics, the 
media, and the public.  
                                                          
611 Parts of this paragraph are paraphrased and quotations taken from Dodwell, “From the Center”; 
Susan Faludi, “An American Myth Rides Into the Sunset,” New York Times, March 30, 2003: WK13. 
612 Heather Havrilesky, “The Man Behind ‘Deadwood’,” Salon.com, March 5, 20o5. Online at: 
http://www.salon.com/2005/03/05/milch/ (accessed 12 May 2015). 
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In Europe, much of the media’s critical reaction to Bush’s style of diplomacy was 
summed up in 2005 by Yale diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis. He wrote in 
Diplomatic History that “President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq [despite widespread 
foreign criticism] provoked complaints that great power was being wielded without 
great responsibility, followed by an unprecedented collapse of support for the United 
States abroad. From nearly universal sympathy in the weeks after September 11, 
Americans within a year and a half found their country widely regarded as an 
international pariah.”613 So for many of America’s allies, then, the US became the Miller 
gang coming to terrorize the town (Iraq) rather than Will Kane reluctantly but bravely 
and rightly staying to protect it. Within a year and a half of 9-11, Bush’s invitation 
seemed to have more in common with The Magnificent Seven’s bully Calvera terrorizing 
Mexican villages than with Yul Brynner’s Chris and his coalition of six more than willing 
states reluctantly coming to town to deal with the evil terrorists. As early as May 2002, 
when the President travelled to Germany to try to obtain support in Europe for a war in 
Iraq, NBC Nightly News reported that the “‘German media are portraying Bush as a 
Rambo-like cowboy intent on going after Saddam Hussein with or without Europe’s 
support.’”614 This was not the charming LBJ Ranch-style Frontier Myth that had been 
presented to Chancellor Erhard back in 1963 but instead an arrogant, reckless and 
aggressive Presidential gunslinger who was out of his league and a danger rather than a 
protector of international stability.  The next year, the then editor of the Daily Mirror in 
London, Piers Morgan, complained that Bush’s version of the cowboy centred on a 
domineering man of action who always had to get his way. “I think people look at him 
                                                          
613 John Gaddis quoted in Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush,” 523. 
614 NBC’s Cameron Brown quoted in Dodwell, “From the Center.” 
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[Bush] and think John Wayne. We in Europe like John Wayne, we liked him in cowboy 
films. We don’t like him running the world.”615 During Bush’s first term, then, Frontier 
Myth served as an interpretive framework for Americans but not for non-Americans in 
other nations. By his second term, the post-9/11 myth that his administration had 
nurtured would falter with Americans as well. 
 
Figure 10.7:  By 2005, George W. Bush’s approach to foreign policy had become the target 
of increasing ridicule and derision from mainstream cartoonists and editorialists not only 
                                                          
615 Piers Morgan quoted in Ibid. 
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abroad but within the United States itself. The conservative Frontier Myth that had worked 
with considerable effectiveness within the United States for more than three years was in 
trouble. (“Baby Bush,” Daryl Cagle, May 8, 2005. Reproduced with permission of Daryl Cagle’s Political 
Cartoons.com; #15531) 
 
From 2001 through the 2004 Presidential election, overall support for Bush held 
as conservatives and independents, initially, accepted Bush’s version of the Frontier 
Myth and his contention that he had kept the nation secure after 9/11 with his posse in 
the Middle East and tough vigilance at home.  In what may have been key to the 
election’s outcome, 54% of voters polled believed that Americans were better protected 
and safer from terrorism than they were four years earlier while 41% believe that they 
were less safe.616 The majority of Americans in early November 2004, still accepted the 
need for an aggressive and mostly unilateralist approach to foreign relations using 
overwhelming gunman force to ensure security at home and the promotion of American 
interests abroad. 
In its first term, the Bush Administration had pushed the structural parameters of 
the conservative Frontier Myth to new limits. Bush had shifted foreign policy on world 
frontiers from one of containment to a policy of pre-emption. High expectations for 
success in spreading American style democracy in the Middle East—and to rid the world 
of evil—proved impossible to fulfill. And Cowboy Bush, unlike Shane or the Virginian, 
was not slow to anger but instead promoted hard-charging, violent action to head off 
trouble in Iraq—for reasons that proved false—rather than responding to a crisis. Even 
after losing the UN Security Council vote on Iraq, the inflexible, optimistic Bush went 
ahead and raised his own invasion posse. LBJ though likewise proceeding on false 
                                                          
616 2004 Presidential Election exit polling data from November 3, 2004 appears [in German] in 
Helmut Norpoth, “Mission Accomplished: Die Wiederwahl von George W. Bush,” [The Re-Election of 
George W. Bush], Politische Vierteljahresschrift (March 2005): Vol. 46, No. 1: 5. 
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pretense with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, had at least tacit support from most of the 
US allies in Vietnam.  And Bush’s “self-reliant” unilateralist approach to the 
international community also encompassed missile testing, environmental issues and 
the international criminal court. President Bush’s determination to act first and think 
through the consequences later—using the conservative myth’s tropes of American 
exceptionalism, individualism, and six-gun justice—was also in contrast to the strategic 
thinking and “speak softly” approach of Frontier President Theodore Roosevelt a 
century before and even diverted from the style of his idol, Ronald Reagan, who was in 
terms of the actual use of force, a compromising and cautious conservative.  
In the mid-2000s decade, when events abroad and at home spiraled out of control 
and beyond the limits of American power, support for Bush’s policies faltered at home. 
Foreign nations, especially in Europe, had already resented the Bush Administration’s 
insistence on its supremacy over the “Old World” and put little if any stock in the 
conservative, American Frontier Myth’s explanations and accommodations of Bush’s 
post-9/11 foreign policy. For non-Americans living in the 21st Century, the myth itself 
was foreign. Liberals who had still revered liberal elements of the Myth from the pre-
hinge era of Shane and The Magnificent Seven had likewise found these thoughtful 
elements noticeably absent from George W. Bush’s “Dirty Harry”, vigilante approach 
that now included torture, abuse of prisoners abroad, and extensive electronic 
surveillance. When his policies both at home and abroad stalled out these same liberals, 
and some moderates as well, became even more openly hostile toward their “fake” 
cowboy President. The events of the Iraq War were crushing the Frontier Myth’s 
interpretive persuasiveness and sapped the vision of its power to be an explanatory 
narrative through which the world could be understood. Ironically, Bush found himself 
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in a similar position with Iraq that LBJ had found himself in with Vietnam vis a vis the 
Frontier Myth.  
As events in the Middle East and the economy at home seemed to worsen in 2005-
06, even conservative Americans increasingly perceived the Frontier Presidency as 
having failed under Bush—though the myth itself would endure for them, be it in a 
familiar and reassuring, if re-tooled, form. This revised version of the conservative myth 
would appeal to those further right than George W. Bush and employ a previous GOP 
icon to do so: re-imagined to match the particular values and goals of early 21st Century 
conservatives. 
As we shall see,  in his second term, changing historical events and circumstances 
both at home and abroad, along with presidential discourse that no longer seemed to 
match these events, pulled the momentum away from Bush and forced the Frontier 
Myth “brand” to fall back on its pre-9/11 Republican default - Ronald Reagan; the overt 
conservative expressions caused many liberals and many moderates put further distance 
between themselves and this incarnation of the Frontier Myth as they came to perceive 
it as incapable of explaining the reality of the 21st century world and a betrayal of the 
more inclusive frontier mythology of TR and LBJ; and, in the years to follow, both 
political parties would respond very differently to the power of the Frontier Myth, 
become increasingly polarized and entrenched in their positions, and create a tidal wave 
of political crises and impasses in Washington that persist to the present day. 
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XI. 
 
The Decline of Conservatism and the Frontier Myth 
 
 
“Cowboy diplomacy, RIP.” 
    --Time magazine (July 17, 2006) 
      
 
During his first term in office, George W. Bush used the Frontier Myth to great 
advantage to promote a war that was based on poor intelligence and had obvious 
connections with American corporate oil interests. As reflected in films like Disney’s 
Hidalgo, millions of Americans became convinced through the frontier rhetoric of the 
Bush Administration that, once again, the United States would set out to provide an 
example to the world by facing down treachery, demonstrating the superiority of 
American values (which the oppressed people of the Middle East would naturally 
embrace), and achieving a happy ending. So long as Americans remained true to the 
ethics that had allowed them to conquer the frontier “other” or, in Bush’s own language, 
“evil-doers” of the Middle East—from Al Qaeda, to the Taliban to Saddam Hussein—
these enemies would be destroyed so that American democracy and civilization could 
bring hope and liberty to the troubled region. 
But this generation was not the post-World War II generation, and with their 
history of experience in Vietnam a larger segment of the American public were now 
more inclined than in earlier decades to question the validity of these adventures once it 
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became obvious their side was not winning. This skepticism set in increasingly as claims 
of “mission accomplished” in Iraq by their president in Iraq proved hollow. By the mid-
2000s decade, the conservative myth’s explanation for events and claims of their 
inevitable victory over lesser nations were unraveling. Given the fact that George W. 
Bush came to the White House with the intention of paring down America’s 
commitments around the globe, it is ironic that after 9/11 this “reluctant sheriff” would 
lead a massive commitment of American resources abroad that would include a full 
scale invasion of Iraq.  After successfully ousting Saddam Hussein, the United States 
immediately began dropping the ball in its efforts to bring order and stability to that 
troubled nation. Whatever damage was done to America’s reputation during the 
invasion itself, the damage done in the years that followed was much greater. 
Ultimately, the War on Terror would come to be viewed more as a source of division 
than of unity. “In a fracturing world,” Robert Kagan observed in Foreign Affairs, “the 
only thing worse than a self-absorbed hegemon is an incompetent self-absorbed 
hegemon.” Polls show that Bush’s popularity at home peaked at close to 90% after 9/11, 
but fell at an almost steady rate throughout the rest of his Administration: bottoming 
out at under 30% a few weeks before he left office.617 By 2005 and 2006 it was becoming 
increasingly evident that the “civilizing values” of American society were not taking hold 
in Iraq or the Arab world: Osama Bin Laden had not been “brought to justice”; with the 
dictator Hussein gone and no weapons of mass destruction found, Iraq began fracturing 
into opposing sects with a long history of hatred for one another; and the toll in 
                                                          
617 American diplomat Richard Haass quoted in Robert Kagan, “The September 12 Paradigm: 
America, the World, and George W. Bush,” Foreign Affairs (2008): 29; Ibid 36; Polling figures translated 
from Jurgen Wilzewski, “Lessons to Be Learned”: Die Bush-Doktrin, der Irakkrieg und die präventive 
Weltordnungspolitik der USA,” American Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3, Die-Bush-Administration: Eine erste 
Bilanz (2008): 357. 
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American and civilian lives and treasure spent as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
ground on with no end in sight. Except among some conservatives, George Bush’s 
deployment of the frontier myth had lost its interpretive power, and as such the events 
which had precipitated the use of the myth needed to be explained in new ways; the 
Frontier Myth had been, as during the Vietnam War, transformed. 
One important lesson that Republicans had learned from the experience in 
Vietnam that helped enable the Bush frontier myth to endure for a time, however, was 
the importance of transforming every soldier into a heroic symbol of America: a cavalry 
man defending and civilizing the frontier. Support the soldier out there on the Middle 
East frontier became equated with patriotism, and patriotism by default with supporting 
the president’s policies. By linking support for the troops to support of their own 
policies, Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and company could stifle criticism among 
conservative Americans in particular and some centrists as well. The differing reactions 
to this patriotic strain of the Frontier Myth emerged with intensity and clarity in popular 
culture, in particular in the American music industry. 
 
Popular Music Responses to 9/11 and the War in Iraq 
In popular music, noticeable schisms developed between American conservatives 
and liberals of the post-9/11 era. The conservative response, led by country and western 
singer Toby Keith, was based on determination to rally around the president, salute the 
troops, crush the enemy, and extract revenge. Beginning in 2002, Keith made several 
trips to the Middle East to show his encouragement and support to American military 
personnel serving on or near the front lines. “My father was a soldier. He taught his kids 
to respect veterans,” Keith told reporters for the American Forces Press. “It’s that 
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respect and the thank-you that we have a military that’s in place and ready to defend our 
nation; our freedom.”618 In “Courtesy of The Red, White and Blue (The Angry 
American)” Keith celebrated American resolve and the bombing of Afghanistan with the 
line: “Man we lit up your world, like the fourth of July.” He then went on to describe his 
own version of country vengeance with the lyrics: 
 
Oh, justice will be served: and the battle will rage 
This big dog will fight, when you rattle his cage. 
An’ you’ll be sorry that you messed with the U.S. of A 
Cos’ we’ll put a boot in your ass, it’s the American way.619 
 
 
Toby Keith went on to endorse the re-election of President Bush in the 2004 
presidential campaign and performed at a rally in Dallas on the night before the 
election.  
The conservative myth could accommodate Toby Keith. Especially during the first 
term of the Bush Administration, the response from the right and from some elements 
in the centre—like that from Keith—was to support and not to critique actions abroad. 
This resurgent myth included a strong sense of American exceptionalism, superiority of 
American institutions, freedom, self-reliance, and an obligation to enforce the American 
way on those who caused trouble around the world. When Keith sang of putting “a boot 
in your ass” in reference to rogue nations and terror groups, his lyrics resonated 
perfectly with the new contours of the Frontier Myth being tapped into by the Bush 
Administration. 
                                                          
618 Toby Keith quoted in Michael Greenberger, “Toby Keith Entertains Troops in Afghanistan” (28 
April 2009), American Forces Press Service online. 
619 Toby Keith, “Courtesy of The Red, White and Blue (The Angry American)” lyrics, online at 
Cowboy Lyrics.com: < http://www.cowboylyrics.com/lyrics/keith-toby/courtesy-of-the-red-white-and-
blue-10125.html > (accessed 24 October 2015). 
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By contrast, when the Dixie Chicks lead singer Natalie Maines told fans at a 
London gig that “We’re ashamed that the president of the United States is from Texas” 
because of his actions in Iraq, country and western websites responded by lambasting 
the Chicks and dubbing them “Saddam’s Angels.” The cowboy myth of the early Bush 
years could not accommodate the Chicks. Numerous radio stations stopped playing 
their music and encouraged listeners to boycott their American tour and toss their Dixie 
Chicks CD’s into trash bins.620 Toby Keith even used a stage backdrop with a doctored 
photo of Maines and Saddam Hussein in romantic embrace. If the Chicks represented 
the left’s version of the Frontier Myth—that good cowboys don’t bully and best let their 
neighbors alone—much of the nation was in no mood to hear their message. The recent 
events of September 11th followed by the intensity of War in Iraq had left the majority of 
Americans with little inclination, in the short-term, toward self-criticism. “We’re a great 
nation. We’re a nation of resolve,” Bush reminded the American people. “We will rid the 
world of evil-doers.”621 
Toby Keith and the Chicks arguably represented some of the more polarized 
responses to Bush’s brand of frontier justice. Perhaps most indicative of the general 
mood of the nation as a whole, at least directly following the September 11th attacks, was 
the music of Bruce Springsteen. Since the late 1970s, Springsteen’s lyrics engaged in the 
impact of events on individuals and communities. The Rising (2002), in keeping with 
this long-standing approach, was intended to bring healing to the nation. As literature 
                                                          
620 Natalie Maines quoted and boycott described in detail in: Martin Cloonan, “Musical Responses 
to September 11th: From Conservative Patriotism to Radicalism.” 9/11 – The Free World is Out of Tune, 
Dietrich Helms and Thomas Phelps, eds. Online chapter on Freemuse, <  
http://freemuse.org/archives/431  > (accessed 23 October 2015). 
621 George W. Bush: "Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange With Reporters," 
September 16, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63346 (accessed 11 January 2016). 
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and music scholar David Carithers describes it, the album is “’a work of romantic 
pragmatism’” since it enables listeners to engage and work through their feelings “’of 
hopelessness, grief, divisiveness, and hatred…’” before they turned to “’renewed 
strength, love, and hope for reconciliation.’”622 Before long, though, Springsteen would 
move away from this relative neutrality and take a decidedly liberal and critical stance 
toward US policy abroad and at home, rejecting key components of Bush’s version of the 
frontier myth. Within five years, the political evolution of the Boss’s music during the 
2000s decade saw his bi-partisan and sorrowful post-9/11 album The Rising replaced by 
his open disappointment and recrimination toward the Bush Administration in Magic 
(2007). 
By George W. Bush’s second term in office, Springsteen had become “committed to 
politically judging” events at home and abroad including an outright rejection of the 
conservative Frontier Myth.623 As one critic observed, his song “Livin’ in the Future” 
was a biting commentary on “cowboy ethics and aggression” of the Bush White 
House.624 In the opening line of “Gypsy Biker,” meanwhile, soldiers became little more 
than pawns in Bush and Cheney’s wars fought for the oil industry: “The speculators 
made their money on the blood you shed.”625 And the ultimate critique of the War in 
Iraq was inherent in the title of his song “Last to Die,” essentially a condensed version of 
the testimony provided by John Kerry when he returned from Vietnam and asked 
                                                          
622 David Carithers quoted in Ian Collinson, “A Land of Hopes and Dreams? Bruce Springsteen & 
America’s Political Landscape from The Rising to Wrecking Ball,” Social Alternatives, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1 
January 2014): 69. 
623 Collinson, “A Land of Hopes and Dreams?,” 70. 
624 Quotation in Ibid. 
625 Bruce Springsteen, “Gypsy Biker,” Magic, Columbia Records, 2007. Lyrics appear online at: 
http://www.springsteenlyrics.com/lyrics/g/gypsybiker.php (accessed 27 October 2015). 
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Congress in 1971: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”626 
Iraq and Vietnam and the lyrics and sentiment of Springsteen, were both inextricably 
linked. A few years after Magic, during the 2012 presidential campaign, the Boss’s 
album Wrecking Ball continued to remind fans of the failings of the Bush conservatives’ 
version of the Frontier Myth at home. In the ironically titled “We Take Care of Our 
Own,” The Boss belts out that: “From the shotgun shack to the Superdome, There ain’t 
no help, cavalry stayed home.”627 A clear reference to the former President’s bungling of 
the Hurricane Katrina crisis of 2005. 
While the Dixie Chicks were censored and pulverized by many Country and 
Western music critics earlier in the 2000s, in 2007 Springsteen only seemed “to have 
been rewarded for his criticism of neoliberalism, certainly in terms of album and ticket 
sales.”628 Now, the mood swing of the nation was even identifiable among some who 
had previously supported the President. That same year Toby Keith disassociated 
himself with favouring the Iraq War. Asked by Newsday if he supported the conflict, 
Keith responded that he “Never did” and now supported time limits on the campaign.629 
The next year the country and western star lamented how the Democratic Party had 
“allowed all the kooks in” and spoke to CMT of his admiration for Republican vice-
presidential candidate Sarah Palin.630 Like many on the right, with the events not 
                                                          
626 John Kerry quoted in Ibid. 
627 Bruce Springsteen, We Take Care of Our Own,” released as a single on 12 January 2012. Lyrics 
appear online at: < http://www.springsteenlyrics.com/lyrics/w/wetakecareofourown.php > (accessed 27 
October 2015). 
628 Ian Collinson, “A Land of Hopes and Dreams?” 71.  
629 Toby Keith’s January 2007 interview with Newsday quoted in “Toby Keith Biography,” 
SongsOnLyrics, online at: < http://lyrics.songonlyrics.net/toby-keith-biography > (accessed 27 October 
2015). 
630 Darden Bevill, “Toby Keith Sticks Up for Sarah Palin,” 6 October 2008, Toby Keith quoted from 
The Boot, online at:< http://theboot.com/toby-keith-sticks-up-for-sarah-palin/ > (accessed 27 October 
2015).  
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having lived up to the promises, Keith would no longer find interpretive solace in the 
frontier philosophies of Bush. 
 
Bush’s Global Six-Guns Go Back in the Holster 
While the American press and public were initially favourable toward Bush’s 
frontier speech rhetoric, as the War in Iraq dragged on and casualties and costs 
mounted, Americans became much less approving. Bush had promised to bring the 
perpetrators to justice, but Osama Bin Laden, rather than having been “smoked out” of 
his cave, was instead allowed to escape from the hills of Afghanistan to somewhere 
else—presumably Pakistan. Iraqis and Afghans were supposed to embrace democracy 
and freedom but instead the nations were riddled with sectarian conflict, corruption and 
chaos. Al Qaeda, though weakened, continued to make its presence known both through 
the media and in follow up bombing attacks in Madrid and throughout Iraq. The 
Taliban in Afghanistan, though initially set on the run by the US “cavalry” and its allies, 
was now on the rebound. And in Iraq, Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites divided the country 
instead of bringing it together under the democratic elections of a tamed Middle East 
frontier. The values of freedom, entrepreneurialism, democracy and liberty that the 
Bush team had promised would follow the “liberation” of these nations had still not 
come to pass. Simultaneously, by late 2005 and 2006, the magic persuasive power of the 
Frontier Myth, Bush style, had faded. The myth had not delivered as promised as events 
did not match the structure that the Bush team had believed in, promoted, and worked 
so hard to reinforce. Rhetorical uses of frontier mythology no longer seemed capable of 
persuading Americans that they did not need to understand the complexity of Middle 
East politics, or that foreign policy could be interpreted through John Wayne’s eyes. 
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Bush too appeared to begin doubting his own approach. In this milieu, his employment 
of the myth began to noticeably retract.  
In a January 2005 interview with Barbara Walters the President said he would 
now “be more disciplined in how I say things” adding, “I’ll have to be cautious about 
conveying thoughts in a way that doesn’t send the wrong impressions about our 
country.”631 But having earlier deployed a narrow conservative version of the Myth on 
such a large scale and with such fervor, Bush could not shake his own image of a kind of 
reckless, international yahoo. If the Frontier Myth still had symbolic power to motivate 
Americans it was clear, as the previous chapter demonstrated, that Bush had lost the 
ability to control the myth or to define which western cowboy he was.  As much as he 
may have wanted to be Marshal Matt Dillon, Americans (like their European erstwhile 
allies) were coming to see Bush more as the uneducated and impulsive cowpuncher who 
arrived in Dodge after the cattle drive unaware of Matt Dillon’s determination to 
promote law and order and, as such, hell bent to provoke bar fights and in other ways 
stir up trouble with people he neither really knew nor understood. For some observers 
the cozy relationship between powerful oil companies and the Bush Administration 
caused some Americans to sense skulduggery reminiscent of the corrupt and disgraced 
banker, Gatewood, in Stagecoach.  Like the old poster of LBJ picking up his dogs by 
their ears, Bush was viewed as one who meddled too much in others’ affairs and now the 
nation was paying the price. The American administration had cowboys, but it did not 
have a Marshall Dillon. The Administration now understood this too. 
                                                          
631 Bush’s interview with Barbara Walters quoted in Malphurs, “The Media’s Frontier Construction 
of George W. Bush,” 195. 
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President Bush’s measured response to North Korean missile tests in the summer 
of 2006 seemed to confirm what Gary J. Bass, political scientist at Princeton, calls 
“’doctrinal flameout.’” Time noted: “Put another way: cowboy diplomacy, RIP.”632 Now 
Victor David Hanson, a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institute, wrote in 
the conservative National Review that “[t]he Beltway consensus is that the beleaguered 
president has finally learned that he cannot posture as the [L]one [R]anger on the 
frontier. Instead he has concluded that, in a sophisticated world where all nations are 
interdependent, there is no place for his ‘smoke ‘em out,’ ‘dead or alive’ 
Weltanschauung—or even for those post-9/11 photo-ops in which he drove his pickup 
around the ranch to chainsaw brush while wearing a Stetson and shades.”633  
Professor Geoff Smith agreed and indicated that the President’s Lone Ranger 
image had exchanged “altruism for arrogance.”634 Inevitably, it seemed, a bold headline 
“The End of Cowboy Diplomacy” donned the cover of Time magazine on July 17, 2006 
and featured a George W. Bush bobble-head engulfed in a giant straw cowboy hat.635 
The widely publicized cover and accompanying article seemed to sum up the situation 
for many of its readers. Frontier Bush was in decline and Democratic presidential 
nominee candidate Hillary Clinton was among those critics who got plenty of mileage 
out of the headline. Addressing a large crowd near Oakland, Clinton stated that on her 
first day as president she would send her diplomats around the world out to deliver the 
message that “’the era of cowboy diplomacy is over.’”636 Now a prominent Democrat was 
                                                          
632 Gary J. Bass and Time quotations in Allen and Ratnesar, “The End of Cowboy Diplomacy,” 14. 
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636 Quotation from Hillary Clinton in Ibid.   
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openly rejecting not just conservative elements of the frontier myth, but the myth’s 
symbolism.   
To some degree Hilary Clinton and other Americans, especially on the left, have 
likely been influenced in their views of the Frontier Myth, either directly or indirectly, 
not only by events and perceived “failures” of their conservative rivals in the political 
arena but by the work of New West scholars such as Richard White and Patricia 
Limerick as well. Limerick, for example, had directly challenged popular beliefs about 
the Frontier West in her influential book, The Legacy of Conquest (1987). Here Limerick 
picks up on many of the same arguments made three decades earlier by Earl Pomeroy 
and others, when she contends that Turner had it all wrong. She also asserts that the 
conquest of the West, with its inherent racism and economic exploitation, had more in 
common with the legacy of slavery in the South than with claims for the advancement of 
a superior civilization. Writing in the waning days of the Reagan Administration, she 
took on Reagan himself by explaining how the President evoked simplified and 
ethnocentric images of the West. Limerick asserted that while she and other New West 
scholars “explored conflict, unintended consequences, and complexities in Western 
history,” presidents typically saw “only freedom, opportunity and abundance in the 
same story.”637 The lack of impact the New West historians were having in the late 
Eighties was lamented by Limerick herself, who confessed that their published efforts 
had “not rippled out to residents or the public.”638 But in the wake of Iraq and other 
foreign frontier quagmires, these revisionist arguments appear to be gaining more 
traction among liberals and some moderates again in the twenty-first century. 
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America Gets Bush-whacked in Iraq and at Home 
The Frontier Myth failed to be able to deal with and accommodate 9/11, 
consequently the Bush Doctrine failed most blatantly in the particular place that the 
U.S. tried to apply it. The myth’s assertion that America was an exceptional country and 
that those who opposed the values that their nation stood for—freedom, democracy, and 
liberty—were the United States’ enemies rang hollow as U.S. foreign policy. Americans 
were told through the myth that once Saddam was defeated, Iraqis would quickly 
embrace these values. At first the war went well. Iraq’s army was quickly defeated and 
Saddam deposed and captured. Vice President Dick Cheney assured Americans that the 
Iraqis would welcome the American and British forces as liberators and that Iraq would 
soon be the beacon for democracy in the Middle East.639 But instead Americans were 
viewed by most as conquerors.640 Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis were soon at each other’s 
throats and, when they were not fighting each other, waged a war of liberation against 
the United States. American casualties mounted and Bush was “dumbfounded.”641 By 
the end of Bush’s presidency the war would cost 4,200 Americans killed and more than 
ten times that number wounded. About 100,000 Iraqis had been killed and the war had 
cost more than a trillion dollars.642 Much of the media and public were also sickened by 
the harsh torture methods used against “the enemy” along with reported abuses at Abu 
                                                          
639 Tim Russert interview with Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, NBC News, March 16, 
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(accessed 29 October 2014). 
640 See interview with Iraqi political scientist Azhar Abdul-Karim Abdul-Wanab in Mark Kukis, 
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Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons.643 Good cowboys like Gene Autry would never 
tolerate, let alone endorse, such atrocities and abuses. In time, Americans had come to 
understand that his terrible carnage had been the result of “poor intelligence” as Bush 
Administration assumptions about weapons of mass destruction and links between Iraq 
and Al Qaeda—the two primary rationales for the invasion from the outset—proved to be 
false. Over time the frontier myths ability to sustain American support for the war 
faltered…then collapsed. 
The Frontier Myth’s eventual inapplicability to both Presidents Lyndon Johnson 
and George W. Bush was keenly identified by some members of the press and scholars 
as well. USA Today founder Al Neuharth advised Bush to follow the lead of another 
cowboy president: “Maybe Bush should take a cue from a fellow Texan, former president 
Lyndon Baines Johnson [who] after mismanaging the Vietnam War…turned tail and 
rode off into the sunset of his Texas ranch.”644 Events that had rendered earlier 
expressions of the myth less viable to Democrats in the 1960s and ‘70s would do much 
the same for the George W. Bush Republicans in the 2000s. But this time there was a 
twist as conservative Bush’s “Frontier” approach was being compared unfavourably to 
Ronald Reagan’s. Historian Douglas Brinkley, for example, likened Bush to a poker play 
“who bet all his chips on Iraq, and it hasn’t come out the way he wanted.” Brinkley 
points out the difference with Cowboy Reagan: “When terrorists blew up the Marine 
                                                          
643 Mark Danner, “We Are All Torturers Now,” New York Times (January 6, 2005) online: 
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barracks in Lebanon, Reagan was frustrated and furious, as Bush was after 9/11. But he 
didn’t stick us in a war with no exit.”645 
 The impotence of Bush’s cowboy symbolism in war was not the only reason that 
Americans were growing suspicious of the president’s ability to effectively lead. 
Compounding Bush’s troubles was Mother Nature in the form of Hurricane Katrina, and 
as the Administration had by now determined, shooting from the hip at men in black 
hats provided little comfort or respite from Katrina. The event of Hurricane Katrina hit 
the Gulf States in late August 2005 killing nearly 2,000 Americans (almost half as many 
as had died in Iraq) and leaving hundreds of thousands homeless. The relief effort was 
miserable and Americans were not pleased by what they saw on their TV sets and their 
laptops. Some likely wondered if conservatives’ antigovernment rhetoric had gone too 
far and become part of the problem.646 Despite the happy stories Reagan had told, in the 
case of Katrina a strong government that could take control was not the problem, it was 
the solution, and the conservative Frontier Myth provided no corrective models from 
Bush to draw upon. If epic fails in foreign affairs and disaster relief were not enough, the 
unexpected collapse of the economy would come to overshadow even the War on Terror 
in the 2008 presidential election bid. The “bonanza” economic policies that George 
Bush had trumpeted and implemented during his presidency proved to have disastrous 
results that emerged just months before the election. In a hugely powerful, capital 
market that had been almost completely deregulated—bringing unprecedented earnings 
to American bankers and financiers—the wheels fell off and the bubble burst as trillions 
of dollars in US assets were lost and the world financial system, led by the US, teetered 
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on the brink of collapse. The conservative principle of deregulation and belief in the 
power of the unrestrained free market had, in the end, caused the economy to collapse. 
And to add to Republican woes over time, traditional conservative opposition to equality 
for a majority of Americans, including women, minorities and gays, had placed them on 
the wrong side of history.  When Bush left office in January 2009, the conservative 
movement he had led, like the American economy, was in a state of disarray.  The events 
of Iraq and Katrina had proven too much for the narrowly defined conservative Frontier 
Myth, and its interpretative power as a model for action and a predictor of the future 
sputtered in disrepute.  
 
Cowboy Conservatism in Shambles 
With the complete collapse of Bush’s “frontiers for freedom” abroad and prosperity 
at home, the public’s verdict on Dubya at the end of his presidency was overwhelmingly 
negative. In a December 2008 Pew Research Center survey, just 11% said Bush will be 
remembered as an outstanding or above average president – by far the lowest positive 
end-of-term rating for any president since the 1970s. During the Bush years, the 
government brand took a major beating. In a December 2008 survey nearly two-thirds 
(64%) of the American public said that his Administration would be more remembered 
for its failures than for its successes and a plurality of 34% believed that Bush would be 
remembered in history as a poor president. When asked to describe President Bush in a 
word, three of the four most common responses in 2008 were negative: “Incompetent,” 
“Honest,” “Idiot,” and “Arrogant.” Except for “Honest” (as some Americans apparently 
blamed others, and not Bush, for the Administration’s falsification of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction) none of these words had anything in common with the Cowboy Code Bush 
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had grown up with. Outside of the United States, a 2008 survey by the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project showed that the majority of respondents in 19 of the 24 nations – 
including several strong U.S. allies – also had little confidence in Bush as he neared the 
end of his presidency. The year before, a survey of 45 nations had found anti-American 
sentiment extensive as well as increasing disapproval for key aspects of American 
foreign policy. 647 
When Bush first took office in 2001, the GOP had control of Congress as well as the 
Presidency. But during Bush’s second term there was a significant shift in party 
preferences as a failing war overseas and unregulated, free market economics at home—
facilitated with the help of Frontier Myth symbolism—took their toll on George W. Bush 
and Republican congressional leaders. In the 2006 midterm elections more moderates 
and independents aligned themselves with the Democratic Party which took control of 
both the House and the Senate. The public’s appetite for military involvement overseas, 
meanwhile, had dramatically diminished.648 The most telling poll numbers for Bush 
personally were his presidential job approval ratings. When asked: “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as President?” The response 
of the American public reached its highpoint of 89% approval and 6% disapproval on 
September 21-22, 2001. By October of 2008 he stood at a 25% approval and 71% 
disapproval rating. Since September 2001, Bush’s approval trajectory fell in an almost 
steady rate of decline throughout the rest of his Administration. America’s faith in the 
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most recent incarnation of the Frontier Myth structure would take a beating as well: 
eventually compelling its remaining conservative adherents to fall back on the memory 
of their old Cowboy President standby: Ronald Reagan.649 
 
 
 
The 2008 Presidential Campaign and the Return of the Republican Frontier 
“Mavericks” 
 
Even with the host of substantial setbacks for Cowboy Bush, more attempts arose 
to revive Frontier imagery in the service of Republican presidential hopefuls in the 2008 
election campaign. The conservative tropes of the post-Reagan era attempted to situate 
the Republican 2008 candidates for the presidency in the company of legendary 
pioneers and America’s most powerful long-standing myth. The chosen Republican 
presidential candidate, Senator John McCain of Arizona, was not so much taken with 
the cowboy trappings of his predecessors. Instead, McCain had compelling hero 
credentials of his own: as a POW in Vietnam he spent years living out his gruesome 
captivity narrative for six years at the “Hanoi Hilton” (refusing along the way, an out of 
sequence early repatriation offer). A self-described “maverick,” McCain’s persona fit 
well with the image of the loner seeking to bring justice to a troubled world. The 
candidate frequently likened himself to the first Frontier President, Theodore Roosevelt. 
And he drew on Ronald Reagan’s habit of invoking John Winthrop’s statement that 
Americans were “as a City upon a Hill” to emphasize America’s exceptionalism and 
greatness. Cowboy Bush was almost never mentioned. As his sidekick, McCain chose 
Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska—the state often portrayed as America’s residual 
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frontier—as Maverick number two on his team. Palin was allegedly a cowgirl mother 
who could “field dress” a Moose. Camille Page claimed: “‘The gun-toting Sarah Palin is 
like Annie Oakley...a brash ambassador from America’s pioneer past.’” Another ecstatic, 
conservative observer called her “‘a Western version of Margaret Thatcher.’”650 The 
2008 election demonstrated that the Frontier Myth remained resilient among many 
conservatives even if it had soured among those of other political stripes. 
 
 
Figure 11.1: McCain and Palin as “The New 
Mavericks” of the 2008 Presidential Campaign. 
(From author’s collection) 
 
Throughout the 2008 campaign, big business and conservative pundits relentlessly 
attacked proponents of restrictions on carbon emissions—describing climate change as a 
fake phenomenon that prevented Americans from exploiting their “frontier bonanza” of 
economic growth and unrestricted consumption. McCain dutifully played along with 
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Scholar, Vol. 78, No. 1 (Winter 2009): 33. 
 
 
448 
 
their assertions to a point. But some on the right of the presidential candidate quickly 
wanted to put the kibosh on McCain’s own allegedly hypocritical claims that he was a 
Republican “in the Theodore Roosevelt mold.” The suspicious Michael Knox Beran of 
the National Review complained adamantly about McCain’s self-comparisons to TR: 
  
It’s one thing for a conservative to admire T. R.’s style and gallantry, 
the charge up San Juan Hill, the rounding up of crooks in the 
Badlands. It’s something else for a conservative to identify Roosevelt 
as a fellow reformer, as Sen. McCain did….Far from allaying 
conservative fears of a man who, largely for reasons of expediency, 
embraced a host of dubious reforms, and who ended his career by 
embracing the Progressive dream of a state strong enough to 
command the industry and commerce of a nation….All in all John 
McCain would do better to talk more about Ronald Reagan and less 
about Theodore Roosevelt.651  
 
 
Liberal critic Dan Santina had his own take on both Reagan and Bush 43 versus TR in 
his online piece, “Ride-em Brush Cutter”. Santina too was offended by Republicans’ 
comparisons of the recent Republican Frontier Presidents to TR but for the opposite 
reasons of the National Review. “In domestic policy, the latter day Republican 
presidents are as different from TR as day from night…. Cowboy imagery helped all 
three get elected president, but maybe Roosevelt’s years in the saddle with working class 
cowboys gave him an insight into the human condition that would forever escape the 
fake cowboy presidents…. Aw Shucks Reagan and Smoke ‘Em Out Bush are laughingly 
embarrassing when faced with the real McCoy. At least, for a while, Theodore Roosevelt 
walked the walk.”652 The liberal TR—and the version of the Frontier Myth he espoused—
is out of favour in the twenty-first century GOP; but so too is the bungled Bush 
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association with the myth. Instead a more conservative than Reagan version of Reagan 
has been ushered into service. All of which is demonstrative of the recent changes 
brought by the event/structure relationship to the Frontier Myth.  
 
Cowboy Reagan as The Republican Icon 
The popular image of Ronald Reagan has improved with time. During the late 
Bush Sr. and much of the Clinton years, Reagan was rated as an average president by 
the American public.653 Though still unpopular with many Democrats and 
Independents, as early as the 2004 campaign, Reagan had become the Republican gold 
standard for presidents and presidential candidates: a legacy tied inseparably with the 
conservative Frontier Myth.  
On June 14, 2004, just after Ronald Reagan’s death at the age of 93, Time, 
Newsweek and People magazines made an extremely unusual decision: they all 
independently decided to run the exact same close-up photo of Cowboy Reagan in his 
white Stetson and denim shirt on their front covers (and the very same image used in 
the America: Reagan Country campaign). For Republicans, Reagan and Frontier 
Conservatism went together like Roy Rogers and Trigger. In 2009, while touring the 
“Hall of Great Westerners” at the huge National Cowboy Hall of Fame and Western 
Heritage Center in Oklahoma City, I encountered a larger than life Cowboy Reagan 
statute entitled “After the Ride”. Two years later I bumped into an identical statue at the 
entrance to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. Inside the 
building in the official Reagan Presidential Museum, meanwhile, an entire display of 
                                                          
653 Nancy Benac, “Reagan, Bush, Clinton Rated So-So,” Ventura County Star, February 9, 1997: 
A15, in Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Newspaper Reference Files, “Reagan, Ronald W. – Historical 
Analysis” file. 
 
 
 
450 
 
Stetsons, spurs and gun belts is dedicated to Reagan as “the traditional Man of the 
West” standing tall and victorious from his savage war against Soviet Communism 
abroad and big government at home.  In 2012, I had another brush with a somewhat 
lower budget Reagan statue, once again in his most famous incarnation at the entrance 
to Scheels All Sports sporting goods and gun store in Bismarck, North Dakota.  This 
time the Republican’s #1 Cowboy hero, wearing similar attire to “After the Ride” (minus 
the jacket) had his foot up on a bench in a “sit by me” stance. The accompanying plaque 
at the entrance to the massive store proudly displayed the self-reliant Reagan 
quotations: “Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the 
problem,” and “The most terrifying words in the English language are ‘I am from the 
government and I am here to help.’” For conservatives, Reagan has become part of the 
nation’s glorification of the mythic West (just as has the Cowboy Hall of Fame’s original 
eighteen-foot-high plaster cast of James Earl Fraser’s 1896 sculpture, The End of the 
Trail, is the most famous of all the images of the Vanishing American). For many 
Americans, Reagan, conservatism and the Frontier Myth have become virtually 
synonymous. 
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Figure 11.2: After The Ride statute appearing at the entrance 
to the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, 
California. A duplicate resides at the National Cowboy Hall 
of Fame in Oklahoma City. (Photograph by the author, 2011) 
 
By 2011, the year that would have marked Reagan’s 100th birthday, his iconic 
popularity had reached a fever pitch. Just prior to Presidents Day 2011, more Americans 
now rated Ronald Reagan as the country’s greatest president—greater than any other. In 
the Austin American-Statesman’s special “Centennial Tribute to Reagan’s Influence,” 
the editor exclaimed that: “Ronald Reagan would have turned 100 this Sunday, and 
nearly seven years after his death, one might think he is still alive and leading the 
Republican Party….Reagan’s near-idol status in the GOP is so ingrained that when 
potential party chairmen were asked last month to name their political hero, the 
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moderator hastened to add ‘aside from President Reagan.’” Potential GOP presidential 
candidate and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich gushed on the centenary that 
Reagan was “extraordinarily quotable and inspiring, as much as Lincoln and more than 
anyone else in the 20th century.” As observed in earlier chapters, Reagan’s presidency 
followed the Vietnam experience, assassinations, OPEC Crisis, Watergate, Stagflation 
and humiliation in the Middle East. Americans wanted to believe in themselves and in a 
revised version of the Frontier Myth which had allegedly made their country both great 
and exceptional. Former Clinton aide Paul Begala was less glowing on the revitalization 
of the former Republican president: “Reagan holds unique status today because the 
Republicans don’t have anyone else,” Begala contended. “They can’t lionize Eisenhower 
because, by today’s standards, he was a liberal. They can’t lionize Nixon because he was 
a criminal. Who have they got left? He was an extraordinary president but the right 
needed a hero, so they turned him into a hero.” The right needed a hero, but it was 
Reagan’s spin on the Frontier Myth which provided the structures upon which a hero 
could be made. Now, as another observer notes, it has been 30 years and Republicans 
are searching for another Reagan but no one has yet filled the his shoes.654 
 
After Bush: The Far Right Frontier  
“Remember George W. Bush?” asked Howard Kurtz of Newsweek in his 2012 
editorial, “Ditching Dubya.”  “It doesn’t seem all that long ago that he was the revered 
leader of the Republican Party: a paragon of courage….But now GOP candidates seem to 
be running against him almost as aggressively as they’re running against his Democratic 
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successor.” Kurtz went on to point out that all the frontrunners for the GOP presidential 
candidate nomination in 2012—Mitt Romney, Rick Perry and Newt Gingrich—were 
doing whatever they could to put as much distance between themselves and Bush as 
possible.655 Ashley Parker of the New York Times wondered if Governor Rick Perry’s 
chances of becoming the next President might be hurt by his surface similarities with 
Bush: including the swagger, the cowboy boots “and a down home way of speakin’ that’s 
heavy on the dropped g’s” (as in “over-taxin’, over-regulatin’ and ‘over-litigatin”).  As 
Perry attempted to win the loyalty of those on the far right, his supporters reportedly got 
the news out that their candidate “represents a more authentic version of the down-
home Texan Mr. Bush only claimed to be”—ironically, taking a page out of Bush’s own 
playbook from the days he ran for Governor of Texas. 656 For those on the right of the 
Republican Party, including a larger proportion of rural voters, the Frontier Myth was 
viewed as having become their “property” under Reagan, not Bush—and in the 2000s 
when Reagan’s own positions seemed too conciliatory, both Reagan’s image and the 
myth underwent a shift even further on the right of the political spectrum.  In recent 
years, ultra-conservatives have heavily invoked the myth’s ideals of individualism and 
self-reliance and the like and attached these to Reagan as the symbol of a clearly 
partisan myth. The Spring 2011 issue of Libertas, the quarterly publication of the right 
wing Young America’s Foundation, features Sarah Palin on horseback at the Reagan 
Ranch (an image made into posters as well). Inside the former Alaska Governor gushes 
over the Ranch as “unmistakably the home of a western conservative who celebrated our 
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pioneering spirit.”657 Dick Cheney and conservative polemicist Ann Coulter also figure 
prominently in the issue as they celebrate the Reagan centenary but the issue featured 
no signs of more moderate Republicans such as John McCain. Less than subtle features 
of the young conservatives’ magazine included several large images of Reagan in cowboy 
attire along with a series of posters and books directed at the Democratic President, 
Barack Obama. Among the slogans, intended to be unflattering, that appeared alongside 
grim images of the Democratic President were: “Barack Obama: Epic Fail,” and “Resist! 
The Tyranny of Socialism.” The issue also featured an interview with Jason Mattera, 
author of Obama Zombies: How the Liberal Machine Brainwashed My Generation.658 
 In what Newsweek labelled “a right-wing panderfest” the political culture post-
Bush had become even grimmer and more extreme after Dubya had departed: giving 
rise to a Tea Party that had shaken the establishment of the Republican Party and 
instilled a sentiment in American politics where “Cooperation became a dirty word.” The 
Frontier Myth’s recent manifestations are almost exclusively employed by those on the 
right of the political spectrum as Reagan himself is appropriated by these conservative 
ideologues as being more to the right than Reagan ever was.659  
Since Bush left office in 2008, collectivist readings of the American Constitution by 
Democrats have collided increasingly with the individualist readings of those on the 
right: with the “Obamacare” healthcare program, the environment, gay rights, gun 
control, Social Security, enduring troubles in the Middle East, and a series of economic 
crises seemingly driving the wedge even further between two camps who understand 
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their country’s history and values differently.660  As has always been the case, events and 
forces often beyond control of the presidents themselves have largely shaped the legacy 
of their Administrations and of the Frontier Myth—that four of them explored in this 
study relied upon so heavily. 
 
A Century After TR: The Frontier Myth in Reverse 
Just as Republicans have been moving away from Theodore Roosevelt’s liberal 
brand of the Frontier Myth as an icon/guide for their Party and ideology, the current 
President Barack Obama has invoked it on numerous occasions to promote both TR’s 
liberalism and the protection of the weak in society from the corruptions of corporate 
power. Perhaps the occasion which received the most attention was Obama’s speech in 
Osawatomie, Kansas (the “home” of TR’s New Nationalism) where Obama told his 
audience in 2011 that: “[Theodore] Roosevelt believed then what we know is true today, 
that the free market is the greatest force for progress in human history….But Roosevelt 
also knew that the free market has never been a free license to take whatever you can 
from whomever you can.” Obama then quoted from the first Progressive President: 
“’Our country," [TR] said, "...means nothing unless it means the triumph of a real 
democracy...of an economic system under which each man shall be guaranteed the 
opportunity to show the best that there is in him.’” Press reaction to the speech on both 
sides of the political spectrum was immediate and polarized. The New Jersey Star-
Ledger offered up the view of many of Obama’s supporters: according to the Star-
Ledger’s editor, the current Republican Party’s “worship of the free market, its aversion 
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to using an active government to remedy its excesses, would drive Roosevelt into the 
arms of the Democrat Party if he were alive today.” Some Republicans still winced at 
such descriptions but others returned to their attacks on TR himself: a reflection of how 
much the political nature of the Frontier Myth has changed over the past century.661 
Obama has never wrapped himself in the mantle of the Frontier Myth—as 
Roosevelt, Johnson, Reagan and Bush did—but like most Presidents since TR he has not 
completely avoided its use either. In his remarks at Springfield, Illinois in 2009, Obama 
praised Abraham Lincoln’s understanding that “personal liberty and self-reliance, that 
fierce independence” were at the heart of the American frontier experience. “But he also 
understood something else,” Obama reminded his audience. “He recognized that while 
each of us must do our part...there are certain things we cannot do on our own. There 
are certain things we can all do together.” Many of the “certain things” were then 
described in terms related to the President’s plans for the nation.662  In other speeches, 
Obama has briefly invoked the myth in his references to wilderness preservation, the 
pursuit of modern frontiers in science and technology, and hope for the future.663 But 
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Illinois," February 12, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency 
Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85778. (accessed 2 July, 2014) 
663 See Barack Obama: "Proclamation 8409 - National Wilderness Month, 2009," September 3, 
2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86586 (accessed 2 July, 2014); Barack Obama: "Proclamation 
8437 - Columbus Day, 2009," October 9, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86750 (accessed 2 July 2014); 
Barack Obama: "Remarks on America's Great Outdoors Initiative," February 16, 2011. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
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while Obama has engaged the Frontier symbolism on occasion—putting it to some of the 
same uses that TR and LBJ did previously—these have only been passing references. 
Barack Obama’s lack of inclination to invoke the Frontier Myth in a substantive way is 
not surprising in an era when the myth has become the appropriated property of the 
Republican Party.  
In his Second Inaugural Address, exactly 32 years after Ronald Reagan had 
launched an era of anti-government politics with his first inaugural address, Obama 
offered a comprehensive rebuttal that Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer 
conceded “marked the end of Reaganism.”664 Picking up on similar themes to TR and 
LBJ—but in Obama’s case void of references to Western imagery—the Democratic 
President insisted that what happens across town affected you and your neighbours and 
he called upon Americans to realize that they cannot have liberty for all without justice 
for all. Contrary to conservatives’ idea that government and liberty were always at odds, 
Obama insisted that in reality they complemented each other. “Individual freedom,” he 
proclaimed, was “heightened best when balanced with community security.” Taking a 
line almost right out of LBJ’s 1964 Democratic Party Platform, he then declared that 
“Preserving our individual freedoms ultimately requires collective action.” And instead 
of government being the problem, the President reminded viewers that anyone could fall 
victim to sudden misfortune and that it took both individual responsibility and the role 
of community to give each child an opportunity to succeed. While Reaganites and their 
ancestors had chided a nation of “Welfare Queens” and “takers,” Obama contended that 
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Medicaid, Medicare and Social Security “free us to take the risks that make this country 
great.” Inclusiveness was part of the first African-American President’s message too: 
diversity, equal rights, fair pay, and maintaining a safety net for the poor and disabled—
all were what had made the American Dream possible for each new generation. 665 As 
historian Brian Balogh of the University of Virginia declared after the address: “He 
stated the ‘c’ word—collective—loudly and proudly.” By invoking this collective action 
explicitly, Obama tapped into a century-old progressive agenda launched by TR to the 
nation’s founding documents and to its past history. But, notably, Obama did so again 
without the persuasive powers of the Frontier Myth which both TR and LBJ had used so 
persuasively.666 
Unfortunately for Obama, he has been somewhat less successful in this era of 
political brinkmanship than TR was in his day when the latter urged Americans to have 
empathy with people, including cowboys, from other walks of life and to transcend 
mutual interests in favour of the mutual good. Still, if the results of the 2012 presidential 
race are any indication, Obama received less of the blame from the electorate than did 
the growing perception of congressional dysfunction. The current state of the Frontier 
Myth is caught in a kind of conservative limbo as it was for liberals during another 
postwar period of economic uncertainty: the late 1960s and 1970s. Given its previous 
resilience, one can certainly envision that the Myth might be called upon again in a 
major way by presidential contenders of the future: the shape of which to be determined 
at least as much by events and forces beyond the Presidents’ control, as by those who 
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would deploy the symbolism and power of the myth themselves. And though the 
presidents and presidential candidate protagonists of the myth have been conservatives 
since Reagan, there is no reason why major events such as the Iraq War and Hurricane 
Katrina, along with changing circumstances, could not cause a shift back to some of the 
original liberal uses of the Frontier Myth that began with Theodore Roosevelt. 
 
Conclusion 
President Lyndon Johnson’s frontier myth was too shaken by the events of 
Vietnam for him to seek re-election. President Bush’s conservative frontier mythology 
saw his popularity eventually to drop even lower levels in 2008 than Johnson’s depths 
in 1968. By the time Bush 43 left office in 2009, the conservative movement that he had 
led was in a mess. The war in Iraq had become yet another painful quagmire; 
Afghanistan, meanwhile, had become a low-intensity slog against the al-Qaeda backed 
Taliban which had seemingly only deepened its resolve as it spread into Pakistan. 
General Westmoreland had promised Americans that the war in Vietnam would be over 
by Christmas 1965. Emphasizing fiscal matters, VP Cheney had once similarly said that 
the Iraq conflict would cost Americans next to nothing. They were both wrong.  
Previously, many scholars, journalists and diplomats have situated the Iraq War 
largely in the context of a conflict that was based in and predicated upon a fabricated lie. 
For LBJ his Great Society at home was eclipsed by the fabricated Gulf of Tonkin 
incident. For Bush, his Administration’s false claims of weapons of mass destruction in 
Iraq has been perceived as leading to long term disaster in the Middle East. 667 Some 
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analysts, especially on the left, have emphasized the corporate interests that America 
held toward a region rich in oil reserves.668 Though these points are in many respects 
accurate and insightful, what these discussions fail to do is to provide answers to the 
question: How did Bush so successfully promote a war based on bad intelligence and 
false information about weapons of mass destruction and where corporate interests 
were so blatantly visible? The answer, as I hope I have demonstrated, lies largely in the 
ability of presidents to engage and deploy powerful frontier mythology. This mythology, 
however, is not ahistorical (as Turnerian scholars such as Ray Allen Billington and leftist 
liberals such as Patricia Limerick might lead one to think). Rather, the myth shifts and 
adapts in the face of powerful historical events. For LBJ it was Vietnam and upheaval at 
home, for Carter, the economy and the seeming impotence and upheaval at home in the 
face of crisis in Iran. This created a hinge that shifted the Frontier Myth from one that 
was broad and capable of explaining the lived history and potential future of a broad 
range of Americans into a narrow and conservative one that disenfranchised black, 
Hispanic, gay, and liberal cowboys. But in an ironic twist of fate, the events of Iraq and 
Iran and Hurricane Katrina shook the foundations of the conservative frontier 
structures and have created, it seems, an opportunity for Obama or, more likely, future 
Democrats to reclaim the domestic frontier mythology of TR. 
Americans had paid a terrible cost in lives and treasure in Iraq. At first, as with 
LBJ, the American media and public had mostly supported President Bush’s venture 
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overseas; but as Bush’s credibility gap widened, the press and public turned against him 
just as it had against Johnson. The day after LBJ announced his decision not to run for 
re-election in 1968, he told the National Association of Broadcasters in Chicago that the 
media is highly selective in the stories it pursues. The media and especially TV, Johnson 
contended, prefers the spectacle of war in the stories it pursues to the less visually 
compelling quest for peace. “Peace, in the news sense, is a ‘condition.’ War is an ‘event.’” 
The “event” LBJ had described, which helped destroy the liberal version of the Frontier 
Myth is a potential threat to the conservative version too. 669 
Marshall Sahlins challenges scholars to look not only at how events impact on 
structure—in this case the structure of the Frontier Myth—but how structure shapes 
events. Both inform one another. George W. Bush attempted to deploy Western 
symbolism in the aftermath of 9/11, most significantly through his invasion of Iraq: a 
country which today remains bitterly divided and gripped by civil war as a direct result 
of Bush’s actions more than a decade ago.670 Bush, like Reagan, wanted to restore “the 
good old days” through what he perceived as a return to simpler times of frontier justice 
that he had learned about largely from popular culture. But when Bush’s responses to 
9/11 and a failing economy proved inadequate to deal with the complex realities of the 
world in the twenty-first century, it became obvious to the majority of Americans that 
the kind of frontier symbolism and ethics he promoted did not match the historic 
experience. Bush’s empty boasts of “mission accomplished” in Iraq caused the optimism 
of the can-do Frontier Myth to once again be called seriously into question just as it had 
been for the liberal LBJ four decades before. The limits of American power have again 
                                                          
669 Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks in Chicago Before the National Association of Broadcasters," 
April 1, 1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28774 (accessed 2 July 2014). 
670 See Michael Crowley, “Iraq’s Eternal War,” Time, Vol. 183, No. 25 (June 30, 2014): 28-34. 
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become glaringly evident and the nation’s sense of mission, or at least its ability to carry 
this out, viewed with increasing doubt. Domestically, the Bush Republicans insistence 
on rugged individualism through de-regulation, a free-for-all “bonanza” economy, and 
“get-the-government-off-our-backs” tax cuts has also been viewed with an increasingly 
skeptical eye as it appeared to Americans that it was these very policies that caused the 
collapse of the nation’s powerful economic system in 2008.  
As we have observed since the early twentieth century, major events in United 
States and world history have caused the emphasis of the Frontier Myth to be changed 
to varying degrees; simultaneously, presidents could attempt to marshal this symbolism 
in support of their wide-ranging ideologies and backgrounds. Theodore Roosevelt and 
Ronald Reagan appear to have had more success in these areas than did the tragic 
presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and George W. Bush. For all four Presidents, though, 
the myth had a discursive power that both constrained and liberated actions by creating 
expectations among the American public of what Frontier America should do and what 
it could do. Events and decisions that rendered earlier expressions of the myth less 
viable for Democrats in the late 1960s and 1970s would have a very similar impact on 
George W. Bush in the 2000s. Today it is Republicans, not Democrats, who are still 
much more prone to apply the Frontier Myth and to try to do so in the context of their 
one relatively recent presidential icon, Ronald Reagan, rather than through the much 
more maligned Bush. But the Republicans success in using this imagery appears to have 
been rendered largely impotent outside of the most “red” of states. Johnson and Bush’s 
own discourse and policy were partly responsible for the myth’s ultimate inability to 
provide solutions to both of them, but in a broader sense their downfall and the two 
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periods of decline in the myth’s power have been a result of broader, changing historical 
events and circumstances as well. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The word frontier is not about to go away, for it will always 
hold a privileged place in the American cultural lexicon. 
 --John Mack Faragher, Rereading Frederick Jackson 
Turner (1994)671 
 
 
 
Figure C.1: TR’s Maltese Cross Ranch Cabin in its final resting place near the entrance to 
Theodore Roosevelt National Park, Medora, North Dakota. (Photograph by the author, 2011) 
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The Presidential Ranches 
All four frontier presidents who are the focus of this study owned ranches that 
became an integral component of their own cowboy personas and served as a symbolic 
setting for policy promotion and diplomacy. Significantly, the long term fates of these 
Western White Houses mostly reflect the dominant Frontier Myths of each president’s 
time in office. For conservationist presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, 
the National Park Service would play a key role in the future of their frontier spreads. 
For the conservative ideologue Ronald Reagan, Rancho del Cielo was destined for profit 
and promotion of the GOP. George W. Bush’s ranch, meanwhile, remains an ironic work 
in progress. 
Theodore Roosevelt’s Maltese Cross Ranch Cabin in southwestern North Dakota 
went on “tour” during his years in the White House—going on the road to the 1904 
World’s Fair in St. Louis, the Clark Exposition in Portland the following year, then to 
Fargo and the North Dakota State Capital Grounds in Bismarck in 1908. Over that four 
year period the Cabin was viewed by more than two million people—including 
Roosevelt’s children and TR himself.672 Since 1959 the then fully restored cabin has 
been located near the Visitors’ Centre at the Theodore Roosevelt National Park near 
Medora, North Dakota. According to the park rangers and park literature, it is furnished 
to look exactly as it did when TR lived in it 130 years ago.  
Not all has gone as planned for the park preservationists, though. On June 6, 2010, 
TR’s Elkhorn ranch next to the Little Missouri was designated one of America’s most 
endangered historic places by the National Trust for Historic Preservation. The ranch is 
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in peril due in large part to the North Dakota oil boom and its nearby use of hydraulic 
fracturing, or fracking, just outside the borders of the Theodore Roosevelt National 
Park. TR’s great-grandson, Tween Roosevelt, states that: “’TR fought those who would 
ravage our national resources for the benefit of a few. Now it is time to fight to save his 
ranch from the same type of selfish people today who would destroy it for their personal 
gain.’”673 Former North Dakota tourism director Jim Fuglie has also spoken out publicly 
about threats to the park, telling the Los Angeles Times in late 2013 that: “We have 
pristine air, we have pristine water; nothing has ever threatened these things before.” 
Today, however, “the park has become an island in the sea of development.”674 That 
these kinds of battles over lands protection and commercial development are occurring 
over Roosevelt’s ranch testifies to the fact that many of the same issues he dealt with in 
his day remain just as controversial today. At the time of writing, if anything might save 
the Roosevelt ranch lands and park from further degradation it may be the sudden drop 
in oil prices in the Fall of 2014 which has shut down just over half of the state’s drilling 
rigs.675 
More than 1,000 miles to the South of TR’s Elkhorn, the LBJ Ranch in Stonewall, 
Texas, was considered by President Johnson himself as an integral part of his own 
frontier image which he continued nurturing after having left office in 1969. That LBJ 
                                                          
673 Tween Roosevelt quoted in “National Trust for Historic Preservation Names North Dakota’s 
Elkhorn Ranch Among America’s Most Endangered Historic Places,” Boone and Crockett Club [website], 
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675 Mara Van Ells, “A North Dakota Oil Boom Goes Bust,” The Atlantic (June 27 2015), online at: < 
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was so taken by his cowboy, man of the soil self-image, is evident from the story behind 
the photograph below (Figure C.2)—which is filed at the LBJ Library under the heading, 
“John Wayne photo.” Remarkably, it was not until 500,000 photographs were taken of 
the President by White House photographers over the course of a decade that Johnson 
finally got the exact image of himself he had been longing for: shot while in retirement, 
fittingly, at the LBJ Ranch. Frank Wolfe, the photographer who captured it, explained 
what LBJ liked about the image: “the cowboy, hat and shirt gave an ‘earthy look,’ 
making him appear ‘tall and robust.’ It is the image of a man who comes from the land—
tough, grizzled, dependable, not given to boasting—the heroic figure John Wayne played 
in so many Hollywood productions.”676 As for the Ranch itself, park service champions 
Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson aptly gifted their own Texas White House ranch and its 
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Figure C.2: The post-presidential “John 
Wayne” photo taken in September 18, 
1972, just four months before Johnson’s 
death. (Courtesy of the LBJ Library, Photo No. 
D4717-23A.) 
 
buildings to the Federal Government in 1972 to become a National Historic Park. Like 
the LBJ Library and Museum, the Historic Park is unusual for its free admission charge 
arranged through LBJ’s own estate so that all Americans (or, at least, those who travel 
there) might have equal access. Most of the rooms in the ranch house have been 
restored to look exactly as they did during Johnson’s presidential years. Along with the 
house, the LBJ Ranch grounds include a large number roaming cattle, Johnson’s 
birthplace, the family cemetery, and numerous frontier-theme and conservation 
exhibits. 
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 The fate of Rancho del Cielo after conservative Ronald Reagan left the White 
House in 1989 differs markedly from the TR and LBJ ranches but it too is tied closely to 
this President’s policy-making legacy. A few weeks after Ronald Reagan was diagnosed 
with Alzheimer’s disease in 1996, the Ranch went up for sale at an asking price of $5.95 
million. There were no takers. The following year California’s Republican Governor Pete 
Wilson and Republican Congressman Ralph Regula, chairman of the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee, put forward a plan to spend $5 million from the federal 
budget to purchase the ranch from the Reagans and turn it into a state park. While 
Ronald and Nancy supported the idea of the state park for the ranch many locals did 
not, objecting to the idea of using taxpayer money to purchase and maintain the ranch. 
Soon protests were organized.677 Editorialist John Krist of the Ventura County Star 
summed up the essence of the locals’ concerns in his column: 
 
It is almost comically ironic to think that federal parkland money might 
be spent on the Reagan ranch. While he was president, Reagan savaged 
the national park acquisition budget, virtually zeroing out expenditures 
from the Land and Water Conservation Fund because he was 
ideologically opposed to expanding the federal park system….Reagan 
may have been the greatest enemy of federal park expansion to occupy 
the White House in this century. From a historical perspective, it is little 
short of absurd to propose buying his ranch with the money he so 
doggedly refused to spend on behalf of the American people.678  
 
                                                          
677 Robert Jablon, “Protest Thwarts Taxpayers’ Purchase of Reagan Ranch,” Ventura County Star, 
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Fans Now Propose,” Ventura County Star, October 30, 1997 in Ibid. As Krist’s title would indicate, he was 
unaware that the Reagans actually liked the idea of selling Rancho del Cielo to the government so that it 
could be made a state park. 
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More in sync with their own philosophy, the Reagans eventually sold Rancho del Cielo 
in 1998 to the Young America’s Foundation (YAF) which promotes conservative values 
among college and high school students.679 
Today the YAF’s director and his wife refer to the Reagan Ranch as “hallowed 
ground” and use the ranch for leadership conferences to steep young Americans in 
“Reaganism.”680 As with the LBJ Ranch, everything at the Rancho del Cielo today is 
placed exactly where it had been when Ronald and Nancy Reagan lived there during his 
presidency. Along with Reagan’s choice of Western novels on the bookshelf are rugged 
Western paintings on the walls, a shotgun resting on antlers over the doorway, Reagan’s 
riding boots in the closet, a large collection of cowboy hats and belt buckles, a spur once 
carried into space, and a blue and gold cavalry horse blanket hanging on the wall. 
Adriene Davis, a spokesperson for the foundation, describes the motive behind the 
purchase of the ranch: “There’s a tremendous hunger in the Republican Party and the 
conservative movement for a Reagan-like leader.”681 In promotional material for the 
YAF’s recently released movie, Still Point in a Turning World: Ronald Reagan and his 
Ranch, we find some clues as to what kind of leader this would be. We are told that 
Rancho del Cielo remains “a living embodiment of the timeless values he [Reagan] held 
dear. The Ranch was where hard work and self-reliance showed themselves in principles 
he championed for all Americans: Freedom, Prosperity, and Victory.”682 The title of this 
2011 film would also appear indicative of the Republican Party’s ongoing promotion of 
                                                          
679 Ibid.  
680 YAF Director quoted in Jeff Wilson, “Reagan Ranch Becomes a Conservative Shrine,” Austin 
American-Statesman, November 22, 1998: A36, in LBJ Library, Reference Files Collection—Reagan, 
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681 Adriene Davis quoted in Trejos, “Group to Buy Reagan’s California Ranch.” 
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Reagan as holding firm to the past and alleged American “traditions” in the face of 
modernity and change. At the YAF’s hands-on Reagan Ranch Center museum in Santa 
Barbara, colourful stories about Rancho del Cielo’s history abound that perpetuate the 
current Republican take on Reagan’s image as the nation’s number one hero. In one 
such story we learn of the “Hanging Tree” on the ranch grounds where “frontier justice” 
was dispersed on stagecoach “bandits” and robbers: an apparent symbol of Reagan (and 
many current Republican’s) own desire for a more “traditional” style of law and 
order.683 The Ranch Center is open to the public while the Ranch itself is accessible by 
invitation only through the Young America’s Foundation. As Jon Stewart might say, the 
Clintons and the Obamas should not be expecting an invitation anytime soon. 
 
                                                          
683 See the Young America Foundation’s “Reagan Ranch Center” website for a virtual tour at:  < 
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Figure C.3: Ronald Reagan’s ranch created the frontier milieu for conservatism in the hills 
east of Malibu. Here the president poses for the press after signing his first tax cut bill at 
Rancho del Cielo on August 13, 1981. The table and chair are among those items now 
owned by the Reagan Ranch Center museum. (Courtesy Ronald Reagan Library, Photo #C3487-
3A) 
 
George W. Bush’s Prairie Chapel Ranch near Crawford, Texas, is somewhat of an 
anomaly compared with TR’s Elkhorn, the LBJ Ranch, and Rancho del Cielo—but then 
again, perhaps not. Bush acquired the 1,600 acre ranch in 1999, just prior to his first 
presidential run but at the close of his presidency the Bushes moved to Dallas. The 
ranch is still owned by George and Laura Bush and though it still features no horses it 
does, curiously, contain a great deal of green space, a geothermal heating system, and a 
rain-fed 42,000-gallon cistern used to irrigate the lawns. Such eco-friendly features 
would appear to run contrast to Bush’s own pro-resource extraction, unfriendly 
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conservation policies during his presidency. As environmental historian William Cronon 
explains, though, that if Bush’s private and public stances on the environment are at 
odds, the at-home-conservationist Bush is much more in keeping with the pre-Reagan 
tradition of the Republican Party. In his article “When the G.O.P. Was Green,” Cronon 
points out that Republican opposition to environmental protection is only a recent 
development. Until the 1980s, the G.O.P. could claim to have had an environmental 
record just as distinguished as that of the Democratic Party. TR, a Republican himself, 
had launched conservation as the first national political movement. The Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge was created by Republicans—a fact that Cronon contends makes current 
Republicans insistence on drilling for oil there all the more distressing. At one time the 
two parties actually competed over which one cared for the environment more. But by 
1980, the right flank of the party had begun levelling their sites at big government; and, 
since the Johnson years, environmental protection has become associated with federal 
regulation. Now demonized by Republicans as governmental interference of property 
rights, some westerners in the 1980s became increasingly hostile toward federal 
ownership of the land. As Cronon states, since Cowboy Reagan: “The party has turned 
its back on a proud history.... [the] older, Republican tradition [honors] our heritage by 
preserving public lands, remembering the deep spiritual ties to the land that led the 
United States to be the first nation in the world to create wilderness parks—what actions 
could be more conservative than these?”684 In the twentieth century starting with 
Republican TR, the G.O.P., at least in this one regard, adhered to the more active 
government version of the Frontier Myth. But The Hinge, which included the election of 
Reagan, changed all that. 
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The Hinge 
The artist John Gast, historian Frederick Jackson Turner, novelist Owen Wister, 
and amateur historian, part-time cowboy and soon to be president Theodore Roosevelt 
were among the key individuals who together, had struck a responsive chord with the 
nation at the outset of the twentieth century with their mutually reinforcing 
articulations of the Frontier Myth. In a sense, they helped relegate the American West to 
a place of the mind (a frontier, an idea, a mythic country), rather than a geographic 
region. The Frontier Myth had been clearly established as a national myth, not a 
regional one. 
As referenced throughout this study, Brian Dippie’s seminal cultural history, The 
Vanishing American, demonstrated how myths (regardless of the extent to which they 
reflect social realities) can be extremely influential, that “ideas have consequences,” and 
that studying powerful myths not only reveals popular societal attitudes but that these 
are actual shapers of attitudes and policies as well. As such they are key to our 
understanding of American history and culture. This has been evident throughout this 
study of the four frontier presidents.  As Dippie had demonstrated through another 
American myth, these structures of thought which people have held in the past can be 
extremely influential—depending upon who believes them and acts upon them. Further, 
John Cawelti has contended in Six Gun Mystique: The Sequel that while the myths and 
symbols of the frontier American West maintain some general constants, it is also “an 
evolving and changing expression of different stages of American cultural history.”685 
This intellectual foundation of Dippie and Cawelti has provided much of the theoretical 
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basis for this study of the myth and the presidencies of Roosevelt, Johnson, Reagan, and 
Bush. 
In keeping with the Frontier Myth’s progressive features of the early twentieth 
century, Theodore Roosevelt had vigorously pursued an active federal government and a 
strong chief executive. In TR’s view and that of many of his contemporaries, large 
corporations in particular had accumulated a great deal of power in American society 
for which they were in no way being held accountable. In other words, the wealthy now 
wielded a juggernaut of influence that they often deployed without any regard for its 
consequences in terms of poverty and injustice. For TR a balance of power, rather than 
an emphasis on individualism, could only be established with federal government 
intervention. In order to regulate business, promote leveling social or economic 
programs, redistribute income, and protect the nation’s “green” spaces, TR and the 
progressive presidents who followed him believed that the federal government had to 
grow and that the president had a key role to play. The president’s leadership was 
crucial to the process and lead to an expansion of his staff as well as his authority. Just 
as success in the hunt out in the wilderness often depended on teamwork, for Roosevelt 
“manly qualities” not only included tough individualism but just as importantly 
cooperation and camaraderie. During Roosevelt’s tenure, a shift in race relations began 
to occur from a philosophy based on racial hierarchies to a more nationalistic “melting 
pot” approach. Roosevelt also moved away from his early 1890s emphasis on pining for 
a nostalgic past and toward a more forward looking vision for the twentieth century of 
the United States as a nation of limitless frontiers and possibilities. The Frontier Myth 
of the Roosevelt era likewise celebrated the triumph of national unity and community—
as had recently been expressed in his literary work on The Rough Riders and in Owen 
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Wister’s The Virginian. This vision reinforced the idea of the West as the “crucible for 
the idea of a modern unified nation held together by its parts.”686 Further, where the 
effete of “Old Europe” had failed (in building the Panama Canal, etc.), America would 
succeed replacing these old empires with a young, technologically advanced nation that 
would simultaneously promote the conservation and sustainability of its unique 
wilderness. Hand in hand this seeming dichotomy of celebrating the modern and 
pastoral would, according to TR, allow America’s uniqueness and exceptionalism to be 
preserved in the long-term. This was a theme examined carefully by Leo Marx in The 
Machine in the Garden and explored in numerous Western and science fiction stories of 
the twentieth century. As president, Roosevelt defined his office as one focused on all 
Americans, rather than the elites, and later in his “Bull Moose” campaign TR laid the 
foundation for much of the liberal reformist agenda of subsequent decades. Theodore 
Roosevelt acted on his own belief and faith in the emerging liberal Frontier Myth and 
played a greater role in helping shape its early manifestations and some of its features 
than any other political leader.   
During the 50 year period dating from Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, the myth 
established itself firmly in American literature and popular culture as the single most 
persuasive and pervasive interpretive framework for understanding not only America’s 
past but its present concerns. The frontier/Western genre had dominated the film, novel 
and radio industry with thousands of manifestations and by the late 1950s was 
dominating TV as well (with 48 series running in 1959 alone).687   
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In this milieu the next frontier president, Lyndon Johnson, attempted to bring the 
full Frontier Myth forward with his own progressive approach—infused with an 
intensity surpassing even that of TR’s. For almost two years, Johnson seemed an 
absolute success story: destroying his ultra-conservative opponent Barry Goldwater in 
the 1964 campaign and passing a plethora of progressive legislation on civil rights, anti-
poverty, conservation, and numerous other liberal causes. As Paul Conkin writes: “No 
other president, before or since, achieved as many legislative goals or seemed as fully a 
master of the spectrum of tasks that go with such an almost monarchial office.”688 
Throughout this period, LBJ ran with what Ray Allen Billington had contended was the 
most prominent feature of the frontier thesis: optimism. Johnson and a majority of 
Americans had bought fully into and promoted the myth’s idea that “can do” Americans 
were winners who could accomplish anything and overcome the same kinds of great 
obstacles that their pioneering ancestors had. This belief created great expectations 
when applied to both domestic and foreign policies: the “War on Poverty,” the “Great 
Society,” echoes of Martin Luther King’s “We Shall Overcome”—all of which were part of 
his community bolstering, inclusive agenda. His guns and butter approach also included 
the hope and promise of victorious American troops coming home from Vietnam “with 
the coonskin on the wall.”  Before long, however, this over-optimism  proved a double-
edged sword as a series of unforeseen events, including a quagmire in Vietnam, race 
riots, and other crises both at home and abroad, would cause the grip of the existing 
liberal Frontier Myth structure on the American people (along with Johnson’s own 
reputation) to weaken and then collapse.  
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By the mid-point of Johnson’s second term in office, the significance of the 
Western and Frontier Myth began undergoing drastic changes as a result of a growing 
movement to expose the longstanding myth for what the counter culture and anti-war 
protestors thought it was: a violent cultural tradition based on self-interest, avarice, and 
faux depictions of good versus evil. The frontier hero was no longer seen as an 
emancipating force based on the morality, honour or truth. Instead of upholding the 
noble values of a heroic Virginian, Shane or the Magnificent Seven, the cowboy/gunman 
in popular culture was now serving destructive ends. The traditional Western myths 
were a reflection of ideas that had moved off of the national stage. By the end of the 
explosive Sixties, the liberal, nationalist Frontier Myth that Johnson had so closely 
adhered to had become viewed increasingly as a dangerous mindset that no longer 
seemed to fit the nation’s circumstances.  
As anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has contended, a dynamic relationship exists 
between the structures of culture on one hand and historical events on the other. 
Sometimes events are so powerful that they transform a society’s underlying social 
structures, and on other occasions the underlying structures of culture are so powerful 
that they subsume events (causing them to be interpreted within the existing confines of 
a culture). During periods such as the early years of the Johnson presidency, the 
Frontier Myth offered an explanation for everything that occurred in society. But during 
certain watershed periods, as in the late 1960s and the decade to follow, where events 
did not match up with the expectations of the myth, it forced the structure to change 
substantially, or at least forced it to have a different emphasis. Over a period of a dozen 
years, from 1968-1980, changes in the Frontier Myth’s structure encompassed a near 
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complete swing of the pendulum from the left to the right of the American political 
spectrum. 
During the 1970s, the longstanding liberal Frontier Myth initially went into hiatus 
as Republicans increasingly attacked liberalism as the source of America’s problems. In 
the wake of LBJ, the right harangued against the dangers of federal power. Government 
regulation of business had allegedly torn the nation’s fabric of freedom apart, including 
individual rights. Conservatives argued that progressive presidents and their 
administrations had created false issues in order to inflate the powers and status of 
government and of themselves, and that they had botched their mission to spread 
liberty abroad. This was not without considerable irony. As John Morton Blum 
contends: “The rightists were the prisoners of a stroboscopic nostalgia for a time that 
had never been.”689 Arguably, neither the national government nor the chief executives 
themselves were the ones who had created the problems they were attempting to solve. 
But the power of major events to effect changes to the structure and emphases of even 
the most powerful of myths—just as Sahlins had contended—would soon prove clearly 
evident. 
Given that in the post-World War II period, the Frontier Myth and related Cold 
War rhetoric of America’s duties in the world had become deeply woven into Americans’ 
thinking about their nation’s identity and purpose, it would be difficult to blame 
Johnson or most of his speech-writers too much for not seeing where the frontier 
rhetoric was ultimately leading them. Initially, most Americans had bought fully into the 
idea that their nation had a duty to extend its superior civilization throughout the world, 
to “go west” as the pioneers had done. During the first two decades of the Cold War, the 
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Western seemed to embody the psychology of the East-West struggle and had offered 
clear answers to complex questions and a paradigm of dedication to purpose. But in the 
context of Southeast Asia, the counter culture, assassinations, and race riots, the 
American experience was something altogether different than was depicted and believed 
to have been experienced on the frontier. The guidance of the myth no longer provided 
the answers needed to deal with the complex events that confronted and confounded an 
American nation that seemed to be on the verge of a nervous breakdown. With forces 
spiraling out of control by 1968, Johnson came to personify the perceived failures of 
frontier liberalism in the 1960s. 
From the late 1960s through 1980, a shift took place, the hinge from LBJ to Ronald 
Reagan.  Within the parameters of American political culture, the Democratic president 
Johnson and Republican Reagan came down at diametrically opposite poles: one called 
for more government intervention, the other called for much less – both relied heavily 
on the Frontier Myth for success. Turner had argued that the two greatest products of 
the frontier: tolerance, diversity and politically democratic communities on the one hand 
and the construction of the libertarian individual on the other, are in ongoing conflict 
with one another. Johnson’s platform of 1964 chose to emphasize tolerance and a 
national agenda based on equality as opposed to regional policies and values; Reagan in 
1980 then moved the emphasis to the other side of the spectrum and toward the kind 
libertarian individualism and states’ rights that Barry Goldwater had previously 
envisioned but had pursued with much less success. LBJ, like TR, projected frontier 
imagery forward in time to a progressive future while Reagan projected it backwards 
and looked to a nostalgic past. A dichotomy developed here and with it the discourse and 
the myth, or at very least its emphasis, shifted and changed. By the 1980 presidential 
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campaign, national politics and most popular culture versions of the Western—from 
films to novels to TV programs— were well on their way to becoming a narrower, less 
inclusive, conservative voice. President Johnson’s attempts to bring the full liberal 
Frontier Myth to fruition had sputtered, then collapsed; the Western myth receded into 
the background in the 1970s; and by the time Reagan had entered the White House in 
1981, a reactionary, nostalgic way of understanding America had replaced the more 
future oriented, progressive vision. Reagan’s frontier America is a reasserted structure 
that looked backward in time to the past to create a contention that the myth had been 
reinvigorated by returning to what it originally was, or was supposed to have been. The 
emergence of Reagan as a presidential icon can best be understood not simply as a 
resurgence of American conservatism—the usual explanation provided by scholars—but 
as this dissertation has demonstrated, in the context of a restructured and redirected 
version of the Frontier Myth in response to domestic and international events. 
As both candidate and president, Reagan was a kind of nineteenth century man 
who communicated in simple terms through uplifting, patriotic and often fictional 
Western stories, metaphors and references to Hollywood movies, to overturn LBJ’s 
vision of the country. Reagan did so through: the unlikely combination of “rugged” 
individualism and law and order, an emphasis on defense rather that domestic 
spending, taking a hardline against the Soviets, prioritizing libertarianism and property 
rights over Civil Rights and inclusion, and, at least in terms of rhetoric, reducing both 
the size and role of the federal government in America. The failures of the economy and 
belief that America was losing its world leader status abroad—having failed to win in 
Vietnam, permitted the Soviets to run amok in Afghanistan, and allowed Iranian 
students to humiliate the United States—were all said to be the fault of those who did 
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not understand the true lessons of the frontier experience. For Reaganite Republicans 
the biggest culprits behind the debacle were identified as the big-spending liberal 
cowman LBJ (who in their eyes had failed the frontier test) and his weak-kneed, peanut 
farmer accomplice Jimmy Carter. Reaganites saw their own conservative President’s 
connections to the frontier western story as powerful symbolism, the undercurrent of 
which implied that to oppose Reaganism was somehow to be against “Americanism” 
itself. During his Presidency and afterwards, even many who were not in agreement 
with his policies admired Reagan himself and his direct connections with the 
conservative Frontier Myth.  
Today the popular idea that frontier American leaders and politicians are naturally 
Republicans with conservative ideals flows directly from the Reagan era. The watershed 
events of the mid-Sixties through the late Seventies broke up the consensus of a liberal, 
progressive Frontier Myth that no longer appeared to match the historic experience: the 
very same process articulated by Marshall Sahlins. Instead the liberal frontier model 
was replaced with a conservative version and its combination of nostalgia, sense of 
American exceptionalism, exclusion of non-bona fide Americans, and both optimism 
and resentment. In the twenty-first century, however, the power of the conservative 
Frontier Myth lost a significant degree of its power and acceptance during the 
controversial presidency of George W. Bush. 
From Bush’s “amphitheatre” on his horse-less Prairie Chapel ranch to his “dead or 
alive” and “mission accomplished” rhetoric, the President from Crawford (via 
Kennebunkport) came to be viewed by the end of his time in office as the most contrived 
and self-conscious of the Cowboy Presidents. But more significantly for the purposes of 
this study, Bush 43, as with LBJ, is a clear example of a President working to expand the 
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parameters of the Frontier Myth in response to broader international and domestic 
events but ultimately being overtaken by events in the process. In response to 9/11 and 
troubles at home, George W. Bush took Reagan’s frontier structure and added different 
and sometimes contradictory emphases. Bush’s unilateralist approach to the 
international community in Iraq and on the environment, nuclear arms treaties, and 
international justice, saw him go further than any other US president of recent times to 
put what he viewed as national interests ahead of the global community. But when the 
American effort in the Middle East began to sour with no end in sight, the economy 
went into decline, and Hurricane Katrina caused devastation at home as the federal 
government struggled to respond, many Americans were left the impression that the 
President had let go of the reigns of competent government. This combination of events 
in Bush’s second term brought on serious criticism of his Administration, especially on 
the left and middle of the political spectrum. If conservatives generally continued to 
support his forceful, unilateral action abroad, other Americans saw this as a failure of an 
unchecked president whose reckless cowboy approach to governing had taken the myth 
to extremes and undermined the myth’s viability in the process. By the last half of the 
Bush presidency, in particular, more and more Americans put further distance between 
themselves and what had now become accepted as the conservative incarnation of the 
Frontier Myth. For millions, the Bush era version of the frontier experience as it applied 
to government policy came to be seen as out of step with the world in the twenty-first 
century. For some non-conservatives, Bush 43’s approach amounted to a betrayal of the 
earlier frontier mythology of liberal cowboy presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Lyndon 
Baines Johnson. 
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Related to this negative response to Bush from those on the left and many in the 
center, Republicans in recent times have had a kind of schizophrenic response to 
Theodore Roosevelt. The conservative National Review continues to praise TR for his 
“robust interventionism and unstinting defense of American patriotism and self-
government” but remains clearly wary of Roosevelt on other issues. “TR’s 
progressivism,” its editors complain, had a “direct line” to regulation, modern liberalism 
and “big, intrusive government.” Roosevelt’s advocacy of a graduated income tax and 
tendency to equate great wealth with “selfishness” also bothers the Review which 
concludes that what America now needs is not a TR “but a McKinley, someone with the 
sense to stand back…and let the creativity and imagination of Americans do its work.”690 
To be certain, Roosevelt’s presidency framed questions that Americans still ask today. 
How much influence should the Federal government have over the US economy? What 
needs to be done to protect the environment for future generations? And how much of 
its military and economic power should the United States exert globally? And specific 
aspects of TR’s presidential and “Bull Moose” agenda have been raised regularly by the 
current Democrat President Barack Obama. On March 8, 2010, while promoting the 
health care bill that would ultimately signed into law two weeks later, Obama invoked 
his Republican predecessor TR asking Americans to: “Think about it. We’ve been talking 
about healthcare for nearly a century. I’m reading a biography of Teddy Roosevelt right 
now. He was talking about it. Teddy Roosevelt.”691 
 
                                                          
690 Richard Lowry, “TR and His Fan: Roosevelt and McCain, for Good and Ill,” National Review, 
February 7, 2000: 32. 
691 Daniel M. Fox and Howard Markel. “Is History Relevant to Implementing Health Reform?” 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Vol. 303, No. 17 (May 5, 2010): 1749-50. 
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Figure C.4: Though not opposed to “putting on the hat,” as were some other 
non-Frontier Presidents such as JFK, Barack Obama has rarely employed 
frontier imagery during his Presidency. Here Senator Obama obliges 
supporters at a presidential campaign rally in Austin, Texas. (Photographer: 
Benjamin Sklar, February 23, 2007. © Ben Sklar Photography) 
 
On the international front, political scientist David Lake contends that 
conservatives today are much more likely than liberals to believe that American ideals 
and culture are superior to those of other nations in the world: an issue which may have 
direct implications for the nature and future role of the Frontier Myth. A 2011 Pew 
 
 
486 
 
Research Center poll found that 63% of Americans who regarded themselves as 
conservatives believed that American culture is superior to others as compared to just 
34% for liberals. Professor Lake explains that conservatives expect other countries to 
recognize the inherent goodness of the American people and the foreign policies 
produced by the US government, and to accept America’s international leadership 
because of its self-evident virtue. “Indeed,” writes Lake, “many conservatives call for a 
foreign policy that is free of constraints by the United Nations or other multilateral 
institutions precisely because they believe accommodating the desires of other countries 
would limit our ability to act on our goodness.” As a result conservatives are typically 
the most adamant proponents of an assertive unilateralism in which the American 
government should be trusted by other countries. Liberals meanwhile see the United 
States as exceptional because of its system of limited government and checks and 
balances. Because of these safeguards, Lake explains, those on the left tend to be more 
secure in allowing government to play a larger role in Americans’ lives. In this view, the 
US should welcome limits to its freedom of action abroad in the same way that it does 
this with domestic issues at home. Also in keeping with these attitudes, the same Pew 
Research poll found that while 57% of liberals believe that the United States should 
obtain United Nations approval before taking military action, only 38% of conservatives 
see this as an important step.  Lake observes that: “It is striking that the most avid 
proponents of an assertive unilateralism in which other countries are expected to trust 
us—and our government—simply because we are good are the same conservatives who 
so distrust government at home.” Since the late 1970s, the conservative Frontier Myth 
paradigm in politics and popular culture has portrayed government as the problem that 
interfered in Americans efforts for success and justice both at home and abroad. How 
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the US government could be the problem at home and a beacon of flawless policy and 
goodness elsewhere, however, is never explained. For Lake, American exceptionalism—a 
key element of the Frontier Myth—has become “a conservative trope” used to question 
the nationalism and patriotism of liberals. But as he asserts, in the end, the inherent 
contradiction in the conservative myth’s philosophy of exceptionalism is perhaps what is 
most “exceptional” of all.692 
 
The Future of the Frontier Myth in Presidential Politics 
The Frontier Myth is resilient. It has been embraced in popular culture and 
politics for more than a century as a comforting narrative of American society and 
purpose. Most significantly, this study finds that this set of ideas in American mythology 
has held tremendous power at the level of presidential politics. Roosevelt, Johnson, 
Reagan, Bush 43, and to varying degrees presidents with non-Cowboy identities have 
tapped into the frontier of the imagination for more than a century—with its limitless 
possibilities, claims of a unique relationship between Americans and the natural world, 
ideas about the expansion of American values in faraway places, the exceptionalism of 
the American character and its institutions, struggle of civilization versus savagery, and 
promise of a bonanza just over the horizon. Liberal and conservative presidents have 
engaged the tensions inherent within the changing Frontier Myth across a broad 
spectrum: the pull between old and new, between nostalgia and progress; and the 
demands for individualism versus needs of the community and of tolerance and 
inclusiveness.  All of these tropes, whether conservative or liberal in their emphasis, 
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served to strengthen the hopes of presidents and presidential campaigns by situating 
them and their policies in the same company as the nation’s heroic pioneers and its 
great mission. 
Careful and thorough attempts to debunk the Frontier Myth have been with us 
since the days of Charles Beard in the 1920s and Earl Pomeroy in the 1950s but have 
been limited in their influence on the general public and on most American Presidents. 
Perhaps this is in part because, as David H. Murdoch contends, “the ultimate defence of 
all myth is to argue that it is true—if not literally, then in some transcendental sense.”693 
The myth of the frontier experience remains the most powerful set of American ideas to 
emerge since the Civil War that directly engages with the nation’s society and character. 
And the Western genre has undergone dramatic changes in its emphasis and style over 
the last century. But the frontier symbolism and Western story continues to hold a 
special appeal to many Americans who, in our post-postmodern world still want to 
experience it through art, films, novels, TV shows, advertising or in trips to places like 
Tombstone, Arizona or Deadwood, South Dakota. So pervasive are those ideas that the 
frontier themes these forms of media perpetuate have the potential to remain influential 
in American culture and politics a century from now.  
As this study demonstrates, the power of ideas to shape policy as articulated by 
historian Brian Dippie, and the power of events to shape the structure of these ideas as 
contended by anthropologist Marshall Sahlins—is of great relevance to our 
understanding of the role of the Frontier Myth in presidential politics, policy and 
personas since the beginning of the twentieth century.  
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Looking forward, the nature of the Frontier Myth’s message in the realm of 
presidential politics depends on the shape and influence of national and world events 
that will occur in the years and decades to come. Brian Dippie, John Cawelti and 
Marshall Sahlins remind us that myths do not stay static for all time—that even with the 
most powerful myths some features of them endure, others do not, and that major 
events can cause myths to dramatically change their nature and/or trajectory. Just as 
the changing nature of the myth allowed conservative Presidents Reagan and Bush 43 to 
capture the symbolism of the Frontier Myth from liberal Presidents Roosevelt and 
Johnson, another shakeup in the contours and emphasis myth could someday swing 
perceived “ownership” back to those on the left of the political spectrum. In the current 
firestorm of world events involving intense and multinational conflicts in the Middle 
East, the mass movement of refugees, fear of terror attacks at home, economic 
uncertainty, enduring racial tensions on America’s streets, highly publicized domestic 
gun violence, hostility on the part of bona fide Americans toward immigration, and 
polarization in American politics to the point of non-communication—the nature of the 
Frontier Myth could once again be entering a watershed period. The myth has often 
played a significant role in putting the majority of Americans on the same page, as 
during the early Cold War, but at the other extreme has contributed to a division of the 
left from the right and an intensification in the polarization of American politics—as has 
arguably been the case in recent years.  In the end, it is the events that are in large part 
outside of the American Commander-in-Chief’s control which may prove most crucial in 
determining the nature, shape and acceptability of the Frontier Myth in American 
culture and politics along with its role in presidential politics in the decades to come. 
That the myth has endured to this day, more than a century after the first Frontier 
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President left office, is a testament to its ability to adapt and change while holding a 
constant grip on the American imagination. 
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